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ABSTRACT 
‘Beside	the	great	issues	of	progress,	sovereignty	and	economic	justice	that	swirl	around	
the	MNE,	taxation	sounds	like	a	matter	for	petty	minds	that	warm	to	accountancy.	That	
instinct	is	squarely	wrong,	because	it	turns	out	that	arrangements	for	taxing	corporate	
net	incomes	constitute	the	dominant	factor	in	the	division	of	spoils	between	source	and	
host	country’	Caves	(1982).	
	In	recent	years	tax	avoidance	has	come	under	scrutiny	from	the	public,	the	media	and	the	government.	Tax	planning	 is	 the	way	 in	which	companies	efficiently	manage	the	payment	of	taxes	using	a	variety	of	methods	to	reduce	tax	legally.	It	is	a	key	function	of	multinational	 enterprises	 (MNEs),	 yet	 little	 is	 known	 about	 the	 way	 in	 which	 it	 is	implemented.		Internalization	 theory	underpins	 the	 research	 contained	 in	 this	 thesis	which	 argues	that	early	International	Business	(IB)	theory	had	a	more	explicit	focus	on	tax	and	the	opportunities	 that	 it	 confers	 on	 the	 MNE.	 Tax,	 it	 is	 argued,	 gives	 MNEs	 a	 financial	advantage	over	domestic	companies.	The	development	of	IB	theory	more	recently	has	failed	to	build	on	this	early	understanding	and	consequently	tax	has	become	a	neglected	topic	within	the	field	of	IB.		This	study	aims	to	enhance	our	understanding	of	tax	planning	phenomena	and	the	way	in	which	US	MNEs	are	able	to	manage	their	Effective	Tax	Rate	(ETR).	It	is	an	innovative	study,	considering	the	importance	of	tax	planning	to	the	MNE	as	well	as	providing	new	insight	into	the	way	in	which	tax	planning	is	conducted	within	the	MNE.		Mixed	methods	of	qualitative	and	quantitative	research	are	used	 in	this	study	which	helps	 to	 examine	 the	MNE’s	 tax	 planning	 in	 a	 holistic	 and	 systematic	manner.	 This	includes	 in-depth	and	detailed	analysis	 from	the	parent-firm	level	 to	 the	subsidiary-level,	and	interviews	with	subsidiary	managers	and	tax	experts	to	obtain	their	insights	and	 views.	 Specifically,	 a	 series	 of	 interviews	 with	 senior	 tax	 executives	 from	 UK	subsidiaries	of	US	MNEs	and	experts	from	tax	advisory	firms	is	conducted,	focusing	on	the	 experience	 of	 the	 MNE	 subsidiary	 operating	 in	 the	 UK.	 The	 study	 shows	 the	
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importance	 of	 the	 people	 within	 the	 business	 in	 terms	 of	 setting	 the	 tone	 for	 tax	planning	and	strategy	and	the	risk	that	the	organisation	is	prepared	to	take.			A	 quantitative	 study	 examines	 94	 large	 US	 MNEs	 from	 the	 group	 perspective.	 The	analysis	uses	two	different	measures	of	the	ETR	and	a	measure	of	the	cash	held	by	the	company	to	improve	the	understanding	of	the	ways	in	which	tax-planning	strategies	are	 implemented.	The	analysis	unpicks	 the	 impact	of	different	 characteristics	of	 the	companies	to	add	to	our	understanding	of	what	drives	the	heterogeneity	of	approaches	in	place.		A	series	of	six	case	studies	is	used	in	the	final	section	to	reconcile	the	findings	from	the	two	 empirical	 studies	 –	 the	 interviews	 and	 the	 parent-level	 data	 analysis.	 	 Using	published	 accounting	 data	 and	 other	 company	 information	 (e.g.	 management	discussion,	disclosure	notes,	and	organizational	structure	and	business	configuration)	the	 case	 studies	 make	 a	 clear	 contribution	 by	 providing	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	companies	involved	over	a	ten	year	time	horizon.	
Key Findings and Contributions This	study	makes	a	new	key	theoretical	contribution	by	extending	knowledge	about	the	motivations	and	abilities	of	MNEs	to	plan	their	tax	affairs	efficiently.	Early	work	within	IB	considered	transfer	pricing	alone	and	this	subject	has	then	been	neglected	in	recent	years.	This	study	demonstrates	that	transfer	pricing	is	only	one	part	of	the	complex	tax	(and	tax	planning)	interactions	between	governments	and	MNEs.		It	highlights	the	need	to	 distinguish	 between	 the	 value	 appropriation	 (rent	 seeking)	 aspirations	 of	MNEs,	which	 are	 the	 primary	 concern	 of	 governments,	 and	 the	 value	 creation	 (efficiency	based)	 internalization	 activities	 of	 MNEs	 as	 they	 use	 internal	 prices	 to	 overcome	exogenous	 market	 imperfections	 (Rugman,	 1980).	 Furthermore,	 findings	 from	 the	interview	research	 suggest	 the	 importance	of	 aspects,	 such	as	 the	experience	of	 the	individuals’	and	the	company’s	overall	attitude	to	risk	that	the	development	of	theory	must	take	into	account.	This	thesis	reaffirms	the	centrality	of	financial	planning	(an	in	particular	tax	planning)	to	internalization	theory.		
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Early	 theoreticians	 could	 not	 test	 the	 economic	 models	 that	 they	 developed.	 The	quantitative	 research	 in	 this	 thesis	 builds	 an	 economic	model	which	 is	 then	 tested	empirically.	The	importance	of	the	size	of	a	firm,	the	use	of	intellectual	property,	the	use	of	small	 tax	havens	and	 the	proportion	of	women	on	 the	board	are	 found	 to	be	important	factors	in	determining	the	aggressiveness	of	the	tax	stance	adopted	by	US	MNEs.			The	 findings	 from	 this	 research	 have	 important	 implications	 for	 policy	 makers	 by	providing	new	and	useful	insights	into	the	way	in	which	MNEs	plan	their	tax	strategies.	The	 research	 will	 also	 be	 of	 interest	 to	 managers	 within	 the	 firm,	 adding	 to	 their	understanding	of	the	role	of	tax	in	corporate	strategy.	
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Going	concern	 A	company	is	defined	as	being	a	‘going	concern’	if	it	is	able	to	function	for	at	least	12	months	without	the	threat	of	liquidation.	Hybrid	entity	 A	company	that	from	a	tax	perspective	is	‘transparent’	in	one	taxing	jurisdiction,	meaning	that	it	is	deemed	part	of	another	company	(usually	the	parent)	but	from	the	point	of	view	of	another	taxing	jurisdiction	is	a	taxable	entity.	Internal	Revenue	Service		 The	US	government	agency	responsible	for	tax	collection	and	tax	law	enforcement.	Initial	Purchase	Offering	(IPO)	 When	shares	in	a	company	are	sold	for	the	first	time.	The	company	becomes	publicly	listed,	rather	than	being	a	private	company	and	has	to	adhere	to	stricter	rules	in	relation	to	disclosure	as	well	as	to	the	management	of	the	company.	Inversion		/	invert	 MNE	buys	a	subsidiary	of	a	foreign	company	and	then	inverts	the	company.	This	makes	the	newly	purchased	subsidiary	the	new	parent	company,	with	the	former	US	parent	company	becoming	a	subsidiary.	The	new	parent	
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company	is	based	in	the	country	of	the	purchased	subsidiary.	Patent	Box	 A	tax	incentive	enabling	companies	to	apply	a	lower	rate	of	corporation	tax	to	profits	from	its	patented	inventions.	This	tax	scheme	is	available	in	a	number	of	European	countries	(Ireland,	The	United	Kingdom,	France,	Belgium,	Hungary,	Luxembourg,	the	Netherlands,	and	Spain);	however,	it	is	not	available	in	the	US	tax	system.	Permanently	reinvested	earnings	 Overseas	earnings	which	US	Companies	deem	to	be	permanently	reinvested	overseas.	Consequently	no	tax	is	payable	in	the	US	on	these	earnings.	Permanent	establishment	 A	 fixed	place	of	business	 that	generally	gives	 rise	 to	 tax	liability	 in	 a	 particular	 jurisdiction.	 The	 OECD	 sets	 out	what	constitutes	a	PE	for	corporation	tax	purposes.		R&D	Tax	Credits	 Tax	credits	available	to	set	off	against	investment	in	R&D.	Subpart	F	income	 Income	that	is	generated	from	passive	investments	or	from	income	‘split	off	from	the	activities	that	produced	the	
value	in	the	goods	or	services’	Office	of	Tax	Policy	(2005).	Subsidiary	 A	company	that	is	more	than	50	per	cent	owned	by	parent.	Transactional	Net	Margin	Method	 One	of	the	approved	methods	set	out	by	the	OECD	for	calculation	of	transfer	prices.	Transfer	price	 The	price	charged	to	account	for	intra-firm	trade,	intra-firm	loans	or	knowledge	flows	between	affiliates	of	the	MNE.		Transfer	price	manipulation	 The	deliberate	setting	of	the	price	paid	by	one	company	to	another	in	the	group	located	in	another	taxing	
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jurisdiction,	usually	for	the	purpose	of	reducing	the	aggregate	‘tax’	burden	of	the	company	and	its	affiliates.	Valuation	allowance	 A	valuation	allowance	is	an	item	in	the	balance	sheet	that	offsets	all	or	part	of	the	value	of	a	company's	deferred	tax	assets	because	the	company	doesn't	expect	it	will	be	able	to	realize	this	value.	
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1 Introduction Tax	affects	every	business.	For	many	companies	it	is	the	single	largest	bill	that	they	will	pay	 each	 year.	 The	 implications	 for	 corporation	 tax	 liabilities	 are	 considered	when	firms	formulate	and	implement	their	strategy.	Where	investments	are	made,	how	much	is	invested,	how	that	investment	is	funded	and	where	profits	are	recorded	are	decisions	facing	the	multinational	enterprise	(MNE)	that	will	have	significant	implications	for	its	tax	liability.	This	introductory	chapter	argues	that	tax	is	an	important	driver	of	MNE	behaviour.	In	recent	years,	however,	academic	International	Business	(IB)	research	has	not	focused	adequately	on	the	corporate	income	tax	of	MNEs	(Nebus,	2016),	and	the	development	of	relevant	 theory.	This	 thesis	argues	that	understanding	the	approach	adopted	 towards	 tax	 is	 key	 to	 understanding	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	 MNE.	 Thus,	 the	central	overarching	research	question	of	this	thesis	is:	‘what	drives	the	adoption	of	tax	
avoidance	strategies	by	MNEs?’		Tax	avoidance	by	MNEs	has	been	headline	news,	particularly	since	the	global	financial	crisis	of	2008.	The	press,	the	UK’s	House	of	Commons	Select	Committee	enquiries	and	the	US’	Congressional	Committees	have	identified	this	as	a	key	issue	for	governments,	consumers	 and	 business.	 The	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Cooperation	 and	Development	(OECD)	is	undertaking	a	major	programme	under	its	Base	Erosion	and	Profit	Shifting	(BEPS)	work	stream	(OECD	2017).		Work	by	individual	governments,	the	OECD	and	the	European	Union	(EU)	all	consider	the	issue	of	tax	avoidance.	There	is	a	growing	understanding	that	the	current	tax	system	fails	 to	 deal	 adequately	 with	 the	 modern	 business	 environment	 and	 with	 digital	companies	 in	particular.	A	key	 feature	of	 tax	 avoidance	 is	 the	ability	 to	 shift	profits	between	different	tax	jurisdictions,	with	MNEs	choosing	to	book	a	greater	share	of	their	profits	 in	 low	 tax	 countries.	 In	 this	 way	 MNEs	 are	 able	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 tax	differentials	across	countries.		As	MNEs	become	more	proficient	at	shifting	parts	of	their	value	chains	in	order	to	take	advantage	of	location	specific	advantages	(LSAs),	tax	has	become	 a	 more	 prominent	 instrument	 of	 MNE	 strategy.	 Tim	 Cook,	 Chief	 Executive	Officer	(CEO)	of	Apple	has	claimed	that	the	US	tax	system	is	flawed:	‘This	is	a	tax	code	
that	was	made	for	the	industrial	age,	not	the	digital	age’	(Brinded	2016).	
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Public	 scepticism	 towards	 globalisation	 and	 hostility	 towards	 MNEs	 increased	 as	 a	direct	consequence	of	the	global	financial	crisis.	Governments,	stimulated	by	the	need	to	increase	fiscal	revenues	post	financial	crisis,	are	focusing	more	on	the	tax	affairs	of	large	MNEs	which	have	consequently	become	a	political	issue.	Governments	are	also	motivated	by	the	perceived	threats	to	their	economic	sovereignty	from	large	MNEs	with	the	ability	 to	shift	elements	of	 their	global	value	chains,	economic	activity	or	simply	profits,	between	locations.		Whilst	tax	may	not	drive	the	fundamental	strategic	direction	of	an	MNE,	it	is	likely	to	be	considered	as	a	key	factor	in	the	implementation	of	strategic	plans.	Cases	such	as	the	failed	Pfizer	/	Allergan	merger	(Financial	Times	2016)	have	demonstrated	clearly	the	importance	of	corporate	tax	planning	as	a	driver	for	the	actions	of	MNEs.	The	proposed	$160	billion	Pfizer	/	Allergan	merger	was	driven	by	the	proposal	to	‘invert’,	to	shift	the	combined	 company	 headquarters	 out	 of	 the	 US	 and	 into	 Ireland.	 As	 a	 consequence	Pfizer	would	 face	an	Irish	corporate	tax	rate	of	12.5	per	cent,	a	significant	reduction	from	 the	US	 statutory	 rate	of	35	per	 cent.	The	 importance	of	 tax	as	a	driver	 for	 the	merger	was	made	clear	when	changes	to	US	tax	regulations	were	implemented	which	would	have	prevented	Pfizer	from	inverting	following	the	merger.	Without	the	draw	of	inversion	and	the	ability	to	take	advantage	of	the	low	Irish	tax	rates,	the	merger	was	not	sufficiently	attractive	to	go	ahead	and	Pfizer	withdrew.		In	2016	the	European	Commission	concluded	that	Apple’s	tax	agreements	with	the	Irish	tax	authorities	 in	1991	and	2007	artificially	 lowered	Apple’s	 tax	 liability.	Apple	was	ordered	to	pay	the	Irish	government	€13billion	in	additional	tax	and	interest.	Although	Apple	was	not	found	to	have	broken	the	law,	the	agreement	was	in	breach	of	EU	state-aid	rules	that	prevent	member	states	from	offering	preferential	treatment	to	specific	firms	(The	Economist	2016).	The	ruling	reveals	the	size	of	the	savings	that	MNEs	are	able	to	make	by	carefully	selecting	the	tax	jurisdiction	where	profits	are	booked.	The	ability	 to	 make	 savings	 on	 this	 scale	 indicates	 the	 importance	 of	 considering	 tax-planning	mechanisms	as	a	driver	for	MNE	behaviour	and	strategy.		MNEs	are	able	to	plan	their	tax	affairs	using	a	multitude	of	strategies	to	reduce	their	tax	bill,	 largely	 through	 shifting	 their	 profits	 between	 jurisdictions.	 Tax	 competition	
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between	 countries	 has	 intensified	 in	 recent	 years	 as	 countries	 compete	 to	 attract	inward	FDI	(Devereaux,	Lockwood	and	Redoano	2008;	Altshuler	and	Grubert	2006).	The	resulting	low	corporate	tax	rates,	combined	with	the	continued	availability	of	tax	havens	have	increased	the	opportunities	for	MNEs’	profit	shifting.			The	tax	liability	of	an	MNE	relates	to	the	location	where	profits	are	recorded.	The	MNE	therefore	has	an	incentive	to	shift	profits	to	subsidiaries	in	low	tax	locations.	MNEs	can	take	measures	to	 increase	their	profits	 in	 lower	tax	 jurisdictions	and	decrease	them	where	 taxes	 are	 higher.	 This	 can	 be	 done	 through	 overcharging	 (undercharging)	subsidiaries	in	high	(low)	tax	locations	for	intermediate	goods	or	the	use	of	intellectual	property,	consequently	reducing	(increasing)	profits,	and	therefore	the	tax	payable	in	high	tax	regimes	(Samuelson	1982;	Rugman	and	Eden	1985;	Zucman	2014).	
1.1 Example: Profit Shifting In	the	example	below,	a	company	with	two	subsidiaries	is	able	to	reduce	its	overall	tax	bill	 by	 increasing	 the	profits	 recorded	 by	 Subsidiary	B	 in	 a	 low	 tax	 jurisdiction	 and	reducing	 them	 in	 Subsidiary	A	 in	 a	 high	 tax	 jurisdiction.	 Subsidiary	A	must	make	 a	payment	 to	 Subsidiary	B	which	 is	 a	 cost	 to	 Subsidiary	A	 and	 is	 revenue	 for	 B.	 This	payment	could	be	a	royalty	payment	to	B	for	the	use	of	intellectual	property	(IP)	by	A.	Alternatively,	it	could	be	an	interest	payment	to	B	on	a	loan	it	has	made	to	A.	It	could	also	reflect	the	choice	of	a	higher	cost	(transfer	price)	for	the	sale	of	goods	or	knowledge	from	B	to	A.			At	first	the	company’s	overall	tax	bill	is	150,	made	up	of	100	paid	by	A	and	50	by	B.	Profits	are	then	shifted	by	increasing	A’s	costs	by	200	which	it	must	pay	to	B,	increasing	B’s	revenue.	Overall	profits	remain	the	same	at	800	but	the	tax	payable	is	reduced	from	150	to	125.				
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 Figure 1 Profit Shifting Example 
Subsidiary	A	 Subsidiary	B	(High	tax	jurisdiction)	 (Low	tax	jurisdiction)	
Revenue	 1000	 Revenue	 1000	
Costs	 600	 Costs	 600	
Profits	 400	 Profits	 400	
Tax	(25%)	 100	 Tax	(12.5%)	 50	
Overall	profits:		 800	
Overall	tax	bill:		 150		 Subsidiary	A	 Subsidiary	B	(High	tax	jurisdiction)	 (Low	tax	jurisdiction)	
Revenue	 1000	 Revenue	 1200	
Costs	 800	 Costs	 600	
Profits	 200	 Profits	 600	
Tax	(25%)	 50	 Tax	(12.5%)	 75	
Overall	profits:	 800	
Overall	tax	bill:		 125		Eden	(2009)	suggests	 that	 tax	and	transfer	pricing	(TP)	are	at	 the	core	of	an	MNE’s	successful	financial	strategy.	MNEs	can	gain	an	advantage	over	domestic	firms	through	the	use	of	tax	arbitrage.	In	general,	MNEs	plan	their	tax	affairs	to	ensure	that	they	are	paying	only	what	they	need	to.	The	approach	taken	and	the	degree	of	aggression	with	which	 tax	 planning	 is	 executed	 differs	 between	 MNEs.	Many	 MNEs	 create	 complex	structures	to	avoid	tax	(UNCTAD	2016).			Global	value	chains	are	becoming	increasingly	complex,	providing	more	opportunities	for	profit	shifting.	Similarly,	corporate	structures	are	becoming	more	complex,	often	driven	specifically	by	tax	planning.	The	World	Investment	Report	by	the	United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development	(UNCTAD)	(2016)	report	that	over	40	per	cent	of	 foreign	 affiliates	worldwide	 have	multiple	 ‘passports’.	 These	 affiliates	 have	 cross	border	links	with,	on	average,	three	different	jurisdictions.	UNCTAD	also	highlight	that	larger	MNEs	have	more	 complex	ownership	 structures	with	a	 surge	 in	 cross	border	
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mergers	and	acquisitions	(M&As)	($721	billion	in	2015;	$432	billion	in	2014)	driven	by	corporate	reconfigurations	including	tax	inversions.	Deal	making	in	certain	industries	such	 as	 pharmaceuticals	 also	 grew	 with	 tax	 considerations	 thought	 to	 be	 a	 key	motivator1.			The	 scale	of	 tax	motivated	profit	 shifting	appears	 to	be	growing.	Between	2003	and	2008	income	booked	through	holding	companies	accounted	for	an	average	of	4	per	cent	of	 income	 for	US	Foreign	Direct	 Investment	 (FDI).	By	2015	 this	had	 increased	 to	an	average	 of	 52	 per	 cent	 (UNCTAD	 2016).	 UNCTAD	 concludes	 that	 due	 to	 their	predominance	 in	 jurisdictions	 with	 low	 tax	 rates,	 the	 use	 of	 these	 companies	 and	structures	is	largely	tax	motivated.	There	is,	however,	some	evidence	that	the	use	of	tax	havens	 and	 offshore	 financial	 centres	 (OFC)	 may	 be	 starting	 to	 fall.	 Changes	 to	government	 policies	 in	 Luxembourg	 and	 the	 Netherlands 2 	appear	 to	 have	 led	 to	 a	reduction	 in	 the	volume	of	 financial	 flows	 through	 these	 countries	 (UNCTAD	2016).	Similarly	investment	in	Caribbean	Offshore	Financial	Centres	(OFCs)	slowed	in	2015	(UNCTAD	2016).	The	proportion	of	 investment	coming	 from	the	US	and	the	EU	 into	these	 centres	 fell,	whilst	 investment	 from	Hong	Kong,	China,	Brazil	 and	 the	Russian	Federation	increased	(UNCTAD,	2016).		Against	this	background,	tax	planning	is	also	rising	up	the	academic	agenda.	Zucman	(2014)	calculates	that	subsidiaries	with	little	or	no	economic	activity	in	seven	low	or	no	tax	countries3	account	for	18	per	cent	of	total	US	corporate	profits.	He	estimates	that	profit	 shifting	 enables	 US	 companies	 to	 reduce	 their	 total	 tax	 liabilities	 by	 about	$13billion	a	year.	The	increasing	scale	of	the	current	problem	is	driving	academics	to	consider	 the	 use	 of	 tax	 havens	 and	 profit	 shifting,	 with	work	 addressing	 this	 issue	published	recently,	after	a	period	of	neglect	(Muller	and	Kolk	2015;	Brajcich,	Friesner,	and	Schibik	2016;	Jones	and	Temouri	2016).	The	following	chapter:	Literature	Reviews	
																																																								
1 UNCTAD (2016) quotes the acquisitions of Allergan (United States) by Actavis (Ireland) for $68 billion, of 
Sigma (United States) by Merck AG (Germany) for $17 billion, and of the Oncology Business of GlaxoSmithKline 
PLC (United Kingdom) by Novartis (Switzerland) for $16 billion as examples of tax driven deals.  
2 The Government in Luxembourg changed their TP and ‘substance’ rules whilst in the Netherlands new 
substance rules for group financing and licensing companies were brought in (UNCTAD 2016 p.20).  
3 The Netherlands, Bermuda, Luxembourg, Ireland, Singapore, Cayman Islands and Switzerland. 
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discusses	 the	 position	 of	 corporation	 tax	 and	 tax	 avoidance	 within	 the	 academic	literature	in	detail.		The	 international	 tax	 regime	 is	 governed	 by	 a	 complex	 system	 of	 tax	 treaties.	Inconsistencies	 have	 developed	 in	 the	 way	 that	 treaties	 govern	 various	 aspects	 of	corporation	 tax.	 MNEs	 exploit	 these	 differences	 and	 choose	 the	 locations	 of	 their	subsidiaries	 carefully	 (treaty	 shopping)	 to	generate	opportunities	 to	minimise	 taxes		(see	Google	Case	Study	in	Chapter	6).	The	ability	of	MNEs	to	select	the	locations	where	their	subsidiaries	are	based	has	been	enhanced	by	changes	emerging	from	the	growth	of	the	digital	economy.	Whilst	many	companies	continue	to	base	their	location	decision	on	 LSAs	 and	 their	 ability	 to	 generate	 economic	 value,	 many	 are	 also	 free	 to	 base	subsidiaries	in	low	or	no	tax	jurisdictions	and	shift	profits	between	them	in	a	manner	that	does	not	reflect	the	flows	of	economic	value	within	the	company.		Defining	 the	 abstract	 concepts	 of	 tax	 planning	 and	 avoidance	 is	 difficult.	 The	 next	section	sets	out	the	scope	of	this	thesis	and	the	definitions	used	in	this	research.	The	following	sections	then	set	out	the	features	of	the	international	tax	regime	and	the	US	system	in	particular,	that	contribute	to	the	ability	of	MNEs	to	take	measures	to	reduce	their	tax	bills.	The	research	methods	employed	in	this	thesis	are	discussed	in	Chapter	3.	Although	every	effort	has	been	made	to	make	the	tax	related	language	clear	to	the	non-specialist	 IB	reader,	because	of	 the	highly	specialist	nature	of	 tax	a	glossary	has	been	included	at	the	start	of	the	thesis.	
1.2 Definitions of tax avoidance and tax planning  Tax	avoidance	 is	often	defined	as	 the	 ‘legal’	measures	taken	by	companies	to	reduce	their	 tax	 bill,	 with	 evasion	 considered	 as	 more	 extreme	 ‘illegal’	 measures.	 This	simplistic	duality	does	 little	 to	explicate	the	reality	of	 the	options	 facing	the	modern	MNE.	 	 The	 MNE	 will	 adopt	 a	 strategic	 posture	 in	 relation	 to	 its	 tax	 planning	 that	positions	 it	 on	 a	 continuum	of	 possible	measures.	 Some	 tax	 planning	measures	 are	relatively	straightforward;	such	as	the	application	of	Research	and	Development	(R&D)	tax	 credits,	patent	box/innovation	box,	or	depreciation	allowances.	Other	measures,	such	 as	 corporate	 management	 fees	 charged	 by	 the	 headquarters	 to	 foreign	subsidiaries	 may	 be	 acceptable	 to	 tax	 authorities	 in	 some	 jurisdictions,	 but	
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unacceptable	in	others.	The	scale	and	scope	of	possibilities	facing	the	MNE	are	vast.	The	MNE	will	adopt	an	overall	position	that	reflects	its	understanding	of	the	legality	of	the	stance	and	the	risk	that	it	is	prepared	to	take	that	a	tax	authority	may	challenge	them	at	a	later	date,	potentially	resulting	in	back	payments,	fines	or	legal	cases	(Wall	Street	Journal	2006;	Financial	Times	2016).		Hanlon	and	Heitzman	(2010,	p.	137)	define	tax	avoidance	as	activity	that	results	in:		‘the	
reduction	 of	 explicit	 taxes’.	 This	 definition	 is	 broad,	 encapsulating	 any	 activity	 that	reduces	the	tax	bill.	Some	activities	may	be	undertaken	for	operational	reasons	but	may	still	have	the	effect	of	reducing	the	tax	bill.	For	example,	a	company	may	invest	in	R&D	for	 reasons	of	 creating	 competitive	advantage;	however,	under	 this	definition,	 if	 the	R&D	attracted	government	tax	credits	it	would	be	labelled	as	a	tax	avoidance	activity.			The	term	‘tax	planning’	has	become	used	fairly	recently	and	incorporates	the	activities	undertaken	 by	 a	 firm	 implementing	 a	 strategic	 approach	 to	 the	 tax	 bill.	 Measures	included	 within	 tax	 planning	 could	 be	 straightforward	 tax	 avoidance	 or	 reduction	schemes,	 or	 could	 relate	 to	 the	 timing	 of	 payments.	 Corporation	 tax	 planning	 will	include	 measures	 that	 focus	 on	 the	 tax	 payable	 on	 annual	 income	 but	 will	 also	concentrate	on	the	tax	implications	of	other	corporate	activities,	such	as	the	structure	of	the	business,	particularly	around	M&A	activity.			Publicly	listed	companies	in	most	countries	have	to	report	their	annual	earnings	and	expenditures	in	Annual	Reports	that	are	audited	by	an	external,	independent	auditor.		These	reports	must	conform	to	the	local	or	international	accounting	standards,	referred	to	as	Generally	Accepted	Accounting	Practices	(GAAP)	in	the	US,	whereas	companies	in	Europe	and	Asia	Pacific	follow	the	International	Financial	Reporting	Standards	(IFRS).		The	Effective	Tax	Rate	(ETR)	is	a	key	measure	used	in	tax	research	to	compare	the	tax	paid	by	 companies	over	a	period	of	 time	or	 in	a	 specific	 location.	 It	 is	 calculated	by	taking	a	measure	of	 the	tax	paid	as	 the	numerator	over	a	measure	of	 income	as	 the	denominator.	A	full	discussion	of	this	measure	is	included	in	section	5.4.	
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1.3 The International Tax System The	international	tax	system	is	based	on	a	series	of	bilateral	and	multilateral	treaties.	The	purpose	of	these	treaties	is	to	ensure	that	businesses	are	not	hampered	by	‘double	taxation’,	where	profits	are	taxed	in	both	home	and	host	countries.		In	1922	The	League	of	Nations	established	a	panel	of	 four	economists	 to	consider	the	 issue	and	devise	a	system	for	the	avoidance	of	double	taxation.	They	defined	three	principles	(League	of	Nations	1923)	which	have	been	at	the	foundation	of	international	taxation	ever	since:	
• Corporate	tax	is	to	be	paid	in	the	source	country;	
• Arm’s	length	pricing;	and	
• International	 issues	should	be	addressed	by	bilateral	rather	than	multilateral	tax	treaties.	Whilst	many	of	the	problems	that	would	emerge	with	the	establishment	of	this	system	could	 be	 immediately	 foreseen	 (Coates	 1925),	 it	 was	 quickly	 implemented	 and	 has	subsequently	been	the	basis	for	the	international	tax	system.			Developed	country	MNEs	are	expected	to	price	goods	and	services	when	transferred	internally	 using	 the	 ‘Arm’s	 Length	 Standard’	 (ALS)	 as	 set	 out	 in	 the	OECD	Transfer	Pricing	Guidelines	(OECD	2010).	The	MNE	must	price	goods	and	services	in	a	manner	comparable	to	that	which	they	would	use	to	price	goods	to	an	independent	third	party.	In	reality,	however,	there	are	two	key	problems	with	the	ALS:	1)	MNEs	can	intentionally	misprice	goods	and	services	to	shift	profits;	2)	in	many	circumstances	it	is	very	difficult	to	determine	a	comparable	price	as	there	may	be	no	similar	transaction	in	the	external	market	particularly	when	the	transaction	involves	royalty	payments	or	IP	(Eden	2016).	
 MNEs	must	provide	significant,	costly	documentation	to	tax	authorities	in	the	relevant	countries	 to	 justify	 the	use	of	 the	TP	that	 they	have	selected.	This	must	be	based	on	research	 into	 the	 external	market.	 There	 are	many	 occasions,	 however,	 particularly	around	the	use	of	IP,	where	no	external	price	exists	(Eden,	2009;	2016).	It	is	then	very	difficult	 for	 the	 tax	 authorities	 to	 determine	whether	 the	 TP	 in	 use	 is	 a	 ‘fair’	 price	equivalent	to	that	which	would	be	charged	to	a	third	party.		
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Corporate	tax	is	calculated	based	on	the	profits	earned	by	individual	subsidiaries	within	a	MNE.	Establishing	the	profits	of	an	individual	subsidiary	is	now	considered	by	many	to	be	unfeasible,	particularly	because	of	the	role	of	proprietary	IP	and	as	digital	delivery	is	the	norm	for	many	MNEs.	This	has	led	to	campaign	groups	calling	for	the	adoption	of	‘Country	 by	 Country	 Reporting’	 (CBCR)	 where	 MNEs	 would	 be	 required	 to	 submit	information	pertaining	to	their	profits	and	tax	payments	on	an	individual	country	basis.	Whilst	it	seems	likely	that	this	will	be	adopted	by	OECD	countries	in	some	form	in	the	near	future,	it	is	unlikely	that	this	information	will	be	publicly	disclosed,	instead	it	will	be	reported	confidentially	to	countries’	tax	authorities	(OECD	2015;	Murphy	2016).		Conflicts	are	inevitable.	Headquarters	(HQs)	of	MNEs	incur	overheads	and	costs	that	must	be	allocated	between	subsidiaries	in	different	tax	jurisdictions.	How	this	should	be	done	and	what	 is	a	 ‘fair’	recharge	to	different	subsidiaries	has	 led	to	many	of	 the	large	disputes	with	tax	authorities	(Wall	Street	Journal	2006).	Differences	in	national	tax	systems	allow	for	the	possibility	of	tax	arbitrage,	in	essence,	the	shifting	of	profits	between	 different	 jurisdictions	with	 different	 tax	 rates	 and	 systems.	 The	 growth	 of	global	value	chains	has	exacerbated	this	issue.	Different	economic	activities	undertaken	by	different	parts	of	the	MNE	mean	that	knowledge	and	intermediate	goods	are	shifted	between	tax	jurisdictions	and	these	transfers	must	be	accounted	for	using	a	system	of	transfer	prices	(Dicken	2011).	
1.4 The US Tax System This	 thesis,	 like	much	extant	 research	on	 the	 topic	of	 corporation	 tax	 focuses	on	US	companies.	 This	 is	 partly	 because	 of	 the	 dominant	 position	 of	US	 companies	 in	 the	global	economy	but	interest	also	emerges	from	the	consequences	of	the	US	tax	system	itself.	 This	 section	 gives	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 US	 tax	 system	 and	 the	 elements	 that	facilitate	 tax	 planning	 by	 US	 MNEs.	 Particular	 routes	 for	 tax	 avoidance	 are	 also	highlighted	in	detail	in	the	case	studies4	presented	in	Chapter	6.			MNEs	based	in	the	US	are	taxed	on	their	worldwide	income.	This	means	that	global	US	earnings	must	be	declared	in	the	US	for	tax	purposes.		There	are	two	ways,	however,	in																																																									
4 See for example the Google Case Study in section 6.4 for an explanation of the Irish Double Dutch Sandwich 
and the Ford Case Study in section 6.2 for the use of deferred tax and valuation allowances. 
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which	a	US	company	can	reduce	 its	 tax	bill,	at	 least	 temporarily:	cross	crediting	and	deferral.	To	avoid	double	taxation	US	companies	can	obtain	a	credit	for	the	tax	that	they	have	paid	abroad,	up	to	the	US	rate	of	tax.	When	companies	have	paid	more	tax	overseas	than	they	would	have	been	liable	to	in	the	US	they	are	in	a	‘credit’	position.		Tax	paid	in	a	higher	rate	country	can	be	offset	against	the	lower	tax	paid	in	others	(cross	crediting).	Companies	therefore	have	an	incentive	to	invest	in	low	tax	countries	to	offset	against	taxes	paid	in	countries	with	higher	taxes	than	the	US.	If	the	US	tax	rate	of	35	per	cent	is	higher	than	a	given	firm’s	average	foreign	tax	rate	for	example,	20	per	cent	in	the	UK	in	2016,	the	MNE	will	pay	US	tax	on	any	repatriated	foreign	earnings	at	a	rate	equal	to	the	difference	between	the	US	tax	rate	and	the	foreign	tax	rate,	here	15	per	cent.			As	the	rates	in	other	countries	have	fallen	over	recent	years	whilst	rates	in	the	US	have	remained	static,	 the	 incentive	 for	US	MNEs	to	cross	credit	has	theoretically	 fallen.	 In	1981,	 the	US	 tax	rate	was	49.7	per	 cent	against	52	per	 cent	 in	 the	UK	and	an	OECD	average	of	47.5	per	cent.	By	2013,	the	average	US	rate	had	fallen	to	39.1	per	cent	but	the	UK	had	fallen	to	23	per	cent	(and	reduced	down	to	20	per	cent	by	2015)	and	the	OECD	average	was	25.5	per	cent	(Tax	Foundation	2013).	Cross	crediting	was	limited	by	the	1986	Tax	Reform	Act	so	that	income	can	be	averaged	only	with	other	similar	types	of	income,	that	is,	taxes	paid	on	active	and	passive	income5	cannot	be	cross	credited.	
 Whilst	tax	is	payable	annually	on	earnings	generated	in	the	US,	worldwide	income	is	only	liable	for	tax	in	the	US	when	it	is	repatriated,	that	is,	when	the	subsidiary	company	pays	a	dividend	to	the	parent	in	the	US.	If	a	MNE	invests	in	a	low	tax	country	and	defers	repatriation	 it	 can	 continue	 to	 reinvest	 the	profits	 earned	without	 incurring	any	US	liability	(Clausing	2009;	Graham,	Hanlon	and	Shevlin	2010;	Kleinbard	2011).	If	the	US	MNE	chooses	not	to	repatriate	earnings	in	order	to	defer	tax	payments	it	can	deem	them	to	be	 ‘permanently	reinvested	earnings’	 (PRE).	As	the	MNE	is	essentially	saying	that	these	earnings	will	never	be	returned	to	the	US	the	audited	annual	report	does	not	need	to	include	any	accrual	for	tax	to	be	paid	in	the	US	despite	including	the	foreign	earnings	in	the	reported	pre	tax	income.	If	this	income	has	been	earned	in	a	lower	tax	country	the	MNE	will	have	a	lower	GAAP	ETR	and	higher	after	tax	GAAP	earnings	than	if	the	income	had	been	earned	in	the	US	or	not	deemed	as	PRE.		
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An	 exception	 is	 made	 for	 Subpart	 F 5 	income,	 that	 is,	 passive	 income	 generated	 by	investments	and	from	business	service	industries	abroad.	It	is	treated	as	if	repatriated	immediately	and	therefore	subject	 to	US	taxes.	The	aim	is	 to	reduce	the	 incentive	to	shift	these	highly	mobile	forms	of	income	to	low	tax	countries.	However,	cross	crediting	is	 still	 possible	within	 Subpart	 F	 income	 so	 there	may	 still	 be	 an	 incentive	 to	 shift	income	 if	 the	MNE	 is	 in	a	 ‘credit’	position.	Clearly	 the	advantages	 from	deferral	 and	cross	crediting	are	mutually	exclusive	(Hines	and	Rice	1994).	One	can	be	used	when	income	is	repatriated	and	the	other	applies	when	it	is	not	repatriated.		Subpart	F	rules	also	distinguish	between	payments	made	to	related	parties	from	those	made	to	external	third	parties.	Transfers	to	related	parties	are	included,	as	it	is	believed	that	 they	 are	 more	 easily	 manipulated	 than	 payments	 to	 external	 parties.	 Hybrid	entities	 (see	Glossary)	however,	 are	often	used	by	US	MNEs	 so	 that	 these	payments	become	invisible	to	the	IRS	(Altshuler	and	Grubert	2006).	
 An	alternative	 to	 the	worldwide	 tax	 system	used	 in	 the	US	 is	 the	 territorial	 system,	where	foreign	source	income	is	(either	wholly	or	partially)	exempt	from	taxation	in	the	home	 country.	 The	 UK	 has	moved	 away	 from	 a	 system	 of	worldwide	 taxation	 to	 a	system	where	foreign	source	income	is	largely	exempt	from	corporation	tax.		Germany	exempts	95	per	cent	of	foreign	source	income	of	German	MNEs	from	taxation	(Graham,	Hanlon	and	Shevlin	2010).		A	specific	feature	of	the	US	tax	system	for	international	companies	is	the	‘check	the	box’	regulations,	 introduced	by	 the	 Internal	Revenue	Service	 (IRS)	 in	1997	 (Grubert	 and	Mutti	2007;	Mutti	and	Grubert	2009).	This	simplified	the	use	of	hybrid	entities	by	US	companies.	Hybrid	entities	are	treated	by	one	country	as	a	fully	incorporated	subsidiary																																																									
5 Joint Committee on Taxation 2003 definition of Subpart F (passive) income: 
‘Subpart F income consists of foreign based company income, insurance income, and certain income relating 
to international boycotts and other violations of public policy. Foreign based company income consists of 
foreign personal holding company income, which includes passive income (e.g. dividends, interest, rents and 
royalties) as well as a number of categories of non passive income, including foreign base company shipping 
income and foreign base company oil related income.’ 
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but	by	another	 country	as	simply	a	 transparent	branch	of	 another	 company.	Hybrid	companies	therefore	allow	US	MNEs	to	avoid	the	taxation	of	payments	that	flow	from	one	 subsidiary	 to	 another	 that	 would	 otherwise	 be	 taxable.	 In	 essence,	 hybrid	structures	enable	US	MNEs	to	avoid	having	income	that	falls	in	the	category	that	makes	tax	immediately	payable.			Opportunities	 exist	 for	MNEs	 from	 the	US	 and	 other	 countries	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	differences	between	the	tax	systems	of	different	countries.	Whilst	a	low	statutory	rate	of	 tax	 can	 make	 a	 country	 attractive	 to	 MNEs	 seeking	 to	 reduce	 their	 overall	 tax	expenses	the	regulations	in	place	and	the	stringency	with	which	these	are	enforced	can	also	be	attractive	to	the	MNE.	This	thesis	explores	some	of	the	different	mechanisms	that	are	used	by	MNEs	to	reduce	their	tax	bills	but	the	key	issue	under	consideration	is	the	differences	between	companies	–	why	some	take	a	more	aggressive	approach	to	planning	their	corporate	tax	affairs	than	others.			An	overview	of	the	potential	mechanisms	that	can	be	used	to	shift	profits	is	included	in	the	empirical	literature	review	in	section	2.2.4.	The	case	studies	in	Chapter	6	provide	in	depth	analysis	of	number	of	mechanisms	used	by	specific	companies	to	avoid	tax.	
1.5 Overview of Research Mixed	 methods	 of	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 research	 are	 used	 in	 this	 study	 to	examine	the	heterogeneity	of	approaches	to	corporate	tax	planning	by	US	MNEs	in	a	holistic	and	systematic	manner.		The	area	under	investigation	dictates	the	choice	of	method.	A	qualitative	approach	is	taken	for	planning,	conducting	and	interpreting	the	results	from	a	series	of	interviews	with	senior	tax	executives	presented	in	Chapter	4.	The	work	explores	tax	planning	from	the	perspective	of	 the	 individual	and	explores	the	role	of	 the	 interviewees	and	their	experience	of	tax	avoidance.		In	Chapter	5,	statistical	regression	techniques	are	employed	to	examine	a	database	of	94	US	MNEs.	The	quantitative	approach	allows	for	a	clear	investigation	of	the	different	
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company	characteristics	and	the	impact	that	these	have	on	the	propensity	of	the	MNE	to	plan	their	tax	affairs.			The	 final	 piece	 of	 research	 uses	 a	 combination	 of	 qualitative	 and	 interpretive	techniques	to	provide	detailed	analyses	of	the	tax	planning	approaches	employed	by	six	large	US	companies.	The	case	studies	presented	in	Chapter	6	largely	rely	on	the	analysis	of	data	taken	from	audited	annual	reports	to	provide	a	clear	overview	of	the	means	by	which	 the	 companies	 plan	 their	 tax	 affairs	 and	 the	 impact	 that	 this	 has	 on	 their	disclosed	financial	performance.	Chapter	3,	Research	Methods,	discusses	the	selection	of	 the	 appropriate	 methods	 involved	 in	 the	 research	 in	 this	 this	 and	 includes	 a	discussion	of	the	theoretical	purpose	of	the	type	of	research	and	how	it	contributes.	
1.6 Contribution of this Research This	 study	 contributes	 to	 IB	 theory	 by	 revisiting	 early	work	 and	 demonstrating	 the	importance	that	was	initially	attached	to	TP	as	a	driver	of	MNE	activity.	It	argues	that	new	 theoretical	 development	 (or	 the	 extension	 of	 existing	 theories)	with	 a	 broader	focus	on	international	taxation	and	the	tax	planning	of	MNEs	is	needed	within	the	field	of	 IB,	 to	counter	the	more	recent	neglect	of	 the	 impact	of	corporation	tax	and	TP	on	MNE	activity	and	performance.	The	demonstration	of	the	original	importance	attached	to	 tax	 within	 internalization	 theory	 and	 its	 subsequent	 neglect	 is	 one	 of	 the	 key	theoretical	contributions	of	this	thesis.			This	thesis	presents	both	qualitative	and	quantitative	work,	which	together	contribute	to	 the	 understanding	 of	 what	 drives	 MNEs	 to	 avoid	 corporation	 tax.	 The	 series	 of	interviews	presented	in	Chapter	4	provides	an	important	new	data	source.	The	findings	from	these	interviews	make	a	significant	contribution	to	enhance	our	understanding	of	the	decision	making	processes	within	the	 firm,	and	the	concerns	and	motivations	of	those	who	are	making	key	decisions	(Rugman	and	Verbeke,	2008).	A	theoretical	model	of	the	drivers	of	tax	avoidance	is	developed	in	this	chapter	as	a	mechanism	to	frame	the	findings	from	the	interview.	This	is	an	important	new	theoretical	contribution.		The	quantitative	analysis	reported	in	Chapter	5	provides	significant	new	findings.	The	analysis	considers	the	characteristics	of	companies	and	their	Effective	Tax	Rates	(ETR).	
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It	finds	important	roles	for	the	size	of	the	company,	the	role	of	women	on	the	board	and	the	use	of	tax	havens.		The	 case	 studies	presented	 in	 Chapter	 6	make	 a	 new	 contribution	 both	 to	 research	methodology	 and	 to	 empirical	 findings.	 The	 case	 studies	 provide	 a	 rich	 source	 of	information	 that	 illuminates	 the	 activities	 of	 MNEs	 and	 demonstrate	 the	 key	mechanisms	used	by	MNEs	to	reduce	taxes	that	make	a	new	empirical	contribution.	It	also	 highlights	 some	 important	methodological	 issues,	 such	 as	 the	 content	 analysis	method	 of	 company	 documents	 and	 publicly	 available	 documents	 as	 well	 as	 the	conventional	methods	of	 interviews	for	qualitative	research	and	regression	tests	 for	quantitative	research		It	 is	 clear	 that	 corporation	 tax	 drives	 the	 behaviour	 and	 tax	 planning	 of	MNEs	 in	 a	number	of	areas	and	that	a	theoretical	and	empirical	understanding	of	this	behaviour	is	 necessary	 if	 IB	 scholars	 are	 to	 engender	 a	 comprehensive	 understanding	 of	 the	activities	of	MNEs.	A	full	discussion	of	the	contribution	of	this	thesis	is	made	in	section	7.1.	This	research	clearly	demonstrates	the	importance	of	this	subject	to	the	field	of	IB:		it	 is	 therefore	 vital	 that	 work	 in	 IB	 generates	 a	 clear	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	understanding	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 corporation	 tax	 drives	 MNE	 investment	 and	behaviour.	
1.7 Structure of this Research This	thesis	contains	seven	chapters.	 	Chapter	2	provides	an	overview	and	analysis	of	the	existing	research	literature	on	this	subject.	It	commences	with	a	discussion	of	the	theoretical	 literature.	 It	 considers	 the	 evolution	 of	 IB	 theory	 and	 the	 integration	 of	corporate	 taxation	 from	 a	 theoretical	 perspective.	 It	 argues	 that	 early	 theoreticians	considered	taxation	and	TP	as	a	key	part	of	the	potential	advantages	for	the	existence	of	the	MNE.	Over	time	this	advantage	has	been	ignored	as	work	has	focused	on	other,	more	knowledge	related	advantages	of	the	MNE.			The	review	then	turns	to	the	empirical	literature.	Research	work	has	been	conducted	across	a	number	of	academic	disciplines	and	this	chapter	reports	on	the	key	findings	from	the	fields	of	IB,	accountancy	and	economics.	It	presents	research	findings	that	take	
	 36	
an	aggregate	or	macro	approach	to	the	issue,	concluding	that	tax	avoidance	appears	to	have	grown	over	recent	years.	Research	into	specific	tax	avoidance	mechanisms	is	also	presented:	looking	at	the	different	approaches	used	by	MNEs	and	the	impact	of	these	mechanisms	on	their	overall	ETRs.	This	research	adds	to	our	understanding	of	the	key	company	characteristics	that	affect	a	MNE’s	motivation	and	ability	to	shift	profits	and	reduce	their	taxes	paid.	This	systematic	literature	leads	to	the	development	of	specific	hypotheses	that	are	then	tested	in	Chapter	5.		Chapter	3	presents	the	research	methods	used:	the	reasons	for	their	adoption	and	the	details	of	their	employment.			Chapter	4	presents	the	findings	from	the	first	of	the	primary	research	studies	conducted	for	 this	 thesis.	 It	 reports	on	 the	 conclusions	drawn	 from	a	 series	of	 interviews	with	senior	 tax	 executives.	 The	 chapter	 makes	 a	 new	 key	 theoretical	 contribution	 by	extending	 knowledge	 about	 the	motivations	 and	 abilities	 of	MNEs	 to	 plan	 their	 tax	affairs	efficiently.	This	research	adds	significantly	to	knowledge	about	the	experience	of	the	individuals’	and	the	importance	of	the	company’s	overall	attitude	to	risk	that	the	development	of	 theory	must	 take	 into	account.	These	new	 findings	make	 important	extension	to	internalization	theory	as	well	as	providing	new	empirical	data.		Chapter	5	presents	findings	from	the	statistical	analysis	of	a	database	of	94	US	MNE.	Certain	aspects	of	the	MNEs	under	consideration	such	as	size,	IP	ownership,	use	of	tax	havens	and	 the	proportion	of	women	on	 the	board	of	directors	are	 found	 to	have	a	significant	relationship	to	 the	taxes	paid	by	the	MNE	as	measured	by	their	cash	and	GAAP	ETRs	over	a	 ten	year	period.	The	work	also	adds	 to	 the	understanding	of	 the	measurement	 of	 ETRs	 and	 the	 factors	 driving	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 two	 key	measures	employed.		A	series	of	case	studies	are	detailed	in	Chapter	6.	The	case	study	format	allows	for	the	explicit	interrogation	of	the	companies’	strategies	and	tax	payments	based	on	publicly	available	information.	The	case	study	format	also	allows	for	detailed	examination	of	the	variety	of	approaches	undertaken	by	the	different	companies	selected.		
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The	 discussion	 and	 conclusions	 in	 the	 final	 chapter,	 Chapter	 7	 demonstrate	 the	importance	of	tax	as	a	topic	for	IB	research.	This	chapter	also	discusses	the	limitations	of	the	research	presented	within	this	thesis	and	suggests	areas	for	future	research.			 	
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2 Literature Reviews  
2.1 Theoretical Literature Review  
2.1.1 Introduction This	chapter	sets	out	the	way	in	which	IB	theory	has	evolved	and	the	role	played	by	corporation	tax	within	IB	theory.	Within	IB,	TP	is	often	considered	to	be	synonymous	with	 tax.	Whilst	 TP	 is	 one	 of	 the	 key	 elements	 of	 the	 complex	 tax	 and	 tax	 planning	interactions	 between	 government	 and	MNEs,	 this	 thesis	 is	 not	 solely	 about	 TP.	 The	research	focus	of	this	thesis	is	broader,	encompassing	a	holistic	view	of	corporation	tax	and	the	tax	planning	strategies	of	MNEs.		Corporation	tax	is	an	issue	that	affects	every	business	and	impacts	company	behaviour	in	terms	of	where	and	how	much	investment	is	made,	how	it	is	made	and	where	profits	are	recorded	within	the	MNE.	Tax	and	the	consequent	TP	issues	for	the	MNE	were	seen	as	a	core	issue	by	early	scholars	considering	the	MNE,	but	were	later	disregarded	by	IB	scholars.	Today,	it	should	be	noted	that	TP	is	just	one	fractional	part	of	the	complex	tax	planning	activities	of	the	MNE	and	its	interactions	with	international	governments.			Despite	the	lack	of	research	in	this	area,	academics	have	argued	that	an	understanding	of	 corporation	 tax,	 from	 a	multidisciplinary	 angle	 is	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 a	 complete	analysis	of	 the	MNE	 (Caves	1982).	This	paper	contributes	 to	 IB	 theory	by	 revisiting	early	work	and	demonstrating	 the	 importance	 that	was	 initially	 attached	 to	TP	as	a	driver	of	MNE	activity.	It	argues	that	new	theoretical	development	or	the	extension	of	existing	theories	is	needed	to	underpin	much	needed	empirical	research	into	the	impact	of	 corporation	 taxation	 on	 tax	 planning,	 locations	 of	 business	 activities	 and	performance.	 This	 is	 particularly	 important	 due	 to	 the	 intensified	 tax	 competition	between	countries	attempting	to	attract	FDI	from	MNEs.		Early	 explanations	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 the	MNE,	 particularly	 internalization	 theory,	emphasise	the	key	role	played	by	internal	financial	transfers	in	enabling	the	MNE	to	overcome	 the	 liability	 of	 foreignness	 and	 external	 capital	 market	 imperfections	(Rugman,	1980;	Lessard	1979;	Hymer	1976).	Over	 time,	however,	 internal	 financial	
	 39	
transfers	within	the	MNE	came	to	be	seen	as	less	central	to	the	overall	theory	of	the	MNE.	TP	has	been	viewed	simply	as	a	mechanism	employed	by	MNEs	to	avoid	taxes	rather	than	as	a	core,	innate	part	of	the	advantage	of	the	MNE.	
	The	 lack	 of	 available	 data	 for	 research	 due	 to	 issues	 of	 confidentiality	 has	 led	 to	difficulties	 in	 conducting	 empirical	 work	 in	 this	 area.	 Early	 research	 work	 took	 an	alternative	approach,	 focusing	 instead	on	the	modelling	of	TP,	rather	than	providing	direct	 empirical	 evidence	 of	 TP	 or	 how	 tax-planning	 systems	 are	 structured.	 The	difficulties	 involved	 in	testing	theoretical	models	as	 they	were	developed,	combined	with	a	positive	assessment	of	the	contribution	of	MNEs	to	the	global	economy	since	the	late	1980s,	also	reduced	the	impetus	to	perform	research	in	this	area.		Following	the	global	financial	crisis	of	2008,	however,	tax	avoidance	has	risen	up	both	the	political	and	academic	agendas.	The	financial	crisis	drove	greater	public	scepticism	of	globalisation	and	free	trade,	 as	well	as	hostility	 towards	MNEs.	Stimulated	by	the	financial	crisis	and	the	perceived	threats	to	economic	sovereignty	by	large	MNEs	with	global	 value	 chains,	 governments	 are	 attempting	 to	 increase	 their	 corporation	 tax	revenue	by	reducing	the	ability	of	MNEs	to	shift	their	profits	to	lower	tax	jurisdictions.		Work	by	individual	governments,	the	OECD	and	the	EU	have	all	considered	the	issue	of	tax	avoidance,	including	work	to	look	specifically	at	the	methods	employed	by	MNEs	to	reduce	overall	corporate	income	tax	bills	legally.	There	is	a	growing	understanding	that	the	 current	 tax	 system	 fails	 to	 deal	 adequately	 with	 modern	 digital	 companies	 in	particular	 and	 that	 as	MNEs	 become	more	proficient	 at	 shifting	 parts	 of	 their	 value	chains	to	take	advantage	of	location	specific	advantages	(LSA)	tax	has	become	a	more	prominent	part	of	MNE	strategy.	It	is	important	that	IB	theory	can	contribute	to	this	debate	and	to	the	promotion	of	efficient	national	and	international	policies.	Without	a	firm	 theoretical	 foundation,	 understanding	 of	 the	 behaviour	 of	 MNEs	 and	 the	implications	of	government	policies	will	be	limited.		Whilst	academic	research	focusing	on	tax	avoidance	has	taken	place	across	a	range	of	disciplines:	public	economics,	accounting,	finance	and	law	there	has	been	a	dearth	of	research	from	within	IB.	Tax	avoidance	is	now,	however,	beginning	to	rising	up	the	IB	
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agenda.	The	scale	of	the	current	problem	is	driving	academics	to	consider	the	use	of	tax	havens	and	profit	shifting	with	empirical	work	addressing	this	issue	published	recently	(Muller	and	Kolk	2015;	Brajcich,	Friesner,	and	Schibik	2016;	Jones	and	Temouri	2016).		Given	 the	 importance	of	 corporate	 taxation,	 this	 thesis	makes	a	 timely	 contribution.	This	chapter	sets	out	how	tax	and	TP	can	be	treated	within	the	scope	of	internalization	theory.	 It	 argues	 that	 early	 writers	 considered	 TP	 and	 finance	 to	 play	 key	 roles,	fundamental	to	the	existence	of	the	MNE.	More	recent	scholars	have	largely	overlooked	the	importance	of	TP	for	the	MNE.	This	thesis	argues	that	the	importance	of	this	area	for	understanding	the	behaviour	and	strategies	of	 the	MNE	should	be	acknowledged	and	considered	to	be	a	fundamental	part	of	IB	theory.		The	rest	of	this	chapter	is	organised	as	follows:	Section	2.1.2	provides	details	of	a	key	literature	review	conducted	specifically	for	this	chapter.	Section	2.1.3	then	considers	internalization	 theory	 and	 how	 taxes	were	 treated	 during	 its	 development.	 Section	2.1.4	 examines	MNE	motivations	 for	 FDI	 and	 assesses	 the	 extent	 to	which	 this	 can	inform	our	understanding	of	tax	avoidance.	The	following	section	(section	2.1.5)	then	takes	a	step	back	and	considers	early	academic	work	that	modelled	TP,	in	relation	to	tariffs	and	taxes.	The	subsequent	sections	cover	the	economic	models	that	establish	the	advantages	to	the	MNE	from	TP	and	the	impact	of	TP	on	global	efficiency	and	welfare.	The	final	sections	consider	the	development	of	research	over	time	and	conclude.			Section	2.2	presents	a	separate	review	of	the	empirical	literature	on	this	topic.	Within	this	 review,	 specific	 hypotheses	 are	 developed	 and	 presented	 within	 the	 relevant	sections	of	literature	review.	The	testing	of	these	hypotheses	is	presented	in	Chapter	5.	The	research	methods	used	for	the	testing	are	described	in	detailed	in	Chapter	3.		The	next	section	gives	the	details	of	a	literature	search	that	was	conducted	to	give	a	comprehensive	picture	of	the	work	that	has	been	conducted	on	corporate	tax	avoidance	and	in	particular	the	work	undertaken	within	the	field	of	IB.		
2.1.2 Literature Search and Analysis A	 literature	 search	 was	 conducted	 to	 locate	 and	 analyse	 the	 relevant	 academic	
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publications	in	relation	to	corporation	tax.	The	search	was	conducted	in	an	inductive	manner,	 adapting	 the	 methodology	 used	 by	 previous	 researchers	 (Nguyen	 2016;	Jormanainen	 and	 Koveshnikov	 2012).	 	 The	 methodology	 is	 presented	 clearly	 to	demonstrate	the	reliability	of	the	search.	Searches	were	made	for	peer	reviewed,	full-length	academic	journal	articles	published	in	English.	In	 the	 first	 stage	 a	 search	was	made	 using	 the	 Business	 Source	 Complete	 database	compiled	by	EBSCO	Industries,	Inc.	The	Boolean	search	terms	used	were	‘tax	avoidance’	OR	‘tax	planning’	OR	‘transfer	pricing’.	Search	terms	related	to	this	topic	are	difficult	to	define	as	the	language	and	focus	of	articles	has	changed	over	time.	Tax	planning	is	a	term	that	has	come	into	use	only	relatively	recently,	referring	to	the	ability	of	MNEs	to	plan	and	structure	their	tax	affairs	involving	a	range	of	potential	mechanisms	to	reduce	tax	legally	other	than	transfer	pricing.	Yet,	early	work	focused	on	TP	as	it	was	believed	to	be	the	only	important	mechanism	by	which	profits	could	be	shifted	to	facilitate	tax	avoidance.	Early	theoretical	work	also	focused	on	the	optimization	of	TP.	Tax	is	a	very	broad	term	and	digitized	searches	tend	to	provide	articles	that	relate	to	other	forms	of	tax	than	just	corporation	tax,	(VAT,	inheritance	tax,	etc).	These	articles	were	identified	and	removed	from	the	search	findings.	
Table 1 Journals Containing More Than 13 Articles on Corporation Tax 
Journal Number 
of 
articles 
Stars Subject Practitioner 
focused? 
International Tax Review 1,774 
  
Practitioner 
Journal of Accountancy 440 
  
Practitioner 
National Tax Journal 165 2 Economics 
International Tax Journal 158 
  
Practitioner 
Journal of the American Tax 
Association 
146 3 
 
Practitioner 
CPA Journal 129 
 
Accounting 
Journal of Financial Service 
Professionals 
118 
  
Practitioner 
Journal of Financial Planning 112 
  
Practitioner 
Accounting Review 111 4* Accounting 
International Financial Law Review 69 
  
Practitioner 
Journal of Accounting Research 61 4* Accounting 
Financial Executive 58 
  
Practitioner 
Journal of Tax Practice and 
Procedure 
57 
  
Practitioner 
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Journal of Finance 50 4* Finance 
 
Journal of Passthrough Entities 46 
  
Practitioner 
Contemporary Accounting Research 44 4 Accounting 
Public Finance Review 42 
  
Practitioner 
Tax Lawyer 35 
  
Practitioner 
American Economic Review 33 4* Economics 
OECD Observer 33 
 
Economics 
 
International Executive 31 
  
Practitioner 
Journal of State Taxation 30 
  
Practitioner 
Annals of the University of Ordea 28 
 
Economics 
 
Journal of Business Ethics 28 3 Management 
Australian Tax Forum 25 
 
Tax and Law 
Harvard Law Review 24 
 
Law Student 
published 
American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology 
23 
 
Sociology 
 
ATA Journal of Tax Legal Research 21 
 
Accounting 
Issues in Accounting Education 20 
  
Practitioner 
Journal of Performance Management 20 
  
Practitioner 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis 
19 4 Finance 
 
Journal of Retirement Planning 19 
  
Practitioner 
Virginia Tax Review 19 
  
Student 
published 
Management Science 18 
 
Managemen
t 
 
Canadian Journal of Economics 17 3 Economics 
Journal of Public Economic Theory 17 2 Economics 
Journal of Taxation of Investments 17 
  
Practitioner 
Review of Accounting Studies 17 4 Accounting 
Public Choice 16 3 Economics 
Review of Economics and Statistics 16 4 Economics 
Appraisal Journal 15 
 
Real estate 
Journal of Economic Literature 15 4 Economics 
Economic Journal 14 4 Economics 
Journal of Practical Estate Planning 14 
  
Practitioner 
Applied Economics 13 2 Economics 
European Accounting Review 13 3 Accounting 
Financial Services Review 13 
  
Practitioner 
Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting 
13 3 Accounting 
Journal of Taxation of Financial 
Products 
13 
  
Practitioner 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and 
Finance 
13 3 Accounting 
 
Total articles 4,242 
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	The	results	of	the	first	search	were	sizeable,	with	4,242	articles	identified.	The	diversity	of	the	journals	publishing	articles	reflects	the	cross	cutting	nature	of	the	work.	Table	1,	above,	gives	data	from	the	Business	Source	Complete	search	and	gives	the	names	of	all	journals	publishing	more	than	13	relevant	articles.	As	revealed	in	Table	1	the	majority	of	 the	academic	articles	were	published	 in	accountancy	 journals	supplemented	by	a	number	of	economics	journals.	It	is	clear	that	tax	avoidance,	tax	planning	and	TP	have	been	the	subject	of	significant	academic	scrutiny	and	research	over	the	time	period,	with	much	of	the	work	published	after	the	year	2000.	No	IB	journals	feature	in	this	list	and	information	accessed	in	this	way	could	not	be	used	to	identify	journals	publishing	fewer	than	13	articles.	The	fact	that	no	IB	journals	have	published	more	than	13	articles	demonstrates	that	these	issues	have	been	of	a	lower	priority	for	IB	scholars.	A	second	search	was	then	conducted	to	supplement	this	first	search,	this	time	focusing	purely	on	IB	journals.	This	supplementary	search	focused	on	IB	journals	–	all	those	given	a	rating	of	2-star	level	 or	more	 in	 the	Academic	 Journal	 Guide	2015	 (Association	 of	Business	 Schools	2015).	These	journals	are	listed	in	Table	2.	Each	journal’s	publications	were	searched	independently.	Where	possible	 the	search	 terms	were	applied	 to	 the	abstract	of	 the	articles.	For	some	journals	this	was	not	possible	and	the	search	therefore	returned	a	larger	 number	 of	 articles.	 The	 relevant	 articles	 were	 then	 hand	 picked	 from	 the	automatically	generated	lists.	
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Table 2 IB Journals With Rating of More Than 2 Included in Literature Search 
Journal of International Business Studies 4* 
Journal of World Business 4 
African Affairs 3 
Asia Pacific Journal of Management 3 
International Business Review 3 
Journal of Common Market Studies 3 
Journal of International Management 3 
Management and Organisation Review 3 
Management International Review 3 
Asia Pacific Business Review 2 
Asian Business and Management 2 
China Quarterly 2 
Critical Perspectives on International Business 2 
Emerging Markets Review 2 
Eurasian Geography and Economics 2 
Europe – Asia Studies 2 
Journal of Latin American Studies 2 
Journal of Modern African Studies 2 
Journal of World Trade 2 
Multinational Business Review 2 
Third World Quarterly 2 
Thunderbird International Business Review 2 
Transnational Corporations 2 	The	results	in	Table	3,	below,	show	that	out	of	the	23	IB	journals	included	only	4	have	published	 relevant	articles	on	 corporation	 tax.	Critical	Perspectives	on	 International	Business	 published	 seven	 articles,	 averaging	 one	 article	 per	 year	 since	 2011.	 The	Journal	of	International	Business	Studies	(JIBS)	published	eleven	articles	in	total	with	ten	of	these	published	before	1993,	and	one	other	article	published	in	2005.	No	more	recent	articles	have	been	published.	Multinational	Business	Review	(MBR)	published	19	articles	with	articles	appearing	steadily	over	the	period	1995	to	2016.	Third	World	Quarterly	published	5	articles	between	2007	and	2013.	The	focus	on	corporation	tax	has	been	patchy	at	best.	The	high	profile	journal	JIBS	publication	record	in	particular	demonstrates	the	importance	that	was	attached	to	corporation	tax	as	a	driver	for	MNE	behaviour	in	the	early	days	of	theoretical	development	but	the	lack	of	attention	more	recently.	This	appears	to	confirm	the	argument	made	by	Nebus	(2016)	that	it	is	difficult	for	 tax	 research	 to	 find	 its	way	 into	mainstream	 IB	 journals	 (Nebus	2016).	More	 IB	
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research	and	theoretical	development	is	needed	to	improve	understanding	of	tax	as	a	significant	issue	for	MNEs	affecting	operational	and	strategic	planning	and	action.		
Table 3 IB Journals Publishing Relevant Articles 
Journal Number of articles Dates of articles 
Multinational Business 
Review 
19 1995, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 206, 2008, 
2008, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2014, 
2014, 2015, 2015, 2016 
Journal of International 
Business Studies 
11 1974, 1978, 1978, 1980, 1980, 
1980, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1993, 
2005. 
Critical Perspectives on 
International Business 
7 2011, 2012, 2013, 2013, 2014, 
2015, 2016 
Third World Quarterly 5 2007, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 	The	following	section	explores	the	evolution	of	internalization	theory	with	a	focus	on	the	treatment	of	corporation	tax	and	other	financial	issues	within	the	theory.	It	argues	that	early	writers	considered	that	these	issues	were	key	to	the	development	of	the	MNE	but	 that	 a	 subsequent	 focus	on	knowledge	aspects	of	 internalization	drew	attention	away	from	tax	and	other	financial	factors.		
2.1.3 Internalization Theory and the MNE This	section	considers	the	development	of	internalization	theory	and	the	way	in	which	tax	has	been	considered,	as	well	as	arguing	that	this	area	now	needs	greater	focus.	Early	writers	on	the	MNE	(Kindleberger	1969;	Caves	1971;	Hymer	1976)	took	an	industrial	organisation	approach	to	explain	the	advantages	of	the	MNE.	They	viewed	the	MNE	as	a	monopolistic	rent	seeker,	exploiting	its	power	through	the	establishment	of	barriers	to	entry	(Bain	1956).		The	ability	to	manipulate	internal	TP	was	a	concern	for	those	who	believed	that	the	MNE’s	advantage	came	from	the	exploitation	of	monopoly	power	as	the	use	of	TP	was	seen	as	conferring	an	additional	advantage	on	the	MNE	over	domestic	firms.		Coase’s	 seminal	 paper	 (1937)	 demonstrated	 that	 firms	 are	 established	 as	 a	consequence	of	the	costs	of	using	the	price	mechanism.	Models	of	the	market	economy	
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fail	 to	account	 for	 the	costs	 incurred	 in	using	the	price	mechanism	for	coordination.	When	 the	 costs	 of	 establishing	 a	 firm	 to	 coordinate	 through	 administrative	 fiat	 are	lower	than	 the	 costs	of	using	 the	market,	 a	 firm	will	be	established.	When	 the	most	efficient	allocation	of	 resources	 is	 achieved,	 the	 combined	wealth	of	 the	economy	 is	maximised.	At	 this	point	no	one	 can	gain	without	another	 losing.	Costs	of	using	 the	external	market	(transaction	costs)	are	overcome	by	the	use	of	internal	prices	(transfer	prices)	to	allocate	resources.	Coase	emphasised	the	importance	of	taxes	concluding	that	overcoming	the	costs	of	a	sales	tax	on	separate	firms	and	rationalising	tax	structures	could	be	sufficient	to:	‘bring	into	existence	firms	which	would	otherwise	have	no	raison	
d’être’	(Coase	1937	p.393).		An	alternative	view	of	the	MNE	emerged,	based	on	this	Coasian	view	of	the	firm	(Coase	1937).	 This	 view	 accentuated	 the	 efficient	 nature	 of	 the	 MNE	 as	 a	 hierarchical	organisation	brought	into	existence	in	order	to	substitute	for	inoperable	or	inefficient	market	 systems.	 Internalization	 theory	 (Buckley	 and	 Casson	 1976;	 Rugman	 1981;	Hennart	1982)	refers	to	the	ability	of	the	MNE	to	replace	external	markets	for	either	proprietary	 knowledge	 or	 intermediate	 goods	 with	 managerial	 decision-making.	Internalization	 enables	 the	 MNE	 to	 overcome	 imperfections	 in	 external	 markets	including	both	those	that	arise	naturally	and	those	that	are	imposed	by	governments.	Tax	 is	 included	 in	 this	 approach	 as	 a	 government	 imposed	 imperfection.	 Firms	will	internalise	 their	 activities	 up	 to	 the	 point	 of	 efficiency,	where	 the	 costs	 of	 doing	 so	remain	lower	than	the	perceived	benefits.			Other	writers	developed	the	role	of	the	financial	aspects	of	the	firm.	McManus	(1971)	stresses	 the	 impact	 of	 pecuniary	 incentives	within	 the	 firm.	He	 concurs	with	 Coase	(1937)	that	 there	are	costs	 to	using	the	price	mechanism	and	that	 the	most	efficient	method	of	allocating	resources	will	be	chosen.	However,	where	Coase	(1937)	implies	that	 the	 same	 efficient	 allocation	of	 resources	will	 be	 reached	whichever	method	 is	chosen,	McManus	 concludes	 that	 different	 incentives	 operating	within	 the	 firm	will	mean	that	the	allocation	of	resources	may	not	necessarily	be	the	same	allocation	as	that	made	through	the	market	mechanism.	Both	solutions	would	be	efficient	in	the	sense	that	no	one	can	be	made	better	off	without	someone	being	made	worse	off,	but	they	would	not	necessarily	be	the	same.		
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	Where	 Coase	 considered	 the	 domestic	 firm	 and	 the	 national	 economy,	 Buckley	 and	Casson	(1976)	have	a	wider	horizon,	considering	the	establishment	of	the	MNE	in	the	global	economy.	Coase	(1937)	considers	the	division	of	labour	both	in	specific	plants	and	 between	 them.	When	 considering	 the	 international	 sphere,	 it	 is	 the	 division	 of	labour	between	plants	that	is	important.	Firms	are	able	to	exploit	efficiencies	through	vertical	integration	–	placing	plants	in	locations	where	they	gain	an	advantage	due	to	the	cost	or	the	availability	of	key	skills	or	resources	(Buckley	and	Casson	1976).	Buckley	and	 Casson’s	 seminal	 (1976)	 work	 focused	 on	 forward	 integration	 from	 R&D	 into	production,	 reflecting	 their	 view	 of	 the	 important	 role	 of	 knowledge	 in	 the	establishment	of	the	theory	of	the	firm.	They	and	other	early	writers	did	not,	however,	focus	exclusively	on	knowledge.	Buckley	and	Casson’s	initial	work	included	two	forms	of	internalization:	operational	internalization		-	where	products	move	through	different	stages	within	the	same	firm	and	the	distribution	channel	and	knowledge	internalization		-	where	internalization	relies	on	the	flow	of	knowledge	from	R&D.			In	1979	Casson	(1979)	points	out	that	the	potential	advantages	gained	from	TP	may	in	themselves	be	enough	to	instigate	the	internalising	of	markets	and	the	creation	of	the	MNE.	TP	were	not	seen	simply	as	a	mechanism	to	enable	a	MNE	to	manage	its	internal	affairs	but	also	as	offering	an	important	advantage	to	the	MNE	over	the	domestic	firm.	TP	were	 therefore	 at	 the	 core	of	 internalization	 theory	 as	 it	 developed.	Other	 early	writers	 built	 financial	 markets	 into	 their	 exposition	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 MNE,	explicitly	 including	 imperfections	 in	 these	 markets	 as	 drivers	 for	 internalization	(Rugman	1980,	1981).		Dunning	 (1977)	 argued	 that	 knowledge	 was	 a	 key	 source	 of	 ownership-specific	advantage	 (OA).	 Dunning	 considered	 that	 possession	 of	 an	 OA	 was	 a	 necessary	condition	for	a	firm	to	become	a	MNE.	There	may	be	sufficient	efficiencies	to	be	gained,	however,	from	vertical	and	horizontal	integration,	through	the	use	of	TP,	the	avoidance	of	higher	tax	rates	or	tariffs	or	other	financial	synergies	to	generate	sufficient	efficiency	for	the	establishment	of	a	MNE.	Efficient	tax	planning	operationalized	through	profit	shifting	can	give	the	MNE	a	significant	advantage	over	the	purely	domestic	company.	Internalization	 theorists	 argued	 that	 an	 OA	 is	 not	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	
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internationalisation	(Casson	2015).	Some	of	the	efficiencies,	however,	that	are	gained	through	integration	may	be	incorporated	into	what	Dunning	referred	to	as	a	‘financial	
asset	 advantage’	 (Dunning	 1993	p.150).	Dunning	 does	 not	 specify	 exactly	what	 this	would	include	but	points	out	that	a	financial	asset	advantage	is	usually	a	result	of	the	size,	 efficiency	 and	 knowledge	 of	 the	MNE.	 Oxelheim,	 Randoy	 and	 Stonehill	 (2001)	consider	what	could	be	included	within	this	‘financial	asset	advantage’	and	group	MNE	strategies	 into	1)	proactive	 strategies	 that	 are	under	 the	 control	of	 the	MNE	and	2)	reactive	strategies	adopted	in	response	to	financial	market	failure.	However,	the	MNE	is	established	in	response	to	market	failure,	thus	if	there	were	no	market	failure	there	would	be	no	MNE	and	no	way	of	gaining	a	‘financial	asset	advantage’.	This	dichotomy	collapses	(Jones	and	Temouri	2015)	but	it	is	not	an	essential	part	of	Oxelheim	et	al’s	(2001)	argument.	Oxelheim	et	al	(2001)	discuss	a	series	of	pertinent	hypotheses,	each	of	which	could	give	a	skilled	MNE	an	advantage	over	their	competitors,	both	national	and	internationally.	They	include,	within	their	list	of	hypotheses,	the	hypothesis	that	a	firm	is:	‘more	likely	to	engage	in	FDI	when	it	is	able	to	negotiate	reduced	taxation	and	/	
or	subsidies	for	financing	it.’	(Oxelheim	et	al	2001	p.	392)	They	have	not	as	yet	been	able	to	test	their	hypotheses	empirically.		Hymer	(1976)	argues	that	MNEs	must	possess	monopolistic	advantages,	later	known	as	Firm	Specific	Advantages	(FSAs)	(Rugman	1981),	over	local	firms	that	enable	them	to	overcome	 the	 liability	of	 foreignness.	MNEs	will	 therefore	 tend	 to	operate	where	there	are	imperfect	markets	for	final	products.	Kindleberger	(1969)	elaborated	further	on	Hymer’s	view,	emphasising	the	importance	of	monopolistic	advantage	for	the	MNE.	Rugman	 (1981)	 developed	 the	 concept	 of	 FSAs	 arguing	 that	 they	 can	 be	 based	 on	technology	 and	 know	 how	 or	 can	 simply	 reflect	 the	 managerial	 or	 marketing	advantages	that	a	firm	possesses.		The	 complementary	 Country	 Specific	 Advantages	 (CSA)	 from	 Rugman’s	 FSA-CSA	framework	are,	by	contrast,	available	to	any	company	to	take	advantage	of.	CSAs	are	the	advantages	offered	by	countries,	making	them	attractive	to	the	MNE	as	a	place	to	do	business.	Different	countries	have	different	sets	of	resources	and	prices	that	make	operating	a	business	there	either	more	or	less	attractive.	Any	MNE	choosing	to	locate	in	 a	 particular	 country	 will	 be	 able	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	 CSAs	 it	 offers.	 Tax	
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competition	has	grown	in	recent	years	with	countries	such	as	Ireland,	the	Netherlands,	Luxembourg	 and	 Switzerland	 attempting	 to	 attract	 FDI	 by	 lowering	 the	 rate	 of	corporation	tax	charged	and	agreeing	deals	with	large	MNEs	upfront	(Zodrow,	2003;	Devereux	et	al.,	2008;	Devereux	and	Loretz,	2013a;	Economist	2016).	Once	a	company	has	established	a	base	overseas	it	will	need	to	use	TP	to	account	for	the	movement	of	resources	between	subsidiaries	(Rugman	1980).		TP	 was	 considered	 key	 within	 early	 work	 on	 internalization	 theory	 (Buckley	 and	Casson	1976;	Rugman	1980;	Rugman	1981).	Analysis	considered	how	firms	managed	and	priced	the	transactions	that	they	had	internalised.	The	use	of	TP	offered	potential	for	the	MNE	to	make	significant	gains	from	internalization	as	their	use	could	improve	the	performance	of	a	MNE	(Horst	1971;	Nieckels	1976;	Lessard	1979).	Rugman	(1980)	concludes	that	transfer	prices:	‘are	an	efficient	response	by	the	MNE	to	exogenous	market	
imperfections’	(Rugman	1980,	p.76).	Once	a	MNE	is	established	all	transactions	between	the	head	office	and	subsidiaries	must	be	accounted	for	and	the	TP	used	will	affect	the	firm’s	overall	profitability	as	well	as	the	allocation	of	profits	between	subsidiaries.	The	use	of	TP	is	synonymous	with	the	establishment	of	a	MNE.			The	role	of	TP	in	driving	the	formation	of	the	MNE	also	helps	to	explain	why	MNEs	are	concentrated	in	R&D	intensive	and	knowledge	industries	(Buckley	and	Casson	1976).	These	are	areas	where	TP	may	be	more	opaque,	reflecting	the	difficulty	in	assessing	the	true	 value	 of	 internal	 transfers	 from	 outside	 the	 firm.	 There	 are	 few	 comparable	transactions	that	can	be	used	to	compare,	 to	 instigate	the	ALS.	 	This	confers	greater	ability	 on	 the	 MNE	 to	 gain	 through	manipulation.	 Early	 empirical	 work	 by	 Vaitsos	(1974)	and	Lall	(1979)	confirmed	the	importance	of	TP	to	firms	in	knowledge	intensive	industries,	such	as	the	pharmaceutical	industry.			Internalization	enables	the	MNE	to	overcome	natural	market	imperfections	(including	transaction	costs,	improved	information	and	knowledge	sharing	and	greater	levels	of	trust)	 and	 structural	market	 imperfections	 (that	 the	market	 for	 inputs	 and	 finished	goods	 are	 not	 perfectly	 competitive).	 A	 key	 advantage	 for	 the	MNE	 is	 the	 ability	 to	benefit	from	differences	in	factor	input	prices	in	different	locations,	from	differences	in	government	regulations	and	from	differences	in	statutory	corporate	income	tax	rates	
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(Rugman	and	Eden	1985).	Profit	shifting	from	high	to	low	tax	jurisdictions	and	the	use	of	 tax	 havens	 are	 examples	 of	 the	ways	 in	which	MNEs	 use	 differences	 in	 tax	 rates	between	countries	to	generate	higher	economic	rent.		Synergies	and	the	competitive	advantages	that	the	business	gains	from	being	a	MNE	are	therefore	at	the	core	of	internalization	theory.	As	a	direct	consequence	of	internalising	transactions	the	sub	units	of	the	business	work	together	in	a	cooperative	manner	rather	than	the	competitive	way	that	they	would	operate	in	in	the	external	market.	The	gains	from	being	a	MNE	undermine	the	rationale	for	the	ALS	for	TP.	The	ALS	functions	on	the	basis	that	internal	transactions	can	be	priced	in	the	same	way	that	they	would	be	priced	in	an	external	market	transaction.	The	gains	from	internalization,	however,	mean	that	it	may	not	be	possible	to	‘normalise’	an	MNE’s	profit	by	charging	the	same	as	they	would	to	an	external	 third	party.	The	ALS	 ignores	 the	 fundamental	 gains	 that	 are	made	by	virtue	of	being	a	MNE.	 	There	is	no	part	of	the	ALS	that	accounts	for	how	these	gains	should	 be	 treated.	 The	 theory	 underpinning	 the	 ALS	 therefore	 disregards	 the	fundamental	 advantage	 that	 the	 MNE	 gains	 from	 internalization.	 (Eden	 2016).	Consequently,	the	ALS	has	been	criticised	conceptually,	politically	and	legally	(Rugman,	1980;	Shoen,	2011;	Eden,	2016).		Lessard	 (1979)	 also	 considers	 the	 potential	 gains	 from	 finance	 for	 the	 MNE.	 He	examines	 imperfections	 in	 the	 international	 financial	 markets;	 the	 degree	 of	segmentation	or	 integration	 between	national	 capital	markets.	He	 shows	 that	when	external	markets	for	intermediate	products,	or	financial	aspects	are	imperfect	the	MNE	has	an	incentive	to	bypass	them	and	create	internal	markets.	Rugman	(1980)	explicitly	cites	 Lessard	 and	 concludes	 that	 financial	 market	 imperfections,	 including	international	tax	rate	differentials,	provide	an	impetus	for	the	firm	to	avoid	these	by	creating	an	internal	capital	market.			Clearly,	as	internalization	theory	was	initially	developing	writers	explicitly	considered	the	 role	 of	 finance	 and	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 MNE	 to	 gain	 from	 arbitrage,	 for	 example	through	selecting	a	low	tax	country	to	place	their	operations	or	book	their	profits.	As	internalization	theory	developed	the	emphasis	changed	with	writers	focusing	more	on	the	role	of	intermediate	product	transfers	and	more	particularly	on	knowledge	flows	
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as	the	main	advantages,	moving	away	from	the	advantages	from	internalization	derived	from	 financial	market	 imperfections,	 synergies	 and	TP.	 In	 a	 review	of	 fifty	 years	 of	international	business	theory	Rugman,	Verbeke	and	Nguyen	(2011)	discuss	the	shifts	that	 have	 taken	 place	 in	 the	 key	 unit	 of	 analysis	 as	 IB	 theory	 has	 developed.	 They	conclude	that	the:	‘most	promising	area	for	further	IB	development	is	in	essence	the	study	
of	the	interactions	among’	the	three	levels	of	the	country,	the	MNE	and	the	subsidiary.	Their	review	of	progress	does	not	refer	to	TP	or	to	tax	other	than	to	indicate	that	it	is	a	key	mechanism	by	which	the	MNE	contributes	to	welfare.	Clearly	corporation	tax	and	TP	play	key	roles	in	the	interaction	between	governments,	the	MNE	and	the	subsidiary	and	this	must	be	one	of	the	key	areas	where	theory	development	is	required.		In	a	review	of	the	progress	of	internalization	theory	Buckley	and	Casson	(2009)	argue	that	 the	 theory	 has	 continued	 to	 advance	 but	 that	more	 theoretical	 development	 is	needed.	They	acknowledge	the	importance	of	international	financial	markets	and	the	impact	of	the	deregulation	of	domestic	capital	markets	but	do	not	cite	research	on	the	financial	aspects	of	the	MNE	and	internalization	theory,	which	again,	highlight	the	lack	of	existing	research	into	this	area.		
2.1.4 Motivation to Avoid Tax This	 section	 considers	 how	 the	 literature	 on	 FDI	 motivation	 can	 contribute	 to	 our	understanding	of	what	drives	MNEs	to	avoid	tax	through	profit	shifting.		Firms	that	have	more	international	business	activities	are	more	likely	to	operate	in	a	series	of	countries	offering	a	range	of	tax	rates.	These	businesses	will	therefore	have	more	opportunities	to	 plan	 their	 tax	 by	 shifting	 profits	 between	 jurisdictions.	 It	 has	 been	 shown	 that	companies	with	higher	levels	of	IP	are	also	more	able	to	shift	profits	through	the	use	of	royalty	 payments	 (Dischinger	 and	 Riedel	 2011;	 Grubert	 2003b;	 Mutti	 and	 Grubert	2009).			Whilst	there	may	be	heterogeneity	of	opportunity,	however,	there	also	appears	to	be	heterogeneity	in	the	way	that	similar	firms,	with	similar	opportunities	plan	their	tax	affairs.	Research	is	needed	to	understand	the	factors	that	drive	one	MNE	to	take	a	more	aggressive	approach	to	tax	planning	than	another.		
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Understanding	 what	 drives	 FDI,	 where	 and	 how	 investments	 are	 made	 is	 key	 to	understanding	the	behaviour	of	the	MNE.	Much	work	on	understanding	the	motivation	for	FDI	has	built	on	Dunning’s	(1993)	classic	work	on	FDI	motivation	that	focused	on	natural	 resource	 seeking,	 market	 seeking,	 efficiency	 seeking	 and	 (strategic)	 asset	seeking.	Dunning	(1993)	however	also	 included	other	motivations	 for	FDI	 that	have	been	 overlooked	 by	 subsequent	work.	 These	 included:	 escape	 investments,	 support	investments	 and	 passive	 investments.	 Corporation	 tax	 was	 explicitly	 included	 in	‘Escape	 investments’	 as	 these	 investments	would	 include	 those	made	 by	 a	 MNE	 to	facilitate	avoidance	(escape)	of	high	levels	of	corporate	taxation	in	the	home	country.	Subsequent	scholars	(van	Tulder	2010;	Cuervo-Cazurra,	Narula	and	Un	2015;	Cuervo-Cazurra	and	Narula	2015)	have	pointed	out	 the	unwarranted	neglect	of	 these	wider	motivations.	Anecdotal	evidence	such	as	that	pertaining	to	Pfizer	/	Allergan	and	Apple	cited	 in	Chapter	1	demonstrates	 the	 importance	of	corporation	tax	as	a	driver	 for	at	least	 some	 MNE	 activity.	 IB	 theory	 needs	 to	 be	 extended	 to	 fully	 encompass	 this	behaviour.		Witt	and	Lewin	(2007)	emphasise	the	‘escape’	role	of	FDI	as	a	response	to	institutional	constraints	or	regulations,	including	high	taxes	in	the	home	country.	The	host	country	therefore	needs	to	offer	corresponding	advantages.		A	MNE	looking	to	escape	a	high	tax	regime	will	be	attracted	to	a	low	tax	jurisdiction	(van	Tulder	2015).	Van	Tulder	splits	FDI	motivations	into	‘intrinsic’	and	‘extrinsic’.	Intrinsic	motives	are	those	that	arise	from	being	 an	 MNE;	 the	 efficiencies	 from	 internalization	 and	 from	 choosing	 to	 establish	operations	 in	 countries	with	 useful	 locational	 advantages.	 Extrinsic	motives	 fit	 less	easily	into	the	field	of	IB	theory.	They	are	those	driven	by	institutions	in	the	home	and	host	countries.	Van	Tulder	includes	the	desire	to	evade	high	rates	of	corporation	tax	or	other	 stringent	 regulations	 within	 these	 extrinsic	 motives.	 He	 also	 discusses	 the	psychological	impact	of	the	home	country	on	motivation:	the	home	country	institutions,	including	 the	 culture,	 will	 influence	 the	 ‘mind-set’	 of	 managers	 making	internationalisation	decisions.		Ignoring	what	drives	certain	investments,	simply	because	they	do	not	fit	easily	within	a	neo	 classical	 framework	weakens	 the	overall	understanding	of	MNE	behaviour.	 	A	comprehensive	understanding	of	FDI	and	tax	avoidance	must	incorporate	behavioural	
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aspects	of	decision-making.	 IB	 theory	 incorporates	 rationally	bounded	behaviour	by	managers	 and	 the	 information	 asymmetries	 that	 they	 face	 but	 this	 does	 not	 offer	 a	complete	understanding	of	the	behaviour	of	managers.	Managers	make	decisions	that	satisfice	rather	than	optimise.	Cuervo-Cazurra	et	al	(2015)	offer	a	model	of	the	motives	of	 internationalisation	 based	 on	 behavioural	 economics.	 They	 conclude	 that	 the	motives	for	internationalisation	can	be	split	into:	 ‘an	economics	driven	exploitation	of	
existing	resources,	or	exploration	of	new	resources	and	a	psychology	driven	search	 for	
better	host	country	conditions	or	avoidance	of	poor	home	country	conditions’	(Cuervo-Cazurra	 et	 al	 2015	 p.2).	 Further	 research	 is	 required	 to	 derive	 a	 more	 complete	understanding	of	how	tax	avoidance	affects	the	behaviour	and	FDI	decisions	of	MNEs.		The	 following	 section	 considers	 early	 work	 that	 was	 explicitly	 focused	 on	 transfer	prices	and	tariffs.	This	work	attempted	to	use	neoclassical	economic	models	to	develop	understanding	of	the	optimal	TP	systems	that	MNE	could	employ.	
2.1.5 Advantages to the MNE from Transfer Pricing This	 section	 considers	 early	 theoretical	 work,	 some	 of	 which	 predates	 the	 work	discussed	above	on	internalization	theory,	which	focuses	specifically	on	TP	and	its	role	in	 profit	 maximisation.	 This	 early	 work	 from	 both	 economics	 and	 IB	 disciplines	influenced	the	work	of	early	IB	theorists,	focusing	on	the	impact	that	tax,	through	TP	has	on	the	performance	of	the	MNE.	It	takes	a	largely	economic	approach,	attempting	to	model	the	impact	of	TP	and	their	optimisation	on	the	activity	of	the	firm.	Issues	of	confidentiality	 create	 problems	 in	 testing	 these	 models	 empirically.	 The	 theory	espoused,	however,	continues	to	add	to	our	understanding	of	 the	 importance	of	and	scope	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 TP	 and	 therefore	 to	 our	 knowledge	 of	 what	 drives	 MNE	behaviour.		Hirshleifer	(1956)	considers	establishing	the	‘correct’	TP	to	be	of	utmost	importance	to	the	firm:	
‘…the	prices	which	are	set	on	internal	transfers	affect	the	level	of	activity	within	divisions,	
the	rate	of	return	on	investment	by	which	each	division	is	judged	and	the	total	profit	that	
is	achieved	by	the	firm	as	a	whole’	(Hirshleifer	1956	p.	172)		
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He	established	a	theoretical	economic	model,	to	determine	the	price	setting	procedure	that	 a	 firm	with	 two	 autonomous,	 vertically	 integrated,	 profit	 centres	 should	use	 to	ensure	 that	 the	 profits	 of	 both	 subsidiaries	 and	 the	 overall	 firm	 are	maximised.	He	assumes	 perfect	 competition	 as	 well	 as	 other	 simplifying	 assumptions	 and	demonstrates	 that	 the	 efficient	 TP	 is	 the	 market	 price,	 but	 only	 where	 these	assumptions	 hold.	 He	 subsequently	 relaxes	 his	 assumptions	 and	 proves	 that	 if	 the	market	is	imperfectly	competitive	the	TP	should	be	the	marginal	cost	or	a	price	between	marginal	cost	and	the	market	price.	However,	he	considers	only	a	two	division	domestic	firm	 and	 therefore	 the	 implications	 arising	 from	 different	 tax	 jurisdictions	 are	 not	considered	within	his	framework.		Horst	(1971)	also	establishes	a	model	to	explore	the	most	efficient	TP	that	a	firm	should	use.	He	considers	a	monopolistic	firm	simultaneously	selling	in	two	countries	and	the	impact	of	tariff	barriers	and	corporation	tax	on	profit	maximising	decisions.	In	order	to	maximise	profit	the	MNE	must	decide	how	much	and	where	to	produce	and	sell	their	products.	These	decisions	will	be	affected	by	the	imposition	of	government	taxes	and	tariffs.	He	 explores	 the	 impact	 of	 tariffs	on	 the	 firm’s	 decision-making	 and	 how	 the	‘optimal’	TP	can	be	established.			Horst	stresses	the	importance	of	TP	to	the	MNE:	
‘One	of	the	truly	distinguishing	features	of	multinational	corporations	is	that	intra-firm	
transactions	are	not	valued	in	an	open	market	–	rather,	these	firms	choose,	within	certain	
limits,	an	optimal	transfer	price.’		(Horst	1971,	p.1061)	Whilst	the	firm	can	choose	the	TP	there	are	limitations.	It	is	assumed	that	the	authorities	have	enough	information	to	force	the	firm	to	set	the	price	at	no	less	than	the	marginal	cost	(MC)	of	production	and	no	 more	 than	 the	 price	 charged	 for	 the	 good	 in	 the	 home	 market.	 If	 the	 relative	differential	in	tax	rates	between	the	two	countries	is	less	than	the	tariff	rate	the	firm	will	always	choose	the	lowest	transfer	price	possible,	MC,	and	therefore	minimise	tariff	costs	(vice	versa	if	the	tax	differential	was	more	than	the	tariff).	Horst	concludes	that	minor	changes	in	the	tax	rate	are	unlikely	to	impact	on	the	firm’s	behaviour	as	long	as	the	 tax	 rate	differential	 is	 less	 than	 the	 tariff.	A	 country	with	high	 tariffs	 could	 then	increase	its	taxes	without	impacting	on	the	behaviour	of	firms	selling	into	the	country.	Horst	does	not	consider	what	the	implications	of	the	higher	tax	rate	would	be	for	the	
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domestic	companies	unaffected	by	the	tariffs.	His	work	is	also	based	on	the	assumption	that	there	is	a:	‘tendency	of	effective	tax	rates	to	cluster	around	a	general	norm	–	because	
of	both	a	concern	for	tax	equity	and	the	willingness	of	investor	countries	to	refrain	from	
double	 taxation.’	 (Horst	 1971	 p.	 1068).	 Horst	 also	 assumed	 that	 tax	 rates	 converge	towards	 a	 similar	 price	 and	 that	 therefore	 tariff	 differentials	would	 be	 greater.	 It	 is	likely	however,	that	this	position	has	now	reversed,	particularly	in	relation	to	US	firms.	US	tax	rates	are	now	significantly	higher	than	those	of	its	key	competitors	and	tariffs	have	fallen	globally.	Horst	therefore	underestimates	the	scope	for	modern	MNE	to	gain	through	profit	shifting.		Horst’s	(1971)	model	shows	that	the	profit	maximising	decisions	made	by	the	firm	will	depend	on	whether	the	MC	of	production	are	increasing	or	decreasing	and	on	whether	tariffs	on	imports	are	at	a	high	enough	level	to	enable	them	to	discriminate	perfectly	between	the	two	countries.	Other	work	also	adopted	and	extended	Horst’s	model.	Batra	and	 Hadar	 (1979)	 extend	 Horst’s	 model	 to	 consider	 the	 implications	 of	 fixed	 and	floating	 exchange	 rates.	 They	 also	 include	 the	 US’s	 tax	 credit	 where	 a	 US	 MNE’s	domestic	tax	bill	is	reduced	by	the	amount	of	foreign	tax	paid.	Itagaki	(1979)	models	a	MNE’s	TP	behaviour	with	a	good	understanding	of	the	practical	restraints	on	a	MNE	at	that	time.	He	assumes	that	the	MNE	has	some	scope	to	manipulate	TP	but	that	it	can	only	 do	 this	within	 certain	 boundaries.	 It	 is	 assumed	 that	 the	MNE	will	 set	 the	 TP	between	the	market	price	and	its	marginal	cost	but	in	reality	the	customs	authority	will	set	 the	 base	 level.	 The	 lack	 of	 data	 available	 to	 governments,	 however,	 limits	 their	ability	to	restrict	TP	and	increases	the	MNE’s	scope	to	manipulate	them.	Horst’s	model	would	have	been	significantly	more	complicated	 if	he	had	allowed	for	other	 internal	profit	transfers	without	the	impact	on	tariffs.		Samuelson	 (1982)	and	Eden	 (1983)	argue	 that	 the	 limits	on	TP	are	 functions	of	 the	MNE’s	sales	or	intra	firm	trade,	meaning	they	are	set	endogenously	and	are	affected	by	the	 firm’s	 decision	 making.	 Samuelson	 (1982)	 points	 out	 that	 the	 firm	 may	 have	significant	ability	to	manipulate	the	ALS	price	and	models	that	neglect	this	are	ignoring	a	potentially	important	part	of	a	firm’s	behaviour.	He	argues	that	the	TP	limitations	will	be	 derived	 from	 functions	of	 the	 firm’s	 activities.	 The	 firm	does	 not	 simply	 have	 to	accept	 limitations	placed	on	 the	 ‘fair’	 or	 ‘arms	 length	price’	 it	 can	 charge.	The	TP	 is	
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endogenous	–	the	firm	can	manipulate	its	production	and	sales	in	order	to	change	the	TP.	He	 points	 out	 that	 Horst	 assumes	 that	 the	 firm’s	 actions	 in	 this	 respect	will	 be	
‘second	order,	small	and	may	be	ignored’		(Horst	1971,	p.1069)	but	for	Samuelson,	the	firm’s	ability	to	influence	the	‘arms	length’	TP	may	be	a	key	part	of	its	strategy.		Nieckels	(1976)	takes	the	theory	of	corporate	TP	in	the	domestic	economy	as	developed	by	Hirshleifer	(1956)	and	extends	it	internationally.	He	uses	heuristic	programming	to	model	the	optimal	TP	strategy	for	the	MNE.	He	concludes	that	a	MNE	can	increase	its	profits	overall	by	using	TP	which	are	not	necessarily	arms	length	equivalents	or	those	on	 the	 ‘world	 market’.	 Other	 work	 Eden	 (1978)	 and	 Lessard	 (1979)	 drew	 similar	conclusions.	 All	 of	 this	work	 combines	 to	 underline	 the	 importance	 of	 TP	 as	 a	 key	strategic	tool	for	the	MNE.		Bond	(1980)	builds	on	the	work	of	Hirshleifer	(1956)	and	Horst	(1971)	and	extends	his	model	to	consider	the	implications	of	differential	tax	rates	in	different	countries	on	the	output	and	profitability	of	the	two-division	firm.	When	subsidiaries	face	different	rates	of	corporation	tax	in	different	countries	and	a	high	TP	is	charged	to	subsidiaries	in	high	tax	 jurisdictions	 to	maximise	 the	 overall	 profits	of	 the	MNE,	 this	will	 impact	on	 the	marginal	decisions	made	by	the	subsidiary.	Where	decisions	are	made	–	whether	by	a	centralised	authority	or	in	a	decentralised	manner	within	the	subsidiaries,	will	affect	the	 decisions	made	 and	 therefore	 the	 overall	 profitability	 of	 the	 firm.	 The	 business	trades	off	gains	from	reducing	tax	payments	through	TP,	against	the	efficiency	losses	that	they	incur	from	operating	in	a	way	that	is	less	than	optimally	efficient.			A	 business	 that	 operates	 in	 a	 centralised	 way	 will	 use	 MC	 to	 determine	 the	 profit	maximising	level	of	output	to	produce	and	will	then	use	the	TP	charged	to	divide	the	overall	income	between	the	subsidiaries	to	ensure	that	the	lowest	overall	tax	bill	is	paid.	A	 vertically	 integrated	 firm	 will	make	 more	 profit	 overall	 than	 two	 separate	 firms	buying	and	selling	at	‘arms	length’	because	of	the	difference	in	the	two	tax	rates.	This	underlines	 the	 advantage	 that	 TP	 can	 potentially	 offer,	 stimulating	 the	 decision	 to	establish	a	MNE.	Bond	(1980	p.196)	concludes	that:		
‘The	existence	of	different	tax	rates	creates	an	additional	incentive	to	vertical	integration	
beyond	that	normally	present.’		
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	Lessard	 (1979)	 considers	 the	 wider	 question	 of	 whether	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 MNE	 to	internalise	financial	transactions	gives	it	an	advantage	–	particularly	over	local	firms.	Rather	than	simply	considering	what	the	optimum	TP	should	be	in	different	situations	he	investigates	whether	the	internal	finance	system	affects	the	location	of	production	and	how	it	 impacts	 the	distribution	of	 information	among	consumers,	suppliers	and	governments.	He	asks	the	key	question:	‘Do	MNCs	shift	profits	internally	and	as	a	result	
reduce	total	taxes	and	/	or	alter	the	distribution	of	tax	revenues	for	a	given	distribution	
of	real	activities?	Further,	does	this	profit	shifting	alter	the	distribution	of	real	investment,	
production	and	trade	itself?’	(Lessard	1979,	p.	101).	
	Any	 internal	 transfers	 of	 goods	 or	 services	 which	 could	 include	 finished	 products	through	 to	 intangible	 factors	 such	 as	 management	 services,	 that	 are	 not	 paid	 for	immediately	at	 a	market	price	necessitates	a	 financial	 transfer	at	 some	point	and	 is	likely	to	be	giving	an	advantage	of	some	type	to	the	MNE.	The	capacity	to	choose	the	timing	and	nature	of	an	internal	transfer	gives	the	MNE	an	advantage	either	through	the	 ability	 to	 circumvent	 international	 restrictions	 or	 the	 ability	 to	 engage	 in	 tax	arbitrage	(Rugman	and	Eden	1985;	Eden	1998).	Kopits	(1972	and	1976)	recognised	the	role	that	royalty	payments	could	have	within	TP	due	to	the	unavailability	of	comparable	arms	length	prices	and	as	a	way	of	remitting	payments	back	to	the	parent	company.	He	predicted	that	MNEs	will	hide	profits	as	royalty	payments	and	estimated	that	a	quarter	of	 royalty	 payments	 from	 industrial	 countries	 represented	 concealed	 profits.	Subsidiary	ownership	of	these	FSAs	gives	the	subsidiary	control	over	those	assets	and	resources.	 It	 also	enables	 the	 subsidiary	 to	 charge	other	group	companies	 for	using	those	assets	and	 therefore	affects	where	profits	 are	 recorded	and	 tax	payments	are	made.			The	MNE	can	gain	from	overcoming	formal	financial	restrictions	(exchange	controls)	and	direct	taxes	on	the	international	movement	of	funds	as	well	as	other	restrictions	on	flows	 of	 capital	 or	 investment.	 Informal	 barriers	 can	 also	 be	 overcome	by	 the	MNE	through	 better	 or	 cheaper	 access	 to	 information,	 ability	 to	 enforce	 contracts	 with	subsidiaries	and	lower	transaction	costs	(Lessard	1979).		
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Robbins	and	Stobaugh	(1973)	consider	how	the	financial	system	of	a	MNE	affects	its	behaviour	 and	 outputs.	 They	 emphasise	 the	 importance	 of	 internal	 transfers:	 ‘the	
system	[MNE]	can	be	viewed	as	a	network	of	operating	units	linked	to	one	another	by	the	
movement	of	money’	(Robbins	and	Stobaugh	1973	p.11).	They	conclude	that	the	MNE	has	 particular	 advantages	 that	 stem	 from	 its	 discretion	 over	 the	 timing	 of	 financial	transfers	within	the	MNE	as	well	as	the	ability	to	choose	the	financial	mechanisms	used.		Within	the	field	of	accounting	research	Watson	and	Baumler	(1975)	widen	the	focus	of	work,	 attempting	 to	 set	 the	economic	and	mathematical	modelling	of	TP	within	 the	context	 of	 a	 social	 system.	 They	 consider	 the	 decentralised	 MNE	 and	 argue	 that	decentralisation	is	an	inevitable	response	to	uncertainty.	Once	a	firm	is	decentralised,	differences	 will	 arise	 in	 the	 attitudes	 and	 behaviour	 of	 different	 members	 of	 the	organisation.	They	argue	that	the	most	successful	firms	are	those	that	have	the	right	levels	of	differentiation	and	 integration.	TP	plays	a	dual	role:	ensuring	that	separate	parts	 of	 the	 organisation	 are	 differentiated,	 able	 to	 act	 independently	 and	 also	facilitating	integration	through	the	mechanisms	used	to	establish	TP	between	divisions.	As	a	consequence,	the	TP	system	serves	a	wider	function	within	the	MNE	than	simply	accounting	 for	 internal	 transfers.	 TP	may	 be	 set	 at	 least	 partly	 through	 negotiation	between	 different	 branches.	 The	 TP	 used	 may	 therefore	 not	 simply	 reflect	 the	economically	‘optimal’	price	but	may	be	part	of	an	overall	package	of	measures	used	to	guide	integration	within	the	firm.		The	process	used	to	determine	the	TP	influences	the	outcomes	(Grabski	1985).		Spicer		(1988)	argues	that	theoretical	modelling	of	TP	optimisation	is	limited	as	it	fails	to:	‘lend	itself	to	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	dimensions	of	the	entire	transfer	pricing	
process,	 in	 the	 wide	 variety	 of	 organisational	 contexts	 within	 firms	 in	 which	 transfer	
pricing	systems	operate’.	The	way	in	which	the	MNE	is	organised	will	impact	on	the	TP	system	used	and	whether	it	in	fact	achieves	an	economically	optimal	solution.	He	argues	that	variations	in	the	MNE’s	strategy	and	organisation	as	well	as	the	extent	and	type	of	intra	firm	transactions	will	influence	the	choice	of	TP	policies	implemented	rather	than	whether	they	are	economically	optimal.	He	argues	that	empirical	research	is	needed	to	understand	the	process	by	which	TP	are	set	within	MNE.		
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A	key	question	is	the	extent	to	which	manipulating	the	TP	affects	only	financial	factors,	profit	shifting	between	subsidiaries	or	whether	 it	also	affects	 the	underlying	activity	and	decision	making	of	 the	MNE.	Research	 is	needed	now	to	understand	how	MNEs	make	 these	decisions.	Are	 the	predictions	of	 the	 theoretical	models	 correct?	And	 to	what	extent	does	the	use	of	TP	give	MNEs	a	real	advantage	over	the	purely	domestic	firm?	The	next	section	considers	the	wider	 implications	of	TP	manipulation,	moving	from	the	individual	firm	to	the	consequences	for	global	welfare	and	efficiency.	
2.1.6 Efficiency and Global Welfare Scholars	have	considered	how	a	firm	could	operate	optimally	to	maximise	both	private	and	 social	 efficiency	 (Hirshleifer	 1956;	 Eden	 1985).	 The	 growth	 of	 the	MNE	 and	 its	increasing	 impact	 on	 many	 aspects	 of	 the	 global	 economy	 reinforces	 the	 need	 to	consider	the	overall	impact	of	TP	on	global	welfare.	This	was	a	key	issue	for	Penrose	(1959)	 who	 considered	 the	 distributional	 issues	 implied	 by	 the	 successful	establishment	of	a	subsidiary	 in	a	host	country.	She	was	concerned	with	both	 ‘value	
creation’	and	‘value	appropriation’.	Value	creation	by	the	MNE	could	make	an	important	contribution	 to	 a	 host	 country,	 but	 the	 efficient	 distribution	 of	 profits;	 their	‘appropriation’	 would	 require	 government	 intervention.	 Penrose	 felt	 that	 profits	should	be	reinvested	in	the	firm	and	that	dividends	to	investors	needed	to	be	set	at	a	level	sufficient	to	induce	investment	in	the	firm	but	should	not	exceed	this	basic	level.		Penrose	(1959)	argues	that	corporate	taxation	can	distort	the	actions	of	a	firm,	affecting	the	decisions	of	managers,	particularly	in	relation	to	the	way	that	the	wealth	generated	by	the	firm	is	then	held	and	distributed.	Tax	planning	activities	by	MNEs	are	motivated	by	the	desire	to	ensure	that	the	MNE	itself	appropriates	the	rent	that	it	has	generated,	minimising	the	amount	of	rent	paid	to	the	government.		A	MNE’s	efficiency	in	terms	of	the	best	allocation	of	factor	inputs	may	be	impacted	if	an	MNE	manipulates	TP	in	order	to	shift	profits.	Bond	(1980)	assumes	that	the	MNE	uses	a	 single	 TP	 for	 both	 allocating	 resources	within	 the	 firm	 and	 for	 tax	 purposes.	 The	business	must	therefore	trade	off	the	gains	it	makes	from	reducing	its	overall	tax	bill	against	 the	 efficiency	 losses	 that	 it	 incurs	 from	operating	 in	 a	way	 that	 is	 less	 than	optimally	 efficient.	 Others	 consider	 the	 impact	 of	 TP	 on	 the	 efficiency	 of	 the	 firm’s	decision-making	and	conclude	that	firms	need	separate	accounting	systems	to	ensure	
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that	 internal	 decisions,	 pertaining	 to	 resource	 allocations,	 are	 not	 driven	 by	 the	manipulated	TP	(Nieckels	1976).	As	Casson	(1979	p.	51)	points	out,	MNEs	can	gain	by:	
‘dichotomising	 real	 and	 nominal	 prices,	 the	 real	 prices	 being	 a	 guide	 to	 resource	
allocation,	the	nominal	prices	to	present	the	façade	of	compliance	with	price	control	or	
minimise	the	tariff	liabilities’.		Writers	have	differed	in	the	conclusions	that	they	have	drawn	about	the	impact	of	TP	on	overall	efficiency	and	its	impact	on	global	welfare.		Lessard	(1979)	Rugman	(1980,	1981)	and	Aliber	(1985)	argue	that	by	using	TP	the	MNE	improves	global	welfare.	TP	are	 an	 efficient	 response	 by	 the	 MNE	 in	 order	 to	 overcome	 exogenous	 market	imperfections	such	as	tariffs,	tax	rate	differentials,	exchange	controls	and	tax	havens	(Plasschaert	1979;	Rugman	1980).	 	According	to	Rugman	(1980)	whatever	price	the	firm	chooses	 to	use	 for	 its	 internal	pricing	 system	 is	 correct.	Comparing	 them	 to	an	‘arms	length	price’	is	unnecessary	both	because	a	‘correct’	arms	length	price	is	unlikely	to	exist	and	because	whatever	price	the	firm	chooses	is	automatically	correct.	As	long	as	the	final	goods	which	are	produced	are	sold	openly:	‘It	is	meaningless	to	examine	the	
transfer	prices	on	 their	own	or	attempt	 to	 compare	 them	 to	non	existent	arms	 length	
prices’	(Rugman	1980	p.77).	 	He	also	questions	the	ability	of	 the	MNE	to	establish	a	‘correct’	 price	 when	 intangibles	 such	 as	 knowledge	 or	 managerial	 skills	 are	 being	valued.	 Rugman,	 however,	 ignores	 the	 occasions	 when	 there	 may	 exist	 a	 vibrant	external	market	for	an	intermediate	good	for	example	for	an	intermediate	product	that	is	also	readily	available	in	the	external	market.	In	these	circumstances	determining	the	relevant	TP	will	be	straightforward.			Whilst	for	Rugman	the	TP	is	an	internal	matter,	affecting	only	the	internal	allocation	of	resources,	national	governments	will	perceive	the	matter	differently.	If	the	final	good	is	being	sold	in	a	competitive	market	Rugman	argues	that	the	TP	will	not	affect	the	final	price	charged	by	the	company.	This	ignores,	however,	the	allocation	of	profits	between	different	 jurisdictions.	 Developing	 countries	 in	 particular	may	 rely	 on	 income	 from	MNEs	with	income	adversely	affected	if	the	MNE	chooses	to	allocate	profits	out	of	their	country.			
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Rugman	(1980)	ignores	the	impact	on	the	allocation	of	tax	payments,	his	point	is	that	the	overall	profitability	of	the	MNE	will	not	be	affected	by	using	TP.	He	suggests	instead	that:	‘The	overall	profits	of	the	MNE	should	be	analysed	rather	than	partial	aspects	of	the	
firm	such	as	transfer	pricing’	(Rugman	1980	p.	77).	Whilst	overall	efficiency	is	unlikely	to	 be	 affected,	 it	 is,	 however,	 likely	 that	 there	will	 be	 an	 impact	 on	welfare	 via	 the	distribution	 of	 profits.	 Rugman	 (1980)	 explains	 that	 after	 internalization,	 the	distribution	of	resources,	intermediate	products	and	other	factors	are	decided	within	the	boundaries	of	the	firm:	 ‘In	this	process	of	internalization	it	is	natural	that	internal	
[transfer]	prices	are	used’	(Rugman	1980	p.	76).		These	prices:	‘have	to	be	respected	as	
the	prices	necessary	to	make	the	MNE	function	efficiently’.		(Rugman	1980	p.	76).				Rugman	(1980,	1981)	is	concerned	simply	with	the	efficiency	of	the	MNE	rather	than	the	impact	of	its	decisions	on	welfare.	He	suggests	that	if	governments	are	concerned	they	will	be	incentivised	to	harmonise	tax	rates.	This	ignores	the	very	real	difficulties,	or	impossibility	of	governments	being	able	to	coordinate	taxes	on	a	global	level.		In	fact,	Rugman	(1980)	goes	further	listing:	‘international	tax	rate	differentials’	(Rugman	1980	p.	76)	amongst	the	market	imperfections	that	the	MNE	is	created	to	overcome.	He	is	explicit	 that	unless	governments	harmonise	 tax	differentials	 they	will	 impact	on	 the	behaviour	of	MNEs.	Casson	 (1979),	however,	 suggests	 that	TP,	undertaken	solely	 to	divert	 tax	 revenues	away	 from	governments	will	 cause	an	over	extension	of	 foreign	investment,	harming	not	just	the	allocation	of	government	revenues	but	also	potentially	impairing	the	performance	of	the	firm.		The	recent	growth	of	tax	competition	between	countries	has	exacerbated	the	situation.	Rather	than	governments	working	together	to	overcome	TP	manipulation	through	the	coordination	of	tax	rates	and	regimes,	they	are	competing	by	lowering	tax	rates	in	an	attempt	to	attract	MNE	investment	(Zodrow	2003;	Devereux	et	al	2008;	Devereux	and	Loretz	(2013a).				Rugman	(1980)	 is	sceptical	about	the	extent	 to	which	MNEs	will	use	distorted	TP	to	shift	 profits.	 He	 accepts	 the	 work	 by	 Lall	 (1979)	 and	 Vaitsos	 (1974),	 which	 found	evidence	of	TP	distortion	 in	the	pharmaceutical	 industry.	 In	his	own	study	(Rugman	1985)	of	the	Canadian	mineral	resource	industry,	however,	he	found	no	evidence	for	
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TP	manipulation	 after	 risk	 factors	were	 taken	 into	 account.	 	More	 recent	work	 has	found,	often	indirect	and	broad-sweeping	evidence	of	profit	shifting	using	a	variety	of	mechanisms	 other	 than	 TP	 to	 enable	 the	 MNE	 to	 gain	 from	 tax	 arbitrage	 (Taylor,	Richardson	and	Lanis	2015;	Dischinger	and	Riedel	2011;	Altshuler	and	Grubert	2006).		Others	(Bond	1980;	Diewert	1985)	have	also	argued	that	TP	worsens	the	allocation	of	resources,	resulting	in	a	negative	impact	on	global	welfare.	Distortions	in	price	signals	lead	to	an	inefficient	distribution	of	resources.	Bond	(1980)	argues	that	TP	in	response	to	tax	differentials	distort	resource	allocation	as	the	MNE	trades	off:	‘the	gains	from	tax	
evasion	against	 the	efficiency	 losses	 resulting	 from	resource	allocation’	 (Bond	1980,	p	192).	Eden	(1985)	and	Diewert	(1985)	accept	that	TPs	set	using	the	ALS	are	generally	efficient.	They	argue	that	in	a	world	of	tariffs	and	corporate	profit	taxes	the	MNE	would	not	set	the	TP	at	marginal	cost.	A	global	profit	maximising	MNE	chooses	a	TP	such	that	it	trades	the	gain	from	minimising	tax	and	tariff	costs	against	the	loss	in	misallocated	resources	(from	not	using	the	MC).		Eden	(1985)	explores	the	interplay	between	tariffs	and	tax	differentials	and	adopts	an	overall	more	nuanced	position	demonstrating	the	complexity	of	the	issue.	Her	model	demonstrates	that	the	TP	chosen	by	the	MNE	to	maximise	profits	may	be	either	more	or	 less	 efficient	 when	 attempting	 to	 overcome	 government	 imposed	 market	inefficiencies.	 Kant	 (1988)	 also	 concludes	 that	 the	 impact	 on	 global	 welfare	 is	ambiguous.	He	explores	the	 impact	on	company	behaviour	and	returns	in	home	and	host	 country	 if	 penalties	 for	 TP	 are	 increased.	 If	 the	 likelihood	 of	 penalties	 being	incurred	by	the	MNE	increases,	the	TP	used	will	move	towards	the	arms	length	price.	The	 consumer	 surplus	 in	 the	 source	 country	will	 increase	 and	 fiscal	 abuses	will	 be	lower.	However,	 the	 consumer	 surplus	 in	 the	host	 country	will	 decrease	 so	 that	 no	general	conclusions	on	the	effects	of	TP	are	possible.	If	there	is	no	prospect	of	a	penalty,	then,	where	the	tax	rate	differential	is	enough,	the	MNE	will	under	invoice	its	exports	as	much	as	possible.	In	reality,	developing	countries	are	unlikely	to	have	the	resources	to	 police	 the	 TP	 regime	 sufficiently.	 MNE	 are	 able	 to	 manipulate	 TP	 in	 developing	countries	with	little	fear	of	reprisal	(Muller	and	Kolk	2015;	Durst	2016).	Looking	at	the	overall	UK	system	of	taxation,	the	Mirrlees	Review	(Mirrlees	et	al	2010)	concluded	that	changes	are	needed	to	improve	national	welfare	and	efficiency.	The	review	concludes	
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that	the	tax	system	distorts	behaviour	by	treating	similar	activities	in	different	ways	within	the	tax	system.	Understanding	the	 impact	of	 the	tax	system	on	efficiency	and	global	welfare	is	hampered	by	the	difficulties	in	conducting	empirical	work	in	this	area.	The	next	section	goes	on	to	discuss	these	difficulties	in	greater	detail.	
2.1.7 Difficulties Affecting the Development of IB Research on Taxation This	section	discusses	how	changing	perspectives	on	the	MNE	and	their	role	may	have	impacted	the	quantity	and	nature	of	the	research	conducted	in	this	area.	As	the	sections	above	demonstrate,	as	the	theory	of	IB	developed,	TP	became	less	prominent	with	few	articles	 specifically	 discussing	 TP	 or	 financial	 factors,	 published	 in	 IB	 journals.	International	 TP	 papers	 have	 however	 been	 published	 regularly	 in	 accounting,	international	taxation	and	public	economics	journals	(see	Table	1	p.41)	As	discussed	above,	 early	 work	 focused	 on	 developing	models	 that	 explore	 the	 impact	 of	 TP	 on	company	profitability	as	well	as	on	global	welfare.	Little	direct	and	relevant	empirical	evidence,	however,	has	been	provided.		As	the	previous	sections	note,	work	explicitly	focusing	on	TP	began	in	the	1950s	and	progressed	steadily.	Early	work	established	models	to	determine	the	optimal	TP	and	outputs	 for	 firms	under	a	 range	of	different	assumptions.	Later	work	added	 further	assumptions	and	explicitly	considered	the	MNE.	Concern	in	the	1970s,	however,	about	the	power	of	MNEs	and	their	ability	to	erode	the	sovereignty	of	governments	created	interest	 in	 TP	 and	 corporation	 tax	 avoidance.	 During	 the	 1980s	 these	 concerns	appeared	to	lessen.	The	1980s	and	1990s,	brought	a	change	in	attitude	with	a	period	of	‘redemption	for	the	multinational	enterprise’	(Vernon	1998	p.5).	The	benefits	that	MNEs	brought	in	terms	of	capital	investment,	technology	transfer,	advanced	managerial	skills	and	job	creation	meant	that	governments	lost	some	of	their	hostility	towards	the	MNE	and:	 ‘engaged	in	numerous	bilateral,	regional	and	global	negotiations	aimed	largely	at	
smoothing	the	path	for	further	expansion	of	the	multinationals’	(Vernon	1998	p.5).		This	attitude	towards	the	MNE	appears	to	be	reflected	in	the	decline	in	corporate	tax	articles	published	in	JIBS	after	the	mid	1980s.		Von	Neuman	Whitman	(1999)	argues	that	the	1980s	was	a	time	of	huge	instability	for	US	 companies	 with	 large	 numbers	 of	 takeovers,	 mergers	 and	 reorganisations.	
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Competition	 increased	 significantly	and	profit	margins	 fell.	 She	argues	 that	 the	high	levels	of	competition	forced	companies	to	focus	narrowly	on	the	bottom	line,	reducing	the	paternalism	and	social	responsibility	exhibited	by	US	companies	prior	to	this.	These	same	pressures	may	also	have	encouraged	companies	to	consider	their	tax	payments	as	an	area	with	potential	for	savings	to	be	made.			Work	looking	at	TP	manipulation	as	a	means	of	tax	arbitrage	concluded	that	without	international	cooperation	between	governments	and	coherence	on	the	 level	of	 taxes	internationally,	MNEs	would	continue	to	try	to	avoid	tax	(Rugman	1980).	Setting	the	levels	of	tax	is	a	key	element	of	government	fiscal	power	and	supra	national	cooperation	is	difficult.	The	 incentive	 for	academic	work	 in	this	area	may	be	reduced;	whilst	 the	problem	of	TP	manipulation	had	been	diagnosed,	no	 solution	 could	be	 forthcoming.	Falling	tariff	levels,	the	signing	of	free	trade	agreements,	including	the	ratification	of	NAFTA	in	1992,	and	a	more	positive	view	of	the	MNE	may	also	have	reduced	interest	in	conducting	work	on	TP	manipulation	from	within	the	IB	community.				It	is	recognized	that	empirical	work	in	this	area	is	difficult	due	to	the	lack	of	information	available	to	researchers.	Companies	are	reluctant	to	disclose	information	about	the	use	of	TP	or	 their	 tax	planning	positions.	Perhaps	because	of	 these	practical	difficulties,	little	 research	 empirically	 testing	 these	models	 has	 been	 published.	 Recent	 calls	 for	greater	transparency	including	the	publication	of	‘Country	by	Country	Reporting’	and	more	automatic	exchange	of	information	between	tax	authorities	as	per	OECD	on	BEPS	(Murphy	2016;	Eden	2016)	are	needed.	However,	these	proposals	have	been	met	by	some	hostility	from	the	accounting	standard-setting	bodies	because	they	contradict	a	number	of	current	 financial	accounting	standards	and	reporting	requirements	and	 if	implemented	 it	 is	 as	 yet	 unclear	 whether	 the	 information	 will	 be	 made	 publicly	available.	 Greater	 transparency	 in	 the	 future	 however,	 may	 enable	 further,	 more	detailed	empirical	work.			But	now,	more	than	ever,	research	work	is	needed.	After	the	global	financial	crisis	of	2008,	 pressure	 on	 domestic	 budgets	 stimulated	 government	 interest	 in	 reducing	corporation	tax	avoidance.	Governments’	and	international	bodies’	(OECD,	EU)	interest	in	tax	avoidance	has	been	driven	by	the	desire	to	increase	government	tax	revenues	in	
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times	 of	 austerity.	 Publicity	 surrounding	 high	 profile	 tax	 avoidance	 cases	 has	 also	stimulated	 interest	 from	 the	 public,	 putting	 further	 pressure	 on	 governments	 and	bodies,	such	as	the	Her	Majesty’s	Revenue	and	Customs	(HMRC)	to	ensure	that	MNEs	are	paying	their	‘fair’	share	of	taxes	(Dyreng,	Hoopes	and	Wilde	2016).			The	digital	economy	and	expanding	global	value	chains	have	 increased	the	ability	of	increasingly	mobile	MNEs	 to	 shift	profits	globally,	 giving	 them	more	discretion	over	which	tax	jurisdiction	they	report	profits	in.	Global	value	chains	are	growing	in	length	and	complexity	as	better	 communications	systems	enable	MNEs	 to	maintain	 control	and	coherence	over	complex	networks	at	great	distances.	UNCTAD	(2010)	estimates	that	MNE	internal	cross	border	transactions	take	place	now	account	for	one	third	of	the	world’s	exports.	
2.1.8 Conclusions This	review	has	demonstrated	the	importance	of	profit	shifting	and	TP	as	a	theoretical	issue.	The	important	roles	of	financial	planning	and	TP	were	acknowledged	as	offering	competitive	 advantages	 to	 the	MNE	 as	 the	 theory	 of	 internalization	was	 developed.	Over	time	these	roles	have	become	neglected	as	research	topics,	driven	by	the	shifting	attitudes	 of	 government	 and	 policy	 makers,	 combined	 with	 the	 real	 difficulties	encountered	in	trying	to	conduct	empirical	research	in	this	area.		Theory	has	evolved	sporadically	and	in	different	areas	but	there	is	no	unifying	theory	of	what	drives	the	MNE	to	avoid	tax	and	the	implications	that	this	tax	planning	has	for	the	firm’s	wider	operational	strategy.	Internalization	theory	highlights	the	advantage	of	 tax	 planning	 to	 the	 MNE	 over	 domestic	 companies.	 Early	 work	 considering	 the	motives	of	MNEs	for	FDI	 includes	the	 ‘escape’	motive,	 including	corporation	tax	and	other	regulations	within	the	model,	but	as	with	other	aspects	of	corporation	tax,	this	area	was	subsequently	neglected.			Detailed	economic	models	of	TP	were	developed	that	add	to	our	understanding	of	the	potential	 gains	 from	TP	manipulation	 but	 little	 extant	 theory	 considers	 the	modern	reality	 of	 how	 MNEs	 operate	 and	 set	 TP.	 It	 is	 important	 that	 empirically	 testable	theoretical	models	are	developed.			
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	The	 next	 section	 turns	 to	 the	 published	 empirical	 literature	 on	 the	 subject	 of	corporation	 tax,	 tax	 planning	 and	 tax	 avoidance.	 The	 chapter	 concludes	 by	 drawing	together	 the	 gaps	 across	 the	 literature	 and	 where	 indicating	 specifically	 further	research	is	needed.		 	
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2.2 Empirical Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
2.2.1 Introduction This	section	presents	the	key	empirical	research	findings	related	to	corporation	tax	and	the	MNE.	As	corporation	tax	is	a	cross	cutting	issue	this	empirical	review	covers	key	work	 conducted	 within	 the	 fields	 of	 international	 business,	 economics,	 accounting,	finance	and	law.	As	noted	in	the	previous	section,	work	focussing	on	taxation	from	an	IB	perspective	has	been	limited,	but	there	are	important	findings	from	within	IB	that	are	included	here	and	that	add	to	the	debate.		It	is	now	widely	accepted	that	tax	differentials	between	countries	affect	the	behaviour	of	 MNEs	 (Altshuler	 and	 Grubert	 2002;	 Rego	 2003;	 Markle	 and	 Shackelford	 2009;	Hanlon	 and	 Heitzman	 2010;	 Azemar	 2010;	 Dharmapala	 and	 Riedel	 2013;	 Fuest,	Spengel,	 Finke,	Heckemeyer	 and	Nusser	 2013;	 Taylor,	 Richardson	 and	 Lanis	 2015).	Research	at	the	aggregate	level	has	demonstrated	that	US	companies	have	considerable	ability	to	shift	their	profits	(Grubert	and	Mutti	1991;	Hines	and	Rice	1994;	Huizinga	and	Laeven	 2008),	 that	 this	 ability	 is	 increasing	 (Altshuler,	 Grubert	 and	 Newlon	 2000;	Klassen	and	LaPlante	2012;	Zucman	2014)	and	that	MNE	are	becoming	more	sensitive	to	tax	rates	(Altshuler,	Grubert	and	Newlon	2000).			Growing	 tax	 competition	between	countries	has	 increased	 the	ability	of	 the	MNE	 to	arbitrage.	Tax	differentials,	combined	with	the	home	and	host	tax	regulations	(Dyreng,	Lindsey,	Markle	and	Shackelford	2015)	have	an	impact	on	the	location	and	amount	of	capital	invested	abroad	(Grubert	and	Mutti	2000;	Dischinger	and	Riedel	2011;	Voget	2011;	Barrios,	Huizinga,	Laeven	and	Nicodeme	2012)	the	way	in	which	the	investment	is	 financed	 (Gordon	 and	 Lee	 2001;	 Egger,	 Eggert,	 Keuschnigg	 and	 Winner	 2010;	Harrington	 and	 Smith	 2012;	 Taylor	 and	 Richardson	 2013)	 transactions	 between	related	parties	 (Brajcich,	Friesner	and	Schibik	2016)	and	 the	 repatriation	of	 earned	profits	 (Altshuler	 and	 Grubert	 2002;	 Blouin,	 Krull	 and	 Robinson	 2012;	 Brajcich,	Friesner	and	McPherson	2013a).		The	overview	of	research	presented	here	begins	by	discussing	some	of	 the	 inherent	problems	 for	 researchers	 in	 this	 area.	 It	 then	 turns	 to	 research	 that	 provides	 an	
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overview	of	the	issues	of	tax	avoidance	and	profit	shifting.	Section	2.2.3	considers	the	extent	of	profit	shifting	before	Section	2.2.4	presents	the	broad	types	of	mechanisms	that	MNE	 can	 use	 to	 shift	 profits	 and	 the	 extant	 research	 related	 to	 these.	 Further	sections	consider	the	impact	of	location,	the	functioning	of	TP,	cash	holdings	and	the	characteristics	of	MNEs	and	their	effects	on	tax	planning.		The	final	section	concludes,	discussing	the	overall	picture	of	what	is	known	about	the	tax	avoiding	MNE:	the	processes	involved	as	well	as	the	motivations.	It	considers	the	need	for	further	work	on	this	subject	to	drive	our	understanding	of	a	key	part	of	MNE	behaviour.		As	noted	in	Chapter	1,	much	of	the	work	on	corporation	tax	and	the	MNE	focuses	on	US	companies.	 The	 high	 rate	 of	 tax	 in	 the	 US,	 35	 per	 cent	 against	 25.5	 per	 cent	OECD	average	in	2013	(Tax	Foundation	2013)	combined	with	their	high	levels	of	outward	FDI	make	US	MNEs	prominent	in	this	debate.	This	review	of	the	literature	therefore	has	a	similar	US	bias	but	attention	is	also	drawn	to	research	focusing	on	other	localities.		The	 following	 sections	 turn	 to	 consider	what	drives	 companies	 to	avoid	 tax	and	 the	mechanisms	used	to	avoid	it.	There	is	a	large	body	of	research	that	looks	at	different	aspects	 of	 MNEs,	 and	 tries	 to	 establish	 the	 relationship	 between	 particular	characteristics	and	the	propensity	to	avoid	tax.	Hanlon	and	Heitzman	(2010)	argue	that	the	question	 ‘why	do	some	corporations	avoid	more	tax	than	others?’	 is	an	 important	question	 requiring	more	 research.	 They	 also	 raise	 the	 question:	 ‘who	makes	 the	 tax	
decisions	for	the	firm?’	Similarly,	Shackelford	and	Shevlin	(2001)	call	for	more	research	on	 the	 determinants	 of	 tax	 aggressiveness.	 The	 following	 sections	 of	 this	 literature	review	consider	the	research	that	has	been	undertaken	looking	at	the	following	firm	characteristics:	multinationality,	size,	profitability,	corporate	social	responsibility	and	management,	 and	 their	 impacts	 on	 tax	 planning	 aggressiveness.	 Hypotheses	 are	developed	detailing	the	direction	of	causality	and	the	key	measures	of	tax	avoidance:	LR	 Cash	 and	 GAAP	 ETRs.	 These	 hypotheses	 are	 then	 tested	 in	 Chapter	 5	 using	regression	techniques.	The	full	details	of	the	research	methods	used	are	presented	in	Chapter	3.	
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2.2.2 Inherent Difficulties in Researching this Area Empirical	 work	 in	 this	 area	 is	 difficult	 to	 conduct	 due	 to	 the	 problems	 involved	 in	collecting	sufficient	data.	Companies	do	not	disclose	 the	details	of	 their	 tax	 returns,	leaving	the	audited	annual	financial	accounts	as	the	main	source	of	evidence.	Financial	accounts	are	presented	for	shareholders	to	assess	the	financial	on-going	performance	of	the	firm.	They	work	on	an	accruals	basis	so	that	revenue	is	recognised	at	the	time	that	it	is	earned	rather	than	when	cash	is	received.	Similarly,	expenses	are	recognised	relating	to	the	time	period	presented	rather	than	when	cash	leaves	the	bank	account.	The	result	of	the	accruals	accounting	is	that	it	enables	a	clear	picture	of	a	company’s	profitability	and	assets	over	a	particular	period	of	time	to	be	established.		A	note	to	the	accounts	provides	details	about	tax	liabilities	or	assets	and	where	taxes	have	been	paid	but	again	on	an	accruals	basis.		Corporate	 tax	 returns,	 the	 confidential	 submissions	 to	 the	 tax	authorities	which	are	distinct	 from	 the	 audited	 financial	 accounts	 can	 only	 infrequently	 be	 accessed	 by	researchers	(Grubert	and	Mutti	2000).	The	information	contained,	relating	directly	to	tax	payments,	is	useful	but	will	need	supplementing	with	information	on	company	size,	etc.	drawn	from	the	annual	reports,	meaning	that	the	problem	of	matching	periods	is	then	re-encountered	(Hanlon	and	Heitzman	2010).		Identifying	profit-shifting	behaviour	empirically	 is	 inherently	difficult.	MNEs	are	not	currently	 required	 to	 disclose	 their	 sales	 or	 profits	 on	 a	 country-by-country	 basis.	Group	 accounts	 report	 the	 consolidated	 sales	 with	 some	 information	 on	 regional/	geographic	segment	turnover	and	profit	but	there	is	no	requirement	to	present	taxes	on	a	 country	or	 regional/	geographic	basis.	Companies	are	 required	 (through	FRS	8	(UK)	published	by	the	Accounting	Standards	Board	(1995)	and	IAS	24	(international)	(Related	Party	Disclosure)	to	report	information	on	intra	company	payments	in	their	annual	reports	but	an	exception	can	be	made	where	the	company	feels	that	disclosing	this	information	would	put	them	at	a	competitive	disadvantage	(Accounting	Standards	Boards	1995,	para.	17).	In	reality,	most	companies	use	this	exception	and	do	not	reveal	intra	company	payments.		
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Most	studies	therefore	consider	indirect	measures	of	tax	payments	and	where	profits	have	 been	made.	 The	 different	measures	 used	 as	 dependent	 variables	 (DV)	 and	 the	issues	 surrounding	 their	 use	 are	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 5.	 The	 level	 of	 secrecy	surrounding	 tax	 haven	 and	 OFCs	 adds	 a	 further	 complication	making	 it	 difficult	 or	impossible	 to	 access	 data	 on	 affiliates	 in	 these	 locations.	 This	makes	 it	 difficult	 for	researchers	to	know	how,	and	to	what	extent	these	tax	haven	affiliates	are	used.	For	MNEs,	tax	is	a	sensitive	issue	with	few	companies	welcoming	researchers	or	willingly	providing	information	and	data.			The	age	of	some	earlier	studies	may	mean	that	their	findings	are	less	relevant	today.	Corporation	tax	rates	and	regulations	have	changed	significantly	over	the	20	-	30	years	since	the	publication	of	the	data	in	some	of	these	studies	and	the	behaviour	of	MNEs	has	 also	 changed,	 facilitated	 by	 the	 rapid	 advances	 in	 communications	 technology.		Whilst	 the	US	 statutory	 corporate	 income	 tax	 rate	 has	 not	 changed,	 the	 regulations	surrounding	it	and	the	scope	of	business	that	it	embraces	have	changed.			This	chapter	now	turns	to	look	at	the	evidence	for	profit	shifting	in	general	followed	by	more	in	depth	discussions	of	the	research	relating	to	specific	methods	of	profit	shifting.	
2.2.3 Assessing the Extent of Profit Shifting This	section	reviews	literature	that	is	concerned	with	the	overall	scale	of	profit	shifting.	Work	has	taken	a	variety	of	approaches	and	sources	of	data	to	understand	this	problem	and	has	been	unified	 in	 the	general	 findings:	profit	shifting	happens	on	a	significant	scale	in	response	to	tax	rate	differentials	and	is	growing.		MNEs	choose	to	use	profit	shifting	to	mitigate	the	effects	of	host	country	statutory	tax	rates	 and	 regulations.	 A	 tranche	 of	 existing	 studies	 consider	 the	 existence	 and	magnitude	 of	 profit	 shifting	motivated	 by	 tax	 avoidance.	 The	 lack	 of	 available	 data	means	that	the	measures	and	methodologies	employed	are	varied.			Early	 studies	 examine	 changes	 in	 corporate	 behaviour	 following	 movement	 in	corporate	 income	tax	rates	(Grubert	and	Mutti	1991;	Hines	and	Rice	1994;	Huizinga	and	Laeven	2008).	Grubert	 and	Mutti	 (1991)	show	 that	 there	 is	 a	 clear	 relationship	
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between	the	profitability	of	US	MNEs	and	the	host	country	tax	rates;	findings	that	were	repeated	by	Hines	and	Rice	(1994).		Klassen	and	LaPlante	(2012)	find	evidence	for	profit	shifting,	following	a	methodology	used	by	Collins,	Kemsley	and	Lang	(2008)	but	using	a	5	year	time	horizon	rather	than	the	 single	year	used	by	Collins	et	 al	 (2008).	They	 regress	 foreign	profits	on	average	profitability,	with	 the	 residual	 a	 proxy	 capturing	 the	 unexpected	 foreign	 income	 on	average.	 Where	 this	 residual	 is	 correlated	 with	 tax	 incentive,	 tax	 motivated	 profit	shifting	is	inferred.	Collins	et	al	(2008)	found	no	evidence	for	profit	shifting	out	of	the	US	but	by	using	a	five	year	time	period	Klassen	and	LaPlante	(2012)	find	that	US	MNEs	shifted	more	of	their	global	profits	out	of	the	US	during	the	period	2005-2009	compared	to	their	earlier	comparison	period	of	1998-2002.	Despite	the	data	showing	the	expected	profit	 shifting	 behaviour,	 Klassen	 and	 LaPlante	 (2012)	 supplement	 their	 statistical	analysis	with	a	section	reporting	anecdotal	evidence	about	a	number	of	high	profile	US	MNEs	and	how	they	have	reduced	their	US	tax	burden	through	profit	shifting.		Zucman	 (2014)	 uses	 macro	 data,	 (US	 national	 accounts	 and	 balance	 of	 payment	statistics),	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	profit	shifting.	He	computes	the	ETR	on	the	profits	recorded	by	US	MNEs	on	a	world-wide	basis	by	taking	the	corporate	taxes	paid	by	all	firms	out	of	the	US	corporate	profits	as	recorded	in	the	national	accounts.	There	has	been	a	steady	fall	in	this	ETR	from	approximately	30	per	cent	in	1998	to	20	per	cent	in	2013,	whilst	the	statutory	rate	has	remained	unchanged	at	35	per	cent.	He	calculates	that	factors	other	than	tax	avoidance	have	accounted	for	a	proportion	of	this	change	as	tax	law	changes	have	narrowed	the	taxable	base	and	allowances	for	depreciation	have	become	more	generous.	A	reduction	in	capital	gains	and	a	rise	in	bad	debt	expense	also	contributed	to	the	 fall:	 these	would	reduce	a	 firm’s	 taxable	profits	but	would	not	be	reflected	in	the	national	accounts	measure	used	by	Zucman	(2014).	The	fall	would	also	have	been	exacerbated	to	some	extent	by	the	fall	in	profits	and	increase	in	losses	that	can	be	carried	forwards	and	offset	against	taxes,	from	the	2008	financial	crash.	Zucman	(2014),	however	points	out	that	the	2013	ETR	has	not	increased	significantly	since	its	low	 point	 of	 18.4	 per	 cent	 in	 2009	when	 these	 impacts	would	 have	 been	 felt	most	strongly.			
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Zucman	(2014)	also	finds	a	key	role	for	tax	havens.	He	reports	that	20	per	cent	of	all	US	corporate	profits	are	now	booked	in	tax	havens.	He	calculates	that	about	two	thirds	of	the	10	per	cent	decline	in	US	MNE’s	ETR	(1998	to	2013)	can	be	attributed	to	increased	profit-shifting	 to	 low-tax	 jurisdictions.	 Zucman	 (2014)	 also	 finds	 that	 the	 use	 of	 tax	havens	has	grown	ten	fold	since	the	1980s.		Instead	 of	 considering	 US	MNEs	 Huizinga	 and	 Laeven	 (2008)	 focus	 on	 a	 sample	 of	European	MNEs	and	their	affiliates	and	find	evidence	of	substantial	profit	shifting,	both	between	the	parent’s	home	country	and	affiliates	and	also	between	affiliates	in	different	host	 countries.	 They	 conclude	 that	 this	 leads	 to	 a	 substantial	 redistribution	 of	 tax	revenues	between	countries	in	Europe.	The	weighted	average	of	international	tax	rate	differences	between	all	the	countries	where	a	MNE	has	affiliates	operating	will	affect	the	profit	shifting	into	or	out	of	a	specific	country.			Dharmapala	and	Riedel	(2013)	take	a	different	approach	to	estimating	the	extent	of	profit	shifting.	They	consider	how	MNEs	respond	to	exogenous	earnings	shocks	at	the	parent	firm.	Using	a	large	panel	of	European	MNE	affiliates	they	find	strong	evidence	of	profit	shifting.	A	positive	earnings	shock	to	the	parent	company	typically	has	no	impact	on	 subsidiaries	 in	high	 tax	 countries	but	around	2	per	 cent	of	 the	additional	parent	earnings	are	shifted	directly	to	subsidiaries	in	low	tax	countries.	Whilst	these	findings	are	statistically	significant	the	shift	is	of	a	relatively	small	magnitude	at	only	2	per	cent.	Analogously,	 Bartelsman	 and	Beetsma	 (2003)	determine	 that	 at	 a	 sectoral	 level	 the	value	added	that	is	reported	is	negatively	related	to	corporation	tax	rates.	Considering	OECD	countries,	they	suggest	that	government	revenues	are	affected	by	profit	shifting	as	a	consequence	of	a	tax	increase.	Tax	revenues	are	reduced	as	MNEs	respond	to	an	increase	in	statutory	rates	by	reporting	a	decline	in	the	income	in	that	jurisdiction.	
 More	recent	work	(Azemar	2010)	looks	at	the	effects	of	corporation	tax	on	US	capital	invested	 abroad	 and	 on	 the	 tax	 planning	 practices	 of	 MNEs.	 Azemar	 finds	 that	companies	operating	 in	 low	 tax	 jurisdictions	 report	higher	profits,	higher	Subpart	F	income	and	are	less	likely	to	repatriate	profits.	Azemar	also	considers	the	impact	of	an	increase	in	tax	rate	on	the	propensity	to	repatriate	profits.	She	concludes	that	a	1	per	cent	increase	in	the	tax	rate	is	associated	with	2.5	per	cent	greater	dividend	payments	
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as	a	higher	tax	rate	reduces	the	differential	between	the	US	and	host	countries	reducing	the	incentive	to	defer	repatriation.	Azemar	concludes	that	US	companies’	investment	is	strongly	influenced	by	the	average	tax	rate	in	a	country	and	that	the	effect	is	particularly	strong	 at	 the	 lower	 tax	 rates	 (Grubert	 and	 Mutti	 2000).	 The	 greater	 sensitivity	 to	changes	in	tax	rates	when	they	are	initially	low	demonstrates	the	importance	of	the	tax	rate	to	those	investments.	
 Pak	 (2007)	 takes	 a	 different	 approach.	 He	 constructs	 a	 ‘price	 filter	 matrix’,	 using	information	on	US	trade	to	identify	excessively	high	or	low	priced	import	and	export	transactions.	The	price	filter	assumes	that	goods	traded	at	significantly	above	or	below	the	 average	 for	 their	 category	 are	 evidence	 of	 TP	 manipulation.	 He	 concludes	 that	imports	 into	 the	 US	were	 under-priced	 by	 12.1	 per	 cent	 and	 that	 US	 exports	were	overpriced	by	5.5	per	cent.	This	method,	however,	assumes	that	all	the	goods	within	the	category	are	the	same	and	no	allowance	is	given	for	the	inevitable	differences	in	quality.	The	 construction	 of	 the	 matrix	 means	 that	 it	 will	 always	 show	 that	 there	 is	 some	mispricing	as	by	definition	there	are	always	goods	at	the	higher	and	lower	extremes	of	pricing.		The	 different	 methodologies	 and	 findings	 referred	 to	 above	 demonstrate	 the	 key	problem	 of	 quantifying	 the	 extent	 of	 profit	 shifting.	 Examining	 the	 MNE	 from	 the	outside,	with	limited	data	means	it	is	difficult	to	determine	how	much	profit	shifting	occur	 and	 how	 this	 is	 changing	over	 time.	Whilst	 politicians	 and	 policy	makers	 are	convinced	that	there	is	significant	profit	shifting,	there	is	no	single	approach	that	can	confirm	this.		
2.2.4 Tax Avoidance Mechanisms Whilst	the	work	discussed	above	provides	indirect	evidence	for	profit	shifting	it	does	not	address	the	means	by	which	MNEs	are	able	to	move	profits	and	which	methods	are	used	more	heavily.	Understanding	the	means	by	which	MNEs	exploit	lower	tax	rates	to	reduce	their	overall	corporation	tax	bill	is	essential	for	public	policy	makers	wishing	to	change	MNE	behaviour.	Fuest	et	al	(2013)	point	out	that	whilst	there	is	clear	evidence	that	profit	shifting	and	tax	avoidance	occurs,	it	is	difficult	to	assess	the	importance	of	different	methods	 in	 comparison	 to	each	other.	A	number	of	 studies	have,	however,	
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considered	the	mechanisms	by	which	profits	can	be	shifted.	Research	has	often	focused	on	 one	 or	 more	 of	 these	 mechanisms	 –	 attempting	 to	 evaluate	 the	 extent	 of	 profit	shifting	by	the	particular	mechanism	and	the	impact	that	this	has	on	policy.	The	next	sections	consider	the	relevant	research	into	the	various	mechanisms	in	turn.	
2.2.5 Size Larger	MNEs	are	thought	to	have	the	finance	and	capability	to	invest	in	strategic	tax	planning	and	exploit	the	differences	between	tax	rates	in	different	jurisdictions.	Results	of	research	looking	at	the	implications	of	company	size	for	the	ETR	have	been	mixed.	Some	research	has	found	the	expected:	that	larger	firms	are	associated	with	more	tax	avoidance,	 largely	 through	 TP	 (Benvignati	 1985;	 Zimmerman	 1985;	 Lanis	 and	Richardson	2015).	However,	Porcano	(1986)	 finds	a	negative	association	and	others	find	no	association	(Shevlin	and	Porter	1992;	Gupta	and	Newberry	1997).	Rego	(2003)	found	higher	worldwide	ETRs	for	larger	firms	in	a	broad	sample	of	US	domestic	and	MNEs.	After	holding	firm	size	constant,	however,	she	then	finds	that	firms	with	greater	incomes	 have	 lower	worldwide	 ETRs.	 She	 hypothesizes	 that	 larger	 companies	 have	more	 opportunities	 and	 resources	 to	 use	 to	 lower	 their	 ETR.	 She	 also	 found	 that	companies	with	higher	pre-tax	profits	paid	a	lower	ETR	than	those	with	lower	profits	indicating	that	larger	and	more	successful	companies	are	able	to	plan	their	tax	affairs	more	efficiently	–	experiencing	significant	economies	of	scale	 in	relation	to	their	 tax	avoidance.	This	was	reinforced	by	her	finding	that	MNEs	with	more	extensive	foreign	operations	have	 lower	worldwide	 ETRs	 than	 firms	with	 fewer	 overseas	 operations.	This	work,	however,	relied	on	a	single	year	GAAP	ETR	measure	which	as	Dyreng	et	al	(2008)	point	out	is	not	a	reliable	proxy	for	a	longer	term	(ten	year)	ETR.			The	size	of	the	firm	may	also	have	an	impact	on	the	decision	to	locate	or	relocate.	Larger	companies	with	greater	absolute	tax	payments	may	have	a	greater	incentive	to	try	to	reduce	these	and	may	also	have	a	greater	ability	 to	bear	the	costs	associated	with	a	move.	 Desai	 and	 Hines	 (2002)	 found	 that	 firm	 size	 had	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 the	company’s	likelihood	to	relocate	its	HQ.				
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Previous	studies	all	used	single	year	ETRs	and	considered	GAAP	rather	than	Cash	ETR.	From	the	literature	it	is	concluded	that	economies	of	scale	are	likely	to	confer	the	ability	to	reduce	their	tax	bills		on	larger	firms,	thus,	it	is	predicted:		
Hypothesis	1:	The	size	of	the	MNE	is	negatively	related	to	LR	ETR.	This	hypothesis	is	tested	in	the	data	analysis	presented	in	Chapter	5.	
2.2.6 Transfer Pricing One	of	the	key	profit	shifting	methods	available	to	MNEs	is	the	manipulation	of	TP	used	for	internal	transactions.	TP	is	the	system	of	pricing	the	flow	of	intermediate	goods	or	services	between	affiliates	of	 the	 same	company.	Tax	 is	 an	 issue	when	 transfers	are	made	 between	 affiliates	 in	 different	 locations	 when	 these	 are	 in	 different	 tax	jurisdictions.	OECD	guidelines	state	that	these	should	be	accounted	for	as	if	they	were	‘arms	length’	transactions	with	a	third	party	(OECD	2010).	This	relies	on	the	existence	of	an	external	market	to	provide	reference	prices.	If	no	such	market	exists,	which	may	be	 the	 case	 particularly	 for	 transfers	 of	 intermediate	 or	 knowledge	 based	 goods	 or	services	it	is	difficult	to	assess	whether	the	prices	used	equate	to	‘arms	length’	prices.	Different	entities	may	use	resources	jointly,	particularly	knowledge	related	assets.	This	internalization	 of	 knowledge	 transfers	 is	 one	 of	 the	 fundamental	 reasons	 for	 the	creation	of	the	MNE	(see	Section	2.1.3).	It	is	therefore	hard	to	assess	whether	the	MNE	is	shifting	profits	using	inflated	or	deflated	prices	or	whether	they	are	simply	charging	an	affiliate	for	using	a	resource.		The	 large	 body	 of	 theoretical	 work	 concerning	 TP	 discussed	 above	 in	 Section	 2.1	concludes	that	corporate	income	tax	has	an	impact	on	the	TP	charged	for	intra	company	transfers	 (Copithorne	1971;	Horst	1971;	Samuelson	1982;	Bartelsman	and	Beetsma	2003;	 Clausing	 2003).	 Empirical	 research	 attempts	 to	 find	 evidence	 for	 TP	manipulation	 but	 encounters	 difficulties	 in	 obtaining	 relevant	 data	 due	 to	 the	confidential	nature	of	intra	firm	transactions.	Listed	companies	are	required	to	publish	their	annual	reports	containing	some	information	on	intra	company	transfers	although	as	stated	above	many	claim	that	they	are	exempt	from	disclosing	this	information	on	the	 grounds	 that	 it	 could	 harm	 their	 competitiveness.	 Information	 contained	 in	 tax	returns	is	not	made	publically	available.	
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	Early	work	by	Vaitsos	 (1974)	 looked	at	 the	actions	of	MNEs	 in	 four	Latin	American	countries.	 He	 found	 that	 TP	were	 set	 depending	 on	 the	 industry	 that	 the	 company	operated	in,	the	size	of	the	home	country	and	in	response	to	government	policies;	there	was	no	one	‘correct’	price.	He	compared	the	TPs	used	with	actual	prices	available	on	international	markets	and	found	that	there	was	overpricing	of	goods,	particularly	in	the	pharmaceutical	market.	The	impact	of	specific	circumstances	in	Vaitsos’	empirical	work	such	as	a	restriction	on	profits	remissions	 from	Colombia,	 imposed	after	1967	make	extrapolating	from	his	findings	difficult.			However,	 Vaitsos’	 focus	 on	 the	 pharmaceutical	 and	 other	 high	 tech	 industries	continued.	Establishing	the	accuracy	of	TPs	in	this	kind	of	high	technology	industry	is	particularly	 difficult.	 The	 company	 needs	 to	 cover	 the	 costs	 of	 its	 R&D	 and	 other	investment	 and	 must	 apportion	 these	 overheads	 between	 income	 generating	subsidiaries.	Comparator	prices	are	unlikely	to	be	available.			Lall	 (1979)	built	on	Vaitsos’	work,	 looking	 specifically	at	 the	policy	 implications	 for	governments	of	developing	countries.	He	finds	that	there	is	an	uneven	incidence	of	TP	manipulation	across	different	firms	and	industries.	He	concurs	with	Vaitsos	(1974)	that	TP	 manipulation	 varies	 by	 sector,	 being	 more	 of	 an	 issue	 in	 knowledge	 and	 R&D	intensive	 industries.	 He	 concludes	 that	 even	 if	 governments	 could	 overcome	 the	problems	 relating	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 information	 they	would	 still	 need	 to	 consider	 that:	
‘correct	transfer	prices	must	represent	society’s	view	of	how	to	finance	risky	innovation’	(Lall	1979	p.37)		The	 proportion	 of	 intra	 company	 trade	 conducted	 and	 the	 locations	 involved	 will	clearly	impact	the	MNE’s	ability	to	manipulate	TP.	The	wider	the	firm’s	reach	and	the	longer	 its	 value	 chain	 the	 greater	 the	 scope	 for	 TP	 manipulation.	 Vaitsos	 (1974)	concluded	 that	 the	MNEs	 from	smaller	 home	countries	 engage	 in	 greater	 intra	 firm	trade	and	will	therefore	have	greater	scope	for	TP	manipulation	and	profit	shifting.	Lall	(1979)	 also	 points	 out	 that	 companies	 selling	more	 standardised	 products	 are	 less	likely	to	gain	from	internalization	and	therefore	more	likely	engage	in	external	trade	for	 intermediate	goods.	 	Buckley	and	Pearce	(1979)	also	 find	that	 intra	 firm	trade	 is	
	 77	
higher	 in	 those	 firms	 operating	 in	more	 research-intensive	 industries	 as	well	 as	 in	larger	firms.	Lall	(1979)	agrees,	finding	that	TP	manipulation	is	greater	in	MNEs	with	more	 ‘highly	 specific’	 products.	 This	 fits	 with	 his	 finding	 that	 the	 pharmaceutical	industry	has	more	TP	manipulation	than	any	other.	
 Rugman	 (1985)	 disagrees,	 pointing	 out	 that	 in	many	 cases	 there	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	particular	set	prices	in	the	open	market	even	if	there	is	a	comparable	good	available.	He	considers	the	case	of	the	Canadian	petroleum	industry	and	demonstrates	that	even	for	a	 standard	 good	 like	 oil	 there	 is	 a	 range	 of	 comparable	 prices	 making	 comparison	between	 a	market	 and	TP,	 complex	 or	 impossible.	 Rugman	 (1985)	 finds	 that	whilst	some	subsidiaries	appeared	to	have	relatively	high	profits,	ultimately	the	differences	were	eliminated	after	adjusting	 for	risk	of	earnings.	He	concluded	that	 there	was	no	evidence	of	TP	manipulation.	
 The	 growing	 importance	 of	 TP	 to	 international	 businesses	 was	 emphasised	 in	 the	findings	of	Eden,	Valdez	and	Li	(2005).	They	examined	the	impact	of	the	introduction	of	severe	penalties	 for	TP	manipulation	 in	the	US	 in	1990	and	hypothesised	that	 the	introduction	 of	 penalties	 would	 reduce	 incentives	 for	 MNE	 to	 manipulate	 prices,	thereby	 reducing	 future	 profitability.	 This	would,	 in	 turn,	 be	 reflected	 in	 a	 reduced	market	valuation	of	 the	MNE.	They	studied	 Japanese	MNEs	with	US	subsidiaries	and	found	 that	 they	 had	 lost	 12.6	 per	 cent	 of	 their	 1997	 market	 value	 as	 a	 direct	consequence	of	the	introduction	of	penalties	–	evidence	of	the	significant	value	derived	from	TP.		
 Clausing	(2003)	takes	a	direct	approach	to	considering	the	impact	of	TP.	She	uses	data	from	the	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics	(BLS)	on	international	trade	prices	in	1997,	1998,	and	1999	and	considers	how	the	prices	of	related	party	transactions	differ	from	those	of	non-related	party	transactions.	She	finds	substantial	differences	in	the	behaviour	of	related	party	transaction	pricing	compared	with	arms-length	trade.	After	controlling	for	other	variables	that	affect	trade	prices,	she	finds	that	where	tax	rates	are	lower,	US	intra-firm	 export	 prices	 are	 lower,	 and	 US	 intra-firm	 import	 prices	 are	 higher.	 She	therefore	concludes	that	the	prices	used	for	related	party	transaction	trade	prices	are	influenced	by	MNE	tax-minimization	strategies.	A	tax	rate	that	is	1	per	cent	lower	in	the	
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country	of	destination	/	origin	is	associated	with	related	party	export	prices	that	are	1.8	per	cent	lower	and	intrafirm	import	prices	that	are	2.0	per	cent	higher,	relative	to	non-intrafirm	goods.	Clausing	(2003)	also	demonstrated	that	the	TP	used	for	intra-	firm	transfers	 of	 knowledge	 or	 services	 are	 particularly	 sensitive	 to	 the	 tax	 differentials	between	the	countries	that	the	MNE	operates	in.		Much	of	the	literature	assumes	that	regulations	are	enforced	in	a	homogenous	manner. The	way	in	which	regulations	are	implemented	and	enforced	may	differ	depending	on	legislative	maturity	of	the	country	or	the	priority	placed	on	them.	The	OECD	Transfer	Pricing	Guidelines	(OECD	2010)	provides	for	some	assistance	to	tax	authorities	in	less	developed	countries.	However,	the	lack	of	resources	available	for	policing	TP	in	these	countries	 is	 likely	 to	 result	 in	 variability	 in	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 Guidelines	 are	implemented	and	enforced.	Some	research	has	considered	the	impact	of	different	levels	of	enforcement	on	business	decision-making	(Bartelsman	and	Beetsma	2003;	Azemar	2010).	Bartelsman	and	Beetsma	(2003)	examine	the	role	of	OECD	countries	and	the	impact	 of	 profit	 shifting	 between	 them.	 They	 note	 the	 geographically	 widespread	nature	 of	 profit	 shifting.	 They	 also	 suggest	 that	 whilst	 revenues	 from	 tighter	enforcement	of	TP	rules	can	be	significant,	enforcing	rules	more	stringently	may	reduce	the	net	return	on	investment	for	MNEs	operating	in	high	tax	countries	that	may	in	turn	cause	investment	to	shift	to	countries	with	lower	taxes	and	/	or	lower	enforcements.	This	demonstrates	 the	choices	that	MNEs	are	making	–	 they	are	trading	off	between	using	TP	to	shift	profits	and	the	potential	costs	associated	with	doing	so.	
 More	recent	work	by	Azemar	(2010)	focuses	on	less	developed	countries,	arguing	that	they	may	not	have	the	resources	to	enforce	all	their	TP	regulation	conferring	greater	freedom	on	MNEs	to	manipulate	TP.	She	quotes	Chan	and	Chow	(1997)	and	UNCTAD	(1999)	who	 propose	 that	 developing	 countries	 tax	 authorities	may	 avoid	 enforcing	regulations,	particularly	in	key	industries	in	order	to	encourage	investment.	Using	GDP	per	 capita	 to	 measure	 a	 country’s	 development	 her	 findings	 are	 inconclusive,	demonstrating	a	statistically	insignificant	effect.	
 In	a	 rare	piece	of	qualitative	 research	Baker	 (2005)	 conducted	 interviews	with	550	senior	managers	in	trading	companies	in	11	countries	in	order	to	understand	the	role	
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of	 TP	 within	 MNE.	 He	 finds	 strong	 evidence	 of	 collusion	 between	 companies.	 	 He	concludes	that	significant	price	manipulation	takes	place	via	kickbacks,	internal	TP	and	sales	between	unrelated	companies.	Whilst	Baker’s	work	 is	hard	to	verify	and	 is	not	published	 in	an	academic	 journal	 the	extent	of	 the	acceptance	of	mispricing	 that	he	found	 is	 clear.	 More	 qualitative	 research	 that	 can	 elicit	 information	 from	 inside	companies	 is	 urgently	 needed	 to	 add	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 decision	 making	inside	MNEs.		A	large-scale,	repeated	survey	(EY	2013)	has	consistently	found	that	TP	is	used	as	a	tool	by	businesses	to	help	them	to	achieve	their	broader	objectives.	A	recent	survey	found	that	 for	 66	 per	 cent	 of	 companies	 ‘risk	management’	 was	 their	 organisation’s	most	important	issue	in	relation	to	TP.	This	was	an	increase	of	32	per	cent	over	the	previous	survey	in	the	series	(EY	2010).	Conversely,	the	number	of	organisations	identifying	ETR	optimisation	 fell	by	a	 third	to	only	17	per	cent.	Recent	 international	attention	to	tax	issues	and	TP	in	particular,	by	Governments,	the	OECD	and	the	media	may	be	shifting	organisations’	attitudes	to	TP.	 	The	same	survey	also	reports	that	tax	authorities	are	increasing	 the	 scope	 and	 complexity	 of	 their	 investigations	 in	 tax	 issues.	 Required	documentation	is	increasing	and	the	frequency	of	the	imposition	of	penalties	has	also	been	reported.		
 The	following	sections	cover	two	of	the	key	mechanisms	where	TP	can	be	used	to	shift	profits.		
2.2.6.1 Intangible Assets Intangible	 assets	 are	 an	 increasingly	 important	 source	 of	 competitiveness	 (Lipsey	2007).	 Intangible	assets	can	easily	be	separated	 from	production	locations	and	their	public	good	nature	means	that	they	can	be	used	by	more	than	one	subsidiary	at	a	time.	If	the	headquarters	in	the	home	country	has	developed	the	intangible	asset	the	parent	will	receive	royalties	from	the	subsidiary,	equivalent	to	an	arms	length	price.	Royalty	payments	are	considered	a	tax-deductible	expense	in	the	host	country	and	as	additional	(taxable)	income	in	the	home	country	(Grubert	2003a).	MNE	can	base	intangible	assets	in	low	tax	countries	where	they	earn	a	stream	of	revenue	from	other	group	companies	either	on	 the	basis	of	 licensing	or	 royalties.	The	opaque	nature	of	 IP	means	 that	TP	
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manipulation	is	harder	to	detect	when	related	to	this	class	of	asset.	It	is	harder	to	find	an	applicable	arms’	length	price	with	which	to	compare	it	(Gravelle	2008).	IP	is	often	unique	and	may	have	no	functioning	market	to	generate	comparable	prices	(Dyreng,	Hanlon	and	Maydew	2008;	Shackelford,	Slemrod	and	Sallee	2011).		The	MNE	can	therefore	charge	a	relatively	high	royalty	rate	for	the	use	of	intangible	assets	 to	 subsidiaries	 in	 high	 tax	 countries,	 effectively	 reducing	 profitability	 there	(Dischinger	and	Riedel	2011).	This,	combined	with	the	difficulty	in	establishing	arms	length	prices	 for	 intangible	assets,	particularly	 for	regulatory	authorities	outside	the	company,	 adds	 to	 its	 potential	 as	 a	 means	 of	 profit	 shifting	 (Dyreng	 et	 al	 2008;	Shackelford	 et	 al	 2011).	 Fuest	 et	 al	 (2013)	 stress	 the	 importance	 of	 IP	 to	 overall	patterns	of	profits	shifting.	They	emphasise	the	role	of	IP	in	terms	of	value	creation	as	well	as	the	fact	that	it	is	highly	mobile.	Overstating	the	TP	for	royalties	and	licences	is	thought	to	be	one	of	the	key	methods	of	profit	shifting	adopted	by	MNEs	(Kopits	1976;	Grubert	2003a;	Desai	et	al	2006).	As	the	use	of	intangible	assets	increases,	so	does	their	ability	to	profit	shift	(Grubert	and	Mutti	2007).	
 Intangible	 assets	 can	 be	 capitalised	 on	 the	 balance	 sheet	 if	 certain	 criteria	 are	met	(Dischinger	 and	 Riedel	 2011).	 They	 are	 usually	 recognised	 at	 cost.	 Many	 countries	allow	their	inclusion	on	the	balance	sheet	irrespective	of	how	they	were	acquired	–	that	is,	 internally	 generated	 or	 purchased.	 However,	 in	 the	 US,	 Austria,	 Denmark	 and	Germany,	only	 intangible	assets	 that	have	been	acquired	can	be	held	on	the	balance	sheet.	In	Ireland,	Italy	and	the	UK	the	capitalisation	of	development,	but	not	research	costs	is	allowed.	The	differences	in	accounting	for	intangible	assets	affects	the	ability	of	researchers	to	use	this	data	to	make	meaningful	comparisons	between	countries.	
 A	 significant	 amount	 of	 research	 has	 been	 conducted	 looking	 at	 the	 relationship	between	 IP	assets	and	tax	or	TP.	Proxies	 including	annual	R&D	spending,	 intangible	assets	reported	in	balance	sheet	disclosures	and	patent	data	have	been	used.	Dischinger	and	Riedel	 (2011)	 use	 panel	 data	 on	 European	MNEs	 to	 confirm	 the	 importance	 of	intangible	assets	and	their	location	for	tax	planning.	They	find	that	the	average	parent	company	 owns	 significantly	 more	 intangible	 assets	 than	 the	 average	 subsidiary	company	 but	 that	 intangible	 asset	 holdings	 in	 both	 are	 rising	 steeply,	 reflecting	 the	
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growing	importance	of	this	class	of	assets	for	the	MNE.	Significantly,	they	also	find	that	the	lower	a	subsidiary's	corporate	tax	rate	is	relative	to	other	group	subsidiaries	the	higher	 is	 its	 level	 of	 intangible	 asset	 investment	 –	 clear	 evidence	 that	 MNEs	 shift	intangible	assets	to	low	tax	locations	to	enable	profit	shifting.	
 In	most	of	the	countries	Dischinger	and	Riedel	(2011)	consider,	income	from	intangible	assets	is	taxed	at	the	standard	rate	of	corporation	tax.	However,	in	Ireland	and	France	there	are	special	low	rates	on	royalty	income	from	patents	and	licenses.	Others	such	as	Belgium,	Luxembourg	and	the	Netherlands	have	since	introduced	special	low	rates	on	patent	and	license	income.	The	UK	has	also	since	introduced	a	‘patent	box’	tax	regime	where	profits	based	on	patents	will	be	charged	only	a	10	per	cent	corporation	tax	rate	(UK	Government	2014).	This	demonstrates	the	importance	that	governments	attach	to	attracting	MNEs’	intangible	assets	and	the	incentives	for	MNEs	to	ensure	that	they	place	intangible	assets,	either	directly	through	development,	or	indirectly	through	transfer,	in	the	most	tax	efficient	locations.	
 To	relocate	intangible	assets	MNEs	may	need	to	relocate	part	of	their	R&D	with	them.	This	makes	attracting	 intangible	assets	 important	 for	 countries	 that	may	potentially	gain	from	additional	highly	skilled	jobs	and	potential	knowledge	spillover.	Whilst	US	firms	have	 to	pay	 tax	on	 the	value	of	 the	 transfer	of	 the	 IP	assets,	 any	 income	 then	earned	 from	 those	assets	will	be	 taxed	 in	 the	US	only	on	 the	 repatriation	of	profits.	Countries	often	charge	exit	taxes	(capital	gains)	when	intangible	assets	are	relocated	but	MNEs	may	reduce	their	liability	by	distorting	the	TP	for	intangible	assets	facilitated	by	 the	 difficulty	 in	 establishing	 the	 ‘correct’	 value	 from	 outside	 the	 firm.	 Work	demonstrates	 a	 correlation	 between	 MNEs’	 TP	 distortions	 and	 intangible	 asset	ownership	(Grubert	2003b).		
 Earlier	work	tried	to	link	the	level	of	intangible	assets	held	with	the	rate	of	corporation	tax	and	the	profitability	of	 the	relevant	subsidiary.	Hines	(1999)	 found	that	 in	1989	royalty	payments	from	foreign	affiliates	of	American	MNEs	had	an	elasticity	of	-0.4	with	respect	to	the	tax	cost	of	paying	royalties.	Subsequent	work	by	Grubert	(2003b)	also	emphasised	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 tax	 system	 for	 royalty	 payments	 as	 a	 key	determinant	of	US	investments.	He	finds	that	parent	R&D	intensity	increases	the	local	
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tax	burden;	suggesting	that	the	host	government	is	able	to	extract	a	greater	proportion	of	 the	 rent.	 This	 may	 also	 reflect	 that	 R&D	 investments	 tend	 to	 be	 location	 bound	(locational	rather	than	mobile	according	to	Grubert	2003b).	However,	industries	such	as	electronics	and	computers	with	high	levels	of	parent	company	R&D	are	mobile	and	the	tax	treatment	of	companies	in	these	industries	is	more	favourable	than	other	high	R&D	industries.	Grubert	(2003b)	finds	evidence	that	profitability	differences	between	high	and	low	tax	countries	are	due	to	the	shifting	of	income	from	intangibles	combined	with	 the	 strategic	 location	 of	 debt.	 His	work	 also	 demonstrates	 that	 R&D	 intensive	MNEs	engage	in	significantly	larger	volumes	of	intra-	group	transactions	and	therefore	have	more	opportunities	for	income	shifting.		In	 earlier	 work	 Grubert	 (1998)	 also	 finds	 an	 important	 role	 for	 royalties	 in	 profit	shifting.	He	concludes	that	the	royalties	paid	by	subsidiaries	are	influenced	by	the	tax	credit	position	of	the	parent	and	the	local	tax	rate.	Other	research	concurs,	concluding	that	 parent	 firms	 with	 high	 levels	 of	 R&D	 and	 intangible	 asset	 investments,	 and	therefore	good	opportunities	to	profit	shift	are	more	likely	to	have	investments	in	tax	havens,	indicating	the	importance	of	these	assets	to	the	overall	tax	planning	strategy	of	MNEs	(Grubert	and	Slemrod	1998;	Desai	et	al	2006).		
 Grubert	 and	 Mutti	 (2007)	 also	 find	 evidence	 for	 this	 important	 role	 for	 intangible	assets.	They	point	out	that	US	parent	R&D	investments	are	a	weak	predictor	for	royalty	payments	 from	 foreign	 affiliates	 to	 the	 parent	 firm	 but	 they	 strongly	 enlarge	 the	earnings	of	group	affiliates	in	tax	havens.	They	interpret	this	to	mean	that	parents	have	incentives	 to	 set	 up	 tax	 haven	 subsidiaries	 and	 reach	 favourable	 cost	 sharing	agreements	on	R&D	investment	with	them.	The	affiliates	in	low	tax	jurisdictions	sell	the	rights	 to	use	patents	and	 licenses	 to	high	tax	affiliates	and	 subsequently	 receive	 the	royalty	payments	as	earnings,	simultaneously	reducing	the	earnings	of	the	affiliate	in	the	high	tax	jurisdiction.	Barrios	et	al	(2012)	consider	a	range	of	European	MNEs	and	countries	and	find	that	subsidiaries	with	lower	levels	of	fixed	assets	respond	more	to	home	and	host	country	taxation.	They	posit	that	higher	levels	of	fixed	assets	prevent	the	firm	from	making	the	decision	to	move	a	subsidiary	and	that	profit	shifting	is	more	difficult	in	these	circumstances.	
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It	is	clear	that	there	is	a	significant	role	for	intangible	assets	in	tax	planning.	Intangible	assets	 also	 play	 a	 critically	 important	 role	 in	MNE	profit	 generation.	MNEs	have	 an	incentive	 to	 place	 these	 assets	 in	 low	 tax	 jurisdictions	 where	 their	 opaque	 nature	enables	significant	profit	shifting	to	 take	place.	Governments	are	complicit,	 lowering	tax	rates	and	offering	 incentives	 for	companies	to	shift	 their	 intangible	assets	 in	 the	hope	that	they	will	also	shift	jobs	and	revenues.		There	is	significant	anecdotal	evidence	about	the	relocation	of	intangible	assets	to	low	tax	jurisdictions	(Dischinger	and	Riedel	2011).	Pfizer,	Bristol-Myers	Squibb	and	Microsoft	 are	all	 reported	 to	have	 relocated	parts	 of	 the	 R&D	 units	 and	 patent	 holdings	 from	 their	 home	 countries	 to	 Ireland.	Vodafone’s	 intangible	 properties	 are	 held	 by	 an	 Irish	 subsidiary	 and	 Shell’s	 central	brand	management	 is	held	 in	 a	 Swiss	 subsidiary	 from	where	 other	 subsidiaries	 are	charged	royalties	(Dischinger	and	Riedel	2011).	Starbucks	holds	its	intangible	assets	in	the	 Netherlands,	 reputedly	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	 favourable	 tax	 regime	 there	(Financial	Times	2013).	Academic	research	is	hampered	by	the	lack	of	available	data	on	the	movement	of	 IP	assets.	This	 is	 an	area	where	qualitative	 research	 could	make	a	useful	contribution	if	access	could	be	gained.		Dyreng	et	al	(2015)	consider	how	tax	affects	the	structure	of	the	global	equity	supply	chain	of	a	company.	For	their	analysis	they	hypothesise	that	firms	with	more	mobile	income,	 that	 are	 able	 to	 profit	 shift	 will	 have	 less	 incentive	 to	 establish	 holding	companies	that	can	facilitate	the	efficient	return	of	dividends	to	the	US.	They	use	R&D	spending	as	an	indicator	of	whether	a	firm	has	highly	mobile	income	and	establish	that	high	spending	R&D	 firms	are	half	 as	 likely	as	 lower	spending	 firms	 to	use	a	 foreign	equity	holding	company.	This	provides	additional	support	for	the	hypothesis	that	firms	with	higher	levels	of	intangible	assets	have	greater	scope	to	shift	profits.	Profit	shifting	via	intangible	assets	acts	as	a	substitute	for	global	equity	supply	chains	as	a	means	to	mitigate	international	taxes.		Overesch	 and	Schreiber	 (2009)	 consider	 a	 set	 of	German	MNEs	 and	 find	 that	 intra-	group	transfers	in	firms	with	higher	R&D	intensities	are	more	sensitive	to	the	statutory	tax	rate.	They	confirm	the	importance	of	R&D	as	a	mechanism	for	profit	shifting	as	they	find	that	the	tax	sensitivity	of	investments	significantly	decreases	with	increases	in	the	R&D	 intensity.	 They	 conclude	 that	 the	 host	 country	 statutory	 tax	 rate	 becomes	 less	
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important	to	firms	that	have	the	opportunity	to	profit	shift.	They	use	R&D	expenditure	as	a	proxy	for	the	availability	of	intangible	assets	as	well	as	the	specificity	of	the	firm’s	assets.		
 A	different	research	approach	considers	the	impact	of	the	‘check	the	box	regulations’	in	1997	and	the	emergence	of	hybrid	companies	on	royalty	payments.	Mutti	and	Grubert	(2009)	find	that	the	introduction	of	the	‘check	the	box	regulations’	(see	Glossary	and	Footnote	11)	facilitated	the	establishment	of	hybrid	companies	enabling	US	MNEs	to	shift	IP	income	from	high	to	low	tax	countries	and	defer	US	tax	payments	on	dividend	income.	Using	confidential	Treasury	data	they	show	that	dividends	received	into	seven	major	 low	 tax	 countries6	grew	quickly	 over	 this	 period,	 from	$6.4billion	 in	1996	 to	$25.7billion	in	2002,	considerably	outstripping	the	growth	of	total	earnings.		Previous	theoretical	and	empirical	studies	show	that	IP	assets	are	used	by	MNEs	to	shift	profits,	enabling	them	to	structure	their	businesses	and	allocate	income	in	tax	efficient	ways.	As	the	economic	value	from	IP	assets	increases	worldwide	the	ability	of	MNEs	to	shift	profits	is	enhanced.	Thus,	it	is	predicted	
Hypothesis	2:	The	level	of	IP	is	negatively	related	to	LR	ETR.	The	hypothesis	is	tested	in	the	data	analysis	presented	in	Chapter	5.	
2.2.6.2 Capital Structure / Debt A	considerable	amount	of	work	has	focussed	on	the	use	of	debt	and	capital	structure	to	facilitate	tax	avoidance.	The	tax	deductibility	of	interest	expense	adds	an	incentive	for	firms	to	engage	in	this	form	of	financing.	Intra-company	borrowing	and	lending	can	be	used	 to	 shift	 profits	 from	high	 to	 low	 tax	 countries.	 An	 affiliate	 based	 in	 a	 high	 tax	country	borrows	money	from	and	pays	interest	to,	an	affiliate	in	a	lower	tax	country.	This	reduces	the	profits	in	the	interest	paying	affiliate	and	increases	them	in	the	lending	affiliate	or	the	group	finance	company	when	it	receives	the	interest.	According	to	the	OECD	Transfer	Price	Guidelines	(OECD	2010)	interest	payments	should	be	transparent	and	should	be	set	at	a	rate	that	reflects	the	arm’s	length	rate.	The	level	of	risk	attached	to	the	 loan,	however,	 is	not	always	transparent	and	would	legitimately	 influence	the																																																									
6 Ireland, Singapore, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Switzerland. 
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interest	rate	used	(Overesch	and	Schreiber	2009).		The	interest	rate	charged	remains	more	easily	comparable	with	external	rates	than	other	types	of	TP	and	profit	shifting.		Debt	provides	a	shield	from	tax,	relative	to	funding	by	equity,	for	all	firms	including	the	purely	 domestic.	 Interest	 payments	on	 debt	 are	 deducted	 from	profits	 before	 tax	 is	charged,	reducing	chargeable	income	and	therefore	the	tax	paid.	Dividend	payments	to	shareholders	 are	 made	 out	 of	 post-tax	 profits	 and	 therefore	 do	 not	 reduce	 the	 tax	charge	of	the	company.	Whilst	research	has	identified	unusually	high	levels	of	debt	in	high	tax	countries	(Gordon	and	Lee	2001;	Egger	et	al	2010),	it	is	difficult	to	conclude	whether	 this	 is	 as	 a	 result	 of	 profit	 shifting	 or	 just	 because	 the	 firm	 is	 using	 the	traditional	debt	tax	shelter.		When	loans	are	used	for	profit	shifting	the	external	debt	of	the	firm	does	not	need	to	change.	Affiliates	lend	and	borrow	from	each	other	with	the	loans	being	financed	from	retained	 earnings	 or	 parental	 equity.	 The	 tax	 incentive	 to	 use	more	 debt	 therefore	distorts	the	capital	structure	of	the	subsidiary.	Altshuler	and	Grubert	(2002)	and	Desai	et	al	(2006)	show	that	US	MNEs	use	debt	financing	to	shift	profits.	Other	work	confirms	this	 using	 European	 companies	 (Buettner	 and	Wamser	 2007;	Huizinga,	 Laeven	 and	Nicodeme	2008;	Egger	et	al	2010).		Research	confirms	that	the	capital	structure	of	subsidiaries	is	sensitive	to	the	tax	rate	of	 the	host	country	 in	which	they	are	based	(Huizinga	and	Laeven	2008;	Egger	et	al	2010;	Harrington	and	Smith	2012).	The	debt	–	asset	ratios	for	MNE	subsidiaries	in	high	tax	countries	are	higher	than	for	those	in	low	tax	countries,	and	also	for	domestic	firms	(Gordon	and	Lee	2001;	Egger	et	al	2010).	These	studies	focus	on	the	total	debt	–	asset	ratio	however,	and	do	not	distinguish	between	external	and	internal	debt,	due	to	the	lack	of	data	available	specifically	on	internal	debt.	Only	internal	debt	can	potentially	be	used	 as	 a	 profit	 shifting	mechanism,	 although	 there	may	 also	 be	 purely	 operational	reasons	for	its	use.	Very	few	existing	studies	distinguish	between	internal	and	external	debt	as	the	data	is	difficult	to	access	(only	data	published	by	the	US	Bureau	of	Business	Analysis	and	the	German	Central	Bank	 incorporate	this	distinction).	There	are	some	published	studies	(Nguyen	&	Almodovar	2017;	Nguyen	&	Rugman	2015;	Nguyen	2013)	where	survey	data	is	used	by	applying	accounting	standards.	These	studies	conclude	
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that	there	is	a	significant	role	for	internal	lending	between	group	companies	to	fund	exports.	It	is	not	possible	therefore	to	assume	that	all	internal	lending	is	related	to	tax	planning	activities.		Altshuler	and	Grubert	(2002)	and	Desai,	Foley	and	Hines	(2004)	consider	internal	debt	and	find	that	it	is	influenced	by	the	host	country	tax	rate.		The	larger	the	spread	of	tax	rates	between	the	host	country	and	the	 lowest	rate	 faced	by	any	group	member	the	greater	 the	 incentive	 to	 increase	 intra-company	 debt.	 Analogously,	 Buettner	 and	Wamser	(2013)	find	that	the	spread	of	tax	rates	between	affiliates	impacts	on	the	level	of	 internal	 debt.	 Higher	 leveraged	 MNEs	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 relocate	 to	 a	 low	 tax	jurisdiction. Huizinga	et	al	(2008)	determine	that	an	MNE’s	total	external	borrowing	is	allocated	amongst	affiliate	companies	depending	on	the	tax	rate	in	the	host	countries.		Dharmapala	and	Riedel	(2013)	examine	positive	earnings	shocks	to	parent	companies	and	conclude	that	affiliates	in	low	tax	jurisdictions	experienced	a	small	but	significant	increase	 in	 their	profits.	They	 find	that	 this	 is	generated	by	the	use	of	strategic	debt	across	affiliates.	They	use	data	 from	 the	AMADEUS	database,	which	does	not	 report	intra-company	debt,	however,	so	they	use	an	indirect	measure	of	financial	income.			Whilst	 research	 agrees	 that	MNEs	 use	 debt	 for	 profit	 shifting	 the	 size	 of	 the	 effect	established	varies	(Altshuler	and	Grubert	2002;	Desai	et	al	2004;	Dischinger	and	Riedel	2011;	 Buettner	 and	Wamser	 2013).	 Whilst	 Buettner	 and	Wamser	 (2013)	 find	 only	small,	although	statistically	significant	effects	of	tax	on	internal	debt,	Desai	et	al	(2004)	find	that	10	per	cent	higher	tax	rates	are	associated	with	2.8	per	cent	higher	debt	/	asset	ratios	 with	 internal	 debt	 being	 particularly	 affected.	 Altshuler	 and	 Grubert	 (2002)	demonstrate	that	the	debt	levels	held	by	subsidiary	companies	are	highly	sensitive	to	the	local	tax	rate.	Debt,	however,	continues	to	be	held	in	the	balance	sheet	of	even	low	tax	affiliates.	Egger	et	 al	 (2010),	use	a	 large	 sample	of	European	 firms	and	 find	 that	MNEs	have	a	substantially	higher	debt	ratio	 than	domestic	 firms	with	the	difference	between	MNEs	and	domestic	firms	being	related	to	the	rate	of	corporation	tax	payable.				Grubert	and	Mutti	(2000)	gain	access	to	information	aggregated	from	the	tax	returns	of	US	MNEs	(using	returns	from	more	than	500	companies	in	1992)	to	examine	the	way	
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that	host	country	tax	rates	influence	the	amount	of	capital	that	is	invested	in	different	locations.	They	find	that	a	lower	tax	rate	that	leads	to	an	increase	in	post-tax	profits	is	correlated	with	a	3	per	cent	rise	in	the	level	of	capital	invested,	as	long	as	the	country	has	a	relatively	open	investment	regime.	They	conclude	that	19	per	cent	of	US	capital	would	be	located	in	a	different	country	without	the	influence	of	tax	arbitrage.	They	also	find	 that	 at	 low	 levels	 of	 taxation,	 changes	 have	 a	magnified	 impact	 on	 investment	decisions.		Graham	(2003)	summarises	the	empirical	research	work	on	taxes	and	capital	structure	and	concludes	that	capital	structure	decisions	appear	to	respond	to	corporate	taxes.	Graham	 (2003)	 notes	 however,	 that	 some	 academics	 (Myers,	 McConnell,	 Peterson,	Soter	and	Stern,	1998)	suggest	that,	‘Tax	incentives	are	of	a	‘third	order’	of	importance	
in	the	hierarchy	of	corporate	decisions’.	There	may	be	reasons	other	than	tax	for	high	levels	 of	 intra-company	 borrowing.	 Desai	 et	 al.	 (2004)	 argue	 that	 MNEs	 have	 an	advantage	over	purely	domestic	firms	as	they	can	substitute	internal	debt	for	external.	The	MNE	 can	 borrow	 externally	 in	 a	 favourable	market	 and	 then	 lend	 internally	 to	affiliates.	 The	 MNE	 can	 support	 affiliates	 in	 particular	 markets	 that	 have	 trouble	accessing	external	debt	(Nguyen	2013;	Nguyen	and	Rugman,	2015).		Barrios	et	al	(2012)	consider	the	impact	of	taxation	on	mergers	and	acquisitions.	They	find	that	international	double	taxes	that	come	into	effect	due	to	an	M&A	are	to	a	large	extent	already	included	in	the	takeover	price;	in	effect	reducing	the	price	that	will	be	paid.	 This	 indicates	 that	 international	 double	 taxation	 does	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	behaviour	 of	 MNEs	 and	 that	 they	 therefore	 have	 an	 incentive	 to	 own	 foreign	subsidiaries	in	locations	with	low	taxation.	
 Research	clearly	shows	that	the	tax	rate	and	regulations	where	the	MNE	operates	can	clearly	 influence	 the	 capital	 structure	of	 a	 firm.	 Intra-company	debt	appears	 to	be	a	particularly	important	way	of	adjusting	the	company’s	capital	structure	to	minimise	the	tax	burden.	The	next	sections	look	at	other	approaches	used	by	MNEs	to	reduce	their	ETR.	 Rather	 than	 TP,	 these	 are	 generated	 by	 other	 aspects	 of	 the	 international	 tax	regime.	 Due	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 data	 on	 the	 levels	 of	 intra	 firm	 loans	 in	 the	 consolidated	
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accounts	 of	 the	 parent	 firms	 this	 potential	 mechanism	 of	 tax	 avoidance	 is	 not	considered	in	the	empirical	work	presented	in	Chapter	5.			
2.2.7 Top Management Team  The	neoclassical	view	of	the	firm	that	is	typically	expounded	in	tax	research	posits	that	the	same	decisions	will	be	made	within	a	firm,	regardless	of	who	holds	key	offices.	The	individual	is	treated	as	homogenous	or	insignificant,	behaving	in	a	rational	economic	manner	and	responding	to	the	incentives	put	in	place	(Bertrand	and	Schoar	2003).	A	growing	body	of	research	however,	considers	the	influence	that	individuals	may	play	(Bertrand	and	Schoar	2003;	Desai	and	Dharmapala	2006;	Dyreng,	Hanlon	and	Maydew	2010).			Dyreng,	 Hanlon	 and	Maydew	 (2010)	 identify	 a	 gap	 in	 the	 literature	 concerning	 the	impact	that	key	executives	play	in	determining	the	tax	strategy	of	a	firm.	They	quote	anecdotal	 evidence	 that	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 view	 that	 individuals	 can	 play	 an	important	role	in	setting	tax	policy:	
‘David	Bullington,	Wal-Mart’s	vice	president	for	tax	policy,	stated	that	he	began	to	feel	
pressure	to	lower	the	company’s	effective	tax	rate	after	the	current	chief	financial	officer,	
Thomas	 Schoewe,	 was	 hired	 in	 2000.	 ‘Mr.	 Schoewe	 was	 familiar	 with	 some	 very	
sophisticated	and	aggressive	tax	planning.	And	he	rides	hard	on	us	all	the	time	that	we	
have	the	world’s	highest	tax	rate	of	any	major	company,’	Mr.	Bullington	said,	according	
to	a	transcript	of	the	deposition’	(Drucker	2007	quoted	in	Dyreng	et	al	2010).	
 Dyreng	et	al	go	on	to	study	the	impact	that	individual	executives	have	on	tax	avoidance.	Using	a	sample	of	980	executives	they	find	individuals	exert	a	significant	influence	on	the	ETR	(both	cash	and	GAAP)	paid.	They	conclude	that	individual	executives	can	have	a	significant	impact	in	determining	the	level	of	tax	planning	undertaken	in	a	firm.	They	find	an	11	per	cent	difference	between	the	GAAP	ETRs	when	moving	between	the	top	and	bottom	quartile	of	executives.		Whilst	CEOs	are	unlikely	to	be	tax	experts	they	are	able	 to	 impact	 the	 strategy	 of	 the	 company	 by	 ‘setting	 the	 tone’	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	organisation.	Results	were	slightly	stronger	for	CEOs	but	also	held	for	CFOs	and	other	top	executives.	Further	work	controlling	for	the	type	of	industry	the	company	is	in	and	
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to	explore	executives’	motivations	and	tax	avoidance	mechanisms	used,	would	be	of	interest.	Further	exploration	fails	to	identify	any	particular	biographical	characteristics	that	can	be	used	to	predict	which	executives	will	push	tax	avoidance.	They	conclude	that	 there	 are	 no	 identifiable,	 common	 characteristics	 that	 can	 explain	 executive-specific	 tax	 avoidance—the	 executive	 effects	 on	 tax	 avoidance	 appear	 to	 be	idiosyncratic.			Rather	than	considering	individuals,	Desai	and	Dharmapala	(2006)	model	the	effect	of	incentive	 compensation	 and	 governance	 structures	 on	 tax	 avoidance.	 They	 find	 a	negative	association	between	equity	based	compensation	and	tax	avoidance	but	they	find	that	this	holds	only	 in	 firms	with	weaker	shareholder	rights	and	 lower	 levels	of	institutional	ownership.	Robinson,	Kises	and	Weaver	(2010)	also	consider	the	effect	of	incentives	on	 tax	executives	and	 find	 that	when	 the	 tax	department	 is	 considered	a	profit	centre	GAAP	ETRs	are	lower	but	Cash	ETRs	are	not.		Philips	 (2003)	 considers	 the	 impacts	 of	 incentives	 on	 GAAP	 ETR.	 He	 finds	 that	 the	managers	of	business	units	where	performance	 is	assessed	on	after	 tax	measures	of	income	 appear	 to	 exhibit	 lower	 rates	of	 ETR	but	 his	 findings	 do	 not	hold	 for	 CEOs.	Bamber,	Jiang,	and	Wang	(2010)	examine	the	effect	of	different	executives	on	corporate	disclosure	 policies	 and	 find	 that	 the	 individuals	 involved	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	determining	the	level	of	voluntary	disclosure	made.		The	board	of	directors	has	a	crucial	role	monitoring	the	management	of	the	company	on	behalf	of	the	shareholders	(Eisenhardt	1989;	Fama	and	Jensen	1983).	The	directors	on	the	board	need	to	have	an	appropriate	mix	of	experience	and	expertise	to	evaluate	management’s	performance	and	the	strategies	that	they	are	pursuing.	Agency	theory	(Jensen	and	Meckling	1976)	highlights	 the	potential	problems	when	the	goals	of	 the	principal	and	agent	are	misaligned	and	/	or	the	costs	of	monitoring	behaviour	are	high.	A	 second	 problem	 may	 arise	 in	 the	 principal	 agent	 relationship	 where	 there	 are	differences	in	the	attitude	to	risk	(Eisenhardt	1989).		Little	research	considers	the	direct	relationship	between	the	composition	of	the	board	and	 tax	 avoidance.	 	 Lanis	 and	Richardson	 (2011),	 however,	 find	 that	 increasing	 the	
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number	 of	 independent	 directors	 on	 the	 board	 increases	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 its	scrutiny	 of	 top	 management.	 They	 find	 a	 direct	 relationship	 between	 a	 higher	proportion	of	independent	board	members	and	a	reduction	of	tax	avoidance.		The	proportion	of	women	on	the	Board	is	also	of	interest.	Female	board	directors	have	different	profiles	to	male:	they	are	more	than	twice	as	likely	as	men	to	hold	a	doctoral	degree	(Hillman,	Cannella	and	Harris	2002),	have	gained	more	of	their	experience	in	smaller	 firms	 and	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 have	 CEO	 or	 Chief	 Operating	 Officer	 (COO)	experience	(Singh,	Terjesen	and	Vinnicombe	2008).	They	are	also	more	likely	to	bring	expertise	from	outside	of	business	and	therefore	may	have	different	perspectives	on	the	issues	facing	the	board	(Hillman	et	al	2002).	Women	are	thought	to	take	a	different	approach	 to	board	membership	with	 research	demonstrating	 that	 they	 take	a	more	participative	 and	 democratic	 approach	 (Eagly	 and	 Johnson	 1990;	 Eagly,	 Johannsen-Schmidt	and	van	Engen	2003).		Adams	and	Ferreira	(2009)	find	that	female	directors	can	add	value	by	bringing	new	perspectives	and	increasing	monitoring	of	management.	Gender	diverse	boards	spend	more	 time	 monitoring	 management	 actions	 than	 less	 diverse	 boards.	 Adams	 and	Ferreira	 (2009)	 conclude	 that	 this	 can	 negatively	 affect	 a	 firm’s	 performance	when	corporate	governance	is	already	strong	but	that	if	corporate	governance	is	weak	the	longer	time	spent	monitoring	improves	firm	performance.	This	additional	monitoring	may	have	implications	for	the	ETR.	Research	shows	that	where	there	are	more	women	on	the	board	some	outcomes	are	different:	boards	with	more	women	have	a	higher	level	of	charitable	giving	(Wang	and	Coffey	1992;	Williams	2003),	and	attain	higher	levels	of	Environmental	CSR	(Post,	Rahman	and	Rubow	2011).			Empirical	work	has	considered	the	way	that	women	operate	on	the	board	of	directors	and	demonstrates	that	the	number	of	women	on	the	board	is	important	(Bear,	Rahman	and	Post	2010).	A	single	woman	may	have	little	influence	but	as	the	number	grows	a	critical	mass	may	be	achieved	(Konrad,	Kramer	and	Erkut	2008).		Bear	et	al	(2010)	find	that	as	the	number	of	women	on	the	board	increases	the	greater	the	emphasis	on	CSR.			Some	 of	 these	 differences	may	 arise	 from	 the	 different	 attitude	 to	 risk	 that	women	
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appear	to	take.	Female	executives	are	likely	to	have	a	greater	aversion	to	corruption	and	 tax	 evasion	 (Torgler	 and	 Valev	 2010)	 take	 more	 conservative	 positions	 in	accounting	 (Francis,	Hasan,	 Park	 and	Wu	2014),	make	 fewer	 discretionary	 accruals	(Barua,	Davidson,	Rama	and	Thiruvadi	2010),	make	fewer	acquisitions	and	issue	less	debt	 (Huang	 and	 Kisgen	 2013).	 Female	 leaders	 may	 see	 the	 trade	 off	 between	 tax	avoidance	and	its	associated	risks	differently.		Lanis	and	Richardson	(2015)	consider	a	measure	of	CSR	that	incorporates	items	related	to	diversity	in	relation	to	the	CEO,	the	board	of	directors	and	the	provision	of	work/life	benefits.	They	find	that	there	is	a	significant	negative	association	between	the	measure	and	tax	avoidance	indicating	that	more	diverse	companies	(both	in	terms	of	gender	and	ethnic	minorities)	are	less	tax	avoidant	than	less	diverse	companies.		Francis	et	al	(2014)	find	that	female	CFOs	are	associated	with	taking	less	aggressive	tax	positions	 than	 male	 CFOs.	 They	 study	 the	 changes	 following	 a	 male	 –	 female	 CFO	transition.	They	find	that	female	CFOs	participate	less	in	aggressive	tax	planning	(using	measures	 of	 tax	 sheltering,	 unrecognized	 tax	 benefits	 and	 permanent	 book–tax	differences).	When	they	considered	cash	and	GAAP	ETR,	however,	they	find	that	there	are	no	differences	between	male	and	female	CFOs.	These	findings	are	consistent	with	Dyreng	et	al	(2010)	who	also	found	no	difference	between	male	and	female	CFOs.	
	This	leads	to	the	development	of	the	following	hypotheses	which	are	tested	using	data	analysis	in	Chapter	5:	
Hypothesis	3a:	The	proportions	of	female	board	directors	are	positively	related	to	LR	ETR.	
Hypothesis	3b:	Having	women	 in	key	 executive	positions	 (CEOs	and	CFOs)	 is	positively	
related	to	LR	ETR.		
2.2.8 Corporate Social Responsibility	There	 is	 an	 innate	 tension	 between	 firms	 maximising	 returns	 to	 shareholders	 by	minimising	 tax	 paid	 and	 the	 firm’s	 responsibility	 to	 their	 broader	 stakeholders	 and	contribution	 to	 society	 through	 tax	 payments.	 The	 firm’s	 view	 of	 its	 responsibility	towards	 its	 wider	 stakeholders	 is	 reflected	 in	 its	 position	 on	 Corporate	 Social	
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Responsibility	(CSR).	Tax	can	be	seen	as	an	ethical	issue	if	MNEs	are	considered	to	have	at	least	some	degree	of	flexibility	in	the	tax	payments	that	they	make.	Managers	can	be	considered	 to	 be	 operating	 in	 a	 ‘moral	 free	 space’	 (Muller	 and	 Kolk	 2015)	 with	discretion	 about	 which	 tax	 payments	 they	 make	 –	 in	 effect	 having	 some	 level	 of	discretion	over	their	ETR.			There	is	little	extant	research	that	considers	the	issue	of	tax	within	the	area	of	CSR	and	authors	have	called	 for	more	detailed	research	 into	this	area	(Hanlon	and	Heitzman	2010;	Lanis	and	Richardson	2015;	Muller	and	Kolk	2015).		Research	that	does	touch	on	this	 issue	tends	to	be	 in	 the	context	of	developing	countries	(Muller	and	Kolk,	2015;	Bird	 and	 Smucker	 2007).	 Even	 research	 considering	 the	 ‘economic	 dimensions	 of	
corporate	social	responsibility’	(Fontanier	and	Kolk	2007)	fails	to	discuss	the	corporate	tax	dimension.	The	findings	from	research	that	has	been	conducted	have	not	been	clear-cut.			Using	a	sample	of	Australian	firms	Lanis	and	Richardson	(2015)	find	that	firms	with	greater	emphasis	on	CSR	are	less	likely	to	avoid	tax.	Similarly,	Muller	and	Kolk	(2015)	find	that	MNE	subsidiaries	operating	in	India	with	a	strong	reputation	for	CSR	pay	a	higher	ETR	in	comparison	to	MNE	subsidiaries	operating	in	the	same	environment	but	without	the	same	focus	on	CSR.	Davis,	Guenther,	Krull	and	Williams	(2016)	conversely	find	that	managers	and	other	stakeholders	within	MNEs	do	not	see	the	payment	of	taxes	as	associated	with	the	CSR	performance	of	a	firm.	Huseynov	and	Klamm	(2012)	find	that	different	aspects	of	CSR	impact	the	ETR	(both	GAAP	and	Cash)	in	different	ways	depending	on	the	strength	of	the	corporate	governance	within	the	company.		CSR	 can	 have	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 firm	 reputation	 (Fombrun	 2006).	 MNEs	 with	reputations	 as	 socially	 responsible	 can	 use	 this	 reputation	 as	 a	 form	 of	 insurance	against	 future	 crises	 (Peloza	 2006;	 Godfrey,	 Merrill	 and	 Hansen	 2009;	 Muller	 and	Kraussl	2011).	If	MNEs	see	tax	as	a	CSR	issue,	this	may	indicate	that	they	understand	the	 potential	 CSR	 reputational	 risk	 that	 could	 emanate	 from	 their	 tax	management	strategy.	This	leads	to	the	development	of	the	following	hypothesis	which	is	empirically	tested	using	regression	analysis	in	Chapter	5:	
Hypothesis	4:	Concerns	for	CSR	are	positively	related	to	LR	ETR.	
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2.2.9 The Degree of Multinationality Having	 affiliates	 in	 different	 countries	may	 increase	 the	 opportunities	 available	 for	profit	shifting.	Clearly,	domestic	companies	have	few	opportunities	to	profit	shift	but	firms	with	operations	in	a	wider	set	of	countries	may	face	a	broader	range	of	tax	rates	and	regulations,	offering	opportunities	 to	profit	shift.	Firms	with	more	 international	subsidiaries	are	able	 to	use	TP	more	aggressively	or	other	mechanisms,	 such	as	 the	relocation	of	IP	to	low	or	zero	tax	jurisdictions	and	the	ability	to	charge	royalty	fees	or	the	use	of	intra-company	debt.	Companies	with	more	overseas	subsidiaries	or	longer	value	 chains	 appear	 to	 have	 a	 greater	 ability	 to	 shift	 profits	 from	 high	 to	 low	 tax	jurisdictions	(Grubert	and	Mutti	1991;	Rego	2003;	Dyreng	and	Lindsey	2009).			Research	looks	at	the	proportion	of	foreign	subsidiaries	that	a	firm	has	and	the	impact	that	this	has	on	corporate	strategy.	Taylor,	Richardson	and	Lanis	(2015)	find	that	the	greater	 the	 proportion	 of	 foreign	 controlled	 subsidiaries	 a	 MNE	 has,	 the	 more	aggressive	a	position	takes	on	TP.	Similarly	Rego	(2003)	 finds	that	MNEs	with	more	extensive	 foreign	 operations	 have	 a	 lower	 ETR	 than	 those	 with	 less	 extensive	operations.			Research	into	this	aspect	of	US	MNEs,	however,	appears	to	be	becoming	more	difficult.	US	MNEs	must	disclose	the	names	and	locations	of	all	their	‘significant’	subsidiaries	in	Exhibit	21	of	their	10K	report.		The	MNE	can	omit	the	names	of	subsidiaries	that	in	total	account	for	less	than	10	per	cent	of	the	Group’s	consolidated	assets	or	pre-tax	income.	Research	that	looks	at	multinationality	has	relied	on	this	information;	however,	there	appears	 to	 be	 a	 growing	 trend	 for	 US	 MNEs	 to	 reduce	 the	 number	 of	 subsidiaries	disclosed	 (Donohoe,	McGill	 and	Outslay	 2012).	Donohoe,	McGill	 and	Outslay	 (2012)	surmise	that	this	may	be	because	of	the	growing	interest	in	tax	havens	driven	by	media	interest	in	tax	avoidance.	They	cite	Google,	which	listed	108	subsidiaries	in	2009	but	only	 2	 in	 2011.	This	 trend	 towards	opacity	 has	 continued:	 in	2015	 a	 new	 company	Alphabet	was	established	as	the	parent	company	of	Google.	It	lists	only	one	subsidiary	–	Google	(Alphabet	2015).		
	Despite	these	empirical	difficulties	the	following	hypothesis	is	proposed:	
Hypothesis	5:		The	degree	of	multinationality	is	negatively	related	to	LR	ETR.	
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This	hypothesis	is	empirically	tested	in	Chapter	5.	
2.2.10 Location One	of	the	most	straightforward	ways	for	MNEs	to	reduce	their	ETR	is	to	consider	the	country	 or	 countries	where	 they	 operate.	 Competition	 between	 countries	 to	 attract	MNEs	has	reduced	the	statutory	tax	rate	in	many	places	and	increased	the	opportunities	for	MNEs	to	engage	in	arbitrage.	For	MNEs	the	home	and	host	country	tax	rates	and	regulations	 are	 important	 as	well	 as	 the	 interaction	 between	 the	 two.	 This	 section	covers	 research	 on	 location	 choice,	 the	 special	 case	 of	 tax	 havens	 and	 the	 use	 of	inversions.		When	 MNEs	 are	 expanding	 abroad	 they	 consider	 the	 statutory	 tax	 rate	 offered	 by	potential	 host	 countries.	 Research	 confirms	 a	 negative	 relationship	 between	 the	statutory	tax	rate	in	place	and	investment	(Devereux	and	Griffith	2003;	De	Mooij	and	Ederveen	2006;	Azemar	2010;	Barrios	et	al	2012).	The	corporation	tax	rate	is,	however,	only	one	aspect	that	will	affect	a	company’s	decision	on	where	to	locate.	For	example,	the	 LSAs	 and	 the	 size	 of	 the	 market	 will	 also	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 decision.	 To	understand	the	full	implications	of	the	effect	of	taxation	it	is	necessary	to	understand	in	detail	the	reasons	behind	a	company’s	decision	to	locate	in	a	certain	place. 	Decisions	 on	 location	 are	 likely	 to	 depend	 on	 both	 parent	 and	 host	 country	 taxes	(Huizinga	 and	 Laeven	 2008;	 Barrios	 et	 al	 2012).	 Barrios	 et	 al	 (2012)	 use	 a	 large	international	 firm	 level	 data	 set	 incorporating	 a	 range	 of	 European	 countries	 and	companies.	Rather	than	considering	the	impact	of	the	host	country	tax	rate	in	isolation	they	 consider	 the	 interaction	 between	 home	 and	 host	 country	 tax	 systems.	 They	conclude	that	despite	the	ability	to	defer	paying	home	country	taxes	until	repatriation	of	profits,	these	parent	country	taxes	continue	to	exert	an	effect	on	MNE	tax	planning.	MNEs	remain	sensitive	to	the	tax	systems	of	both	home	and	host	countries	and	clearly	plan	 to	 ensure	 that	 their	 overall	 pattern	 of	 international	 ownership	 is	 tax	 efficient.	Barrios	 et	 al	 (2012)	 also	 find	 that	 the	 location	 decisions	 for	 highly	 profitable	subsidiaries	are	less	responsive	to	tax	inducements	than	for	less	profitable	subsidiaries.	They	 speculate	 that	 higher	 profitability	 could	 be	 location	 specific,	 so	 moving	 the	subsidiary	 could	 reduce	profitability.	Location	decisions	of	 foreign	subsidiaries	with	
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low	fixed	assets	are	more	sensitive	to	parent	and	host	country	taxation	–	reflecting	the	fact	that	they	are	physically	easier	to	move	than	subsidiaries	with	higher	levels	of	fixed	assets.	They	also	find	an	important	role	for	repatriation	as	firms	with	the	ability	to	defer	paying	tax	in	the	home	country	until	repatriation	are	only	half	as	responsive	to	tax	rates	as	those	who	cannot	defer.			Dyreng	 et	 al	 (2015)	widen	 the	 scope	 of	 their	 research	 examining	 the	 global	 equity	supply	chains	of	US	MNEs.	They	consider	the	impact	of	both	tax	and	non-tax	factors	on	location	decisions.	They	stress	the	importance	of	the	overall	structure	of	the	group,	and	the	presence	of	holding	companies	located	in	low	tax	countries.	They	also	find	that	the	levels	of	corruption	and	investment	risk	play	a	key	role	in	location	choice	for	holding	companies. 	In	early	work	Devereux	and	Griffith	(1998)	consider	a	panel	of	US	MNE	and	how	tax	affects	their	location	decisions	for	subsidiaries	in	France,	Germany	and	the	UK	between	1980	and	1994.	They	find	that	host	country	average	ETRs	play	a	key	role	in	determining	choice.	More	recent	work	by	Buettner	and	Ruf	(2007),	however,	finds	that	a	sample	of	German	MNEs	are	affected	more	by	host	country	statutory	tax	rates	than	by	average	ETRs	 incorporating	 both	 home	 and	 host	 country	 tax	 rates.	 They	 consider	 decisions	made	between	1996	and	2003	meaning	that	there	is	no	overlap	in	time	period	for	the	two	pieces	of	research.	This	may	account	 for	 the	different	 findings	or	 it	may	be	that	German	MNEs	and	US	MNEs	make	decisions	in	different	ways.	Differences	could	also	reflect	variances	in	the	ability	to	profit	shift;	statutory	tax	rates	clearly	become	a	less	significant	factor	in	a	location	decision	if	part	of	the	profit	generated	there	can	be	shifted	elsewhere.			Grubert	(2003b)	finds	that	US	MNEs	who	have	a	higher	than	average	ability	to	profit	shift,	(that	is	those	with	high	levels	of	intangible	assets	see	section	2.2.6.1	below)	will	choose	 locations	 with	 either	 very	 high	 or	 very	 low	 statutory	 tax	 rates.	 Similarly,	Clausing	(2009)	considers	the	impact	of	tax	incentives	on	location	decisions.	She	looks	at	the	way	that	US	MNEs	respond	to	tax	incentives	both	financially	and	in	terms	of	‘real’	decisions	such	as	determining	the	location	of	employment.	She	finds	that	a	one	per	cent	fall	 in	 the	host	 country	 tax	 rate	 is	 associated	with	a	0.5	per	 cent	 increase	 in	profits	
	 96	
booked	 by	 affiliates	 in	 that	 country.	 She	 also	 regresses	 employment	on	 the	 tax	 rate	differences	between	countries	and	concludes	that	 tax	 factors	 led	to	 the	relocation	of	real	economic	activity	that	in	effect	shifted	approximately	$80	billion	of	US	profits	to	low	tax	countries.			Grubert	 and	Mutti	 (2000)	 find	 a	magnified	 impact	 of	 very	 low	 tax	 rates	 on	 capital	investment	decisions.	They	have	access	to	tax	returns	from	more	than	500	US	MNEs	and	 find	 that	 average	 ETRs	 have	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	 choice	 of	 location	 for	investment,	as	well	as	on	the	size	of	investment.	They	conclude	that	approximately	19	per	 cent	 of	US	 capital	 investments	 abroad	would	 be	 in	 different	 locations	 if	 the	 tax	impact	were	removed.	
2.2.10.1 Inversions and Corporate Structuring / Configuration An	 inversion	 is	 the	name	given	 to	 the	decision	made	by	a	parent	 company	 to	buy	a	foreign	 subsidiary	 and	 then	 invert	 the	 ownership	 structure	 such	 that	 the	 new	subsidiary	becomes	the	parent	company.	Inversions	have	been	politically	controversial	in	 the	 US	 in	 recent	 years	 as	 companies	 inverting,	 and	 effectively	 moving	 their	headquarters	out	of	the	US	are	seen	as	‘unpatriotic’.		
 Creating	such	a	structure	allows	the	MNE	to	completely	bypass	taxation	in	the	US	(Boise	and	Koenig	2002).	Under	the	current	US	 legal	system	a	corporate	 inversion	will	not	function	 for	US	tax	purposes	 if	80	percent	or	more	of	 the	newly	merged	company	 is	owned	 by	 previous	 shareholders	of	 the	US	 company.	 A	 new	bill	has	 been	 proposed	recently	 that	 would	 make	 it	 harder	 for	 US	 companies	 to	 invert	 by	 reducing	 this	threshold	 from	 80	 percent	 to	 50	 percent.	 The	 attractiveness	 of	 inversions	 to	 US	companies	underlines	their	desire	to	reduce	their	tax	bill	(Financial	Times	2016).			These	 changes	 in	 policy	 and	 attitude	 by	 the	 US	 government	 appear	 to	 be	 making	inversions	more	difficult	and	therefore	less	attractive.	Up	to	date	research	is	required	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	policy	but	cases	such	as	the	failed	Pfizer	/	Allergan	merger	(Financial	Times	2016)	appear	to	demonstrate	the	key	role	that	corporate	tax	planning	can	play	in	driving	MNE	actions.	The	proposed	$160	billion	Pfizer	/	Allergan	merger	failed	when	changes	to	US	regulations	meant	that	Pfizer	would	not	be	able	to	invert	and	
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base	its	headquarters	in	Ireland	following	the	takeover.	The	merger	was	not	sufficiently	attractive	 to	 go	 ahead	 without	 the	 promise	 of	 low	 Irish	 tax	 rates.	 Walgreen’s	announcement	 reversing	 their	 decision	 to	 move	 their	 global	 headquarters	 to	Switzerland	despite	taking	over	Alliance	Boots	which	is	headquartered	there	is	thought	to	 have	 been	 triggered	 by	 rhetoric	 from	 the	 Obama	 government	 as	 well	 as	 US	Republicans	 that	 inversions	 are	 unacceptable	 and	 legislation	may	 follow	 (Financial	Times	2014).			Academic	research	has	also	found	a	significant	role	for	inversion	in	corporate	strategy.	Huizinga	 and	Voget	 (2009)	 consider	 international	M&As	 and	 find	 that	 the	 resulting	pattern	of	subsidiary	ownership	is	consistent	with	efficient	tax	planning	by	MNEs	as	the	new	 parent	 company	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 located	 in	 the	 country	 with	 the	 more	favourable	tax	regime.		
 Desai	and	Hines	(2002)	examine	inversions	between	1982	and	2002	and	conclude	that	the	foreign	subsidiary	that	became	the	parent	typically	faced	low	tax	rates.	Similarly,	Seida	and	Wempe	(2004)	consider	12	corporate	inversions	and	find	that	the	ETR	faced	by	the	MNE	reduced	significantly	after	the	inversion	due	to	profit	shifting,	particularly	via	intra-company	debt.	Desai	and	Hines	(2002)	found	that	the	number	of	inversions	carried	out	each	year	was	increasing	although	it	is	likely	that	this	changed	since	their	research	was	conducted	given	the	toughening	of	the	US	policy	stance	on	this	issue.	
2.2.10.2 Tax Havens Tax	avoidance	can	be	facilitated	by	having	group	affiliates	located	in	countries	that	are	tax	havens	or	OFCs.	Tax	havens	are	characterised	by	having	very	low	or	zero	rates	of	corporation	tax	and	high	levels	of	secrecy	that	make	them	attractive	to	MNEs	(Shaxson	2011;	Zucman	2015).	This	secrecy	compounds	the	difficulties	inherent	in	tax	research	limiting	the	potential	for	research	focussing	on	tax	havens	and	their	use	by	MNEs.	Tax	havens	offer	 the	MNE	opportunities	 to	engage	 in	 cross-country	arbitrage,	 exploiting	differences	 in	 tax	 and	 regulatory	 regimes,	 which	 offers	 them	 an	 advantage	 over	domestic	companies.	UNCTAD	(2013)	states	that	investment	via	OFCs	is	accounting	for	a	 growing	 proportion	 of	 global	 FDI	 flows	 and	 that	 investments	 into	 OFCs	 are	 at	historically	high	levels.	
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	Defining	which	countries	are	tax	havens	is	difficult.	Jones	and	Temouri	(2016)	argue	that	the	essence	of	a	tax	haven	is	a	country	that	has	zero,	or	close	to	zero	rates	of	tax	for	companies	that	are	‘non	resident’.	Hines	and	Rice	(1994)	split	tax	havens	into	‘dot	tax	havens’,	 essentially	 small	 island	 economies	 and	 the	 ‘Big	 7’	 (Hong	 Kong,	 Ireland,	Lebanon,	Liberia,	Panama,	Singapore	and	Switzerland).	These	have	low	or	zero	taxation	but	also	have	significant	economies	and	markets	that	may	also	be	attractive	to	MNEs.	There	may	also	have	been	significant	changes	 in	many	of	 these	markets	since	1994.	Jones	and	Temouri	(2016)	use	‘dot’	tax	havens	for	their	empirical	analysis	as	they	are	confident	that	investment	in	these	countries	is	driven	purely	by	their	tax	haven	status	given	the	small	size	of	their	markets.		The	OECD	prepared	a	report	(OECD	1998)	that	argued	that	tax	haven	countries	were	harmful	to	OECD	members	as	they	diverted	funds	away	from	member	countries.	They	subsequently	 (OECD	2000)	 published	 a	 list	of	 the	 countries	 that	 they	 claimed	were	engaging	in	tax	practices	that	were	harmful	to	OECD	members	(Taylor,	Richardson	and	Lanis	 2015).	 Dyreng	 and	 Lindsey	 (2009)	 compile	 a	 list	 of	 53	 countries	 that	 they	consider	to	be	tax	havens.	A	country	fits	their	definition	if	it	is	included	in	3	out	of	the	4	lists	of	tax	havens	published	by	the	OECD,	the	IMF,	the	Tax	Research	Organisation	and	the	US	 Stop	Tax	Havens	Abuse	Act.	 This	 substantial	 list	 of	 countries	 includes	many	countries	that	have	large	markets	and	therefore	the	decision	to	locate	a	subsidiary	there	may	not	always	be	for	reasons	of	tax	avoidance.		Eden	and	Kudrle	(2005)	distinguish	between	‘headquarters	tax	havens’	where	lower	corporate	 taxes	 provide	 an	 advantage	 to	 firms	 that	 incorporate	 in	 that	 jurisdiction	regardless	 of	 where	 the	 shareholders,	 the	 owner,	 of	 that	 firm	 are	 based.	 They	 cite	Belgium	and	Singapore	as	key	examples.	The	second	type	are	‘sham	tax	havens’	that	are	happy	to	host	financial	intermediaries	–	special	purpose	entities	(SPEs)	that	may	be	no	more	 than	 an	 address	 with	 the	 real	 economic	 activity	 and	 investment	 occurring	elsewhere.	They	cite	the	Caribbean	and	Pacific	tax	havens	within	this	category.	Many	sham	havens	are	also	secrecy	havens	where	individuals	or	companies	benefit	from	the	extreme	secrecy	of	the	financial	industry	based	there.		
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Tax	havens	are	widely	considered	to	play	a	significant	role	in	tax	planning	by	MNEs.	Firms	may	register	companies	in	tax	havens	to	take	advantage	of	them	as	a	mechanism	to	reduce	their	overall	corporate	tax	rate	still	further.	Desai,	Foley	and	Hines	(2006)	find	that	nearly	60	per	cent	of	US	firms	with	substantial	foreign	operations	had	at	least	one	subsidiary	in	a	tax	haven	country.	Dyreng	and	Lindsey	(2009)	report	that	US	MNEs	with	operations	in	at	least	one	tax	haven	report	an	average	worldwide	tax	rate	that	is	1.5	per	cent	lower	than	firms	that	do	not	use	tax	havens.	Taylor,	Richardson	and	Lanis	(2015)	consider	any	firm	with	a	subsidiary	in	a	tax	haven	to	be	tax	avoiding.	There	may,	however,	 be	 some	 legitimate	 economic	 purpose	 for	 some	 businesses	 to	 have	subsidiaries	in	some	tax	havens.		More	significant	use	of	tax	havens	however,	would	be	likely	to	denote	a	firm	that	is	avoiding	tax.		Jones	and	Temouri	(2016)	investigate	the	drivers	of	tax	haven	usage	and	conclude	that	technology	 intensive	manufacturing	MNEs,	 and	 service	 industry	MNEs,	 that	 is	 those	with	high	levels	of	intangible	assets	are	more	likely	to	own	subsidiaries	in	tax	havens.	They	 use	 a	 dummy	 variable	 simply	 defining	 whether	 the	 MNE	 has	 a	 tax	 haven	subsidiary	 or	 not.	 They	 point	 out	 that	 a	 more	 specific	 measure	 of	 the	 extent	 of	investment	 in	 the	 tax	 haven	 would	 be	 preferable	 but	 the	 secrecy	 surrounding	 tax	havens	 makes	 data	 gathering	 for	 a	 more	 refined	 variable	 impossible.	 They	 also	conclude	that	the	home	country	statutory	corporation	tax	rate	has	little	impact	on	the	decision	to	invest	in	a	tax	haven.	They	point	out	that	despite	the	range	of	tax	rates	in	OECD	countries	they	are	all	significantly	different	from	those	offered	in	tax	havens	and	so	small	changes	in	home	country	rates	are	unlikely	to	affect	the	decision	to	invest	in	tax	havens.		Empirical	work	has	found	that	tax	liabilities	of	US	MNEs	with	affiliates	in	tax	havens	are	lower	than	those	that	do	not	have	them	(Harris,	Morck,	Slemrod	and	Yeung	1993),	and	that	US	MNEs	with	material	operations	in	at	least	one	tax	haven	have	an	average	world-wide	tax	rate	that	is	around	1.5	per	cent	lower	than	those	without	such	an	affiliate	in	their	structure	(Dyreng	and	Lindsey	2009).	Dyreng	and	Lindsey	(2009)	calculate	that	this	translates	into	a	reduction	of	$68	billion	in	tax	expense	for	their	sample	of	3,433	firms	over	the	period	studied	(1995-2007).	Other	research	has	demonstrated	the	link	between	US	investments	in	tax	havens	and	profit	shifting	(Hines	and	Rice	1994;	Grubert	
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and	 Slemrod	 1998;	 and	 Desai,	 Foley	 and	 Hines	 2006;	 Taylor	 Richardson	 and	 Lanis	2015)			Recent	research	by	Zucman	(2014)	uses	US	balance	of	payments	data	and	determines	that	55	per	cent	of	US	foreign	profits	are	made	from	six	countries	that	he	classifies	as	tax	 havens:	 the	 Netherlands,	 Bermuda,	 Luxembourg,	 Ireland,	 Singapore	 and	Switzerland.	He	reports	that	 foreign	profits	have	 increased	to	about	one	third	of	 the	total	of	US	corporate	profits.	He	calculates	that	as	55	per	cent	of	this	is	recorded	in	tax	havens,	18	per	cent	of	all	US	corporate	profits	are	now	derived	through	tax	havens.	
 It	 is	 clear	 from	 the	 research	 presented	 in	 this	 section	 that	 corporate	 tax	 rates	 and	regimes	can	play	a	significant	role	 in	directing	MNE	location	decisions.	The	extreme	cases	 are	 inversions	 and	 tax	 havens	 but	 other	 host	 country	 decisions	 are	 clearly	influenced	 by	 the	 tax	 systems	 and	 /	 or	 by	 the	 ability	 of	MNEs	 to	 shift	 their	 profits	between	locations.	The	use	of	the	smallest	‘dot	tax	havens’	in	corporate	structures	can	only	be	part	of	 a	 tax	planning	 regime.	The	 cause	and	effect	of	 larger	 countries	with	attractive	markets	 as	well	 as	 attractive	 tax	 regimes	may	 be	 less	 clear-cut.	 The	 next	section	turns	to	transfer	pricing	and	the	key	mechanisms	through	which	MNEs	are	able	to	shift	their	profits	between	the	selected	locations.		Following	these	insights	from	the	above		work	the	following	hypothesis	is	proposed:		
Hypothesis	6:	The	establishment	of	at	least	one	tax	haven	subsidiary	is	negatively	related	
to	LR	ETR.	This	hypothesis	is	empirically	tested	in	the	regression	analysis	presented	in	Chapter	5.	
2.2.11 Losses	MNEs	that	have	made	losses	in	the	past	are	able	to	use	these	to	offset	against	future	tax	liabilities.	This	can	significantly	reduce	an	MNE’s	future	tax	payments	after	incurring	a	loss.	There	is	however,	little	published	research	into	this	area	of	tax	planning,	possibly	because	losses	are	not	thought	to	be	something	that	MNEs	can	manipulate.	Interview	research	for	this	thesis	(see	Chapter	4)	shows	that	US	MNEs	consider	carefully	where	to	accumulate	losses	in	order	to	maximise	their	potential	for	tax	planning.		
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Loss	making	companies	are	often	excluded	from	research	on	tax	(Rego	2003;	Markle	and	Shackelford	2009;	Dharmapala	and	Riedel	2013).	Whilst	these	authors	state	that	they	are	excluding	loss	making	companies	they	do	not	explain	clearly	their	motivation	for	doing	so.	 It	would	appear	 that	 their	 inclusion	could	distort	regression	results	 as	these	 companies	 may	 behave	 differently	 to	 profit	 making	 companies.	 Hanlon	 and	Heitzman	(2010	p.129)	point	out	that:	‘we	do	not	have	a	very	good	understanding	of	loss	
making	firms,	the	utilization	and	value	of	tax-loss	carry-forwards	and	how	the	existence	
of	losses	affects	the	behaviour	…of	any	of	the	involved	parties’.		Research	that	has	incorporated	net	operating	losses	(NOL)	has	not	found	them	to	be	significant.	Research	has	considered	the	role	of	losses	in	M&As	but	found	little	evidence	that	 they	 are	 considered	 valuable	 (Hanlon	 and	 Heitzman	 2010).	 Overesch	 and	Schreiber	(2009)	consider	the	loss	carry-forwards	of	these	NOLs	within	their	study	of	the	 impact	 of	 R&D	 intensity	 on	 profit	 shifting.	 They	 predict	 that	 companies	 with	relevant	loss	carry-forwards	would	have	less	propensity	to	shift	profits	away	from	the	host	 country.	 However,	 the	 loss	 carry-forwards	 in	 their	 investigation	 prove	insignificant.	Clearly,	more	research	is	needed	to	add	to	our	understanding	of	the	way	that	MNEs	use	NOL	and	the	impact	that	this	mechanism	has	on	their	tax	planning	and	payments.	This	thesis	therefore	tests	the	role	of	losses	in	Chapter	5	(data	analysis).	The	following	hypothesis	is	proposed	and	tested:		
Hypothesis	7:	Registering	losses	for	two	or	more	years	is	negatively	related	to	LR	ETR.	
2.2.12 Profit Repatriation (Dividend Payment) Versus Cash Holdings The	US	tax	system	requires	MNEs	to	pay	tax	on	their	overseas	earnings	only	when	they	are	 repatriated	 to	 the	US	 (with	 certain	 exceptions	 –	 see	 section	 in	 Introduction	 for	details).	 Consequently,	 there	 is	 a	 benefit	 to	 the	 MNE	 of	 deferring	 repatriation	 and,	therefore,	tax	payments,	equivalent	to	an	interest	free	loan	from	the	US	Government	(Brajcich,	Friesner	and	McPherson	2013b).		Research	demonstrates	that	US	firms	defer	the	repatriation	of	profits	when	local	taxes	are	lower	(Kopits	1972;	Grubert	and	Mutti	1991;	 Grubert	 and	 Mutti	 2001;	 Louie	 and	 Rousslang	 2008).	 Azemar	 (2010)	 finds	specifically	that	a	1	per	cent	increase	in	tax	rate	is	associated	with	an	increase	of	2.5	per	
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cent	in	dividend	payouts.	As	the	differential	between	the	host	country	and	the	US	falls	the	incentive	to	delay	repatriation	also	falls.			Hines	and	Rice	(1994)	find	that	Subpart	F	income	has	accumulated	in	low	tax	countries	and	Azemar	(2010)	confirms	this	finding,	concluding	that,	despite	the	Subpart	F	rule,	holding	passive	investments	in	low	tax	countries	appears	to	be	more	profitable	than	repatriation.	The	costs	of	repatriating	in	terms	of	agency	costs,	international	interest	rates	and	the	liquidity	needs	of	the	company	will	also	impact	the	decision	to	repatriate	(Desai	 et	 al	 2006).	 When	 the	 tax	 cost	 of	 repatriating	 increases,	 firms	 reduce	 their	repatriations	(Altshuler	and	Newlon	1993;	Grubert	1998;	Desai	et	al	2006).	
 In	 their	 work	 on	 capital	 structure,	 Altshuler	 and	 Grubert	 (2002)	 find	 that	 the	 tax	implications	of	the	method	chosen	by	an	MNE	subsidiary	to	repatriate	profits	have	a	direct	influence	on	real	investment.	Subsidiaries	that	face	high	tax	costs	of	repatriating	profits	will	make	greater	investments	in	other	group	companies	and	send	dividends	to	other	foreign	affiliates.	They	also	pay	off	more	local	debt	as	a	way	of	using	their	profits	without	repatriating	them.	Tax	therefore	has	an	impact	on	group	cross	ownerships	and	holdings	as	well	as	simply	on	intra-company	debt.		Work	looking	at	the	supply	chains	of	US	MNEs	(Dyreng	et	al	2015)	to	consider	how	tax	and	 non-tax	 country	 characteristics	 affect	 location	 decisions	 and	 the	 use	 of	 foreign	holding	companies,	also	reveals	 that	US	MNEs	with	more	profit	shifting	capacity	are	less	 likely	 to	 use	 foreign	 equity	 holding	 companies.	 These	MNEs	 have	 less	 need	 to	generate	structures	to	repatriate	dividends	in	a	tax	efficient	manner	as	they	have	the	capacity	to	shift	profits	within	the	existing	structures.	Clearly,	dividend	repatriation	is	a	decision	influenced	by	the	tax	implications	of	when	and	how	funds	are	transferred	to	the	home	country.		The	American	Jobs	Creation	Act	(AJCA)	of	2004	reduced	US	corporation	tax	rates	to	a	maximum	of	5.25	per	cent	for	dividend	repatriations	back	to	the	US	for	a	single	year	in	order	to	encourage	the	repatriation	of	earnings	from	abroad.	Whilst	the	AJCA	did	induce	MNEs	to	return	cash	to	the	US	the	effect	was	short	lived	and	firms	then	continued	to	re-
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accumulate	earnings	abroad	once	the	single	year	regulations	had	expired	(Clemmons	and	Kinney	2008).			Graham,	 Hanlon	 and	 Shevlin	 (2011)	 consider	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 financial	 reporting	requirements	in	relation	to	repatriation	as	well	as	the	cash	tax	impact	of	paying	taxes	when	repatriating	profits.	Companies	are	required	to	account	 for	 the	tax	payable	on	repatriation,	 reducing	 the	 reporting	 financial	 income	 for	 the	year	of	 repatriation.	 In	effect	 there	 becomes	 a	 mismatch	 between	 the	 tax	 payable	 and	 the	 income	 that	generated	it.	Income	is	booked	when	made	but	if	the	company	defers	repatriation	and	states	that	the	earnings	are	PRE	no	tax	needs	to	be	provided	for.	If	at	a	later	date	the	firm	decides	to	reverse	its	decision	and	repatriate	the	earnings,	tax	becomes	due.	This	later	 repatriation	 of	 earnings	 will	 have	 implications	 for	 a	 company’s	 ETR.	 By	 not	repatriating,	the	MNE	does	not	have	to	recognise	the	income	tax	expense	at	the	same	time	as	recognising	the	income,	which	therefore	reduces	GAAP	ETR	for	that	year.	If	the	decision	is	reversed	at	a	later	date	the	GAAP	ETR	will	be	increased	for	that	year.	This	may	 give	 companies	 some	 leverage	 to	 manipulate	 the	 ETR.	 Further	 research	 work	specifically	considering	the	movements	in	company	PRE	and	its	impact	on	tax	payments	is	needed.		US	MNEs	continue	to	build	 large	reserves	of	cash	overseas,	with	anecdotal	evidence	indicating	 that	 they	 are	 now	waiting	 for	 a	 new	 amnesty	where	 they	 can	 repatriate	dividends	at	a	lower	rate	of	tax.	Zucman	(2014)	reports	that	80	per	cent	of	profits	that	were	 recorded	 in	 key	 tax	 havens	 were	 retained	 there	 with	 only	 20	 per	 cent	 being	repatriated	to	the	US.	Companies	such	as	Apple	have	been	criticised	 for	maintaining	their	reserves	of	cash	overseas	rather	than	returning	it	as	dividends	to	shareholders	or	reinvesting	 it	 in	 the	US.	As	of	2014,	Apple	reported	that	$70billion	of	earnings	were	reinvested	overseas	(PRE)	rather	than	being	returned	to	the	US	(Apple	2014).	This	has	clear	implications	for	policy	makers	as	well	as	for	shareholders.		Brajcich,	 Friesner	 and	McPherson	 (2013a)	 adopt	 a	macro	 approach	 to	 examine	 the	issue	of	repatriations.	They	point	out	the	benefit	to	MNEs	of	deferring	tax	payments,	referring	to	this	as	the	equivalent	of	an	interest	free	loan	from	the	US	Government.	They	also	find	that	geographic	distance	appears	to	play	a	significant	role,	with	repatriation	
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significantly	more	 likely	 from	 subsidiaries	 located	 in	 Latin	 and	 South	 America,	 and	other	nations	in	the	western	hemisphere.	They	conclude	that	these	results	are	driven	by	the	greater	economic	integration	that	exists	between	the	USA	and	both	Canada	and	Mexico,	relative	to	other	nations.			The	evidence	shows	distinctly	that	US	MNEs	take	advantage	of	the	system	of	deferral.	Profits	generated	or	transferred	to	low	tax	jurisdictions	are	less	likely	to	be	repatriated	directly	to	the	US.	The	next	section	considers	the	advantages	to	the	MNE	of	holding	their	earnings	as	cash	rather	than	repatriating	to	the	parent	company.		Many	US	MNEs	choose	to	hold	large	cash	balances	overseas	rather	than	repatriate	to	the	US	and	pay	taxes	on	earnings	(Foley,	Hartzell,	Titman	and	Twite	2007).	Graham,	Hanlon	 and	 Shevlin	 (2010)	 use	 data	 from	 a	 survey	 of	 tax	 executives	 and	 find	 that	following	the	AJCA,	more	than	60	per	cent	of	the	funds	that	were	repatriated	came	from	cash	holdings	that	had	previously	been	held	overseas.	Similarly,	Dharmapala,	Foley	and	Forbes	(2011)	find	that	MNEs	with	larger	cash	holdings	overseas	were	more	likely	to	repatriate	funds	as	a	consequence	of	the	AJCA.	Graham	et	al’s	(2010)	survey	also	reveals	that	MNEs	are	prepared	to	incur	costs	to	prevent	having	to	repatriate	earnings	at	times	when	the	AJCA	is	not	in	effect.		Nearly	44	per	cent	of	their	respondents	said	that	their	companies	had	issued	debt	capital	in	the	US	in	order	to	avoid	paying	corporation	tax	on	the	 repatriation	 of	 earnings	when	 funds	were	 required	 in	 the	 US.	 20	 per	 cent	 also	reported	that	they	had	invested	their	cash	overseas	despite	these	schemes	having	lower	rates	of	return	than	they	could	have	earned	in	the	US.			Foley	et	al	(2007)	find	that	firms	with	higher	repatriation	taxes	such	as	US	MNEs	hold	higher	 levels	 of	 cash	 and	 hold	 this	 cash	 abroad.	 They	 estimate	 that	 a	 one	 standard	deviation	increase	in	the	tax	burden	from	repatriating	foreign	income	is	associated	with	a	 7.9	 per	 cent	 increase	 in	 the	 ratio	 of	 cash	 to	 net	 assets.	 They	 find	 that	 technology	intensive	 firms	 are	 more	 sensitive	 than	 other	 types	 of	 firm	 to	 the	 tax	 costs	 on	repatriation.	This	may	reflect	the	ease	with	which	they	are	able	to	profit	shift	(Desai	et	al.	2006).		
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Firms	with	greater	access	to	capital,	like	large	firms,	need	to	hold	less	cash.	Foley	et	al	(2007)	control	for	this	by	including	the	natural	log	of	total	assets	as	a	proxy	for	firm	size	and	a	dividend	dummy	that	equals	one	if	a	firm	pays	a	dividend	in	a	given	year.	They	also	acknowledge	that	firms	with	more	foreign	income	may	hold	more	cash	as	a	consequence	of	a	delay	in	transferring	cash	and	that	foreign	businesses	may	be	more	volatile	and	therefore	require	precautionary	cash	holdings.		If	US	MNEs	target	a	particular	level	of	cash	holdings	and	they	hold	large	cash	reserves	overseas	these	may	be	considered	as	a	substitute	for	cash	held	in	the	US.	In	this	case	the	overall	cash	held	by	the	firm	may	not	increase	with	the	cost	of	repatriation.	Whilst	repatriation	taxes	may	incentivise	US	MNEs	not	to	return	earnings	to	the	US	they	may	not	hold	these	earnings	as	cash.	They	may	increase	investment	rather	than	cash.			The	 research	 discussed	 above	 indicates	 that	 levels	 of	 cash	 holdings	 may	 be	 an	indication	of	tax	avoidance.	This	is	tested	in	Chapter	5	where	the	cash	/	asset	ratio	of	a	firm	is	included	as	a	dependent	variable,	in	addition	to	the	key	dependent	variables	of	LR	Cash	and	GAAP	ETRs.		Within	the	empirical	work	in	Chapter	5	cash	is	treated	as	an	endogenous	variable,	that	is,	it	is	assumed	that	the	level	of	cash	that	is	held	by	the	firm	can	change	as	a	result	of	the	tax	planning	position	of	the	firm.	Higher	levels	of	cash	holdings	potentially	indicate	that	 tax	 avoidance	 mechanisms	 are	 being	 used.	 US	 MNEs	 choose	 to	 hold	 earnings	offshore	 as	 cash	 rather	 than	 repatriating	 it	 to	 the	 home	 country	where	 it	would	 be	subject	to	tax.		The	level	of	cash	holdings	(cash	/	asset	ratio)	are	therefore	shown	within	the	model	(Figure	4	Conceptual	Model	of	ETR	Determinants)	to	be	a	consequence	of	tax	avoidance.		
2.2.13 Profitability / Income A	 series	 of	 aggregate	 level	 studies	 consider	 the	 link	 between	 profitability	 and	corporation	 tax	 rates.	 Firms	with	 higher	 profitability	may	 have	 greater	 incentive	 to	avoid	high	 rates	of	 tax	as	 they	have	 the	potential	 to	make	greater	absolute	 savings.	Whilst	 it	was	often	assumed	 that	a	 company	would	need	 to	generate	higher	pre-tax	profits	 in	 higher	 tax	 countries	 to	 make	 those	 operations	 worthwhile,	 research	 has	
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shown	that	affiliates	based	in	low	tax	countries	tend	to	record	higher	pre-tax	as	well	as	post-tax	profits	(Grubert	and	Mutti	1991,	Hines	and	Rice	1994;	Huizinga	and	Laeven	2008).	 Rego	 (2003)	 finds	 that	 firms	 with	 higher	 pre-tax	 income	 have	 lower	 ETRs	suggesting	that	 they	avoid	more	tax	than	similar	 firms	with	relatively	lower	 income.	What	is	not	clear	is	whether	high	profits	stimulate	tax	avoidance	or	whether	a	strategy	of	tax	avoidance	increases	profits	at	least	in	low	tax	locations.	
 Hines	 and	 Rice	 (1994)	 and	 Huizinga	 and	 Laeven	 (2008)	 examine	 profit	 shifting	behaviour.	They	find	a	negative	relationship	between	the	corporation	tax	rate	and	the	firm’s	reported	pre-tax	profitability.	Huizinga	and	Laeven	(2008)	explicitly	include	the	differences	 between	 tax	 rates	 amongst	 affiliates	 in	 different	 countries	 as	 well	 as	between	parent	and	subsidiary.	They	conclude	that	an	MNE’s	profit	shifting	depends	on	a	weighted	average	of	the	corporation	tax	rate	differences	between	all	countries	with	affiliates.			In	 their	 study	 of	 European	 countries	 and	 MNEs	 Barrios	 et	 al	 (2012)	 find	 that	 the	decisions	about	location	where	subsidiaries	are	highly	profitable	are	less	responsive	to	host	or	home	country	taxation.	They	hypothesise	that	this	may	reflect	the	location	or	owner	 specific	 rents,	meaning	 that	 the	 subsidiary	would	 not	 be	 able	 to	make	 these	profits	in	a	different	location	or	with	a	different	parent	company.		Grubert	and	Mutti	(1991),	Hines	and	Rice	(1994)	and	Louie	and	Rousslang	(2008)	all	find	that	there	is	a	negative	relationship	between	foreign	corporation	tax	rates	and	the	profitability	of	US	 affiliates.	 In	 effect	 this	means	 that	US	MNEs	 report	more	of	 their	income	in	lower	tax	jurisdictions.	Azemar	(2010)	finds	that	a	1	per	cent	higher	tax	rate	reduces	income	and	profits	reported	in	that	country	by	1	per	cent.		Evidence	from	the	interviews	undertaken	for	this	thesis	(See	Chapter	4)	indicates	that	firms	in	difficulty	may	also	have	a	strong	incentive	to	avoid	tax.	Paying	the	corporation	tax	bill	may	have	a	serious	negative	effect	on	cash	flow	for	firms	that	are	in	financial	difficulty.	 	There	may	therefore	be	a	significant	motivation	to	avoid	tax	 for	 the	 least	profitable	firms.	More	research	is	needed	to	confirm	this	motivation.			
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In	the	empirical	testing	in	Chapter	5	profitability	is	included	as	a	variable	that	will	have	an	 impact	 on	 the	 LR	 ETRs	 of	 the	 firm.	 The	 model	 is	 not,	 however,	 attempting	 to	determine	the	causes	of	profitability	which	are	incredibly	complex.			
2.3 Conclusions and Areas for Future Research This	 chapter	 has	 set	 out	 the	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 research	 work	 related	 to	corporation	tax,	tax	planning	and	tax	avoidance.	The	section	on	theoretical	work	relies	heavily	on	extant	work	on	TP.	This	reflects	the	paucity	of	work	on	wider	issues	related	to	tax	avoidance.	The	empirical	review	covers	a	broader	range	of	topics	but	research	work	suffers	from	the	difficulties	created	by	issues	of	confidentiality	and	consequent	lack	of	data	encountered	by	researchers	in	this	field.	Whilst	reviewing	the	literature	a	number	of	areas	where	research	work	 is	urgently	needed	have	been	 identified.	This	section	draws	these	areas	together,	setting	out	a	future	research	agenda.	The	empirical	work	contained	in	this	thesis	then	contributes	towards	filling	these	gaps.		Research	work	to	understand	the	nature	and	scope	of	tax	avoidance	uses	a	variety	of	methodologies	due	 to	 the	 severe	 limitations	on	 data.	 The	 changing	 nature	of	 global	business	 and	 international	 trade	 are	 increasing	 the	 opportunities	 for	 MNEs	 to	 act	strategically	to	reduce	their	tax	bill.	Researchers	have	shown	at	the	aggregate	level	that	the	 rate	 of	 corporation	 tax	 charged	 in	 a	 particular	 location	 has	 an	 impact	 on	 the	behaviour	of	MNEs	in	that	place	and	through	the	rest	of	the	group	of	companies.		It	is	clear	that	MNEs	have	considerable	scope	to	avoid	tax	through	profit	shifting	and	other	mechanisms	(including	delayed	repatriation,	use	of	NOLs).	This	review	sets	out	the	findings	from	a	significant	body	of	research	that	identifies	areas	where	MNEs	avoid	tax	and	the	mechanisms	that	they	have	used	to	do	so.	Most	research	focuses	on	a	single	tax	avoidance	mechanism	which,	whilst	useful,	does	not	contribute	to	a	more	general	understanding	 of	 the	 means	 by	 which	 MNEs	 plan	 their	 tax	 affairs	 and	 of	 how	 the	mechanisms	interact.	The	existing	body	of	evidence	cannot	indicate	how	MNEs		vary	in	their	 tax	 planning	 approaches	 and	which	will	 adopt	more	 aggressive	 tax	 avoidance	measures	and	which	will	not.	As	Hanlon	and	Heitzman	(2010	p.145)	conclude:	‘Overall	
the	field	cannot	explain	the	variation	in	tax	avoidance	very	well…tax	avoidance	may	be	
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highly	idiosyncratic	and	determined	by	a	number	of	factors	and	interactions,	not	all	of	
which	can	be	measured.’	
	Work	examining	the	use	of	specific	mechanisms	tends	to	look	at	one	particular	aspect	of	profit	shifting	and	aims	to	generate	an	understanding	of	the	impact	that	a	particular	method	has	on	the	overall	group	profit.	Companies,	however,	may	use	more	than	one	method	of	profit	shifting	to	reduce	their	global	tax	bill.	How	these	methods	interact	with	each	 other	 and	 the	 resulting	 complexity	 is	 difficult	 to	 ascertain	 through	 statistical	analysis	alone.		This	 review	has	 also	 identified	 areas	where	more	 research	 is	 needed.	 This	 includes	research	into:	
• Understanding	 what	 drives	 the	 level	 of	 tax	 planning	 and	 avoidance	 within	individual	MNEs;	
• Understanding	the	full	range	of	factors	that	drive	location	decisions	and	the	way	that	tax	rates	interact	with	these;	
• The	 role	of	 IP	assets	within	 international	groups	and	what	 factors	determine	where	they	are	held	and	which	affiliates	are	involved	in	their	development;	
• The	 use	 of	 NOLs	 and	 how	 these	 are	 carried	 forward	 and	 their	 role	 within	strategic	tax	planning;	and	
• Understanding	 the	 role	 of	 individuals	 including	 the	 CEO,	 COO	 and	 board	 of	directors.		Theoretical	 research	 on	 tax	 has	 focused	 on	TP	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 a	 broader	 view	of	corporation	 tax	 and	 how	 it	 drives	 company	 behaviour.	 Work	 framed	 within	 the	neoclassical	school	expects	rational,	optimising	behaviour	such	that	any	firm	faced	with	a	set	of	options	would	make	the	same	selection.	Some	writers	(Spicer	1988),	point	out	that	taking	an	approach	that	emphasises	the	behavioural	aspects	of	organisation	may	improve	understanding	of	the	actual	actions	of	the	MNE.	Companies	do	not	behave	in	a	homogenous	fashion	in	relation	to	tax.	IB	theory	has	highlighted	the	importance	of	the	interaction	between	governments,	MNE	headquarters	and	MNE	subsidiaries	(Rugman	et	 al.	 2011).	 	 The	 expansion	 of	 theory	 to	 cover	 the	 role	 of	 tax	 and	 the	 interaction	between	 these	 different	 levels	 would	 improve	 our	 understanding	 of	 why	 different	
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companies	 in	 similar	 circumstances	 behave	 differently.	 Little	 is	 known	 about	 the	process	of	decision	making	in	relation	to	tax	avoidance	–	at	what	levels	within	the	firm	and	who	makes	the	key	decisions?	The	development	of	theory	is	vital	but	this	theory	must	be	empirically	testable.			This	thesis	uses	mixed	methods	to	generate	new	understanding	about	what	drives	the	adoption	of	corporate	tax	strategies.	The	following	chapter	sets	out	the	methodologies	and	approaches	used	for	the	research	reported	in	the	subsequent	chapters..		 	
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3 Research Questions and Methodology The	literature	reviews	reported	in	Chapter	2	led	to	the	identification	of	significant	gaps	in	knowledge	about	the	behaviour	of	MNEs	in	relation	to	their	corporate	tax	planning	strategies	 and	 behaviour.	 	 The	 empirical	 research	 discussed	 uses	 a	 range	 of	methodologies	to	try	to	assess	the	extent	of	corporate	tax	avoidance	and	to	consider	the	use	of	specific	methodologies.	Theses	studies	fail	to	present	a	holistic	view	of	the	MNE;	how	its	tax	strategy	is	determined	and	implemented.	Klassen	and	LaPlante	(2012)	for	example,	 acknowledge	 the	 limitations	 of	 their	 statistical	 research	 through	 the	supplementary	anecdotal	evidence	supplied.		This	chapter	presents	the	design	of	the	research	for	this	thesis	and	how	it	allows	this	research	to	contribute	to	the	important	discussion	of	tax	planning	and	implementation.	The	following	section	discusses	the	development	of	the	research	questions	addressed	by	 this	 thesis	 followed	 by	 an	 explanation	 of	 the	 research	 methods	 selected.	 The	development	 of	 the	 research	 questions	was	 an	 iterative	 process	with	 each	 piece	 of	research	conducted	affecting	the	subsequent	piece.	An	overview	is	given	in	this	chapter	and	the	detailed	impact	of	each	piece	of	research	on	the	subsequent	research	questions	is	given	in	the	following	chapters.		This	 chapter	 considers	 the	 research	 methodologies	 that	 are	 have	 been	 utilised	 to	achieve	the	research	objectives.	Quantitative	and	qualitative	research	methods	are	used	to	achieve	an	overall	understanding	of	the	research	questions.		The	research	conducted	consists	of	interviews	with	tax	executives,	data	analysis	and	a	series	of	in-depth	case	studies.	This	chapter	presents	the	reasons	for	the	adoption	of	these	research	methods	and	why	 they	were	 identified	 as	 those	 that	would	 best	 contribute	 new	 knowledge.	Research	method	selection	was	driven	by	an	understanding	of	‘best	fit’,	with	methods	selected	 following	 consideration	 of	 the	 contribution	 that	 they	 would	 make	 to	 the	collection	 and	 analysis	 of	 new	 data	 in	 this	 area.	 The	 rest	 of	 this	 chapter	 includes	theoretical	discussions	of	the	research	methods	employed.		
3.1 Research Questions  The	 literature	 reviews	 reported	 in	 Chapter	 2	 conclude	 that	 theory	 in	 relation	 to	corporate	 tax	 avoidance	 has	 evolved	 sporadically.	 This	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	 existing	
	 111	
situation	where	there	is	no	unifying	theory	of	what	drives	the	MNE	to	avoid	tax.	Theory	fails	 to	 address	 the	 implications	 of	 tax	 planning	 for	 the	 firm’s	 wider	 operational	strategy.	 Internalization	 theory	highlights	 the	advantage	of	 tax	planning	 to	 the	MNE	over	 domestic	 companies	 but	 early	 work	 considering	 the	 motives	 of	 MNEs	 for	 tax	planning	was	subsequently	neglected.	Detailed	theoretical	economic	models	of	TP	have	been	developed	historically	but	 there	has	been	 little	 testing	of	 these	models	and	the	understanding	of	the	reality	of	how	MNEs	operate	and	set	TP	is	limited.	It	is	important	that	 the	 foundations	 created	 by	 early	 work	 are	 used	 to	 create	 empirically	 testable	theoretical	models.			The	review	of	the	empirical	literature	given	in	Section	2.2	demonstrates	that	there	is	a	significant	body	of	 research	 focusing	on	 the	nature	and	scope	of	 tax	avoidance.	The	issue	of	tax	avoidance	is	clearly	growing	in	importance	for	MNEs	and	governments	as	the	 opportunities	 for	 MNEs	 to	 shift	 profits	 increase.	 Researchers	 have	 shown	 the	importance	of	location	for	MNEs	and	the	scope	they	have	to	avoid	tax	through	profit	shifting	and	other	mechanisms	(for	example,	delayed	repatriation,	use	of	Net	Operating	Losses).	The	existing	body	of	evidence	does	not	examine	which	MNEs	will	adopt	more	aggressive	tax	avoidance	measures	and	which	will	not.	This	generates	the	overarching	central	research	question	for	this	thesis:		
What	drives	the	adoption	of	tax	avoidance	strategies	by	US	MNEs?		
	Greater	theoretical	insight	is	needed	in	order	to	answer	these	questions	as	well	as	an	empirical	understanding	of	how	decisions	are	made	within	US	MNEs.	The	 following	sections	set	out	the	research	methods	used	and	how	they	generate	new	understanding	that	contributes	to	the	understanding	of	this	question.	
3.1.1 Research Methods The	 overall	 methodological	 approach	 was	 developed	 in	 order	 to	 investigate	 the	overarching	research	question	and	hypotheses.	The	research	methods	adopted	must	focus	on	generating	new	knowledge	that	adds	to	understanding	of	what	drives	US	MNEs	to	adopt	the	tax	avoidance	strategies	that	they	select.	The	particular	research	methods	used	must	also	address	 the	 lack	of	 theory	as	well	 as	 the	 complications	arising	 from	issues	of	confidentiality	when	researching	this	area.	There	are	significant	gaps	in	the	
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existing	literature	as	identified	in	Chapter	2.	Extant	research	fails	to	takes	a	holistic	view	of	 the	 company,	 instead	 focusing	 on	 macro	 data	 to	 evaluate	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 tax	avoidance	problem	or	considering	individual	tax	avoidance	mechanisms	in	isolation.		Using	 the	 three	 separate	 research	methods	outlined	below	allows	 for	 the	 important	triangulation	of	findings	(Denzin	and	Lincoln,	2000).	The	separate	pieces	of	research	were	conducted	chronologically	rather	than	simultaneously,	enabling	the	findings	from	each	 piece	 of	 research	 to	 influence	 the	 specific	 questions	 addressed	 in	 subsequent	pieces	of	research.	This	is	particularly	true	of	the	first	piece	of	research,	the	interviews	with	 tax	 executives,	 where	 significant	 new	 knowledge,	 was	 generated	 which	consequently	 shaped	 the	 subsequent	 research.	 	When	combined,	 the	 three	 research	methods	present	a	holistic	view	of	the	companies	considered.		
3.2 Interviews This	section	discusses	the	role	of	interviews	within	IB	research	and	the	contribution	that	 they	 can	 make.	 Following	 consideration	 of	 the	 potential	 contribution	 that	interviews	could	make,	a	series	of	interviews	with	tax	executives	based	in	the	UK	was	conducted	for	this	research.		The	details	of	the	research	methods	are	given	below.	The	findings	are	reported	and	discussed	in	Chapter	4.			The	literature	review	chapter	(Chapter	2)	has	demonstrated	the	gaps	in	research	in	this	area.	The	lack	of	publicly	available	information	on	tax	planning	may	contribute	to	the	dearth	 of	 research	 in	 this	 area.	 As	 tax	 returns	 are	 not	 made	 publicly	 available	researchers	examining	this	issue	are	forced	to	look	at	proxies	for	tax	payments	largely	built	on	the	 information	contained	within	the	annual	report.	A	more	comprehensive	understanding	of	the	behaviour	of	the	MNE	requires	penetration	of	the	‘black	box’,	that	is,	the	management	of	the	MNE.	Existing	research	based	solely	on	quantifiable	financial	factors	ignores	the	impact	of	management	decision	and	choice.			Research	in	this	area	is	hampered	by	the	confidential	nature	of	the	subject.	Tax	is	an	increasingly	 sensitive	 issue	 with	 MNEs’	 tax	 payments	 and	 approach	 under	 intense	scrutiny.	This	reduces	the	ability	of	the	researcher	to	gain	access	to	companies	and	to	understand	the	relevant	decisions	made	within	the	‘black	box’.			
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	Using	 qualitative	 research	 is	 a	 useful	 approach	 for	 the	 IB	 researcher	 potentially	providing	new	and	holistic	insights	to	enhance	our	understanding	of	a	phenomenon.	There	 have	 been	 recent	 calls	 (Birkinshaw,	 Brannen	 and	 Tung	 2011;	 Doz	 2011)	 for	greater	 emphasis	 on	 qualitative	 research	methodologies,	 yet	 the	 number	 of	 articles	published	 in	 the	 key	 IB	 journals	 based	 on	 qualitative	 methods	 remains	 low.	 Data	collected	 via	 interviews	 with	 key	 players	 in	 tax	 departments	 has	 the	 potential	 to	provide	significant	new	insights	into	MNE	decision-making	and	behaviour.			The	 field	of	 IB	remains	dominated	by	quantitative	research	where	the	quality	of	 the	data	collected	and	the	conclusions	drawn	may	be	more	easily	evaluated.	The	inherent	difficulties	in	conducting	qualitative	research	in	a	field	where	the	subject	of	interest,	the	MNE,	is	surrounded	by	issues	of	confidentiality	may	make	qualitative	research	harder	to	undertake.	The	important	contribution	that	qualitative	research	can	make	has	often	been	overlooked	in	IB.	Birkinshaw	et	al	(2011)	argue	that:	‘IB	research	has	gravitated	
over	 the	 years	 toward	 the	 use	 of	 discipline	 based	 theories	 and	 quantitative,	 positivist	
methodologies,	 with	 a	 corresponding	 decline	 in	 cross	 disciplinary	 perspectives	 and	
qualitative	methodologies.’	Qualitative	research	can	make	a	key	contribution	towards	the	development	of	theory	(Eisenhardt	1989;	Yin	1989,	1994;	Doz	2011).	It	is	valuable	in	generating	a	deeper	understanding	of	what	happens	within	organisations	and	how	that	can	change	over	time.	Doz	(2011)	claims	that:	
‘Only	rich,	 thick	descriptions	can	provide	the	basis	 for	 the	use	and	possible	synthesis	of	
multiple	 theories	 into	 new	 conceptual	 development’	 (Doz	 2011.	 p.584).	 It	 is	 only	 by	gaining	a	rich	deep	understanding	of	phenomena	and	the	driving	forces	behind	them	that	theories	can	be	advanced	and	improved.	Doz	(2011)	also	points	out	the	benefit	that	qualitative	research	can	have	in	terms	of	identifying	important,	previously	neglected	phenomena.	The	lack	of	coherent	theory	in	relation	to	corporate	tax	planning	indicates	that	detailed	qualitative	research	has	a	significant	contribution	to	make	in	this	area.		Doz	(2011)	goes	on	to	argue	that	more	qualitative	research	is	urgently	needed	within	IB	 to	 help	 to	 extend	 existing	 theories.	 He	 argues	 that:	 ‘We	 know	 less	 about	 how	
multinationals	actually	operate	today…than…in	the	1970s’.	Birkinshaw	et	al	(2011)	also	argue	 that	 the	 ‘thick	 description’	 that	 can	 be	 generated	 by	 qualitative	 methods	 is	
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imperative	for	theory	building	and	generating	hypotheses	in	IB.	They	suggest	that	the	dynamic	nature	of	IB	is	one	of	the	factors	that	makes	qualitative	research	vital	in	this	field.	The	rapid	emergence	of	changes	within	the	technological,	political	or	economic	landscape	within	which	MNEs	operate	make	the	phenomena	studied	by	IB	researchers	particularly	dynamic.	Tax	is	a	clear	example	of	a	rapidly	changing	phenomenon	with	the	 profit	 shifting	 opportunities	 presented	 to	 MNEs	 expanding	 with	 the	 growth	 in	complex	global	value	chains	and	the	rise	in	the	digital	delivery	of	goods	and	services.	This,	 therefore,	supports	 the	view	 that	 the	 in	depth	 findings	generated	by	 interview	research	will	make	a	significant	contribution	to	improving	understanding	of	this	area.		Cheng	 (2007)	 points	 out	 the	 important	 role	which	 qualitative	 research	 can	 have	 in	investigating	the	contextual	differences.		In	IB	these	may	be	cultural,	pertaining	to	the	differences	between	countries	and	within	MNEs.	The	MNE	operates	across	borders	and	qualitative	research	can	play	an	important	role	in	understanding	how	the	difference	in	context	 impacts	 on	 the	 management	 and	 strategy	 of	 an	 MNE	 and	 its	 subsidiaries.	Context	may	play	an	important	role	in	understanding	the	differences	between	MNEs’	positions	in	relation	to	tax	planning.		A	need	for	qualitative	research	has	therefore	been	identified.	This	thesis	attempts	to	address	the	issue	of	the	lack	of	extant	qualitative	research	in	this	area	by	conducting	a	series	of	interviews	with	key	tax	executives.	It	was	envisaged	at	the	research	planning	stage	that	it	would	be	difficult	to	gain	access	to	senior	tax	executives	in	large	numbers.	Section	3.2.2	below	details	the	methods	used	to	elicit	interviews.	The	lack	of	qualitative	research	published	to	date	confirms	the	difficulties.	Interviews	have	been	conducted	with	officials	working	within	the	HMRC	in	the	UK	(Tuck	2013)	but	in	that	particular	study,	access	is	gained	through	the	engagement	of	a	single	organisation,	HMRC,	in	the	research.	 Interviewing	 individuals	 from	 MNEs	 and	 their	 advisors	 involves	 greater	access	 difficulty,	 making	 pragmatic	 expectations	 about	 the	 number	 of	 interviews	necessary.		At	 the	 outset,	 one	 of	 the	 key	 aims	 of	 the	 overall	 thesis	 was	 to	 generate	 a	 greater	understanding	of	how	MNEs	avoid	taxes	and	the	mechanisms	used.	The	research	also	aimed	to	focus	on	the	relationship	between	the	headquarters	of	the	US	MNE	and	the	
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subsidiary	operations	in	the	UK.	The	interview	research	however,	allowed	for	a	more	inductive,	 exploratory	 approach.	 The	 detailed	 insights	 gained	 from	 the	 interviews	generated	new	theoretical	contributions	that	are	discussed	in	Chapter	4.	It	also	meant	that	 the	 research	 questions	 employed	 in	 the	 subsequent	 data	 analysis	 and	 the	 case	studies	were	refined.	This	is	also	reported	in	Chapter	4.			As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 2	 in	 the	 literature	 review,	most	 existing	 research	 on	 tax	 is	concerned	with	understanding	the	mechanisms	of	tax	avoidance	or	evaluating	the	scale	of	 profit	 shifting.	 This	 research	makes	 a	 useful	 contribution	 by	 adding	 to	 the	 small	number	of	studies	that	consider	the	role	of	management	within	corporate	strategy	in	tax	planning.			The	interview	research	was	planned	to	generate	new	insights	into	the	core	research	question	 of	 this	 thesis:	What	 drives	 the	 adoption	 of	 tax	 avoidance	 strategies	 by	 US	MNEs?	 Specifically	 the	 interviews	 were	 planned	 to	 provide	 evidence	 for	 the	 first	question,	 ‘To	 what	 extent	 do	 MNEs	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 adopt	 the	 strategies	 that	
intentionally	 enable	 them	 to	avoid	 tax?’	Discussions	 in	 the	 interviews	 focused	on	 the	extent	 to	 which	 MNEs	 are	 able	 to	 plan	 tax	 affairs	 strategically	 and	 to	 explore	 the	different	approaches	adopted	by	the	organisations	that	interviewees	have	experience	of.	The	interviews	were	also	planned	to	provide	evidence	enhance	the	understanding	of	the	factors	that	influence	MNEs	to	make	the	decision	to	avoid	tax	and	the	manner	in	which	 they	 plan	 their	 tax	 affairs	 as	 well	 as	 considering	 how	 this	 differs	 between	companies.	 The	 research	 also	 aimed	 to	 generate	 new	 insights	 that	 would	 improve	theoretical	understanding	of	the	issues	in	this	area.		Chapter	4	concludes	on	the	findings	from	the	interviews	The	interviews	also	provided	interesting	information	on	the	use	of	ETR	within	companies	.	
3.2.1 Ethical Approval Ethical	 approval	 was	 obtained	 from	 the	 Ethics	 Committee	 of	 the	 Henley	 Business	School,	International	Business	and	Strategy,	the	University	of	Reading,	for	the	question	outline	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 approach	 potential	 interviewees.	 Interviewees	 were	guaranteed	confidentiality	and	were	requested	to	sign	a	Consent	Form	(See	Appendix	
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1	Consent	Form).	Whilst	the	purpose	of	this	form	is	to	protect	the	interviewee,	several	did	not	want	to	sign	it,	citing	a	preference	to	keep	the	relationship	informal	and,	in	their	view,	more	confidential.	This	reluctance	emphasised	the	extremely	confidential	nature	of	the	discussions.	
3.2.2 Identifying Interviewees Participants	were	identified	through	two	routes.	In	the	first,	large	US	companies	with	operations	in	the	UK	were	identified.	The	name	of	the	company’s	Finance	Director	was	obtained	from	the	annual	report	and	they	were	then	approached	in	writing.	The	target	sample	included	a	broad	range	of	industries.	The	same	sample	was	subsequently	used	for	the	quantitative	research	reported	in	Chapter	5.	As	expected,	the	acceptance	rate	was	very	 low	 (4/100).	Two	 further	 companies	 replied	 to	explain	 that	 tax	was	not	a	subject	that	they	were	able	to	discuss	outside	the	company.	Follow	up	calls	and	e-mails	did	not	elicit	any	further	interviews.			Selection	 bias	may	 have	meant	 that	 those	 responding	 positively	 to	 this	 letter	 had	 a	positive	‘tax	story’	to	tell.	In	order	to	address	this	a	second	approach	was	developed	concurrently	using	personal	contacts.	A	rigorous	approach	was	used	to	ensure	that	the	interviewees	identified	using	this	method	were	similar	in	terms	of	seniority	as	those	responding	 to	 the	 letter.	 None	 of	 the	 interviewees	 were	 personally	 known	 to	 the	interviewer.	Whilst	a	more	unusual	approach	for	academic	research,	the	advantage	was	that	those	identified	in	this	manner	were	more	likely	to	represent	a	range	of	opinions	and	experiences	as	they	had	not	self-selected.		Whilst	the	sample	size	is	small	there	is	a	lack	of	disagreement	between	interviewees,	and	the	level	of	repetition	between	them	seemed	to	suggest	that	saturation	had	been	achieved	(Suddaby	2006).	Further	details	of	the	interviewees	and	their	organisations	are	given	below	in	Table	4	on	p.130.	
3.2.3 Interview Methodology The	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 using	 a	 semi-structured	 framework	 with	 a	 flexible	schedule	of	questions	that	was	piloted	before	being	used	in	the	recorded	interviews.	The	question	schedule	was	submitted	to	and	approved	by	the	Ethics	Committee.	The	focus	of	interviews	differed	depending	on	whether	the	interviewee	was	working	in	an	accountancy	firm	or	in	industry	although	many	of	the	interviewees	had	experience	of	
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both.	 The	 interview	 framework	 is	 presented	 in	 Appendix	 2	 Interview	 Question	Schedule.			Where	possible	the	interviews	were	recorded	and	transcribed.	This	was	not	possible	in	two	 instances	where	 the	 interviewees	 objected	 to	 a	 recording	 being	made.	 In	 these	cases	detailed	notes	were	taken	during	the	interview	and	supplemented	with	additional	notes	directly	afterwards.	All	of	 the	 interviews	(except	one	which	was	conducted	by	phone)	were	conducted	face	to	face	and	lasted	for	around	one	hour.	The	interviewees	were	guaranteed	confidentiality	in	that	whilst	their	views	can	be	shared	their	names	and	organisations	cannot.			The	interviewees	clearly	felt	comfortable	with	the	process	and	the	confidentiality	that	was	 guaranteed.	 This	 was	 reflected	 in	 the	 substantial	 details	 about	 explicit	 tax	avoidance	schemes	that	they	had	been	involved	in	as	well	as	in	specific	legal	cases	that	they	 revealed.	 These	 disclosures	 demonstrate	 the	 interviewees’	 acceptance	 of	 the	confidentiality	of	the	interview.	The	interviewer’s	similar	experience	working	as	a	Big	4	auditor	may	have	helped	to	reduce	the	interviewees’	disquiet.			The	interviews	were	analysed	using	Nvivo	specialist	software,	enabling	specific	themes	to	be	identified	and	used	to	code	the	interview	transcripts.	An	initial	coding	frame	was	developed	from	the	literature	review	but	this	was	adapted	iteratively	during	the	coding	process.	The	coding	frame	consists	of	6	key	groups	with	second	order	categories	within	three	 of	 these.	 Using	 such	 a	 framework	 allows	 for	 the	 structured	 and	 systematic	analysis	of	findings.	The	coding	framework	is	shown	below	in	Figure	2.	Coding,	and	the	use	of	Nvivo,	facilitates	the	systematic	and	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	data	collected	(Bringer,	Johnston	and	Brackenridge	2004).			The	transcripts	were	re-read	and	the	recordings	listened	to	a	number	of	times.	When	new	codes	were	 identified	 from	the	data	previous	transcripts	were	revisited	so	that	these	codes	could	be	used.	Key	patterns	and	insights	were	then	identified	and	written	up	as	findings	in	Chapter	4.			 	
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Figure 2 NVIVO Coding Scheme 	
Professional	background	of	interviewee	
Views	on	media	/	public	perceptions	
Views	on	OECD	/	government	policy	
Experience	of	tax	avoidance	a. Deferral	of	repatriation	b. Drawbacks	of	avoidance	c. Ethical	implications	d. Types	of	tax	avoidance	scheme	e. Experience	dealing	with	HMRC	(the	United	Kingdom)/	IRS	(the	United	States)	f. Thoughts	about	whether	avoidance	increasing	/	decreasing	currently	g. Thoughts	on	commonly	cited	avoiders		h. Other	taxes	i. UK	tax	system		
Motivation	for	avoidance	j. Company	strategy	k. Implications	for	stakeholders	l. Tax	planning	direction	setting	in	the	company:	i. Company	culture	ii. Who	sets	tone?	iii. What	drives	aggressiveness?	iv. Understanding	balance	risk	/	reward	m. Relations	between	HQ	and	subsidiaries	n. Cash	management	o. Personal	motivations	
Ability	 p. Corporate	structure	i. Location	HQ	/	subsidiaries	ii. Inversions	iii. Use	of	tax	havens	iv. Size		/	structure	of	tax	team	v. Tax	team	targets	/	objectives	q. Factors	that	enable	a	company	to	avoid	tax	i. Capital	allowances	ii. IP	iii. Losses	iv. Use	of	internal	debt	v. R&D	tax	credits	vi. Related	party	transactions	vii. Transfer	pricing	r. Use	of	external	advisors		
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3.2.4 Interview Technique Interviews	were	conducted	with	tax	executives	with	the	aim	of	eliciting	 information	about	decisions	and	the	decision-making	processes	within	the	MNE.	 Janesick	(1998)	defines	an	 interview	as:	 ‘a	meeting	of	 two	persons	to	exchange	 information	and	 ideas	
through	questions	and	responses,	resulting	in	communication	and	 joint	construction	of	
meaning	about	a	particular	topic’	(Janesick	1998	p.30).	An	open-ended	interview	is	as	Hubbell	(2003)	notes:	‘an	exchange	of	information	and	a	joint	construction	of	meaning.’	An	interview	has	a	structure,	unlike	a	conversation,	but	‘allows	for	the	surfacing	of	more	
serendipitous	 and	 potentially	 interesting	 information	 than	 a	 questionnaire’	 (Hubbell	2003).		Whilst	a	structure	is	a	useful	guide	for	the	interviewer	Hubbell	also	notes	that:	‘with	an	
engaged	and	trusting	interviewee,	the	interviewer	does	not	know	where	the	interviewee	
will	lead	her’.	Hubbell	points	out	that	an	interviewer	who	rigidly	sticks	to	a	pre	prepared	script	is	likely	to	miss	interesting	and	potentially	important	information.		An	interview	of	this	type	differs	from	the	‘positivist’	perspective,	being	potentially	less	systematic	but	may	gain	from	initiating	an	openness	with	the	interviewee	that	enhances	the	insights	disclosed.	 Interviews	 can	 elicit	 information	 that	 gives	 the	 interviewer	 a	 closer	understanding	of	the	micro	processes	at	play	within	an	organisation.		Conducting	interviews	in	relation	to	tax	planning	is	inherently	difficult.	The	nature	of	tax	 planning	 exacerbates	 the	 typical	 issues	 of	 confidentiality	 when	 conducting	interviews.	 Interviewees	 could	 be	 expected	 to	 be	 reticent	 about	 their	 experiences	particularly	 in	 morally	 or	 legally	 grey	 areas.	 Once	 the	 difficulties	 in	 identifying	candidates	 and	 gaining	 their	 commitment	 to	 the	 process	 had	 been	 overcome	 the	interviewees	identified	then	appeared	to	speak	frankly	and	honestly	(Morrell	and	Tuck	2014).			The	detailed	findings	from	the	interviews	and	the	conclusions	drawn	from	the	analysis	are	provided	in	Chapter	4.	
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3.3 Quantitative Analysis The	section	above	describes	the	necessity	for	qualitative	research	in	this	area	and	the	knowledge	that	it	can	elicit.	Issues	with	confidentiality	and	access	limit	the	number	of	interviews	that	can	be	conducted	and	how	generalizable	the	findings	can	be.	The	issue	of	 generalizability	 also	 holds	 for	 case	 study	 research	 in	 this	 field.	 Case	 studies	 can	usefully	 provide	 detailed	 information	 about	 specific	 organisations	 but	 the	 detail	highlights	the	differences	between	companies	as	well	as	any	similarities.		Quantitative	analysis	of	a	larger	sample	generates	data	that	can	be	relied	on,	and	on	which	generalisations	to	the	wider	population	can	be	based.			Chapter	5	reports	on	the	statistical	analysis	of	a	hand	collected	database	of	94	US	MNEs.	The	size	of	the	database	was	carefully	considered	to	ensure	that	the	findings	could	be	effectively	 analysed	 using	 statistical	 techniques	 but	 this	 was	 balanced	 against	 the	necessity	 to	generate	data	that	could	be	 interpreted	with	reference	to	the	 individual	companies.	 This	 therefore	 enables	 the	 data	 analysis	 to	 contribute	 to	 establishing	 a	holistic	 view	 of	 the	 focal	 companies.	 The	 statistical	 analysis	 is	 complemented	 with	outlier	analysis	 and	case	 studies.	Chapter	6	presents	 further	detailed	analysis	of	 six	selected	case	study	companies.			Significant	new	findings	are	generated	using	multiple	regression	techniques.	Multiple	regression	analysis	is	used	to	explain	how	a	series	of	independent	variables	(IVs)	affect	a	 single	 dependent	 variable	 (DV).	 The	 hypotheses	 that	 are	 developed	 from	 the	literature	in	Chapter	2	are	tested	using	a	series	of	DVs,	cash	ratio,	GAAP	ETR	and	Cash	ETR	to	generate	an	understanding	of	the	behaviour	of	companies.	Each	DV	is	examined	in	 turn	 with	 the	 previous	 DV	 becoming	 an	 explanatory	 variable	 (IV)	 in	 the	 next	regression.	 The	 conceptual	model	 set	 out	 in	 Chapter	 5	 is	 recursive,	 with	 causation	flowing	in	one	direction.	It	is	used	to	test	the	hypotheses	that	have	been	developed	in	Chapter	2.	The	recursive	model	provides	a	heuristic	device	for	broadening	the	scope	of	simple	 regression	 approaches	 that	 normally	 focus	 on	 a	 single	 DV	 and	 a	 set	 of	explanatory	variables.	Multiple	regression	is	used	to	establish	if	an	IV	has	a	statistically	significant	effect	on	the	DV	and	to	evaluate	the	correlation	between	the	single	DV	and	
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the	IVs.	Multiple	regression	can	also	indicate	the	hierarchy	of	importance	of	each	of	the	IVs	in	terms	of	its	impact	on	the	single	DV.			Quantitative	analysis	in	 this	area	 is	challenging	because	of	 the	dearth	of	 information	and	data	 freely	available.	Companies	are	strongly	 incentivised	(by	the	reduced	taxes	that	they	pay)	to	reveal	as	little	as	they	can	about	the	way	that	they	structure	internal	transactions	and	their	corporation	tax	payments.	Much	research	therefore	relies	on	the	disclosures	made	 in	 firms’	annual	reports	(10K).	The	majority	of	previous	empirical	studies	have	focused	on	US	MNEs	using	data	collected	by	the	US	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis.	 This	 section	 explains	 the	 resulting	 approach	 adopted	 in	 this	 research	 and	provides	a	comparison	with	approaches	adopted	in	previous	academic	studies.		As	discussed	above,	 the	 lack	of	published	data	prevents	 the	direct	assessment	of	 tax	avoidance	undertaken.	The	findings	presented	in	Chapter	5	demonstrate	however,	that	it	 is	 possible	 to	 generate	 new	 data	 that	 contributes	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 this	phenomenon	using	information	published	in	audited	annual	reports.		The	hypotheses	are	tested	using	a	new	dataset	of	94	US	MNEs	operating	in	the	UK.	Data	was	compiled	using	the	OSIRIS	database	supplemented	by	additional	information	hand	picked	 data	 from	 annual	 reports	 (Form	 10K	 in	 the	 US).	 The	 theoretical	 model	developed,	 the	 development	 of	 variables	 and	 their	measures	 and	 the	 testing	 of	 the	model	are	presented	in	Chapter	5.	
3.4 Case Studies There	 has	 been	 significant	 debate	 about	 the	 role	 of	 case	 studies	within	 IB	 research	(Piekkari	and	Welch	2011).	Debate	focuses	on	the	underlying	purpose	of	the	case	study	in	 terms	 of	 what	 can	 be	 learnt	 and	 how	 robust	 or	 generalizable	 are	 the	 findings.	Researchers	 have	 disagreed	 on	 whether	 case	 studies	 are	 a	 ‘research	 strategy’	 (Yin	2003)	 or	 simply	 a	 ‘research	 design’	 (Rosenberg	 and	 Yates	 2007).	 Most	 case	 study	research	 in	 IB	 is	 based	 on	 a	 positivist	 approach	 using	 the	 guidelines	 set	 out	 by	 Yin	(1989)	or	Eisenhardt	(1989).		
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	Despite	different	views	on	the	purpose	of	the	case	study,	research	using	case	studies	needs	clear	theoretical	underpinning.	The	researcher	must	be	recognise	the	purpose	of	the	case	studies	in	the	research	plan	and	what	reliance	can	be	placed	on	any	findings	generated.	 Rosenberg	 and	 Yates	 (2007)	 argue	 that	 the	methods	 used	 in	 case	 study	research	are	generally	pragmatically	rather	than	paradigmatically	driven	(Rosenberg	and	Yates	2007).	However,	as	Yin	(1994)	argues,	the	researcher	must	ensure	that	the	methods	 selected	within	 the	 case	 study	 research	are	appropriate	 to	 their	governing	paradigm	to	guarantee	rigour	and	reliable	results	(Yin	1994).		Case	 studies	 are	 a	 particularly	 useful	 method	 of	 research	 for	 increasing	 the	understanding	of	a	phenomenon	(Stake	1995;	Ghauri	and	Grønhaug	2002).		The	range	of	methods	and	sources	of	information	that	can	be	obtained	and	used	within	the	case	study	makes	 this	 form	 of	 research	 very	 flexible.	 Information	 can	 be	 obtained	 from	formal	 analysis	 of	 company	 documentation	 or	 through	 interviews	 with	 relevant	company	 employees	 or	 directors.	 Published,	 audited	 annual	 reports	 contain	information	on	the	financial	performance	of	the	firm	but	also	include	a	discussion	on	the	firm’s	performance	and	risks	facing	the	firm.	The	supplementary	disclosure	notes	provide	a	degree	of	detail	that	enables	the	researcher	to	gain	insight	into	the	strategic	planning	of	the	business	(Piekkari	et	al	2009).	Case	studies	can	be	used	to	research	a	variety	 of	 different	 types	 of	 research	 questions	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 variety	 of	different	epistemological	positions,	from	the	positivist	to	the	phenomenological.	The	in	depth	approach	offered	by	the	case	study	enables	a	detailed,	holistic	view	of	the	focal	company	to	be	developed.		Yin	 (1989,	 p.	 23)	 defines	 a	 case	 study	 as:	 ‘an	 empirical	 inquiry	 that	 investigates	 a	
contemporary	 phenomenon	 within	 its	 real-life	 context	 when	 the	 boundaries	 between	
phenomenon	and	context	are	not	clearly	evident	and	in	which	multiple	sources	of	evidence	
are	 used’.	 Piekkari	 et	 al	 (2009)	 define	 the	 case	 study	 as:	 ‘a	 research	 strategy	 that	
examines,	through	the	use	of	a	variety	of	data	sources,	a	phenomenon	in	its	naturalistic	
context,	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 ‘confronting’	 theory	 with	 the	 empirical	 world’.	 Both	definitions	highlight	the	contextual	nature	of	the	case	study.	Yin	(1989)	is	less	specific	about	the	purpose	of	the	case	study,	but	for	Piekkari	et	al	(2009)	the	case	study	offers	insight	on	the	interaction	between	theory	and	the	real	world.	
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	Gaining	 the	 deep	 understanding	 that	 case	 study	 research	 can	 potentially	 offer	 will	usually	involve	the	use	of	multiple	resources	across	a	number	of	time	periods	(Gupta	and	Webster,	2005).		Cases	are	selected	from	a	target	population	which	must	be	well	defined.	Gathering	information	from	multiple	sources	means	that	the	internal	validity	of	 the	 information	can	be	established.	Where	there	are	anomalies	between	different	sources	of	information	this	can	be	investigated	further.		
 Piekkari	and	Welch	(2011)	point	out	that	the	value	that	case	studies	offer	in	terms	of	generating	deep	insight	into	a	phenomenon	can	be	lost	when	the	research	methodology	is	driven	by	a	positivist	desire	 to	provide	quantifiable	 findings	 in	order	 to	generate	conclusions	that	can	be	generalized	to	a	larger	population.	They	argue	that	the	insight	that	comes	from	depth	is	sacrificed	when	much	research	design	over	emphasizes	the	importance	of	breadth.		Bryman	 (2007)	 argues	 that	 it	 is	 important	 that	 the	 value	 of	 case	 study	 research	 is	judged	in	terms	of	the	quality	of	the	theoretical	inferences	that	are	produced.	Bryman	(2007)	agrees	with	Yin	that	purpose	of	this	type	of	research	is	not	to	generate	findings	that	 can	be	 inferred	 from	a	 sample	 to	a	population,	but	 to	gain	an	understanding	of	patterns	and	linkages	that	could	be	of	theoretical	importance.			The	appropriate	methodology	to	be	employed,	however,	will	depend	on	the	purpose	of	the	case	itself.	If	it	is	generating	new	information	that	could	be	used	for	the	generation	of	 theory	the	methodology	will	be	different	 from	case	studies	that	are	testing	extant	theoretical	assumptions.	Writers	on	research	methods	have	stressed	the	different	ways	in	which	case	studies	can	be	used.	For	Eisenhardt	(1989)	the	key	purpose	of	the	case	study	is	in	generating	and	testing	new	theory,	particularly	where	‘existing	theory	seems	
inadequate.’	 She	 also	 emphasizes	 the	 importance	 of	 case	 studies	 in	 enabling	 the	dynamic	 of	 the	 situation	 to	 be	 studied	 (Eisenhardt	 1989).	 For	 Eisenhardt	 (1989)	replication	 is	key	with	multiple	case	studies	preferred	over	the	single	 in	depth	case.	Stake	 (1995)	 however,	 contends	 that	 a	 single	 case	 study	 can	 generate	 valuable	information	when	it	provides	new	rich	detailed	description.	Yin	(1989)	discusses	three	roles	for	case	studies:	the	exploratory,	the	descriptive	and	explanatory	cases.	Yin	also	
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argues	 (1994)	 that	 case	 studies	 are	 a	 particularly	 important	 research	 method	 to	generate	 information	 in	response	to	 ‘how’	or	 ‘why’	questions	(Ghauri	and	Grønhaug	2002).	Piekkari	and	Welch	(2011)	argue	that	researchers	using	case	studies	simply	to	generate	generalizable	findings	have	a	narrow	view	of	the	case	study.	They	cite	Byrne’s	(2009)	 view	 that	 the	 case	 study	 can	 help	 move	 research	 beyond	 the	 narrow	dichotomies	of	‘quantitative	/	qualitative	–	explanation	/interpretation’	(Byrne	2009).		Rather	 than	 aiming	 to	 provide	 statistical	 representativeness,	 case	 study	 research	enables	a	detailed,	in	depth	view	of	the	phenomenon	being	studied	to	be	established.	It	is	this	in	depth	character	of	case	studies	that	is	the	primary	purpose	of	the	case	studies	presented	here.	Using	case	studies	has	enabled	a	detailed,	holistic	picture	of	the	focal	companies	to	emerge.	Case	studies	also	enable	the	researcher	to	consider	contextual	information	and	how	phenomena	have	changed	over	time.		
 The	case	studies	presented	here	do	not	attempt	to	evaluate	the	 importance	of	profit	shifting	 mechanisms	 for	 the	 sample	 of	 companies	 studied	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 or	 for	 the	population	as	a	whole,	rather	they	aim	to	provide	an	overview	of	how	these	specific	companies	operate.	They	provide	detailed,	 in	depth	 information	 that	 should	prompt	quantitative	researchers	focusing	on	tax	to	consider	the	complexity	of	each	measure.	When	quantitative	researchers	focus	on	a	single	measure,	whether	that	be	LR	ETR	or	a	more	complex	construction,	they	must	ensure	that	they	are	aware	of	what	that	measure	captures	and	what	is	omitted.	Taking	a	case	study	approach	allows	consideration	of	the	way	that	the	different	methods	are	used	to	reduce	the	tax	burden	and	how	they	interact	with	each	other.			Longitudinal	 case	 study	 research	 can	 generate	 an	 understanding	 of	 complex	relationships	between	organizations	or	between	characteristics	of	an	organization	and	how	these	change	and	evolve	over	time	(Leonard-Barton	1990;	Halinen	&	Törnroon,	2005).	The	case	studies	presented	in	Chapter	6	focus	on	a	ten	year	period	and	examine	how	the	companies’	positions	on	tax	evolved	during	that	time.		
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The	case	studies	generate	an	in	depth	understanding	of	the	tax	planning	of	a	number	of	companies	over	the	ten	year	period.	The	case	studies	are	based	largely	on	an	analysis	of	 the	 content	 of	 company	 annual	 reports,	 known	 as	 content	 analysis	methodology	(Wright	2011).	Quantitative	research	tends	to	focus	on	the	comparison	of	large-scale	data	on	a	panel	or	longitudinal	basis.	Figures	may	be	extracted	from	the	annual	report	for	use	in	these	databases	but	there	is	little	research	that	uses	the	depth	of	information	that	 is	 provided.	 Whilst	 there	 are	 severe	 limitations	 to	 the	 disclosures	 made	 by	companies	 in	 annual	 reports	 there	 is	 scope	 for	 far	 more	 research	 to	 utilise	 the	information	that	is	made	public	in	this	way.			The	research	presented	here	uses	case	studies	to	investigate	the	extent	to	which	and	the	ways	in	which	MNEs	shift	profits	between	subsidiaries.	The	case	studies	presented	are	empirical	inquiries,	conducted	to	study	the	phenomenon	of	profit	shifting.	The	focus	is	 on	 ‘how’	MNEs	 shift	 profits	 as	well	 as	 the	 ‘what’	 and	 ‘why’	 of	 profit	 shifting.	 The	research	also	focuses	the	attention	on	the	detailed	elements	of	annual	reports	and	the	information	that	 they	contain.	Certain	of	 the	case	studies	(Ford	and	Goodyear	Tires)	highlight	 in	 particular	 the	 role	 of	 deferred	 tax	 and	 suggest	 that	 future	 researchers	incorporate	a	greater	understanding	of	how	this	impacts	on	their	selected	measures	of	tax	avoidance.		The	 case	 studies	 are	 not	 designed	 to	 generate	 comparisons	 between	 the	 cases	themselves	but	 to	supplement	the	 findings	 from	the	 interviews	and	the	quantitative	analysis	presented	in	earlier	chapters.	They	are	intended	to	work	together	to	form	a	collective	piece	of	evidence.	Each	provides	an	analysis	of	the	company	in	question	–	its	history	and	the	context	in	which	it	operates.	It	then	discusses	in	detail	the	key	features	of	any	tax	avoidance	mechanisms	used	by	the	company.	The	Nucor	case	study	presents	a	 company	 that	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 aggressively	 avoiding	 corporation	 tax.	 This	provides	a	comparison	with	the	other	case	studies	that	analyse	the	mechanisms	used	by	the	focal	company	to	reduce	the	corporate	tax	bill.		The	 case	 studies	 aim	 to	 provide	 new	 additional	 insights	 that	may	 act	 as	 a	 form	 of	evidence	 allowing	 hypotheses	 to	 be	 tested	 and	 conclusions	 drawn.	 This	 is	 a	 new	approach	 to	 tax	 research	 providing	 detailed	 information	 about	 the	 tax	 planning	
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approaches	 of	 these	 companies	 and	 exploring	 mechanisms	 neglected	 by	 previous	research.	 Focusing	 on	 these	 neglected	 elements	 of	 previous	 research,	 notably	 the	impact	of	deferred	tax	and	corresponding	valuation	allowances	on	LR	ETRs,	provides	substantial	new	insight	that	must	be	reflected	in	future	analytical	techniques.		Each	 case	 study	 is	 based	 on	 a	mixture	 of	 primary	 and	 secondary	 evidence.	 Similar	primary	evidence	 (largely	 information	drawn	from	 the	annual	 reports	of	 the	parent	firms	 and	 the	 subsidiaries	 in	 the	UK	 and	 Ireland	 as	well	 as	 other	 public	 sources	 of	information,	such	as	the	UK	Public	Accounts	Committee	and	the	European	Commission,	etc)	 is	 used	 to	 provide	 tables	 and	 information	 that	 may	 be	 compared	 across	 case	studies.	 Secondary	 sources	 include	 information	 from	 House	 of	 Commons	 and	Congressional	 Select	 Committee	 investigations	 and	 investigative	 journalism.	Information	from	these	sources	is	triangulated	with	the	data	from	the	audited	annual	reports.	 Information	 from	 secondary	 sources	 that	 is	 included,	 however,	 is	inconsistently	available	and	therefore	cannot	be	compared	across	the	case	studies.		In	this	study	the	population	is	the	subsidiaries	of	US	MNE	operating	in	the	UK.	The	case	study	 companies	 are	 taken	 from	 the	 sample	 generated	 for	 the	 quantitative	 analysis	reported	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.	 Companies	were	 taken	 from	 the	US	 Fortune	 500,	excluding	those	that	are	not	multinational	as	well	as	those	operating	in	the	banking	and	finance	sector	and	those	in	the	utility	sector.	
 The	companies	were	selected	from	the	overall	sample	as	those	where	detailed	attention	could	 generate	 significant	 insight.	 Two	 of	 the	 companies	 (Goodyear	 Tires	 and	 Ford	Motor	Company)	were	excluded	from	the	statistical	analysis	reported	in	Chapter	5	as	their	 extensive	 use	 of	 deferred	 tax	 assets	 and	 valuation	 allowances	 would	 have	distorted	 the	 evidence	 generated	 there	 (See	 Chapter	 5	 for	 a	 detailed	 discussion).	Starbucks,	 Amazon	 and	 Google	 have	 been	widely	 cited	 as	 ‘tax	 avoiding’	 companies.	Starbucks	operates	a	traditional	‘bricks	and	mortar’	business	and	the	case	study	focuses	on	 their	 UK	 tax	 payments	 and	 how	 these	 are	 affected	 by	 their	 internal	 company	transfers.	 Amazon	 and	 Google	 are	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 digital	 delivery.	 Using	 these	companies	 as	 case	 studies	 generates	 new	 insight	 into	 the	 way	 that	 tax	 affairs	 are	planned	by	such	companies	that	may	be	transferable	to	other	digital	companies.	They	
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highlight	real	policy	issues	facing	governments	when	dealing	with	this	industry.	A	final	case	 study	 considers	 Nucor	 a	 company	 that	 appears	 to	 adopt	 less	 aggressive	 tax	planning	techniques.	This	case	study	enables	comparison	between	the	different	types	of	companies.	Nucor	was	selected	from	the	larger	sample	as	the	two	measures	of	ETR	(cash	and	GAAP)	appeared	to	be	similar	to	each	other	and	close	to	the	statutory	rate.	Nucor’s	 annual	reports	were	 then	analysed	 to	examine	whether	any	evidence	of	 tax	avoidance	could	be	found.		Focusing	on	 these	 companies	enables	a	 comprehensive	picture	of	 the	 tax	avoidance	practices	in	place	to	be	generated.	The	companies	place	different	emphases	on	the	use	of	 dissimilar	 tax	 planning	 approaches.	 Concentrating	 here	 therefore	 generates	extensive	new	information.		Chapter	6	details	the	case	studies	themselves,	presented	in	alphabetical	order.	They	are	followed	 by	 a	 section	 that	 draws	 together	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 case	 studies	 and	concludes.	
3.5 Conclusion This	chapter	has	presented	the	three	research	methods	used	in	combination	to	research	the	question:	
What	drives	the	adoption	of	tax	avoidance	strategies	by	US	MNEs?		The	three	methods	provide	complementary	insights.	Interview	research	provides	for	the	 detailed	 probing	 into	 phenomena	 that	 can	 assist	 with	 the	 generation	 of	 new	theoretical	insights,	useful	as	the	foundation	for	building	new	models.	Data	analysis	at	the	 aggregate	 level	 allows	 for	 the	 comparison	 across	 a	 set	 of	 companies.	 Using	regression	techniques	generates	new	information	about	the	impact	of	a	range	of	IVs	on	the	DVs	across	the	model.	Case	studies	are	used	for	analysis	of	complex	phenomena,	creating	understanding	of	the	intricate	way	that	the	firm’s	history,	strategy	and	success	combine	in	its	tax	planning.		Chapter	4	reports	on	the	detailed	findings	from	the	interviews.	The	empirical	tests	of	hypotheses	developed	in	Chapter	2	are	empirically	tested	using	statistical	analysis	and	are	reported	in	Chapter	5.		
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4 Interviews with Tax Executives 
4.1 Introduction This	 chapter	 presents	 the	 key	 findings	 from	 eleven	 semi-structured	 interviews	conducted	in	2015	with	senior	tax	executives.	Five	interviewees	were	interviewed	in	their	role	working	for	a	US	MNE	operating	in	the	UK.	Six	were	interviewed	more	broadly	to	 explore	 their	 extensive	 knowledge	 of	 tax	 operations	 in	 the	 UK.	 The	 research	methodology	used	to	identify	interviewees,	conduct	the	interviews	and	record	findings	is	explained	in	Chapter	3.			Qualitative	research	can	make	an	important	contribution	to	improving	understanding	within	the	field	of	IB	(Doz	2011;	Birkinshaw,	Brannen	and	Tung	2011).	The	interviews	conducted	 for	 this	 research	aimed	 to	generate	new	understanding	of	processes	and	motivations	from	within	the	MNE,	opening	the	‘black	box’.	Gaining	access	for	qualitative	research	 can	prove	difficult,	particularly	when	 there	are	 issues	of	 confidentiality,	 as	with	corporation	tax.	This	may	have	contributed	to	the	existing	lack	of	qualitative	work	in	this	area.	This	research	starts	to	fill	the	gap	in	understanding	of	the	internal	processes	of	the	MNE	in	relation	to	tax	planning	in	a	way	that	quantitative	research	could	not.		As	discussed	in	section	2.2,	the	Empirical	Literature	Review,	most	existing	research	on	tax	is	concerned	with	understanding	the	mechanisms	of	tax	avoidance	or	evaluating	the	scale	of	profit	 shifting.	The	 research	presented	here	makes	a	useful	 contribution	by	adding	 to	the	 small	number	of	studies	 that	 consider	 the	 impact	of	 the	 individual	on	corporate	 strategy.	 Dyreng	 Hanlon	 and	 Maydew	 (2010)	 track	 the	 movements	 of	individual	CEOs	and	CFOs	and	conclude	that	these	individuals	have	a	significant	impact	on	the	level	of	tax	avoidance	undertaken	by	firms.	They	find	an	11	per	cent	difference	in	 GAAP	 ETR	 between	 the	 top	 and	 bottom	 quartiles	 of	 executives.	 Similarly,	 the	discussion	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 reputation	 on	 corporate	 tax	 behaviour	 contributes	 by	adding	to	a	new	area	of	research.	Dyreng,	Hoopes	and	Wilde	(2016)	demonstrate	the	importance	of	public	pressure	on	corporate	tax	behaviour.	They	show	that	companies	affected	by	increased	scrutiny	from	activist	groups	are	likely	to	change	their	behaviour.	
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This	appears	to	be	confirmed	by	these	interview	findings.	Interviewees	distinguished	between	different	types	of	companies	and	the	different	force	with	which	reputational	concerns	would	be	likely	to	impact	tax	planning	behaviour.		These	interviews	were	intended	to	provide	detailed	evidence	over	a	range	of	issues	that	cannot	 be	 easily	 extracted	 via	 quantitative	 analysis.	 It	 was	 intended	 that	 the	 depth	provided	by	 interviews	would	enable	 the	development	of	 a	 theoretical	 contribution.	Evidence	from	interviews	would	be	used	to	answer	the	overarching	research	question:	‘What	drives	the	adoption	of	tax	strategies	by	US	MNEs?’		The	interviews	aimed	to:	
• Generate	new	information	on	the	internal	workings	of	the	company,	the	‘black	box’	of	decision	making;	
• Increase	understanding	of	the	role	of	key	individuals	within	the	firm	and	how	their	 experiences	 and	 attitude	 to	 risk	 affect	 the	 adoption	 of	 tax	 planning	processes;	and	
• Gain	insight	from	senior	tax	executives	into	the	ways	that	companies	avoid	tax	and	how	this	has	changed	over	recent	years.															
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Table 4 Background of Interviewees  	
	
Company	1	Representative		 UK	national.	Qualified	with	smaller	audit	company	before	moving	to	Big	4	firm	as	tax	accountant.	With	company	for	7	years.	Company	2	Representatives		 Two	US	nationals.	One	a	tax	specialist	in	UK	on	secondment	for	a	year,	been	with	company	for	30	years.	One	the	COO,	been	with	company	for	8	years.	Company	3	Representative		 UK	national.	Qualified	with	Big	4	firm.	Been	with	company	for	10	plus	years.	Company	4	Representative		 US	national.	Qualified	with	Big	4	firm.	Works	out	of	US.	Been	with	company	5	plus	years.	Company	5	Representative		 UK	national.	Qualified	with	Big	4	firm.	Worked	for	another	company	for	10	years	that	was	taken	over	by	current	company	8	years	ago.	Expert	1		 Qualified	35	years	ago.	Varied	career	in	tax	throughout	specific	industry	including	time	with	Big	4	firm.	Expert	2		 Qualified	with	Big	4	firm	and	worked	there	18	years.	Recently	(2	plus	years	ago)	moved	into	industry.	Expert	3		 UK	national.	Tax	Partner	with	Big	4	firm.	Worked	there	25	plus	years.	Expert	4		 US	national.	Worked	as	Tax	Partner	in	Big	4	firm.	Now	works	at	boutique	tax	advisory	firm.	Worked	in	Tax	30	plus	years.	Expert	5			 US	national.	Tax	Partner	at	Big	4	firm.	Has	worked	for	2	big	4	firms	over	30	plus	year	career.	Expert	6			 UK	national.	30	year	career	in	industry	including	work	as	transfer	pricing	specialist	covering	significant	legal	cases.	Now	an	independent	transfer	pricing	consultant.	
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4.2 Key Findings The	 following	 sections	 detail	 the	 results	 of	 the	 analysis.	 Key	 findings	 are	 discussed	below	in	detail	and	a	section	proposing	a	new	theoretical	framework	for	analysing	the	propensity	 of	 MNEs	 to	 avoid	 taxes	 follows	 these.	 The	 final	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	summarises	 findings	and	concludes.	Throughout	the	chapter	uncorrected	quotations	are	used	within	the	text	 to	add	support	 to	 the	discussion	or	 to	highlight	a	particular	point.	 Boxes	 of	 quotations	 are	 also	 used	 to	 provide	 additional	 evidence	 for	 the	conclusions	drawn.	Pratt	(2008)	argues	that	quotations	from	interviews	should	be	used	in	this	way	to	fulfil	two	functions,	‘power’	and	‘evidence’	within	academic	work.		The	evidence	quotations	presented	in	boxes	are	selected	to	demonstrate	the	types	of	points	made	and	are	not	intended	to	be	a	comprehensive	list	of	all	the	support	for	a	particular	point.	 The	 two	 interviews	 that	 were	 not	 recorded	 are	 under-represented	 in	 the	quotations	as	fewer	direct	quotations	were	available,	however	the	notes	and	analysis	from	those	interviews	have	been	comprehensively	included	in	the	discussion.	
4.3 Extent of Tax Planning Interviewees	 discussed	 their	 approaches	 to	 tax	 planning.	 The	 view	 was	 strongly	expressed	that	companies	have	to	make	decisions	on	the	stance	that	they	take.	Tax	laws	and	regulations	are	seen	as	providing	grey	areas,	within	which	MNEs	have	scope	for	decision-making	and	strategic	planning.	Tax	planning	was	seen	as	a	continuum	where	the	risk	of	damage	to	reputation	and	potential	fines	from	HMRC,	are	balanced	against	the	potential	to	save	money	on	tax	payments.	Reputation	strongly	influences	decision	making	 within	 companies	 with	 potential	 damage	 to	 both	 personal	 and	 corporate	reputations	affecting	the	degree	to	which	tax	avoidance	is	pursued.	It	was	the	decisions	stemming	from	this	that	drove	much	of	the	discussion	in	interviews.		Companies	were	seen	to	have	a	responsibility	to	shareholders	to	ensure	that	they	paid	only	 a	minimum,	 obligatory,	 level	 of	 tax.	 The	 actual	 level	 of	 tax	 paid	was	 seen	 as	 a	consequence	of	choices	and	strategies	implemented	by	the	company.	It	was	suggested	that	 in	 the	 US	 companies	 have	 a	 clearer	 fiduciary	 duty	 to	 maximise	 returns	 to	shareholders,	which	 could	 drive	US	 companies	 to	 avoid	 tax	more	 aggressively	 than	those	 from	other	countries.	 	One	interviewee	thought	 that	 the	press	reporting	of	 tax	avoidance	by	high	profile	companies	would	have	been	different	in	the	US:	
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‘But	because	of	that	if	you	publish	in	the	paper	that	Apple	has	significantly	reduced	its	
liability	US	people	are	not	bothered	by	that,	they	applaud	that.	They	don't	think	that	that	
is	a	bad	thing.’	(Expert	5).		A	 company	with	 a	 clear	 ‘non	 aggressive’	 stance	 on	 tax	 explained	 how	 they	 have	 to	balance	their	stance	with	ensuring	that	they	are	delivering	the	best	returns	possible	for	shareholders:			
‘We	are	utilising	the	tax	law	as	implemented	and	that	is	where	the	tax	department	focuses.	
What	are	the	drivers	to	help	reduce	our	earnings	impact	of	taxes	as	well	as	cash?	That	is	
our	job	responsibility.	If	we	are	not	doing	that	we	are	not	doing	the	right	thing	but	we	
don't	take	that	extra	scam	step.	We	respond	to	the	incentives	that	the	government	has	put	
in	place.	We	wouldn't	be	doing	our	job	if	we	didn't…	We	reduce	our	taxes	as	effectively	as	
we	can	but	doing	so	in	a	moral	way	and	in	being	a	good	corporate	citizen.’	(Company	2)		
‘Tax	is	like	any	other	line	in	your	P&L.	It	is	a	cost	that	you	have	a	duty	or	an	obligation	to	
manage	as	effectively	as	possible.’	(Company	1)	
‘These	things	are	not	aggressive	these	are	just	things	that	are	allowed	for	under	the	rules.’	
(Expert	5)	
	‘The	 thing	of	 it	 is	 that	directors	of	 companies	are	 like	 trustees.	They	have	a	 fiduciary	
responsibility	to	their	shareholders	to	maximise	the	value	of	their	shares	through	creating	
as	much	value	as	possible.	And	it	would	be	against	their	fiduciary	obligation	to	pay	more	
tax	than	they	should.	That	is	where	it	is.	The	way	that	they	do	it	-	it	pushes	the	line.’	(Expert	
4)		Interviewees	felt	that	companies	have	a	difficult	balancing	act.	Whilst	there	are	rules	that	have	to	be	complied	with,	there	is	considerable	scope	for	interpretation.	Managers	have	discretion	 in	how	they	 interpret	 the	 law;	what	 is	acceptable	practice	and	what	isn’t.	This	leads	them	to	operate	in	what	Muller	and	Kolk	(2015)	describe	as	‘moral	free	
space’.	Compliance	with	the	law	is	balanced	with	meeting	the	needs	of	shareholders.	Companies	have	a	decision	to	make	about	how	aggressively	they	pursue	tax	avoidance	and	therefore	how	much	tax	they	pay.	
	
	 133	
‘I	guess	that	you	can	argue	that	they	have	acted,	the	tax	functions	or	the	boards	have	acted	
in	the	best	interests	of	the	shareholders	so	they	are	compliant	with	the	laws’	(Company	1)	
‘There	is,	still	has	to	be,	this	basic	presumption	that	if	you	can	do	something	that	you	are	
going	to	do	anyway	for	commercial	reasons	in	one	of	two	different	ways	and	one	of	them	
gives	you	a	better	tax	outcome	without	any	sort	of	artificiality	or	any	diversion	of	profits	
or	any	entities	being	set	up	that	exist	purely	for	tax	purposes	then	you	know	your	duty	is	
to	your	shareholders	to	maximise	your	value	by	taking	that	choice...	I	can't	think	of	any	
other	area	in	the	business	or	any	other	decision	where	you	might	have	a	binary	decision	
and	go	for	the	more	costly	one,	it	just	doesn't	seem	sensible.’	(Expert	2)	
‘Broadly	speaking	the	philosophy	is	that	we	believe	we	are	good	corporate	citizens,	we	
don't,	we	want,	well	we	don't	want	to	pay	tax,	we	recognise	that	we	need	to	pay	tax	and	
we	as	a	company	are	not,	our	philosophy	as	a	company	is	not	to	take	aggressive	positions	
on	things.	That	said,	we	will	always	look	to	do	things	in	a	tax	efficient	manner’(Company	
4)		Since	 the	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2008	 companies	 have	 felt	 increased	 hostility	 to	 tax	avoidance	emanating	from	the	public,	the	media	and	the	government.	This	appears	to	have	generated	more	internal	debate	in	companies	about	their	responsibilities	to	both	their	shareholders	but	also	to	a	broader	set	of	stakeholders:		‘We	need	to	maximise	our	shareholder	values,	which	means	keeping	costs	and	tax	as	low	
as	possible	whereas	on	the	other	hand	the	Revenue	would	like	us	to	pay	loads	of	tax.	So	I	
think	that	that	has	become	much	more	of	a	balancing	act.	In	the	past	it	was	more,	you	
know,	we	are	beholden	to	our	shareholders	and	our	shareholders	alone,	sorry	if	you	don't	
like	it,	bad	luck.	But	I	think	that	that	is	now	an	internal	debate	now	in	most	organisations,	
as	opposed	to	it	being	a	very	simple	we	always	do	the	thing	that	gives	us	the	lowest	tax	
outcome.	I	don't	think	it	is	as	clear	as	that	anymore.’	(Expert	2)	
	Interviewees	discussed	high	profile	cases	such	as	Starbucks	and	Amazon,	for	the	most	part	feeling	that	these	companies	have	been	unfairly	criticised	for	making	choices	that	are	within	the	bounds	of	current	legislation.	It	was	felt	that	companies	currently	have	to	make	moral	decisions	about	how	much	avoidance	is	legitimate,	but	that	they	should	simply	have	to	comply	with	the	law	and	if	operating	legally	that	should	be	acceptable:	
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‘They	[HMRC]	have	a	legal	obligation	to	make	sure	that	everybody	pays	their	fair	share	of	
tax…Gee,	 if	 they	[Starbucks]	are	violating	the	 law	then	you	should	be	doing	something	
about	 that.	 But	 I	 am	 confident	 that	 they	 are	 not	 violating	 the	 law	 -	 they	 are	 clearly	
following	the	statute.’		(Expert	5).	
		Another	interviewee	argued	that	Starbucks	had	simply	been	misunderstood	and	that	they	should	not	be	criticised	for	adopting	normal	tax	planning	processes:	
‘You	know	there	are	many	reasons	why	Starbucks	haven't	paid	tax		-	I	don't	think	that	they	
have	articulated	themselves	very	well	because	they	have	made	losses	for	several	years	and	
you	are	allowed,	every	company	is	allowed	to	carry	those	losses	forward	against	future	
profits	so	they	have	not	actually	done	anything	dishonest’	(Company	1)		Only	 one	 expert	 argued	 that	 these	 high	 profile	 companies	 could	 be	 legitimately	criticised	for	their	tax	planning	and	suggested	that	there	are	differences	between	being	legally	and	ethically	correct:		
‘I	mean	Amazon	selling	a	billion	dollars	of	gear	in	the	UK	and	paying	$6m	tax	that	is	just	
not,	that	is	Amazon	not	behaving	fairly	that	is	what	that	is.	That	is	a	guy	like	me	setting	
up	a	structure	that	is	within	the	limits	of	the	law	absolutely	because	the	law	is	what	the	
law	is…	you	need	to	change	the	law	and	there	is	push	to	do	that’	(Expert	4)	
4.4 Reduction in Avoidance Since 2008 Interviewees	all	 felt	 that	 the	 incidence	of	 tax	avoidance	 is	currently	at	relatively	 low	levels.	The	financial	crisis	of	2008	was	described	as	a	turning	point	with	attitudes	to	business	changing	as	the	public	became	more	critical	and	hostile	to	‘big	business’	whilst	at	the	same	time	governments	came	under	financial	pressures	to	ensure	that	they	were	maximising	their	fiscal	budgets.	A	number	of	reasons	were	suggested	to	be	driving	the	lower	incidence	of	corporation	tax	avoidance:	
• More	restrictive	regulations	reducing	the	scope	for	implementing	tax	avoidance	schemes;	
• Greater	attention	from	public	policy	makers,	including	the	OECD,	international	governments	and	government	committees	towards	tax	planning;		
• Companies	anticipating	the	potential	introduction	of	new	international	disclosure	measures	such	as	Country	by	Country	reporting;	
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• An	increase	in	the	potential	impact	on	company	reputation	driven	by	greater	public	awareness	of	and	hostility	towards	tax	planning;	
• HMRC	improved	efficiency	at	shutting	down	schemes	and	at	communicating	what	is	an	is	not	acceptable	to	companies;	
• An	acceptance	that	a	wider	set	of	stakeholders	are	relevant	for	tax	planning	purposes	than	just	shareholders;	and	
• A	cultural	shift	in	what	is	ethically	acceptable,	although	not	all	interviewees	agreed	that	there	has	been	a	comprehensive	shift	in	attitudes.		
‘There	is	always	another	idea	round	the	corner.	You	shut	one	down	and	we	will	get	another	
one.	 But	 the	 attitude	 in	 the	 late	 2000s	 and	 coming	 into	 this	 decade	 was	 a	 bit	 more	
circumspect	around	what	is	this	[tax	reduction	measure]	going	to	look	like.’	(Expert	4)	
‘A	lot	of	boards	that	were	previously	more	aggressive	have	all	calmed	down.’	(Company	1)	
‘There	has	been	quite	a	lot	of	unravelling	of	avoidance	positions	and	a	lot	of	emphasis	at	
the	moment	is	about	doing	compliance	right	rather	than	doing	tax	planning.	So	our	work	
around	 the	 firm	 here	 is	 directed	 towards	 getting	 it	 right	 and	 reflecting	 substance	 in	
operations’	(Expert	3)	
‘I	came	into	tax	at	the	end	of	the	1970s	and	tax	planning	was	rife.	We	used	to	talk	about	
evasion	and	avoidance	and	the	difference	between	the	two	was	one	of	them	you	did	time	
in	prison.	But	who	went	to	prison	for	evasion	in	the	60s,	70s	80s	and	even	90s?	…	So	there	
was	an	attitude	that	anything	goes.’		(Expert	1)	
	‘Even	 though	 businesses	 will	 restructure	 in	 response	 to	 legislative	 change	 and	 public	
pressure,	I	don’t	think	you	will	necessarily	get	a	MNE	paying	its	entrepreneurial	profits	
within	the	UK’.	(Expert	3)	
‘There	are	definitely	a	couple	of	[companies	in	this	industry]	who	in	my	experience	will	
also	 be	 a	 lot	 better	 behaved	 now…but	 probably	 entirely	 because	 of	 the	 reputational	
damage	that	could	arise,	rather	than	them	thinking	it	is	the	right	thing	to	do’	(Expert	2)	
‘[after	 the	 financial	crisis	 there	was]	a	shrinking	 in	the	kind	of	aggressive	planning…It	
wasn’t	about	reputation,	well	it	was	about	reputation,	but	first	and	foremost	I	couldn’t	
afford	to	do	it’	(Expert	1)	
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‘I	mean	I	think	that	there	are	definitely	a	couple	of	banks	who	in	my	experience	will	also	
be	 a	 lot	 better	 behaved	 now	 if	 you	 think	 through	 a	 sort	 of	Margaret	 Hodge	 lens,	 but	
probably	entirely	because	of	the	reputational	damage	that	could	arise	rather	than	them	
thinking	that	it	is	the	right	thing	to	do.	There	is	that	additional	step.’	(Expert	2)	
‘I	strongly	suspect	 that	there	is	a	genuine	trend	towards	companies	doing	less	and	less	
aggressive	tax	planning.	Partly	for	reputational	reasons	and	partly	because	it	is	just	a	lot	
harder	than	it	used	to	be.’		(Expert	2)	
‘…there	 is	a	better	understanding	between	 industry	and	 the	Revenue	 [HMRC]	between	
what	the	Revenue	see	as	being	on	the	right	side	of	the	line	and	the	wrong	side	of	the	line.	
People	don't	want	to	go	to	the	time,	effort,	cost,	resources	and	reputational	impact	of	a	4	
-5	year	journey	through	the	courts.’	(Expert	2)			Whilst	 interviewees	believe	 that	 companies	are	now	less	aggressive	 in	 tax	planning,	whether	 this	 reflected	a	 fundamental	 change	 in	approach	with	 this	broader	view	of	company	responsibility	was	unclear.	Whilst	practices	may	be	changing,	some	felt	that	this	was	due	to	a	tightening	of	regulations	and	the	greater	difficulty	in	establishing	legal	avoidance	practices,	rather	than	from	a	fundamental	change	of	attitudes.	Discussions	focussed	on	the	potential	impact	to	corporate	reputation	with	interviewees	stating	that	companies	place	a	greater	emphasis	on	potential	damage	to	their	reputation	than	had	previously	been	the	case.		
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‘Personally	 I	 think	pretty	much	all	 the	[companies	 in	 this	sector]…	now	want	to	do	the	
right	thing,	not	necessarily	with	the	same	underlying	motives.	I	think	that	they	all	want	to	
do	the	right	thing	because	they	want	to	be	seen	to	do	the	right	thing	and	not	incur	a	load	
of	additional	negative	publicity	which	they	would	not	doubt	incur	if	they	were	found	to	be	
engaged	in	tax	avoidance.	’	(Expert	2)	
	‘I	 think	 that	 there	might	 be	 a	 philosophical	 change	 in	 attitude	 -	 when	 you	 see	 what	
Margaret	Hodge	has	been	doing,	the	naming	and	shaming	to	a	degree.	But	I	don't	think	
that	 is	 like	an	 intangible	change,	but	 the	tangible	one	 is	 that	you	can't	afford	to	do	 it.’	
(Expert	1)	
4.5 What Drives a Company’s Adopted Position? Interviews	 explicitly	 explored	 what	 drives	 the	 adoption	 of	 individual	 companies’	position	on	tax.	This	section	considers	the	different	factors	that	interviewees	revealed	were	driving	 the	stance	adopted	 towards	 tax	planning	within	 the	organisations	 that	they	have	worked	for.	A	number	of	factors	intrinsic	and	extrinsic	to	the	company	were	discussed	and	these	are	set	out	in	the	sections	below.	
4.5.1 People and Culture Interviewees	concluded	that	the	people	within	the	company,	the	overall	management	and	culture	were	key	to	understanding	the	aggressiveness	of	the	tax	stance.	CFOs,	CEOs	and	the	board	were	all	felt	to	have	a	role	in	setting	the	overall	‘tone’	of	the	company	and	its	attitude	to	risk.	In	some	companies	setting	the	tone	or	values	of	the	business	was	treated	as	an	explicit	 task.	 In	others	there	was	a	more	 implied	understanding	of	 the	common	values	of	the	company.	A	clash	could	occur	if	a	person	behaved	in	a	way	that	was	not	aligned	with	 corporate	values.	Responding	 to	a	question	about	what	drives	their	 tax	 position	 one	 interviewee	 said	 simply:	 ‘The	 tone	 at	 the	 top’	 (Company	 4).	Another	replied:	‘Culture.	The	most	important	thing	about	[Company	name]	I	would	say	
is	our	culture	and	embedded	within	that	is	the	business	ethics	associated	with	that	-	that	
is	our	discriminator.	Name	one	of	our	competitors		-	they	can	hire	the	same	engineer	or	
same	financial	person	or	same	tax	person	we	hire,	the	difference	is	our	culture	-	that	is	our	
real	discriminator.’	(Company	2)		
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‘I	asked	my	boss	3	or	4	years	ago	when	he	came	over,	he	has	been	over	since	then,	but	I	
asked	him	where	are	we	in	terms	of	tax	aggression	-	0	-	10	and	he	said	10.’	(Company	3)	
‘Attitudes	 are	 shaped	 by	 organisations.	 If	 I	 started	my	 career	 again	 it	 would	 be	 very	
different	in	terms	of	the	overall	climate.	I	think	working	for	people	inside	[a	company	in	
this	industry]	who	are	schooled,	cultured	in	what	the	organisation	is	about	is	much	better	
than	having	these	mavericks,	these	firebrands	who	pitch	up	and	say	hey	-	aren't	I	macho	I	
can	do	X,	Y	and	Z.’	(Expert	1)	
‘I	think	we	always,	well	our	previous	VP	of	tax	was	our	head	of	tax	for	more	than	30	years	
I	guess	so	 I	 think	it	 [conservative	attitude	to	tax]	probably	stemmed	from	him.	Funnily	
enough,	it	might	seem	obvious	now	but	in	those	days	it	was	quite	a	normal	thing	because	
I	guess	he	never	wanted	our	name	to	be	named	and	shamed	in	the	papers	so	he	had	that	
foresight	from	then	to	I	guess	have	that	vision	of	always	being	clean.’	(Company	1)	
‘Individuals.	Well	it	starts	with	the	Board.’	(Expert	4)		The	Board	of	Directors	was	cited	as	having	a	significant	impact	on	tax	planning	both	in	terms	of	setting	the	culture	within	the	company,	but	also	with	its	understanding,	and	being	open	to	what	is	possible.	As	the	understanding	of	boards	differs,	their	attitude	to	what	is	possible	and	how	their	company’s	position	compares	with	others	will	also	vary.	The	difference	in	knowledge	and	attitude	from	board	members	was	also	cited	as	a	key	influence	in	setting	the	tone	of	the	company.	The	ability	of	the	company	to	set	the	level	of	 tax	 that	 it	 pays	was	 taken	 for	 granted	 in	 these	 discussions	with	 no	 interviewees	adopting	the	position	that	taxes	are	simply	set	by	governments	and	paid	by	companies.		It	was	felt	that	whilst	boards	of	directors	may	understand	the	general	stance	few	would	know	 the	 details	 of	 a	 company’s	 tax	 strategy.	One	 company	 reported	 that	 they	 had	recently	created	a	specific	board	position	with	responsibility	for	tax.	
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‘…some	boards	are	very	savvy	and	commercially	aware,	of	how	the	process	works.	Some	
are	completely	oblivious	to	it.’	(Expert	5).	
‘Revenue	came	up	with	this	thing	called	senior	accounting	officer.	Tax	in	the	boardroom	
which	started	probably	10,	11,	12	years	ago.	Does	the	board	know	what	is	going	on?	The	
Board	would	know	what	is	going	on	in	terms	of	direction	of	travel	but	the	detail	they	don't.	
They	don't	know	what	is	going	in	lots	of	other	areas.	They	rely	on	having	the	people	to	flag	
what	the	issues	are.’	(Expert	1)	
‘The	board	has	to	actually	approve	everything	so	if	the	board	remains	of	the	view	that	in	
the	current	environment	we	want	to	maintain	our	risk	averse	status.	And	you	might	have	
found	this	already,	but	a	lot	of	boards	that	were	previously	more	tax	aggressive	have	all	
calmed	down.’	(Company	1)		These	findings	confirm	the	importance	of	individual	executives	and	corporate	culture	on	the	company’s	position	on	tax.	The	statements	above	confirm	the	importance	of	the	individual	as	demonstrated	by	Dyreng	Hanlon	and	Maydew	(2010).	
4.5.2 Risk Interviewees	 discussed	 entrepreneurial	 risk,	 seeing	 profits	 as	 the	 reward	 for	 taking	risk.	According	to	interviewees	the	part	of	the	MNE	that	bears	risk,	determines	where	the	profit	should	accrue.	Interviewees	agreed	that	companies	should	be	rewarded	for	entrepreneurial	risk	where	that	risk	is	taken	–	rather	than	where	sales	are	made.	One	company	reported	that:	‘Effectively	we	run	a	limited	risk	model	in	most	of	the	world	so	
we	treat	the	US	as	the	entrepreneur	and	everyone	else	is	like	a	limited	risk	service	provider’	
(Company	3).	The	US	bears	 the	 risk	of	 investing	and	conducting	operations	 in	other	countries	and	therefore	it	receives	the	residual	–	any	profit	that	is	made.	Companies	in	the	UK	and	elsewhere	are	paid	for	the	service	that	they	offer	to	the	US	company.			The	 company’s	overall	 attitude	 to	 risk	was	also	 thought	 to	drive	 its	 approach	 to	 tax	planning	with	 the	adoption	of	 aggressive	 tax	avoidance	 considered	as	an	 inherently	risky	strategy.	Whilst	attitudes	to	risk	or	tax	avoidance	could	change	over	time	this	was	likely	 to	happen	slowly	 in	most	 instances	as	people	 trying	 to	push	 for	 change	more	quickly	would	be	resisted.	
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	This	risk	aversion	was	felt	to	permeate	across	all	aspects	of	the	business	and	was	set	by	individuals	at	the	top	of	the	organisation.		Risk	aversion	in	tax	was	felt	to	be	part	of	the	
‘ethos,	 rather	 than	 prescriptive	 policy’	 (Company	 5).	 The	 top	 of	 this	 company	 has	 a	system	for	setting	‘visions	and	values’	and	these	are	then	systematically	devolved	down	through	the	group	to	individual	team	members.		
‘In	terms	of	attitude	to	tax	risk	-	if	you	had	a	very	conservative	organisation.	It	is	its	history	
and	its	legacy	that	have	got	it	there	and	the	likelihood	is	that	the	people	at	the	top	level	
are	of	that	mould	so	if	you	bring	in	someone	who	is	very	aggressive	it	is	unlikely	that	they	
will	survive	or	if	they	do	survive	it	will	change	the	culture.’	(Expert	1)	
‘…have	to	balance	tax	advantage	of	evasion	with	the	reputational	risk.		This	[company]	is	
definitely	risk	averse	not	that	[company	name]	doesn’t	take	risk	but	that	they	know	how	
to	manage	it.’		(Company	5)	
‘[Company	name]	is	overall	a	risk	averse	organisation,	would	never	enter	into	complex	
structures.’	(Company	5)	
‘My	first	boss,	he	was	incredibly	bright,	had	real	insight	into	things	but	he	was	cautious.	
Incredibly	cautious.	[He]	was	a	taxman	who	had	become	a	finance	director	so	he	wasn't	
that	aggressive	about	things.’	(Expert	1)	
‘So	I	have	worked	for	eight,	nine	bosses	at	[company	name].	I	always	reported	to	the	CFO,	
only	one	of	them	was	really	aggressive.’	(Expert	1)	
The	new	CFO	came	and	didn't	like,	[name],	the	CFO	and	a	couple	of	other	people.	They	
broke	[company	name].	They	took	too	much	risk,	didn't	really	understand	what	they	were	
doing	and	there	is	a	court	case	going	on.’	(Expert	1)	
‘I	worked	 for	 the	 CFO	 at	 [company	 name],	 a	 guy	 called	 [name].	He	 only	 lasted	 for	 15	
months.	Very	measured,	very	cautious.	So	what	happened	to	him?	He	arrived	in	the	spring	
of	2002	…	and	he	was	gone	by	the	end	of	2003.	He	didn't	fit.	He	has	gone	to	greater	things.’	
(Expert	1)	
‘When	you	are	confident	that	your	leadership	is	doing	the	right	thing	-	that	is	our	code	of	
ethics	-	I	forget	what	the	terminology	is	at	the	moment	but	we	believe	in	doing	the	right	
thing’	(Company	2)	
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‘As	a	business	we	don’t	like	uncertainty,	I	guess	one	of	our	principles	as	a	business	is	to	
have	certainty	so	we	like	to	have	this	agreement	[with	HMRC]	if	we	can’.	(Company	1)		
‘[Companies	want]	certainty	and	comfort	around	the	operation	of	those	rules.	Tax	is	a	cost	
of	doing	business	so	you	don’t	want	to,	in	a	year’s	time,	be	hit	with	a	bill,	25	per	cent	tax	
rate	assessment	that	you	knew	nothing	about’.	(Expert	3)		Almost	all	interviewees	felt	that	their	company	took	a	conservative	attitude	towards	tax	avoidance.	The	interviewees	seemed	to	feel	that	their	company	took	only	‘sensible’,	limited	 tax	 avoidance	measures	 that	 any	 company	would.	 Discussion	 about	 the	 tax	avoidance	 measures	 that	 they	 implement,	 however,	 revealed	 a	 wider	 dispersion.	 A	company,	 whilst	 describing	 itself	 as	 unaggressive,	 simultaneously	 gave	 details	 of	 a	number	of	relatively	aggressive	tax	avoidance	measures	that	they	were	undertaking.	The	same	company	know	that	HMRC	disapprove	of	their	system	of	profit	shifting	using	debt	and	 interest	payments.	This	 ‘hybrid’	scheme	uses	 ‘check	the	box’	regulations	to	enable	the	company	to	off	set	interest	payments	from	external	loans	twice,	once	in	the	UK	and	once	 in	 the	US.	Although	 the	 scheme	 is	 currently	 legal,	 the	 regulations	may	change	 in	 the	near	 future.	They	were	happy	however,	 to	 take	 this	 riskier	approach,	reducing	their	tax	bill,	until	they	are	required	to	restructure	payments:	‘There	is	even	
talk	about	our	current	structure,	the	way	we	have	done	it,	about	that	possibly	being	denied	
and	going	away…	We	will	have	to	monitor	that.	That	 is	a	risk	for	us	–	we	will	have	to	
monitor	that.’	(Company	4)	
	Advisers	 similarly	 felt	 that	 the	 advice	 they	 gave	was	 not	 overly	 aggressive	 and	 the	companies	 that	 they	 were	 advising	 adopted	 relatively	 conservative	 stances.	Complications	 arise	with	 complicated	 or	 ‘flamboyant’	 structures	 that	 require	 strong	governance	to	overcome:	‘You	have	got	to	be	very	clear	that	you	are	in	control	of	that	
structure	–	the	more	it	is	skewed	from	the	normal	business	life	the	tighter	your	controls	
need	to	be	on	it.’	(Company	5)	
 
‘In	terms	of	why	we	don’t	think	we	are	aggressive,	you	know,	it	is	broader	than	tax,	our	
accounting	policies,	we	don’t	want	to	be	conservative,	we	don’t	want	to	be	aggressive,	we	
want	 to	 be	 somewhere	 in	 the	middle.	 There	 are	 pros	 and	 cons	 to	 being	 on	 each	 side,	
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certainly	 the	negative	to	being	too	aggressive	 is	you	are	creating	a	 lot	of	exposure	 for	
yourself…	but	at	the	same	time	we	also	don’t	want	to	be	foolish	and	just	waste	money.’	
(Company	4)	
‘Yes	the	rules	are	the	rules	and	we	play	and	operate	within	those	rules	and	if	there		are	
things	that	we	do	efficiently	tax	wise,	that	is	what	we	will	do.’	(Company	4)	
‘How	do	we	operate?	As	conservative	as	you	will	ever	find	any	company	anywhere.	Period.	
I	wouldn't	 assert	 that	 we	 pay	more	 than	we	 should	 but	we	 do	 not	 dodge	 any	 or	 take	
advantage	of	anything	that	is	anything	other	than	absolutely	what	we	should	be	paying	
and	we	do	pay.’	(Company	2)		Interviewees	 suggested	 a	 number	 of	 drawbacks	 of	 tax	 avoidance	 that	 had	 to	 be	balanced	with	the	potential	tax	savings.	There	was	real	concern	about	the	potential	for	damage	to	a	firm’s	reputation	(see	next	section	below).	Increased	administrative	and	regulatory	burdens	were	cited	as	added	costs	to	the	firm	of	implementing	complicated	tax	schemes	and	structures.	7	Uncertainty	also	increased	as	the	potential	for	regulatory	change	 could	mean	 that	 a	 scheme	 that	 is	 currently	 approved	 becomes	 illegal	 in	 the	future	which	could	result	in	significant	costs.	Current	legal	advice	that	a	scheme	was	legitimate	may	not	stand	up	in	court	further	into	the	future.	
‘Some	peers	had	set	up	tax	avoidance	structures	that	ended	up	costing	them	more	to	undo	
than	they	had	originally	saved.	Should	never	be	too	greedy	–	out	of	step	with	the	rest.’	
(Company	5)	
‘May	 have	 a	 legal	 opinion	 on	 record	 from	 5	 years	 ago	 saying	 that	 it	 is	 legal	 but	 not	
necessarily	going	to	stand	now.’	(Company	5)	
4.5.3 Reputation Some	 companies’	 reputations	 were	 thought	 to	 be	 more	 vulnerable	 than	 others	 to	charges	of	tax	avoidance.	Companies	with	direct	relationships	with	the	general	public	as	 consumers	 and	 those	 with	 the	 government	 or	 public	 sector	 as	 key	 clients	were	particularly	averse	to	bad	publicity.	Consumer	boycotts	or	bad	publicity	were	seen	as	potentially	 doing	 harm	 to	 the	 business.	 Those	 operating	 in	 business-to-business																																																									
7 One interviewee suggested that to implement a ‘hybrid structure’ would cost between $250-300,000 but 
that a large company would expect to recover that fee in 3-6 months. 
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segments	or	with	no	public	profile	could	be	more	aggressive.	Pragmatism	appears	to	dominate	strategy	over	any	particular	ethical	stance.		One	 company	 had	 a	 specific	 reason	 for	 not	 avoiding	 tax:	 ‘We	 are	 dominated	 by	
Government	contracts	…It	is	a	smart	business	move	to	make	sure	that	we	are	paying	the	
right	 amount	 of	 taxes	 because	 with	 the	 government	 customer	 base	 that	 we	 have,	 we	
actually	benefit	from	some	of	those	taxes	–	they	invest	back	in	our	business’	(Company	2).		
‘There	are	companies	that	have	no	public	profile	because	they	don't	have	retail	customers	
…	They	don't	transact	with	the	government	and	in	those	situations	they	can	afford	to	be	
extremely	aggressive.	They	don't	have	to	worry	about	the	Vodafone	problem	where	they	
picket	the	shop	windows	because	they	don’t	have	shop	windows.	And	so	they	don’t	really	
care.	So	they	can	be	more	aggressive.’	(Expert	5)	
‘Now	one	aspect	of	why	we	are	fairly	conservative	is	that	we	are	using	tax	payer	dollars.’	
(Company	2)	
‘Retail	banks	particularly	need	to	consider	reputational	risk.	Social	media	and	the	tone	of	
the	 political	 environment	 –	 especially	 for	 banks	 –	 mean	 that	 reputational	 risk	 is	
important.	Less	so	for	investment	banks.’	(Company	5)			‘[we	go	to]	great	lengths	in	the	US	to	make	sure	that	that	rate	drops	from	40	-	20	but	not	
below	a	certain	level	because	they	don't	want	to	be	embarrassed.’	(Expert	5)	
‘There	is	a	huge	fear	of	that	PR	machine	and	that	is	driving	a	lot	of	behaviours.’	(Expert	3)	
4.5.4 Personal Responsibility and Personal Reputation Individuals	working	in	companies	felt	that	it	was	important	to	find	a	company	that	was	a	good	‘fit’	with	their	own	attitudes	to	ethics	and	risk.	This	may	be	more	so	than	for	people	working	in	different	areas	of	finance.	Future	research	could	consider	whether	there	are	differences	in	ethical	emphasis	between	those	working	in	tax	and	other	areas	of	finance.	Interviewees	reported	concern	for	their	own	personal	reputation.		One	interviewee	described	how	his	own	personal	values	dictated	how	aggressive	his	tax	planning	could	be:	‘Some	would	say	that	I	am	very	risk	averse,	some	would	say	that	I	
don’t	take	enough	risk,	but	I	think	on	balance	I	have	always	been	very	comfortable	about	
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how	I	explain	something	and	I	wouldn’t	do	anything	that	I	think	was	illegal.		I	wouldn’t	do	
anything	that	was	reprehensible,	that	is	if	you	had	to	put	your	hands	up	and	confess	you	
would	 be	 embarrassed.	 I	 have	 never	 got	 myself	 in	 that	 situation.	 There	 is	 a	 ledge,	 a	
platform	that	I	will	go	to	but	I	won’t	go	beyond	it.’	(Expert	1)		
‘It	 is	 also	 a	 place	where	 I	 can	 be	 comfortable	 in	my	 own	 skin	 in	 terms	 of	my	 attitude	
towards	the	way	that	the	tax	system	should	work.’	(Expert	2)	
‘It	is	interesting	because	there	are	people	who	are	frightened	of	their	own	shadow	but	at	
the	 other	 extreme	 there	 are	 people	 who	 aren't	 frightened	 of	 anything.	 They	 aren't	
frightened	of	anything	because	they	aren't	aware	of	anything.	I	suppose	my	approach	to	
tax	planning	had	been	very	much	that	I	never	wanted	to	put	my	name	at	risk.’	(Expert	1)	
‘I	would	never	want	to	be	 in	a	situation	where	someone	says	 -	 this	guy	 is	not	credible.	
Might	 say	 he	 is	 not	 very	 good,	 but	 there	 is	 a	 question	 mark	 around	 his	 honesty,	 his	
integrity.	And	there	are	some	people	who	don't	seem	to	understand	what	reputation	is.	I	
do’.		(Expert	1)	
‘My	life	savings	was	my	reputation	so	I	looked	at	selecting	the	company	that	I	was	going	
with	 as	 betting	 my	 life	 savings	 on	 that	 company.	 Because	 all	 of	 a	 sudden	 you	 join	 a	
company	and	then	your	reputation	and	that	of	the	company	are	inextricably	intertwined.	
So	I	bet	my	life	savings	on	this	company	-	based	on	ethical	standards.’	(Company	2)	
‘I	have	never	had	to	question	what	our	leadership	was	doing	in	tax.	Not	to	say	that	I	didn't	
ask	questions	-	like	what	is	going	on	here?	But	they	laid	it	out	-	they	wanted	to	make	sure	
that	I	was	willing	and	able	to	sign	up.’	(Company	2)	
4.6 Cash Management The	company’s	financial	situation	could	also	affect	their	tax	position.	The	impact	of	the	corporate	tax	bill	on	cashflow	was	raised	by	a	number	of	interviewees.	Companies	that	are	struggling	financially	may	take	a	more	aggressive	stance	in	order	to	manage	cash	flow	 issues.	 If	 cash	 is	 needed	 back	 in	 the	 US	 for	 investment	 or	 for	 returning	 to	shareholders	as	dividends,	tax	becomes	a	bigger	issue,	as	the	company	will	need	find	a	tax	efficient	way	to	repatriate	it.	Others	want	to	keep	the	cash	in	the	UK	for	investment	or	other	reasons.			
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‘There	are	a	lot	of	factors	that	influence	whether	their	stance	is	more	aggressive	or	less	
aggressive	and	I	have	seen	situations	where	companies	had	financial	commitments	and	
they	had	no	choice	but	to	be	aggressive	because	they	had	cash	flow	needs	and	so	they	had	
no	choice	because	they	had	to	keep	the	banks	happy.’	(Expert	5)	
‘It	is	about	cash	in	the	business	and	that	is	what	all	finance	directors	focus	on...	What	the	
CFO	 really	 has	 to	 worry	 about	 is	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 balance	 sheet	 and	 the	 cash	
flow.’	(Expert	3)	
‘Tax	is	the	biggest	cheque	of	the	year	so	the	timing,	the	bank	arrangements,	the	absolute	
amount,	which	can	be	dictated	about	where	you	have	recognised	your	profits…So	if	you	
talk	to,	well	people	do	talk	about	tax	and	they	say	to	us,	to	a	tax	partner	what	they	are	
talking	about	when	they	are	talking	to	us	is	about	cash	and	how	much	cash	we	need	to	
keep	in	the	business	to	do	what	we	need	to	do.’	(Expert	3)	
‘You	don't	know	this	but	we	are	not	an	Apple.	[Company	name],	you	know	if	you	stripped	
it	down	have	got	to	maintain	their	dividend	stream	to	their	shareholders,	If	that	were	not	
to	happen	we	would	be	in	all	sorts	of	trouble.	So	the	priority	for	cash	management	is	to	
get	the	cash	to	the	shareholders,	most	of	whom	are	in	the	US.’	(Company	3)	
‘Now	there	is	a	tax	benefit	to	that	-	not	repatriating.	But	we	are	not	sheltering	it	just	for	
the	sake	of	sheltering	it.	We	are	growing	here	-	that	money	will	be	used	for	future	growth,	
whether	that	is	buying	additional	businesses,	whether	it	is	expanding	plants,	whether	it	is	
employing	additional	employees	because	we	win	contracts.’	(Company	2)	
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‘Business	is	doing	great,	generating	a	lot	of	money	so	we've	looked	to	actually	take	the	
earnings	that	they	are	making	and	spread	it	within	the	UK	group	first	to	support	some	of	
the	capex	[capital	expenditure]	and	some	of	 the	other	things	that	 the	other	businesses	
within	the	group	need.	Ultimately,	hopefully,	knock	on	wood,	as	we	continue	to	grow	we	
start	to	generate	even	more	cash	and	then	we	look	to	do	something	with	that	-	so	we	want	
to	do	another	acquisition	in	the	UK,	we	could	use	that	money	to	fund	that.	We	could	send	
it	back	to	the	US	and	there	are	ways	of	actually	doing	that	tax-free	if	we	do	it	right.	The	
way	 to	 do	 it	 is,	 it	 is	 almost,	 and	 the	 reason	 I	 think	 that	 all	 of	 these	 org	 charts	 get	 so	
complicated	is	for	US	tax	purposes	basically.’	(Company	4)	
4.7 Tax and Corporate Strategy Tax	emerges	as	a	key	consideration	for	businesses	operating	in	the	UK	but	not	as	the	dominant	driver	of	company	strategy.	Tax	departments	saw	themselves	as	facilitating	the	efficient	implementation	of	corporate	strategy	rather	than	as	initiators	of	strategy.	One	 interviewee	 described	 the	 role	 of	 tax	 in	 the	mergers	 and	 acquisitions	 that	 the	company	had	made	recently.	The	company	would	identify	a	target	and	then	tax	would	become	a	key	part	of	the	planning	around	how	the	acquisition	should	be	structured	and	financed:	
‘So	the	tax	piece	is	always	a	critical	piece	as	we	are	 looking	to	do	acquisitions	but	it	is	
maybe	second	or	third	on	the	list.	The	first	is	obviously,	ok	what	do	we	see	in	this	business	
...	So	once	we	identify	a	target	and	we	think	it	makes	good	business	sense	then	certainly	as	
we	 get	 into	 the	 diligence	 then	 tax	 ramps	 right	 up	 to	 the	 top	 and	we	 say	 how	 do	we	
structure	this	from	a	tax	perspective.’	(Company	4)		Another	described	the	position	of	the	tax	department	as	like	a	service	centre	for	the	business,	ensuring	that	the	plans	of	the	wider	business	are	implemented	efficiently:		
‘I	think	our,	one	of	our	main	priorities	is	to	work	with	the	business.	You	do	get	instances	
sometimes	when	tax	says	we	need	to	do	this,	this	and	this	because	it	is	going	to	drive	all	
these	tax	benefits	-	you	are	the	business,	can	you	make	sure	you	align	to	us.	But	we	don't	
do	that.	We	really	work	with	the	business,	what	is	the	business	needs,	what	is	the	business	
model,	and	then	making	sure	that	we	are	as	tax	efficient	as	we	can	but	to	suit	the	business	
model	if	you	see	what	I	mean.’	(Company	1)		
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Tax	advisers	interviewed	reported	that	whilst	companies	are	relocating	to	the	UK	and	are	attracted	by	the	favourable	tax	system,	the	UK	market	and	access	to	the	European	market	 remain	 the	 dominant	 drivers.	 For	US	businesses	 the	UK’s	 relatively	 low	 tax	environment	means	that	little	tax	planning	may	be	required	within	UK	subsidiaries.	Tax	paid	on	UK	earnings	will	simply	be	offset	against	US	tax	liabilities.	Companies	pursuing	a	policy	of	deferring	repatriation	have	a	greater	incentive	to	plan	their	UK	tax	affairs	carefully	as	they	have	no	US	tax	liability	to	use	to	offset	the	UK	tax	paid	against.	The	companies	interviewed	however	were	repatriating	at	least	some	of	their	earnings,	after	reinvestment	 in	 capital	 projects	 in	 the	 UK.	 These	 companies	 adopt	 tax	 efficient	mechanisms	to	do	this.		
‘US	companies	with	UK	subsidiaries,	quite	often	the	UK	subsidiaries	are	disempowered	
from	doing	any	tax	planning	because	there	is	absolutely	no	point,	because	they	can	save	
tax	in	the	UK	but	they	will	be	paying	tax	on	it	in	the	US	regardless.’	(Expert	3)	
‘Because	the	CT	rate	in	the	UK	is	certainly	lower	than	in	the	US	I	think	that	there	is	a	lot	
less	 incentive	 to	 engage	 in	 tax	 planning	 in	 the	 UK	 than	 maybe	 there	 is	 in	 other	
jurisdictions.	I	mean	in	the	US	if	you	are	saving	whatever	the	marginal	rate	is	in	the	US,	
30	plus	instead	of	20	plus	you	might	conclude	that	there	is	no	point	in	driving	the	UK	rate	
down	unless	you	are	also	not	paying	some	sort	of	top	up	tax	in	the	US	otherwise	you	are	
just	shifting	the	total	amount	between	jurisdictions.’	(Expert	2)		One	company	reported	that	they	do	not	even	claim	R&D	tax	credits	in	the	UK,	as	they	are	administratively	 complicated	 to	 claim.	Whilst	 they	would	 reduce	UK	 tax	 liability	they	would	simply	result	in	a	greater	tax	liability	in	the	US.	One	expert	confirmed	the	lack	of	incentive	to	plan	taxes	for	companies	deferring	repatriation:	
‘I	think	that	that	is	why	most	of	the	planning	probably	comes	from	the	top	down	because	
if	you	can't	save	the	money	up	at	the	parent's	jurisdiction	there	is	really	no	point	trying	to	
drive	down	tax	in	the	subsidiary	jurisdiction.	You	would	have	to	go	to	an	awful	lot	of	effort	
and	overall,	as	an	organisation	pay	the	same	amount	of	tax	-	to	a	different	authority	but	
there	is	no	net	saving.’	(Expert	2)		
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For	companies	retaining	their	earnings	in	the	UK	or	Europe	the	incentive	to	avoid	UK	tax	remains.		Some	interviewees	reported	considering	inversion	where	the	structure	of	the	 company	 would	 change,	 moving	 the	 MNE’s	 headquarters	 away	 from	 the	 US.	Advisers	interviewed	emphasised	the	regulatory	hurdles	and	difficulty	in	achieving	an	inversion.	They	also	recognised,	however,	that	discussion	of	inversions	may	increase	as	the	UK	has	become	more	attractive	to	US	companies	as	the	corporate	tax	rate	has	fallen	over	recent	years.	One	of	the	companies	interviewed	has	since	announced	that	it	will	invert	its	structure.			
‘We	talked	a	lot	about…inversion,	where	a	US	company	redomiciles	in	another	lower	tax	
rate	jurisdiction.	Whilst	it	makes	sense	in	many	ways,	there	is	a	significant	cost	in	the	US	
of	doing	that.	It	is	a	one	time	cost	but	shareholders	would	get	taxed	and	we	sort	of	shied	
away	from	it8.’	(Company	4)	
‘I	think	just	going	back	to	that	US	inversion	point	-	that	captures	to	me	two	key	aspects:	
number	1	the	attractiveness	of	 the	UK	-	 it	 is	 so	attractive	that	 to	get	 into	the	UK	a	US	
multinational	would	be	prepared	to	go	through	the	world	of	pain	to	try	to	acquire	a	UK	
listed	entity	-	that	is	incredible,	that	is	a	massively	complex.	Like	Pfizer	or	something	and	
that	is	way	outside	anything	that	I	ever	worked	on,	but	the	other	aspect	to	that	is	it	shows	
how	little	scope	there	is	to	do	something	from	a	US	planning	perspective.	You	can't	just	fill	
in	a	piece	of	paperwork	and	you	are	done	and	your	assets	are	out	of	the	US	tax	bracket.	
You	have	got	to	do	something	so	drastic	as	to	buy	an	entity	of	similar	size	if	you	were	to	
get	 to	 a	 position	 where	 you	 were	 going	 to	 halve	 your	 effective	 tax	 rate	 and	 then	
international	world	has	become	 so	difficult	 to	avoid	 through	a	 simple	 technique	 -	 it	 is	
drastic	to	achieve	something	like	that’.	(Expert	5)	
‘The	system	is	way,	way	too	complex	in	the	US,	but	I	know	in	the	UK,	for	example,	I	know	
a	few	UK	companies,	 legally	they	can	just	up	sticks	and	leave	if	they	want.	They	can	all	
leave.	If	that	were	the	case	in	the	US	there	would	be	very	few	companies	that	are	US	based,	
very	few.’	(Expert	5)		
																																																								
8 Shareholders would effectively have to sell their shares in the old company and then buy shares in the new company. 
They would then become liable to capital gains tax on the increase in value of their original shares. 
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One	company	also	talked	about	the	pressures	to	invert	but	felt	that	their	existing:	‘US	
market	investors…	they	know	our	business,	it	is	like	bread	and	butter	to	them.	They	know	
exactly	how	we	operate.’	(Company	1).		The	costs	to	the	company	itself	and	also	to	the	shareholders	were	cited	as	reasons	for	deciding	against	an	inversion.9	
4.8 Corporate Tax Departments  All	the	interviewees	from	US	companies	had	a	larger	tax	team	based	in	the	US	and	a	smaller	team	in	the	UK.	The	US	team	was	responsible	for	overall	tax	policy	with	the	UK	team	generally	responsible	for	implementation	and	compliance.	The	size	of	the	UK	team	varied	 with	 the	 smaller	 teams	 reporting	 a	 greater	 reliance	 on	 outside	 advisers.	Reporting	 lines	and	structures	also	varied,	 largely	depending	on	the	historic	growth	and	development	of	the	organisation.			The	reduction	in	aggressive	tax	planning	cited	by	most	interviewees	has	had	important	impacts	 on	 the	 management	 of	 tax	 departments.	 The	 structure	 of	 the	 companies	included	 within	 these	 interviews	 had	 all	 been	 strongly	 influenced	 by	 mergers	 and	acquisitions.	Two	of	the	companies	were	actively	reviewing	their	corporate	structures	with	the	aim	of	rationalising	and	simplifying	their	complexity.	Similarly,	the	structure	in	terms	of	size	and	location	of	tax	departments	appears	to	have	been	largely	driven	by	these	corporate	events	rather	than	by	strategic	planning.	There	is	significant	variation	in	the	size	of	department	and	the	use	of	external	advisers.	Smaller	departments	report	heavier	use	of	external	consultants.	The	role	of	the	departments	varies	with	differing	emphases	on	 tax	planning,	strategy	and	compliance	as	well	 as	different	 types	of	 tax	including	VAT	and	employment	taxes.			Once	 the	 tone	 has	 been	 established	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 company,	aggressiveness	may	depend	on	how	the	tax	team	is	structured	and	motivated.	Different	companies	set	up	different	Key	Performance	Indicators	(KPIs).	Some	consider	cash-flow	or	staying	within	a	budget:	‘So	if	you	are	judged	on	whether	you	stay	within	your	budget	then	you	might	
not	be	very	aggressive	because	you	might	not	want	to	go	and	spend	a	 lot	of	money	on	
																																																								
9 It has subsequently been reported in the press that this company is now pursuing an inversion. 
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outside	advisors.	I	can	think	of	some	large	companies	that	operate	that	way.	I	think	that	
that	is	penny	wise,	pound-foolish	kind	of	thing.’	(Expert	5)	
	Interviewees	 agreed	 that	 in	 the	 past	 the	 ETR	 had	 been	 the	 key	 KPI	 on	 which	 tax	departments’	 performance	 was	 judged.	 There	 was	 some	 disagreement	 amongst	interviewees	about	the	extent	of	movement	away	from	this.	Some	reported	still	having	an	ETR	target	although	this	was	cited	as	a	range	rather	than	a	specific	 figure	whilst	other	suggested	that	most	companies	would	have	moved	away	from	this	now.		Where	ETR	is	monitored	it	is	seen	as	a	factor	to	be	balanced	with	others	such	as	the	potential	damage	to	corporate	reputation.	Optimising	the	level	rather	than	minimising	it	appears	to	 be	 key.	 One	 interviewee	 spoke	 of	 a	 target	 range	 of	 between	 26	 –	 28	 per	 cent.	Interviewees	agreed	that	historic	pressures	to	minimise	ETR	have	been	replaced	with	targets	to	‘optimise’	it	after	taking	account	its	potential	impact	on	corporate	reputation	and	the	longer	term	outlook	for	the	firm.		
‘Probably	most	organisations	I	would	have	thought	of	would	have	had	an	ETR	target	as	
part	of	their	team	metrics	back	then	for	example…	They	wouldn’t	really	have	thought	of	
wider	things	like	reputational	risk.’	(Expert	2)	
‘So	effectively	every	year	we	get	objectives	and	those	are	numbers	to	reduce	taxes,	cash	
tax	is	and	also	a	target	effective	tax	rate,	at	the	US	level.’	(Company	3)	
‘A	few	years	ago	everyone	wanted	low	ETR	-	lowest	possible,	take	all	incentives,	but	now	
not	everyone	wants	to	be	lowest.’	(Expert	6)	
‘I	think	that	there	is	a	fair	bit	of	challenge	to	Tax	Directors	when	their	effective	rate	isn't	
in	line	with	the	competition	because	the	board	is	looking	to	the	finance	director	-	what	is	
going	on	and	that	trickles	down	pretty	fast.’	(Expert	4)	
‘All	sorts	of	things	come	into	it	but	the	effective	rate	is	huge.’	(Expert	4)	
‘The	ETR	was	a	 factor	 in	my,	performance	but	 I	 could	always	manage	 it.	 Certainly	 if	 I	
needed	a	bit	more	here,	I	could	do	it.	I	could	get	there	so	I	could	always	get	within	my	
target	-	it	wasn't	a	problem.	So	it	was	a	factor	and	it	seemed	a	very	macho	gung-ho	thing	
to	do	in	the	80s	and	90s	but	companies	became	less	keen	now.	Now	I	don't	have	an	ETR	as	
a	target.’	(Expert	1)	
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‘If	 someone	 has	 an	 ETR	 as	 a	 target,	 it	 is	 for	 the	 birds	 nowadays.	 There	may	 be	 some	
organisations...	but	the	vast	majority	of	them,	over	90	%	will	not	have	an	ETR	target.	And	
if	they	do	they	don't	know	what	they	are	doing.	They	need	to	catch	up.’	(Expert	1)	
‘We	have	I	guess	an	ETR	range	that	we	announce	to	the	analysts	I	think	every	year	and	is	
in	the	region	of	26	-	28%	and	obviously	our	aim	is	to	try	to	be	within	that	range	and	that	
is	what	we	as	a	tax	function	are	assessed	on,	judged	on.	No	one	likes,	funnily	enough	even	
if	we	came	really	low	no	one	would	like	that	and	if	we	came	really	high	no	one	would	like	
that.’	(Company	1)	
‘I	think	if	you	go	back	to	before	the	financial	crisis,	most	tax	teams	would	have	seen	their	
stakeholders	as	CFO	-	internally	and	revenue	/	treasury	…	really	on	the	sort	of	operational	
level	externally,	and	that	was	it	from	a	sort	of	corporate	tax	perspective.’	(Expert	2)	
‘But	one	aspect	of	our	business	though	is	that	tax	is	not	driving	our	business,	we	support	
the	business.’	(Company	2)	
‘[Pre	financial	crisis]	Probably	most	organisations	I	would	have	thought	would	have	had	
an	ETR	target	as	part	of	their	team	metrics	back	then	for	example.	And	as	we	were	saying	
before	they	wouldn't	really	have	thought	of	wider	things	like	reputational	risk.’	(Expert	2)		Most	interviewees	reported	comparing	the	ETR	with	that	of	competitors	or	other	high	profile	companies.	One	interviewee	was	clear	that	they	would	never	be	concerned	with	what	 their	 competitors	 reported.	Another	 reported	having	 to	 reassure	 the	CEO	 that	they	were	adopting	an	aggressive	enough	stance:	
‘Now	from	time	to	time	our	CEO	will	challenge	us	and	say	Starbucks	is	doing	this,	Amazon	
this,	Apple	is	doing	that,	why	aren't	we	doing	that?	And	you	know	he	sees	that	the	tax	rate	
is	so	low	and	we	say	but	look	that	is	not	without	risk	and	looks	whose	names	are	in	the	
papers	every	day	about	this	stuff.	We	try	to	balance	it.’	(Company	4)		Companies	 and	 those	 working	 in	 them	 feel	 pressure	 to	 plan	 tax	 efficiently	 but	interviewees	feel	the	need	to	balance	this	‘tax	efficiency’	with	the	need	to	protect	the	company’s	 reputation	and	 to	behave	 in	 a	way	 that	 is	 consistent	with	 their	personal	ethics.		
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4.9 Tax Avoidance Mechanisms As	reported	in	the	research	methods	section	above,	interviewees	provided	significant	detail	about	the	tax	avoidance	methods	and	approaches	that	they	had	been	involved	in.	Not	all	of	the	company	interviewees	gave	details,	as	they	reported	that	their	companies	were	not	involved	in	any	form	of	avoidance.	Others	gave	details	of	what	they	considered	to	be	conservative	schemes.	The	experts	had	a	broader	frame	of	reference	and	talked	more	widely	about	schemes	that	they	had	been	involved	in	at	different	stages	of	their	careers.			There	was	a	shared	view	that	tax	avoidance	is	justified	as	it	relates	to	profit	that	is	the	reward	for	entrepreneurial	effort.	Companies	are	seen	to	have	discretion	over	where	they	 allocate	 at	 least	 a	 proportion	 of	 their	 income	 and	 profits.	 One	 interviewee	described	the	issue	as	working	out	what	proportion	of	the	income	could	be	categorised	as	‘mobile’	and	then	deciding	where	the	company	would	like	to	allocate	it.	US	companies	appear	to	be	split	into	those	that	return	their	profits	to	the	US	and	therefore	want	to	do	so	in	as	tax	efficient	manner	as	possible	and	those	that	prefer	to	defer	repatriation.	The	latter	therefore	look	for	low	tax	jurisdictions	where	they	can	book	income	to	reinvest	or	simply	hold	the	funds	as	cash.		Specific	 schemes	 relied	 heavily	 on	 the	 US	 ‘check	 the	 box	 regulations’10 .	 Debt	 with	related	interest	expense	and	IP	were	also	prominent	parts	of	mechanisms	to	increase	mobility	of	income.	Booking	operating	losses	in	one	entity	can	help	with	tax	efficient	repatriation.			IP	 transfer	was	seen	as	potentially	problematic	as	 it	would	have	to	be	valued	at	 the	market	value	when	 transferred	 from	 the	US,	 incurring	a	 tax	 charge	 in	 the	US.	Early	
																																																								10	US ‘check the box’ regulations mean that business entities can be treated as ‘disregarded entities’ for tax 
purposes, that is that they are treated as if part of the parent company, rather than a separate entity. This 
enables the creation of ‘hybrid entities’ where a MNE subject to corporate income tax in one national 
jurisdiction that qualifies for tax transparent treatment in another resulting in significant tax savings. This is 
accomplished when a company is organized as a partnership in one jurisdiction and as a corporation in 
another. 	
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insight	 would	 be	 needed	 to	 make	 this	 effective.	 One	 interviewee	 stressed	 that	companies	would	need	long	term	planning	to	benefit	from	this:		
‘If	you	start	up	a	business	in	the	US	and	on	the	third	day	you	decide	that	you	have	got	a	lot	
of	money	to	spend	on	your	tax	planning	you	possibly	could	be	well	advised	to	transfer	your	
intellectual	property	to	the	Cayman	Islands	and	pay	tax	on	its	value	on	transferring	it	out	
of	the	US.’	(Expert	3)		
‘[HMRC	could	say]	you	have	only	paid	interest	once	-	you	are	taking	a	deduction	here	in	
our	country	in	the	UK	but	you	are	already	getting	the	deduction	in	the	US	and	we	say	that	
that	is	perfectly	allowable	-	it	is	a	US	tax	planning	strategy.’	(Company	4)	
‘As	soon	as	I	look	to	bring	money	back	the	IRS	is	going	to	want	to	tax	it	but	they	will	leave	
you	alone	generally	speaking	if	it	is	a	foreign	company.	You	can	always	choose	not	to	do	
that	-	you	can	choose	to	say	-	I	don't	want	to	leave	it	alone	-	I	want	to	bring	that	money	
from	that	entity	into	the	US…	if	you	are	smart	about	it	and	put	these	different	structures	
in	place	-	that	is	the	benefit	that	you	can	get.	So	where	all	these	companies	are	doing	this	
-	they	are	saying,	this	entity	I	want	to	bring	the	income	or	expense	back	into	the	US	but	
they	are	shells,	they	are	holding	companies	so	we	are	not	really	bringing	the	profits	back	
of	the	real	business	into	the	US	we	are	sort	of	creating	an	arbitrage	and	bringing	back	
only	what	we	want	to	bring	back,	for	different	planning	reasons.’	(Company	4)	
‘The	profitable	entities	are	actually	different	entities	 in	 the	UK	group	so	 that	 is	not	by	
accident	because	it	is	a	way	to	get	our	money	back	to	the	US	tax-free.	Because	since	it	has	
got	no	earnings,	…we	would	say	that	this	entity	which	is	sending	money	back	to	the	US	has	
no	earnings	and	therefore	it	is	treated	as	a	return	of	basis	or	a	return	of	your	initial	capital	
which	is	tax	free.’	(Company	4)	
‘Once	that	starts	to	become	profitable	we	might	move	that	business	into	another	entity	
because	we	want	to	preserve	those	 losses	so	the	 losses	happened	 just	 through	start	up	
activities	and	things	like	that	and	then	ultimately	like	I	said	-	we	will	look	to	shift	it	away.’	
(Company	4)	
‘And	so	there	are	various	planning	techniques	that	you	can	avail	yourself	of	that	will	allow	
you	to	combine	those	businesses	and	in	the	long	term	extract	those	businesses	from	the	US	
in	a	tax	neutral	way.’	(Expert	5)	
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‘Financing	is	huge	-	the	number	one	tax	planning	tool	that	people	often	play	with	on	a	
regular	basis.	 Second	would	be	 IP	 planning	and	 then	 it	 is	 down	 into	 the	 sophisticated	
transfer	pricing	stuff	and	moving	parts	of	your	profits	to	different	jurisdictions.’	(Expert	
4)	
‘What	 I	mean	 is,	 I	 have	a	UK	company	 and	 I	have	a	US	group.	 So	 remember	my	42%	
effective	rate.	If	I	debt	fund	the	US	there	is	income	here	and	a	deduction	here	so	straight	
debt	funding	with	nothing	fancy	I	get	a	deduction	at	42%	and	income	at	20%	so	there	is	
a	22%	arbitrage.	So	by	doing	nothing	but	debt	funding	the	US	I	am	able	to	take	out	22	
away,	I	am	getting	rid	of	22	in	tax.	Like	I	say	the	holy	grail	is	to	eliminate	the	20.’	(Expert	
4)	
‘But	you	have	got	 losses,	 I	have	got	profits,	 I	want	to	access	your	 losses	which	you	can	
definitely	get	value	for	where	there	is	a	deferred	tax	asset	or	actually	saving	corporation	
tax	 into	 the	 future.	 So	 you	 had	 complicated	 structures	 and	 they	 always	 struck	me	 as	
contrived	but	I	wasn't	that	close	to	them.	We	did	them	from	time	to	time	and	I	had	to	sign	
off	on	them.’	(Expert	1)	
‘Most	US	companies	have	super	hol-co	[holding	company]	structure	and	then	off	to	the	
side	they	might	have	their	play.	So	they	might	have	some	kind	of	IP	shenanigans	going	on	
over	here.’	(Expert	4)	
‘I	have	a	company	here,	and	the	reason	why	I	do	that	is	I	want	to	be	able	to	employ	income	
elsewhere.	I	want	to	be	able	to	shift	my	income	at	will.	If	I	did	this	and	I	paid	a	dividend	
here	and	dropped	it	down	depending	on	what	is	going	on	I	could	end	up	with	a	CFC	income	
being	imputed	up	to	the	US	company	on	a	current	basis.	So	to	manage	the	CFC	rules	as	
well	as	be	able	to	freely	flow	my	cash	around	-	we	set	up	a	partnership	for	Dutch	purposes,	
corporate	for	US	purposes	we	elect	to	disregard	that	entity	under	the	rules	IRS	form	8832	
and	then	I	elect	to	disregard	all	of	these	entities.	Now	there	are	no	entities	underneath	for	
US	tax	purposes	and	I	can	slop	my	money	around	however	I	want	and	there	are	no	current	
inclusions	back	in	the	US.’		(Expert	4)	
‘Effectively	 we	 run	 a	 limited	 risk	 model	 in	 most	 of	 world	 so	 we	 treat	 the	 US	 as	 the	
entrepreneur	and	everyone	else	is	like	a	limited	risk	service	provider.	They	are	paid	a	little	
bit	for	things	that	are	of	value	-	so	people	and	assets	and	everything	else	is	passed	back	
whether	it	is	revenue	from	customers,	costs	for	circuits.’	(Company	3)	
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My	idea	of	thinking	about	this	is	that	of	my	100	per	cent	of	profit	in	any	given	company	in	
whatever	their	business	model	is,	whatever	their	profit	is,	is	going	to	be	composed	of	profit	
that	you	can't	move	-	services	on	the	ground,	production	on	the	ground	etc.	but	there	will	
be	mobile	income,	profit	which	can	be	moved	somewhere	else	through	transfer	pricing	or	
other	 agreement:	 interest,	 royalty	 on	 IP,	 credit	 risk,	 obsolescence	 risk,	 insurance	 risk,	
employee	work	force	risk.	What	can	you	move?	What	do	you	have	that	creates	your	profit?	
What	can	you	carve	out	through	contract	and	send	your	money	somewhere	else	through	
an	intercompany	agreement.	That	is	what	TP	is	all	about.’		(Expert	4)	
4.10 Government Policies The	UK	tax	environment	is	considered	to	be	very	attractive	to	MNEs.	Advisers	reported	working	 with	 clients	 to	 bring	 companies	 into	 the	 UK	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	 low	corporate	tax	rates.	Interviewees	also	commented	on	the	broader	political	environment	where	hostility	 towards	multinationals	and	 ‘tax	avoiders’	has	been	expressed.	These	attitudes	were	not	felt	to	deter	MNEs	from	relocating	to	the	UK	or	to	affect	their	stance	on	tax	planning.		
‘It	is	a	pleasure	to	be	working	with	multinationals	who	are	saying	great	things	about	our	
tax	structure	because	it	is	one	of	the	strongest	in	Europe	and	possibly	the	world	and	it	is	
very	attractive	and	it	is	a	great	piece	of	work	to	be	doing.’	(Expert	3)	
‘We	have	a	very	attractive	tax	regime	and	we	spend	a	lot	of	time	bringing	people	into	that	
regime.’	(Expert	3)	
‘I	consider	myself	to	be	busier	than	ever.	You	have	got	the	attractiveness	of	the	UK	so	the	
multinationals	who	in	reaction	to	all	of	these	changes	are	saying	well	I	need	a	reputable	
country	and	I	don't	mind	paying	tax	and	20%	is	a	reasonable	rate	to	pay	at	so	done	with	
all	 this	 silliness	 of	 low	 substance	 foreign	 companies	 lets	 just	 settle	 on	 the	 UK	 as	
headquarters	and	pay	20%	tax	there.’	(Expert	3)		Interviewees	 commented	 on	 US	 and	 UK	 government	 policies	 and	 the	 OECD’s	 BEPs	project.	 They	 carefully	monitor	 changes	 in	 the	 regulatory	 landscape.	 Internationally	they	 have	 experienced	 tightening	 regulations	 as	 governments	 have	 endeavoured	 to	increase	their	 tax	revenues.	Some	tax	advisers	reported	a	resulting	greater	 focus	on	
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assisting	clients	with	compliance	issues	rather	than	tax	avoidance.	Others	indicated	that	aggressive	 tax	planning	would	 continue	 for	 some	clients	although	 they	also	 felt	 that	attitudes	had	changed	over	recent	years:	
‘There	is	always	another	idea	round	the	corner.	You	shut	one	down	and	we	will	get	another	
one.	 But	 the	 attitude	 in	 the	 late	 2000s	 and	 coming	 into	 this	 decade	 was	 a	 bit	 more	
circumspect	around	what	is	this	going	to	look	like.’	(Expert	4)		The	experts	interviewed	stressed	that	greater	emphasis	is	being	given	to	ensure	that	there	is	substance	behind	economic	transactions:	
‘A	 lot	of	 the	OECD	drive	 is	 about	 reflecting	 trading	 in	places	where	 you	do	 the	actual	
trading,	historically	a	lot	of	planning	has	been	around	you	are	just	a	distributor	or	just	a	
licensee	so	you	take	a	slice	of	the	brains	-	and	the	intellectual	property	sits	back	in	the	US	
therefore	we	route	the	majority	of	the	profit	back	in	the	US.’	(Expert	3)	Others	felt	that	despite	the	changes	to	the	regulatory	environment	companies	would	not	radically	change	their	behaviour:	
‘So	even	though	businesses	will	restructure	in	response	to	legislative	change	and	public	
pressure	I	don't	think	you	will	necessarily	get	an	MNE	paying	its	entrepreneurial	profits	
within	the	UK.’	(Expert	3)	As	 the	 interviews	were	 conducted	 in	2015	 little	was	known	about	 the	output	of	 the	BEPs	process.	Despite	this,	interviewees	appeared	to	be	preparing	themselves	for	the	introduction	 of	 Country-by-Country	 reporting.	 There	 was	 an	 acceptance	 that	 the	concerns	 about	 tax	 avoidance	 would	 be	 reflected	 in	 measures	 to	 require	 greater	transparency.	 	 The	 main	 concern	 raised	 was	 around	 the	 way	 in	 which	 new	requirements	 would	 be	 introduced	 in	 terms	 of	 consistency	 of	 approach	 between	countries	and	the	confidentiality	of	any	increased	disclosures	to	tax	authorities.	
4.11 Findings and Discussion  This	 research	makes	 some	 significant	 contributions	 to	 understanding	 the	 question:	
‘What	drives	the	adoption	of	tax	strategies	by	MNEs?’	It	also	makes	a	new	key	theoretical	contribution	by	extending	knowledge	about	 the	motivations	and	abilities	of	MNE	 to	plan	 their	 tax	 affairs	 efficiently.	 The	 findings	 from	 these	 interviews	 indicate	 the	importance	of	 aspects,	such	as	 the	experience	of	 the	 individuals’	 and	 the	 company’s	
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overall	attitude	to	risk	that	the	development	of	theory	must	take	into	account.	These	new	findings	make	an	important	extension	to	internalization	theory.		The	small	sample	limits	the	robustness	of	some	of	the	conclusions	that	can	be	drawn	from	 this	work	 but	 as	 a	highly	 innovative	 piece	 of	 research	 in	 this	 field	 it	provides	impetus	and	direction	 for	 future	pieces	of	 research	as	discussed	below.	 	Clearly	 the	individuals	 involved	 in	 the	 tax	planning	process	make	decisions	based	on	 their	own	personal	values	and	ethics	as	well	 as	 their	 interpretation	of	 the	 risk	profile	 and	 the	ethical	 stance	 of	 the	 company	 that	 they	 work	 for.	 The	 company’s	 position	 on	 tax	planning	is	affected	by	their	attitude	to	a	more	comprehensive	attitude	to	risk.		The	top	management	and	the	Board	establish	a	wider	culture	of	risk	taking	or	avoidance	and	 the	 tax	 practice	 emanates	 from	 this	 with	 tax	 managers	 interpreting	 the	 risk	 –	reward	 pay	 off	 appropriate	 to	 their	 company.	 Whilst	 the	 scope	 of	 tax	 avoidance	practices	 seems	 to	 have	 reduced	 following	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 there	 is	 uncertainty	about	whether	this	reflects	a	fundamental	shift	in	attitudes	within	companies	or	simply	more	 limited	 scope	 as	 a	 result	 of	 tighter	 budgets	 and	 regulations.	 The	 company’s	reputation	plays	a	key	role,	limiting	tax	minimisation	and	instead	leading	firms	to	adopt	an	‘optimal’	rather	than	‘minimal’	ETR.		Tax	regulations	provide	a	framework	for	MNEs	to	operate	within	but	there	is	still	much	scope	 for	 decision-making	 and	 interpretation	within	 these	 rules.	 The	 findings	 from	these	interviews	offer	insight	into	the	decision-making	processes	within	the	‘moral	free	
space’	defined	by	Muller	and	Kolk	(2015).	Whilst	some	of	the	interviewees	think	that	there	has	been	a	paradigm	shift	in	attitudes	towards	taxation	avoidance,	for	others	the	recent	reduction	in	aggressive	behaviour	that	they	have	observed	has	been	driven	by	fear	 of	 reputational	 impact	 and	 changes	 in	 the	 regulatory	 environment.	 It	 will	 be	interesting	 to	observe	 how	 tax	 avoidance	 levels	 shift	 in	 the	 future	 and	whether	 the	changes	reported	here	have	a	longer-term	impact	or	fail	to	embed	over	the	longer	term	or	in	different	economic	situations.		Cash	management	and	the	financial	success	or	otherwise	of	the	company	also	appear	to	drive	the	motivation	of	companies	to	avoid	tax.	Maintaining	adequate	cash	flow	is	
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clearly	 vital	 for	 the	 long-term	 success	 of	 a	 company.	 Those	 that	 are	 struggling	financially	or	are	at	an	earlier	stage	of	development	may	feel	more	pressure	to	avoid	tax	in	order	to	maintain	their	annual	cash	flow.		The	discussion	on	KPIs	above	demonstrates	clearly	that	the	ETR	remains	a	key	measure	for	 many	 businesses.	 Whilst	 some	 of	 the	 interviewees	 have	 moved	 away	 from	 the	consideration	of	such	a	blunt	measure,	for	others	the	ETR	remains	an	explicit	target.	Chapter	5	discusses	the	use	of	ETR	and	current	moves	away	from	this	to	alternative	measures	in	academic	work.	If	the	ETR	remains	a	useful	measure	for	MNEs	to	evaluate	their	position	and	the	success	of	their	tax	planning	processes	it	must	remain	a	useful	measure	for	academics	in	understanding	the	behaviour	of	MNEs.	
4.11.1 Framework for Company Analysis The	 discussions	 above	 make	 clear	 that	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 interviewees	 is	 that	companies	make	decisions	about	the	level	of	risk	they	are	prepared	to	accept	and	that	this	directly	impacts	the	tax	planning	stance	adopted.	Decisions	are	influenced	by	the	individuals	 within	 the	 company	 from	 the	 Board	 of	 Directors	 down	 through	 the	company,	 as	well	 as	by	 the	overall	 company	culture.	The	risk	and	attitudes	of	 those	within	the	company	affect	the	motivation	to	adopt	an	aggressive	tax-planning	stance.	Potential	 damage	 to	 the	 company’s	 reputation	 and	 therefore	 longer	 term	 financial	performance	appears	to	play	a	key	role	in	influencing	the	drive	to	minimise	or	optimise	tax.			As	well	as	motivation	varying	between	companies,	opportunities	are	also	likely	to	vary.	Some	companies	have	more	opportunities	to	avoid	taxes	by	shifting	profits	to	lower	tax	jurisdictions	or	 through	other	mechanisms.	Opportunities	may	be	dependent	on	 the	type	 of	 industry,	 the	 length	 of	 the	 global	 value	 chain	 or	 the	 size	 and	 the	 degree	 of	multinationality/	internationality	of	the	company	amongst	other	factors.	The	following	quadrant	diagram	(see	Figure	3	below)	sums	up	the	drivers	behind	the	position	that	is	adopted.	 The	 strength	 of	 motivation	 to	 avoid	 corporation	 tax	 interacts	 with	 the	opportunities	presented	to	the	MNE	in	a	two-by-two	matrix.		
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The	MNE’s	ability	to	avoid	tax	will	depend	on	the	profit	shifting	opportunities	available	Companies	in	the	first	quadrant	may	be	highly	motivate	to	avoid	tax,	to	reduce	their	corporation	 tax	 bill	 to	 the	 lowest	 possible	 level.	 These	 companies	 may	 be	 highly	profitable	 so	 that	 reducing	 their	 ETR	 enables	 them	 to	 retain	 a	 higher	 proportion	 of	these	profits,	or	they	may	have	cashflow	difficulties	meaning	that	reducing	their	tax	bill	enables	them	to	continue	to	operate	as	a	going	concern.		The	role	of	the	individuals	on	the	board,	in	senior	positions	and	the	corporate	culture	as	a	whole	are	clearly	important	here.	 These	 companies	 may	 have	 lower	 concern	 for	 their	 reputation,	 potentially	operating	in	lower	profile	market	segments.	For	the	companies	in	quadrant	1	however,	there	 may	 be	 few	 opportunities	 to	 avoid	 tax.	 Their	 business	 may	 not	 be	 very	international	or	they	may	have	few	transfer	pricing	opportunities.		MNEs	 in	 quadrant	 2	 have	 a	 similar	 high	motivation	 to	 avoid	 tax	 but	 they	 also	have	significant	opportunity	to	avoid	tax.	These	companies	will	be	highly	international	and	may	have	extensive	 flows	of	 intermediate	goods	or	knowledge	between	subsidiaries	enabling	them	to	adopt	 tax	avoidance	measures.	Companies	that	operate	digitally	or	have	high	 levels	of	 IP	 that	 can	be	migrated	and	 relocated	 to	 subsidiaries	 in	 low	 tax	jurisdictions	which	in	turn	charge	royalties	to	other	operating	subsidiaries	in	high	tax	jurisdictions	may	have	greater	opportunities	to	exploit	TP	as	a	means	of	reducing	their	taxes.	Similarly,	companies	that	engage	in	more	M&A	may	be	able	to	structure	these	deals	in	such	a	way	that	they	reduce	their	tax	burden.	Anecdotal	evidence	appears	to	show	that	pharmaceutical	companies	are	 likely	 to	engage	 in	aggressive	tax	planning	potentially	due	to	the	greater	opportunities	available	to	them	via	the	high	levels	of	R&D	conducted	 and	 the	 IP	 emanating	 from	 this	 (Financial	 Times	 2016).	 This	 is	 also	supported	by	academic	research	(Vaitsos	1974,	Brajcich	et	al	2016)		MNEs	in	quadrant	3	and	4	have	less	motivation	to	avoid	tax.	This	may	be	as	a	result	of	the	 size	of	 the	 company’s	profits	or	operations	or	 it	may	be	 that	 their	motivation	 is	tempered	 by	 a	more	 significant	 potential	 impact	 on	 their	 corporate	 reputation	 and	subsequent	 financial	 performance.	 Companies	 with	 higher	 public	 awareness	 and	profiles	are	likely	to	face	a	higher	reputational	impact	from	being	perceived	to	be	a	tax	avoiding	company	than	lower	profile	or	business	to	business	companies.			
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Companies	with	existing	reputational	issues	such	as	those	operating	in	controversial	sectors	for	example,	defence,	or	those	working	closely	with	the	public	sector	may	have	lower	motivation	to	adopt	aggressive	tax	avoidance	positions	due	to	the	potential	harm	to	their	reputation.	In	quadrant	4	high	tech	companies	such	as	those	operating	in	the	defence	industry	may	have	significant	scope	for	profit	shifting	through	the	use	of	IP	and	royalties	but	reputational	concerns	may	reduce	their	motivation	to	take	advantage	of	some	potential	tax	avoidance	mechanisms.		
Figure 3 Motivation and Opportunity Matrix 	
		The	quadrants	focusing	on	the	opportunity	for	profit	shifting	can	clearly	be	linked	back	to	 internalization	 theory	 and	 FSAs	 (Rugman,	 1981).	 Those	 MNEs	 with	 greater	opportunities	to	reduce	their	tax	burden	can	be	seen	to	have	an	advantage	over	those	with	 fewer	 advantages.	 The	 extreme	 case	 is	 the	 advantage	 of	 the	MNE	over	 purely	domestic	companies.	Reducing	taxes	paid	increases	the	rent	that	is	appropriated	by	the	MNE	itself	for	further	investment	or	to	return	to	shareholders.	This	appropriation	gives	
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tax-avoiding	MNEs	a	distinct	advantage	against	 the	domestic	 firm	or	others	that	are	paying	closer	to	the	statutory	rate	of	tax.		The	 quadrants	 focusing	 on	 motivation	 introduce	 an	 element	 of	 behaviour	 into	 the	underlying	theory.	The	evidence	from	the	interviews	demonstrates	the	importance	of	the	 tax	 manager’s	 mindset	 (van	 Tulder	 2015)	 in	 driving	 the	 company’s	 adopted	position.	 The	 behaviour	 of	 the	 company	 is	 driven	 by	 attitudes	 at	 the	 top,	 including	board	members,	 the	CEO	and	 the	CFO.	Motivation	 interacts	with	 the	 industry-based	factors	that	appear	to	drive	the	opportunities	for	tax	avoidance.	
4.11.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research Whilst	 the	 sample	 size	used	 for	 this	 research	 is	 small,	 the	variety	of	 the	 individuals	included	and	their	broad	experience	gives	a	wider	spectrum	than	the	sample	size	might	suggest.	 Replicating	 this	 work	 and	 adding	 to	 the	 sample	 size	 would	 increase	 the	robustness	of	the	findings.	Finding	knowledgeable	participants	of	sufficient	seniority	to	have	insights	who	are	willing	to	discuss	their	company’s	approach	to	tax	planning	is	inherently	difficult.	This	study	circumvents	this	problem	through	the	use	of	networks	to	 identify	 potential	 interviewees.	 The	 interviewees	 were	 prepared	 to	 give	 a	comprehensive	picture	of	their	company’s	approach	to	tax	planning.	It	also	meant	that	a	broader	range	of	companies	with	different	approaches	to	tax	planning	was	identified.		Ideally,	future	research	could	build	on	individual	interviews	to	take	a	more	case	study	style	approach	with	multiple	individuals	interviewed	from	the	same	company	allowing	for	triangulation	of	findings.	Access	to	data	and	supporting	documents	from	companies	would	also	increase	the	robustness	of	findings.	Again,	finding	companies	willing	to	give	access	in	this	way	is	likely	to	prove	very	difficult.			Future	research	could	focus	specifically	on	testing	the	model	proposed	in	Figure	3.	Key	questions	that	need	to	be	specifically	addressed	as	part	of	future	research	include:		
• The	extent	to	which	MNEs	have	the	ability	to	adopt	strategies	that	intentionally	enable	them	to	avoid	taxes.	
• How	motivation	and	opportunities	influence	the	corporate	tax	planning	carried	out	by	large	MNEs.	
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More	 work	 is	 specifically	 needed	 to	 understand	 the	 driving	 forces	 behind	 the	motivation	of	organisations	and	the	interaction	of	the	individuals	within	them.	More	qualitative	research	is	needed	to	probe	this	further.	Research	is	also	needed	to	provide	a	greater	understanding	of	the	different	opportunities	presented	to	different	firms	and	what	drives	the	differences.			It	may	be	that	the	motivation	of	the	MNE	plays	a	stronger	role	in	the	position	adopted	than	the	opportunities	presented.	A	strongly	motivated	company	may	be	able	to	find	ways	of	structuring	their	businesses	enabling	them	to	avoid	tax	even	when	 it	would	appear	to	be	more	difficult.	Starbucks	is	a	traditional	‘bricks	and	mortar’	company	but	it	has	been	argued	that	they	have	been	relatively	aggressive	tax	avoiders.	The	case	study	presented	in	Chapter	6	examines	the	mechanisms	that	Starbucks	have	used	to	reduce	their	overall	tax	bill.	They	also	appear	to	have	suffered	some	reputation	impact	from	their	perception	as	a	tax	avoiding	company.	Further	detailed	research	is	needed	that	considers	the	sectoral	impact	of	opportunities	to	avoid	taxes.		The	 interviewees	 report	 that	 the	 pressures	 on	 companies	 and	 the	 potential	 for	reputational	impact	differ	depending	on	the	sector	involved.	Future	research	of	either	a	 quantitative	 or	 qualitative	 nature	 could	 investigate	 these	 sectoral	 differences	 in	greater	depth,	analysing	differences	in	cross	sector	propensities	to	avoid	tax.		The	 background	 of	 the	 individual	 and	 their	 previous	 experiences	 are	 likely	 to	 have	impacted	 their	personal	position.	Future	 research	 could	 focus	on	understanding	 the	professional	experience	of	individuals	and	how	this	has	affected	their	attitude	to	risk	and	tax	avoidance.	Are	those	who	have	been	involved	in	aggressive	tax	avoidance	but	not	been	prosecuted	or	even	had	the	reputation	of	the	company	that	they	worked	for	harmed	more	likely	to	continue	to	pursue	more	aggressive	policies	than	those	who	have	had	serious	negative	experiences?		Research	in	this	field	could	also	contribute	to	the	debate	on	the	role	of	the	subsidiary.	Tax	 is	 an	 issue	 for	 every	 company	 operating	 in	 every	 location.	 Understanding	 how	companies	 choose	 to	 address	 their	 policy,	 structures	 and	 compliance	 could	 help	 to	understand	 the	 wider	 role	 of	 the	 subsidiary	 and	 its	 relationship	 with	 the	 parent	
	 163	
company.	Research	is	needed	on	how	different	governments	manage	the	tax	liabilities	of	firms	operating	in	their	jurisdiction,	either	proactively	or	reactively.		 	
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5 A Study of Different Approaches to Corporate Tax Planning in 
Large US Multinational Enterprises: A Quantitative Analysis  
5.1 Introduction This	chapter	contributes	to	the	literature	in	a	number	of	ways.	It	tests	hypotheses	which	are	developed	upon	the	existing	literature	reported	in	Chapter	2.	Regression	analysis	is	then	 used	 to	 empirically	 test	 these	 hypotheses	 generating	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	individual	variables.	The	model	presented	develops	the	role	of	cash	as	a	mechanism	for	tax	avoidance	and	incorporates	two	different	measures	of	ETR.	Empirical	research	to	date,	as	reported	in	Chapter	2	has	considered	the	range	of	mechanisms	that	a	MNE	may	use	to	reduce	their	tax	liabilities.	This	research	adds	to	this	literature	as	well	as	making	a	 new	 contribution	 in	 terms	 of	 considering	 the	 influence	 of	 characteristics	 of	 the	company	that	may	influence	their	ability	or	motivation	to	avoid	tax	legally.	The	sample	used	has	been	designed	to	generate	a	holistic	view	of	corporate	tax	planning:	the	key	mechanisms	used	to	reduce	tax	payments	and	the	factors	which	allow	or	dispose	the	MNE	towards	this	approach.		This	chapter	tests	a	number	of	specific	hypotheses	presented	in	Chapter	2	examining	factors	that	may	influence	the	ability	of	MNEs	to	avoid	corporation	tax.	The	hypotheses	relate	to	specific	corporate	characteristics	and	to	the	mechanisms	that	may	be	used	to	reduce	tax	liabilities.		These	hypotheses	are	then	tested	in	a	series	of	OLS	regressions.	This	data	analysis	 also	 specifically	 investigates	 the	difference	between	 two	different	measures	 of	 ETR:	 LT	 GAAP	 ETR	 and	 LR	 Cash	 ETR	 (see	 section	 5.4	 for	 a	 detailed	discussion	of	the	differences	of	these	two	measures).	Using	these	two	measures	creates	the	ability	to	investigate	the	differences	between	them	and	the	way	that	they	interact	with	the	independent	variables	(IVs).	A	third	DV	the	cash	/	asset	ratio	is	also	used	to	investigate	the	way	in	which	it	is	used	to	drive	tax	avoidance.		This	chapter	also	contributes	significant	new	findings	in	relation	to	key	features	of	the	MNE	and	their	association	with	tax	avoidance.	This	research	confirms	the	importance	to	the	MNE	of	tax		‘optimisation’	rather	than	‘minimisation’	as	discussed	in	the	previous	
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chapter.	The	findings	provide	clear	evidence	of	the	important	role	played	by	tax	havens	and	internationality	in	corporate	tax	avoidance.			The	size	of	the	firm	is	clearly	important	to	its	tax	planning	strategy,	a	key	contribution	to	 the	 debate	 where	 previous	 findings	 have	 been	 inconclusive.	 As	 reported	 in	 the	literature	review	there	have	been	contradictory	findings	on	the	impact	of	the	size	of	the	firm.	This	 research	 finds	a	 clear	 role	 for	 size	with	 larger	MNEs	paying	 less	 tax	 than	smaller	firms.	Finally,	the	research	reveals	the	important	role	played	by	the	board	of	directors	 and	 particularly	 the	 impact	 that	 female	 directors	 appear	 to	 make	 on	 tax	planning	strategies.		The	remainder	of	this	chapter	is	organised	as	follows:	the	following	section	presents	an	overall	 recursive	 conceptual	 model	 which	 is	 used	 as	 a	 device	 to	 explicate	 the	mechanisms	that	are	tested.	The	following	section	presents	the	Dependent	Variables	(DVs)	that	are	tested	within	the	model.	Section	5.6	gives	the	descriptive	statistics	which	are	followed	by	the	detailed	regression	analysis	and	findings	in	section	5.7.	The	final	section	contains	the	conclusions	and	discussion	of	results.		
5.2 Conceptual Model	The	conceptual	model	 incorporates	Cash	Ratio,	LR	GAAP	and	LR	Cash	ETRs	as	DVs.	Using	these	three	measures	of	corporate	tax	avoidance	generates	new	insights	into	the	measures	themselves	as	well	as	the	mechanisms	by	which	MNEs	reduce	their	corporate	tax	bill.	Using	both	LR	GAAP	and	LR	Cash	ETR	measures	adds	to	the	extant	literature	by	demonstrating	the	variation	between	these	two	measures,	as	well	as	emphasising	their	importance	to	IB	researchers.	Useful	data	on	the	difference	between	the	two	and	how	they	are	affected	by	the	IVs	in	different	ways	is	provided.	This	insight	is	particularly	important	 given	 the	 more	 recent	 trend	 for	 researchers	 to	 look	 for	 new	 DVs	 to	incorporate	in	models	measuring	tax	avoidance.		The	extensive	literature	discussed	in	Chapter	2	demonstrates	that	MNEs	are	able	to	use	a	 variety	 of	 mechanisms	 to	 relocate	 profits	 from	 high	 to	 lower	 tax	 jurisdictions	 to	reduce	the	corporate	tax	bill	(Grubert	and	Mutti	1991,	Hines	and	Rice	1994;	Clausing	2003;	Desai,	Foley	and	Hines	2004).	Research	has	tended	to	focus	on	looking	either	at	
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aggregate	data	(Zucman	2015)	to	establish	whether	profit	shifting	has	taken	place	or	at	company	level	data	to	establish	the	importance	of	different	methods	of	profit	shifting:	TP	 (Klassen	 and	 LaPlant	 2012),	 intra	 company	 debt	 (Grubert	 1998,	 Altshuler	 and	Grubert	 2002,	 Harrington	 and	 Smith	 2012),	 using	 intangible	 assets	 (Grubert	 2003;	Jones	and	Temouri	2016),	the	role	of	individuals	(Armstrong,	Blouin	and	Larcker	2012;	Dyreng,	Hanlon	and	Maydew	2010)	within	a	company	and	the	use	of	tax	havens.	Some	consider	 only	 specific	 sectors,	 for	 example	 pharmaceutical	 (Brajcich,	 Friesner	 and	Schibik	2016).		This	 research,	 like	 most	 preceding	 work,	 focuses	 on	 US	 MNEs11 	partly	 due	 to	 the	relatively	 high	 corporate	 tax	 rates	 faced	 by	 US	 MNEs	 which	 generates	 significant	motivation	 to	 avoid	 tax12	and	 also	 due	 to	 their	 prominent	 role	 in	 global	 trade	 and	investment.	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 companies	 in	 other	 regions	 have	 different	 priorities,	incentives	and	abilities	in	relation	to	tax	avoidance.	Holding	the	home	country	constant	facilitates	 comparison	 of	 the	 companies.	 Inflation	 is	 disregarded	 in	 this	model	 as	 it	would	 equally	 apply	 to	 all	MNEs	 included	 in	 the	 study.	 There	may	 be	 some	 foreign	exchange	differences	between	the	firms	as	they	do	not	operate	equally	in	different	host	countries.	There	are	unlikely	to	be	any	systematic	differences	that	emerge	from	foreign	exchange	gains	or	losses	and	as	a	result	they	are	not	incorporated	within	the	model.		
	The	tax	that	a	company	is	liable	to	pay	each	year	is	incredibly	complex,	generating	and	sustaining	a	large	field	of	expensive	international	advisors.	Losses	generated	in	earlier	years	 can	 be	 carried	 forward	 and	 set	 off	 against	 later	 profits	 to	 reduce	 the	 taxable	profits	 generated.	 The	way	 in	which	 assets	 and	 investments	 are	 accounted	 for	 and	depreciated	over	time	can	have	significant	effects	on	the	timing	and	payment	of	taxes.	As	reported	in	the	previous	chapter,	corporation	tax	will	also	affect	the	way	in	which	mergers	and	acquisitions	and	other	business	deals	are	structured	and	accounted	for.	The	tax	bill	is	likely	to	be	the	biggest	single	bill	that	a	company	faces	each	year	and	there	is	 growing	evidence	 that	 companies	have	 the	ability,	not	only	 to	use	mechanisms	 to																																																									
11 Some research does consider tax planning within the European context: Dharmapala and Riedel (2013), 
Glaister and Frecknall Hughes (2008) and Buettner and Wamser (2013). 
12 US MNEs face a federal corporate income tax rate of 35 per cent plus any state taxes, far higher than the 
OECD average of 25.5 per cent (Tax Foundation 2016). 
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reduce	it,	but	also	have	considerable	ability	to	affect	the	timings	of	the	payments	that	they	 make.	 The	 complexity	 of	 each	 company’s	 tax	 calculation	 makes	 it	 difficult	 to	capture	true	‘avoidance’	empirically.		
Figure 4 Conceptual Model of ETR Determinants 	
		The	conceptual	model	presented	above	shows	the	impact	that	company	characteristics	have	on	the	profitability	of	the	firm,	its	cash	/	asset	ratio	and	two	measures	of	the	ETR	(LR	Cash	ETR	and	LR	GAAP	ETR)	paid	by	the	firm.	Causality	is	unidirectional,	flowing	from	left	to	right	across	the	model.	The	model	assumes	that	there	are	certain	company	characteristics	 that	will	 affect	 the	motivation	 and	 ability	 of	MNEs	 to	 avoid	 tax.	 The	model	 starts	with	 the	 company’s	 characteristics	and	causality	 flows	 from	 there	 in	a	unidirectional	 manner.	 The	 company’s	 characteristics,	 include	 size,	 ownership	 of	intellectual	property	(IP),	 the	percentage	of	women	on	the	board,	whether	the	Chief	Executive	Officer	(CEO)	or	Chief	Financial	Officer	(CFO)	are	women,	whether	the	MNE	was	included	in	the	Dow	Jones	Sustainability	Index	(2014)	(DJSI),	how	international	the	company	is	(the	degree	of	multinationality)	and	its	use	of	tax	havens.			
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The	first	regression	regresses	the	company	characteristics	and	profitability	on	the	cash	/	asset	ratio.	The	second	regression	then	incorporates	the	cash	/	asset	ratio	as	one	of	the	IVs	where	LT	GAAP	ETR	is	the	DV.	The	third	regression	includes	all	of	the	previous	factors	as	IVs	that	determine	the	ultimate	DV,	the	LT	Cash	ETR.		Cash	 holdings	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 an	 endogenous	 variable	within	 this	model.	 The	model	 assumes	 that	other	 company	characteristics	are	determined	by	 the	economic	activity	of	the	company	and	are	less	flexible	–	they	would	change	only	slowly	over	time.	The	level	of	cash	holding	is	part	of	the	overall	strategy	adopted	by	the	firm	and	may	be	the	 result	of	 a	 tax	avoidance	 strategy	by	US	 firms.	 Significant	earnings	may	be	held	offshore	as	cash	rather	than	repatriated	to	the	US	when	tax	would	become	payable.			The	company	characteristics	combine	with	industry	factors	to	generate	the	profitability	of	 the	 firm	 that	 in	 turn	 should	drive	 the	 levels	of	 tax	payable.	 It	 is	unlikely	 that	 the	empirical	analysis	will	be	able	to	capture	the	direct	impact	of	company	characteristics	on	profitability	–	if	this	were	simple	analysis	it	would	present	firms	with	a	formula	for	profitability.	Profitability	is	used	as	a	DV	as	part	of	the	analysis	but	the	results	are	not	discussed.	 As	 shown	 in	 the	 model	 profitability	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	mechanisms	by	which	the	characteristics	tested	may	impact	on	the	cash	ratio	or	ETRs	of	 the	 firm.	The	model	 is	not	attempting	to	determine	the	causes	of	profitability	and	therefore	 the	 results,	 whilst	 listed	 in	 the	 regression	 findings	 in	 Table	 13	 are	 not	discussed	at	length.			Firms	with	higher	profitability	may	have	a	greater	incentive	to	avoid	high	rates	of	tax.		Research	has	shown	that	affiliates	based	in	low	tax	countries	tend	to	record	higher	pre-	tax	 as	 well	 as	 post	 tax	 profits	 (Grubert	 and	 Mutti	 1991,	 Hines	 and	 Rice	 1994	 and	Huizinga	and	Laeven	2008).	Rego	(2003)	finds	that	firms	with	higher	pre-tax	income	have	lower	ETRs	suggesting	that	they	avoid	more	tax	than	similar	firms.	What	is	not	clear	 is	 whether	 high	 profits	 stimulate	 tax	 avoidance	 or	 whether	 a	 strategy	 of	 tax	avoidance	increases	profits	at	least	in	low	tax	locations	through	profit	shifting.	Huizinga	and	 Laeven	 (2008)	 conclude	 that	 an	 MNE’s	 profit	 shifting	 depends	 on	 a	 weighted	average	of	the	corporation	tax	rate	differences	between	all	countries	with	affiliates.			
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Evidence	from	the	interviews	undertaken	for	this	thesis	(see	Chapter	4)	indicates	that	firms	in	financial	difficulty	may	also	have	a	strong	incentive	to	avoid	tax.	The	tax	bill	is	for	many	firms	the	largest	single	invoice	of	the	year	and	can	have	a	serious	deleterious	impact	on	a	firm’s	cashflow	and	its	ability	to	operate	as	a	going	concern.	 	There	may	therefore	be	a	significant	motivation	to	avoid	tax	 for	 the	least	profitable	 firms.	More	research	 considering	 firms	 with	 financial	 difficulties	 is	 needed	 to	 confirm	 this	motivation.		Measuring	profitability	is	relatively	straightforward.	Profits	before	tax	are	taken	from	the	company’s	annual	report	over	a	ten-year	period	(2006-2015)	and	scaled	by	total	assets.	This	 is	consistent	with	previous	relevant	work	(Taylor	et	al	2015;	Gupta	and	Newberry	1997).			As	 discussed	 in	 the	 literature	 review	 (Chapter	 2)	 cash	 may	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 tax	avoidance.	 Firms	may	maintain	 higher	 levels	 of	 cash	 holdings	 overseas	 in	 order	 to	reduce	their	taxable	profits	in	the	US	(Foley	et	al	2007).	Profits	that	are	not	repatriated	to	 the	 US	 may	 be	 reinvested	 overseas	 resulting	 in	 no	 US	 tax	 charge.	 Research	demonstrated	the	importance	of	tax	to	overseas	cash	holdings	when	significant	sums	were	repatriated	following	the	AJCA	2004	when	firms	were	able	to	repatriate	cash	at	a	lower	tax	rate	(Dharmapala	et	al	2011).	Foley	et	al	(2007)	estimate	that	a	one	standard	deviation	increase	in	the	tax	burden	from	repatriating	foreign	income	is	associated	with	a	7.9	per	cent	increase	in	the	ratio	of	cash	to	net	assets.	By	considering	only	US	MNEs	in	this	research,	the	statutory	rate	of	tax	on	repatriation	is	held	constant.			The	model	(Figure	4)	assumes	that	the	DV	the	cash	/	asset	ratio	is	determined	by	the	company	characteristics	as	well	as	by	the	profitability	of	the	firm.	A	larger	cash	/	asset	ratio	 indicates	a	greater	propensity	 to	avoid	 tax,	 if	 only	by	 the	direct	mechanism	of	failure	to	repatriate	earnings.		Cash	held	overseas	cannot	be	determined	separately	from	cash	held	in	the	US	as	this	information	is	not	disclosed	in	the	annual	report.	Therefore	the	measure	of	total	cash	held	by	the	MNE	is	used	in	this	analysis.	There	may	be	operational	reasons	why	larger	firms	may	hold	higher	absolute	levels	of	cash	or	they	may	be	able	to	hold	less	cash	due	
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to	 their	 greater	 access	 to	 capital.	 Following	 Foley	 et	 al	 (2007)	 this	 variable	 was	constructed	by	averaging	the	year-end	cash	balances	for	the	ten	year	period	scaled	by	the	average	total	assets	for	the	same	period	of	time.		A	full	discussion	of	the	other	two	DVs:	LT	Cash	ETR	and	LT	GAAP	ETR	follows	the	next	section	which	presents	the	IVs.	
5.3 Independent Variables This	 section	 describes	 the	 measurements	 of	 variables.	 Findings	 from	 previous	literature	 appertaining	 to	 these	 variables	 are	 discussed	 and	 any	 issues	 surrounding	their	measurements.		The	next	section	discusses	the	two	measures	of	ETR	that	are	used	as	the	key	DVs	within	the	model.	Measures	used	are	based	on	prior	empirical	research	and	are	scaled	where	relevant	by	the	size	of	the	total	assets	of	the	firm	to	remove	any	additional	impact	of	firm	size.	As	all	firms	included	are	based	in	the	US	and	report	their	results	in	US$	no	additional	measures	are	taken	to	account	for	the	impact	of	inflation	or	exchange	rate	differences.	
5.3.1 Company Size The	empirical	literature	review	and	hypotheses	development	presented	in	Chapter	2,	section	 2.2.5	 generated	 different	 findings	 for	 the	 impact	 of	 size	 on	 corporate	 tax	payments	with	some	research	 finding	that	 larger	 firms	are	associated	with	more	tax	avoidance	 (Benvignati	 1985;	 Zimmerman	 1983;	 Lanis	 and	 Richardson	 2015)	 and	others	finding	a	negative	(Porcano	1986),	or	no	association	(Shevlin	and	Porter	1992;	Gupta	and	Newberry	1997).	In	more	recent	work	Rego	(2003)	found	higher	worldwide	ETRs	for	larger	firms	in	a	broad	sample	of	US	domestic	firms	and	MNEs.	All	these	studies	used	single	year	measures	of	ETR	and	considered	only	the	GAAP	rather	than	cash	ETR.	In	 the	 most	 recent	 work	 to	 consider	 this	 aspect	 of	 tax	 avoidance,	 Rego	 considers	economies	of	scale	that	should	offer	larger	companies	greater	opportunity	to	reduce	their	 tax	burden.	Some	counter	pressures	do	exist	however	as	 larger	companies	are	thought	to	be	under	greater	levels	of	scrutiny	reducing	opportunistic	tax	avoidance.		In	 this	regression	size	 is	measured	by	the	natural	logarithm	of	 total	assets	 following	Harrington	and	Smith	(2012),	Taylor	et	al	(2015)	and	others.	Rego	(2003)	uses	natural	log	of	sales	to	determine	size.	An	alternative	measure	of	size	using	Revenue	(sales)	was	
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also	calculated	and	used	for	this	research	(but	not	reported)	with	little	change	to	the	results.	
5.3.2 IP Intellectual	property	(IP)	assets	can	be	moved	overseas	to	low	tax	jurisdictions	with	relative	ease.	Royalty	payments	for	the	use	of	IP	can	therefore	be	used	to	reduce	the	taxable	 profits	 in	 higher	 tax	 countries	 and	 increase	 them	 in	 lower	 tax	 countries.	Empirical	research	examining	TP	(Vaitsos	1974;	Grubert	2003)	finds	that	companies	with	 high	 levels	 of	 IP	 have	 higher	 levels	 of	 TP	manipulation.	Dischinger	 and	Riedel	(2011)	find	that	the	subsidiaries	of	European	MNEs	facing	lower	corporate	tax	rates	have	 higher	 levels	 of	 intangible	 investments.	MNEs	with	 higher	 levels	 of	 intangible	assets	(Jones	and	Temouri	2016)	or	R&D	intensities	(Desai	Foley	and	Hines	2006)	are	more	 likely	 to	 have	 subsidiaries	 in	 international	 tax	 havens.	 As	 noted	 earlier,	 TP	manipulation	 in	 relation	 to	 IP	 can	 be	 hard	 to	 detect	 as	 there	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 fewer	relevant	external	arms’	length	TP	with	which	to	compare	it	(Gravelle	2008,	Shackelford	et	al	2011;	Dyreng	et	al	2008).		Foley	 et	 al	 (2007)	 find	 that	 firms	 that	 are	more	 technology	 intensive	 have	 a	 higher	sensitivity	of	cash	holdings	to	repatriation	burden.	This	indicates	that	those	technology	intensive	firms	hold	cash	in	a	way	that	is	particularly	sensitive	to	the	tax	costs	incurred	when	earnings	are	repatriated.	The	following	hypothesis	captures	the	impact	of	the	use	of	IP:	
Previous	research	has	measured	IP	simply	by	taking	the	measure	of	Intangible	Assets	scaled	by	Total	Assets	(Taylor	et	al	2015)	or	more	directly,	the	level	of	intangible	assets	in	the	balance	sheet	(Dischinger	and	Riedel	2011).	Intangible	assets	are	complex	and	difficult	to	measure.	According	to	Lhaopadchan	(2010)	accounting	for	intangible	assets	is:	 ‘one	 of	 the	 most	 controversial	 and	 intractable	 issues	 in	 accounting’.	 Much	 of	 the	complexity	relates	to	accounting	for	one	section	of	intangible	assets:	Goodwill.		
Goodwill	 is	 created	when	 an	 asset	 or	 business	 is	 purchased.	 It	 relates	 to	 the	 value	recorded	for	the	purchase	that	is	over	the	fair	value	of	the	assets	acquired.	Good	will	is	thought	to	be	open	to	management	manipulation	as	they	have	considerable	discretion	over	 when	 its	 value	 should	 be	 reduced	 or	 written	 off	 following	 any	 impairment	
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(Lhaopadchan	 2010).	 Goodwill	 cannot	 play	 a	 role	 in	 profit	 shifting	 as	 it	 cannot	 be	shifted	to	another	subsidiary	and	royalties	charged	for	its	use.		This	research	therefore	takes	 a	 more	 precise	 measure	 of	 intangible	 assets	 by	 removing	 Goodwill	 from	 the	Intangible	Asset	count.		The	measure	of	IP	used	is,	therefore,	more	accurate	as	a	measure	of	IP	that	can	be	used	to	facilitate	profit	from	shifting:			Intangible	Assets	–	Goodwill	Total	Assets	
5.3.3 Role of Women Within the Company As	with	the	previous	IV,	CSR,	the	role	of	women	on	the	board	is	considered	to	capture	the	 role	of	 ethics	and	 the	 individual	within	 the	adoption	of	 the	 tax	planning	 stance.	Section	 2.2.7	 considers	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 top	 management	 team	 and	 presents	 the	research	 findings	 that	 address	 the	 role	 of	 women	 on	 the	 board	 in	 particular.	 The	research	 shows	 key	 differences	 between	male	 and	 female	 executives	 and	 directors	particularly	in	terms	of	their	attitude	to	risk	(Torgler	and	Valev	2010,	Francis	et	al	2014,	Barua	et	al	2010,	Huang	and	Kisgen	2013),	their	backgrounds	(Hillman	et	al	2002,	Singh	et	 al	 2008)	 and	 their	 approach	 to	 board	 membership	 (Eagly	 et	 al	 2003,	 Eagly	 and	Johnson	1990,	Adams	and	Ferreira	2009).	Boards	with	higher	proportions	of	 female	directors	appear	 to	adopt	higher	 levels	of	 charitable	giving	 (Wang	and	Coffey	1992,	Williams	2003)	and	have	greater	concern	for	environmental	CSR	(Post	et	al	2011).			Work	has	also	examined	the	way	in	which	women	appear	to	work	together	on	a	board	of	directors	with	evidence	that	as	the	number	of	women	on	the	board	increases	a	critical	mass	maybe	achieved,	significantly	increasing	their	influence	(Bear,	Rahman	and	Post	2010;	Konrad,	Kramer	and	Erkut	2008).			Information	on	the	gender	of	Board	members,	the	CEO	and	the	CFO	was	collected	from	the	annual	report	for	2014.	A	limitation	of	this	measure	is	that	there	may	have	been	changes	in	the	position	of	women	in	the	companies	studied	over	the	time	period.	The	number	 of	 women	 on	 the	 board	 over	 the	 ten	 year	 period	 may	 not	 be	 accurately	
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captured	in	the	data	from	2014,	however,	it	may	take	new	board	members	some	time	to	establish	influence	within	the	board	generally	and	over	the	attitude	adopted	to	tax	planning	therefore	even	using	data	for	average	ten	year	averages	may	fail	to	capture	the	true	influence	of	women	on	the	board.	
5.3.4 CSR One	of	the	key	findings	from	the	interviews	reported	in	Chapter	4	was	the	importance	of	the	role	of	wider	attitudes	within	the	MNE	which	impact	on	the	risk	that	management	is	prepared	to	take	and	therefore	the	aggressiveness	of	the	tax	planning	stance	adopted.	This	research	therefore	includes	the	firm’s	broader	ethical	stance	as	proxied	by	their	wider	 position	 on	 CSR	 as	 a	 factor	 that	 could	 influence	 their	 attitude	 towards	 tax	avoidance.			As	 noted	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 section	 2.2.8	 there	 is	 little	 published	 research	 specifically	examining	the	relationship	between	CSR	and	tax	and	there	have	been	calls	 for	more	detailed	 research	 into	 this	 area	 (Hanlon	 and	 Heitzman	2010;	 Lanis	 and	Richardson	2015;	 Muller	 and	 Kolk	 2015).	 The	 research	 that	 has	 been	 published	 however,	 has	produced	interesting	findings.	Whilst	Davis	et	al	(2016)	find	that	managers	and	other	MNE	 stakeholders	 do	 not	 see	 a	 relationship	 between	 taxes	 and	 CSR	Huseynov	 and	Klamm	(2012)	conclude	that	the	strength	of	corporate	governance	plays	a	moderating	role	meaning	that	different	aspects	of	CSR	 impact	 the	ETR	(both	GAAP	and	Cash)	 in	different	ways.	Lanis	and	Richardson	(2015)	find	that	firms	with	stronger	CSR	concerns	are	less	likely	to	avoid	tax	and	Muller	and	Kolk	(2015)	find	that	MNEs	with	stronger	CSR	reputations	pay	a	higher	ETR.		For	 this	 research	 the	 firm’s	 approach	 to	 CSR	 is	 measured	 using	 the	 Dow	 Jones	Sustainability	Index	(DJSI)	for	the	year	2014.	The	index	comprises	companies	that	have	been	evaluated	as	being	in	the	top	10	per	cent	of	their	industry	in	terms	of	their	overall	sustainability	 approach,	 measured	 across	 economic,	 environmental	 and	 social	dimensions.	An	independent	agency13	compiles	the	index	which	is	audited,	considered	
																																																								
13 SAM Research based in Zurich. 
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to	be	a	robust	measure	and	has	been	used	in	previous	academic	research	(Muller	and	Kolk	2015).			A	dummy	variable	is	used	with	1	representing	inclusion	in	the	DJSI	and	non-inclusion	is	coded	0.		
5.3.5 The Degree of Multinationality Tax	 considerations	 may	 increase	 the	 overall	 complexity	 of	 a	 MNE’s	 structure.	 The	number	of	subsidiaries	recorded	may	also	however,	depend	on	the	industry	that	the	MNE	is	operating	within,	as	well	as	decisions	made	about	how	to	structure	operations.	For	example	retail	companies	may	choose	to	operate	using	individual	subsidiaries	for	each	shop	or	may	establish	shops	as	branches	rather	than	as	legal	entities	in	their	own	right.	Within	the	sample	analysed	here,	HCA	Holdings	has	a	total	of	3,799	subsidiaries	largely	relating	to	individual	healthcare	outlets	in	the	US.	Union	Pacific	has	a	total	of	29	subsidiaries	included	in	the	analysis.	Both	of	these	companies	operate	almost	entirely	in	the	US,	demonstrating	that	it	is	not	the	most	international	of	companies	that	use	the	most	 complicated	 of	 group	 structures.	 Corporate	 structures	 may	 also	 be	 the	consequence	of	the	company’s	history.	Those	with	a	history	of	multiple	M&As	are	likely	to	have	more	complex	structures	than	those	where	size	 is	a	consequence	of	organic	growth.		It	is	thought	that	firms	with	more	international	subsidiaries	have	greater	scope	to	profit	shift.	Having	more	subsidiaries	based	in	different	locations	may	facilitate	profit	shifting	by	using	TP	or	through	the	use	of	internal	debt	or	royalty	payments	(Grubert	and	Mutti	1991;	Rego	2003;	Dyreng	and	Lindsey	2009).	Slemrod	(1998)	also	suggests	 that	 the	pattern	of	multinational	operations	influences	the	ability	to	avoid	tax.			As	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	section	2.2.9	US	MNEs	must	disclose	the	names	and	locations	of	 all	 their	 ‘significant’	 subsidiaries	 (in	Exhibit	21	 to	 the	10K).	Donohoe,	McGill	 and	Outslay	(2012)	note	the	trend	for	US	MNEs	to	reduce	the	number	of	subsidiaries	that	are	disclosed	in	the	10K,	as	an	effect	of	restructuring	such	as	in	the	case	of	Google	where	a	new	holding	company,	Alphabet	was	created	to	be	the	parent	of	Google.			
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Despite	potential	disclosure	limitations,	a	MNE’s	internationality	is	measured	using	the	total	number	of	 foreign	 subsidiaries	 scaled	by	 the	 total	number	of	subsidiaries.	The	number	and	location	of	subsidiaries	are	directly	related	to	the	MNE’s	ability	to	profit	shift.	Detailed	data	is	taken	from	the	OSIRIS	database	that	contains	information	on	MNE	subsidiaries.	Data	is	collated	in	up	to	ten	levels	of	subsidiary	ownership.	All	subsidiaries	that	are	more	than	50	per	cent	owned	by	the	overall	parent	company	are	included	in	the	analysis.		This	research	adopts	a	careful	approach	by	cross	checking	and	validating	data	from	various	data	sources,	10K	filing	and	OSIRIS	database	by	Bureau	van	Dijk.	It	is	found	that	the	data	contained	in	OSIRIS	is	in	many	instances,	more	detailed	than	the	information	given	in	the	10K.		Previous	 research	 has	 relied	 on	 the	 information	 disclosed	 by	MNEs	 in	 their	 annual	reports	 (Annex	 21	 to	 the	 10K	 for	 US	 companies).	 This	 measure	 has	 been	 used	 in	previous	work:	Rego	(2003),	Mills	and	Newberry	(2004)	Taylor,	Richardson	and	Lanis	(2015).	This	may	however,	be	less	accurate	now	than	in	the	past	due	to	an	apparent	trend	to	disclose	fewer	subsidiaries	(Donohoe,	McGill	and	Outslay	2012).	Information	for	this	sample	was	obtained	from	the	OSIRIS	database	that	takes	data	directly	from	the	companies	 (as	 per	 discussion	 with	 OSIRIS).	 A	 comparison	 of	 a	 small	 sample	 of	companies	confirms	that	there	are	more	subsidiaries	recorded	within	OSIRIS	than	were	disclosed	in	Annex	21	to	the	10K.	
5.3.6 Tax Havens Tax	havens	are	widely	 considered	to	play	a	 significant	 role	 in	 tax	planning	by	MNE.	Desai,	Foley	and	Hines	(2006)	find	that	nearly	60	per	cent	of	US	firms	with	substantial	foreign	 operations	 had	 at	 least	 one	 subsidiary	 in	 a	 tax	 haven	 country.	 Dyreng	 and	Lindsey	(2009)	report	that	US	MNEs	with	operations	in	at	least	one	tax	haven	report	an	average	worldwide	tax	rate	 that	 is	1.5	per	cent	 lower	than	firms	that	do	not	use	tax	havens.	Taylor,	Richardson	and	Lanis	(2015)	consider	any	firm	with	a	subsidiary	in	a	tax	haven	to	be	tax	avoiding.	There	may,	however,	be	a	legitimate	economic	purpose	for	some	businesses	to	have	subsidiaries	in	tax	havens.	More	significant	use	of	tax	havens	would	be	likely	to	denote	a	firm	that	is	avoiding	tax.	The	issue	of	tax	havens	is	captured	in	the	following	hypothesis:		
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There	 is	no	 single,	 clear	definition	of	 a	 tax	haven	 (also	known	as	Offshore	Financial	Centres	 -OFC)	with	 different	 research	 focusing	 on	 different	 definitions.	 Subsidiaries	based	in	OFC/	Tax	Havens	may	have	legitimate	operational	reasons	for	their	location	but	it	is	more	likely	that	they	are	based	there	for	tax	/	financing	reasons.			Hines	and	Rice	(1994)	and	Desai	et	al	(2006)	distinguish	between	‘dot	tax	havens’	and	others.	Dot	tax	havens	are	tax	havens	that	have	small	populations	and	therefore	lack	the	 pull	 of	 a	market	 for	 goods	 and	 services	 as	 a	 reason	 for	MNE	 activity.	 Jones	 and	Temouri	(2016)	take	what	 they	term	a	 ‘conservative’	approach	and	use	only	dot	 tax	havens	 in	 their	 research.	 MNEs	 may	 have	 reasons	 related	 to	 economic	 activity	 for	locating	subsidiaries	in	larger	countries	that	may	also	be	tax	havens.14	
	This	research	uses	two	different	measures	of	tax	havens	to	capture	the	effect.	The	first	is	that	of	‘dot	tax	havens’	(Jones	and	Temouri	2016).	The	second	measure	of	tax	havens	is	based	on	work	by	the	IMF	(IMF	2000).	The	IMF	published	a	list	of	42	countries	that	they	 term	 ‘Offshore	 Financial	 Centres’,	 essentially	 tax	 havens.	 They	 split	 the	 42	countries	into	3	different	groups:	
• Group	1	-	Countries	largely	seen	as	cooperative	with	higher	international	
standards	and	supervision.	
• Group	2	–	Generally	have	some	procedures	in	place	for	supervising	but	where	
actual	performance	is	below	international	standards.	
• Group	3	-	Jurisdictions	with	a	low	quality	of	supervision,	with	little	cooperation	
with	others	and	little	attempt	made	to	adhere	to	international	standards.			Group	 1	 countries	 are	 richer	 and	 larger,	 including	 countries	 such	 as	 Ireland	 and	Luxembourg	where	 a	 company	 could	 have	 a	market	motivation	 to	 locate	 there,	 but	where	many	US	MNEs	base	their	European	headquarters	in	order	to	reduce	their	tax	payments.	Group	2	and	3	countries	have	more	overlap	with	the	‘Dot	tax	havens’.																																																											
14 Dot tax havens included by Jones and Temouri (2016) are: Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua, Barbados, Bahrain, 
Bermuda, Bahamas, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Isle of Man, Jersey, 
Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macao, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands Antilles, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Seychelles and the Turks and Caicos Islands. 
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This	research	uses	both	measures	of	tax	havens	outlines	above:	the	Jones	and	Temouri	(2016)	 ‘dot	 tax	 havens’	 as	well	 as	 the	 IMF’s	 categories.	 Table	 5	 below	provides	 the	details	of	which	countries	are	positioned	within	which	category.	Within	the	analysis	a	dummy	variable	is	used	with	1	denoting	the	ownership	of	at	least	one	subsidiary	in	a	tax	haven	and	0	where	there	is	no	such	subsidiary.		
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Table 5 Tax Haven Definitions  
Dot Tax Haven Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Andorra	 ✔  ✔  
Anguilla ✔ 
  
✔ 
Antigua ✔ 
  
✔ Aruba	    ✔ 
Bahamas ✔ 
  
✔ 
Bahrain ✔ 
 
✔ 
 
Barbados ✔ 
  
✔ 
Belize ✔ 
  
✔ 
Bermuda ✔ 
 
✔ 
 
British Virgin Islands ✔ 
  
✔ 
Cayman Islands ✔ 
  
✔ 
Cook Islands ✔ 
  
✔ Costa	Rica	    ✔ 
Cyprus ✔ 
  
✔ 
Gibraltar ✔ 
 
✔ 
 
Grenada ✔ 
   
Guernsey ✔ ✔ 
  Hong	Kong		  ✔   
Isle of Man ✔ ✔ 
  Ireland	 ✔ ✔   
Jersey ✔ ✔ 
  
Labuan	(Malaysia)	   ✔  Lebanon	 ✔   ✔ 
Liechtenstein ✔ 
  
✔ 
Luxembourg ✔ ✔ 
  
Macao ✔ 
 
✔ 
 
Malta ✔ 
 
✔ 
 Marshall	Islands	    ✔ Mauritius	    ✔ 
Monaco ✔ 
 
✔ 
 Nauru	    ✔ 
Netherlands Antilles ✔ 
  
✔ Niue	    ✔ Panama	    ✔ 
Saint Kitts and Nevis ✔ 
  
✔ 
Saint Lucia ✔ 
  
✔ 
Saint Vincent ✔ 
  
✔ Samoa	    ✔ 
Seychelles ✔ 
  
✔ Singapore	  ✔   Switzerland	  ✔   Turks	and	Caicos	 ✔   ✔ Vanuatu	    ✔ 	
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5.3.7 Losses Losses	can	be	offset	against	profits	in	subsequent	years,	enabling	MNEs	to	reduce	their	tax	liability.	Previous	research	has	opted	to	ignore	the	impact	that	loss	carryforwards	can	have	on	the	ETR	by	removing	loss	making	companies	from	the	sample	(Markle	and	Shackelford	 2009,	Dharmapala	 and	Riedel	 2008,	 Azemar	 2003).	 Cooper	 and	Knittel	(2006)	find	that	50-60	per	cent	of	losses	are	used	by	firms	to	offset	against	tax	liabilities	within	ten	years,	10	–	20	per	cent	remain	to	be	used	at	some	future	point	and	that	25-30	 per	 cent	 are	 never	 used.	 Losses	 are	 clearly	 valuable	 to	MNEs,	 offering	 them	 the	ability	to	reduce	their	LR	Cash	ETR.		This	 research	 includes	 companies	 that	have	made	 losses	 as	 their	 use	 over	 time	 can	provide	MNEs	with	an	important	reduction	in	their	tax	liability.	A	dummy	variable	is	used	to	indicate	whether	a	company	has	made	losses	for	more	than	two	years	during	the	ten	year	time	period.	This	measure	captures	only	losses	made	during	the	ten-year	period	and	it	is	possible	that	losses	made	before	the	start	of	this	period	could	still	be	used	and	offset	against	losses	made	during	this	period.		The	following	table	summarises	the	hypotheses	that	were	developed	in	Chapter	2	and	that	are	tested	in	this	Chapter.	
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Table 6 Hypotheses Summary 
Hypothesis 1 The size of the MNE is negatively related to LR ETR. 
Hypothesis 2 The level of IP is negatively related to LR ETR. 
Hypothesis 3a The proportions of female board directors are positively related 
to LR ETR. 
Hypothesis 3b Having women in key executive positions (CEOs and CFOs) is 
positively related to LR ETR. 
Hypothesis 4 Concerns for CSR are positively related to LR ETR 
Hypothesis 5 The degree of multinationality is negatively related to LR ETR. 
Hypothesis 6 The establishment of at least one tax haven subsidiary is 
negatively related to LR ETR. 
Hypothesis 7 Registering losses for two or more years is negatively related to 
LR ETR. 	
5.4 Effective Tax Rates: DVs ETR	measures	the	tax	effectively	paid	or	booked	to	the	company’s	accounts.		ETR	is	the	most	direct	measure	of	tax	payments	that	can	be	calculated	from	a	company’s	annual	report.	The	lack	of	public	information	about	direct	tax	payments	has	driven	researchers	to	 rely	 on	 the	 calculation	of	 the	 company’s	 ETR.	 As	 shown	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	however,	ETR	is	a	key	measure	used	by	the	MNE	themselves,	although	the	focus	on	its	minimization	may	have	waned	since	the	financial	crash	of	2008.	ETR	is	calculated	by	taking	a	measure	of	tax	paid	divided	by	a	measure	of	profit	before	tax.					 Effective	Tax	Rate	(ETR)	=		 	 Tax	Paid				Profit	before	Tax		The	two	measures	of	ETR	used	in	this	research	are:	
• LR	GAAP15	ETR	(total	income	tax	expense	scaled	by	pre-tax	income)	and		
• LR	Cash	ETR	(cash	tax	expense	divided	by	pre-tax	income).																																																										
15 Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP) is an accounting term for calculations based on figures 
determined according to defined accounting standards. 
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These	 measures	 have	 been	 used	 in	 many	 previous	 studies	 (including	 Desai	 and	Dharmapala,	2006;	Dyreng	et	al	2008;	Minnick	and	Noga	2010;	Huseynov	and	Klamm	2012).	Firms	undertaking	 tax	planning	may	 focus	on	reducing	 their	Cash	ETR,	 their	GAAP	 ETR	 or	 both.	 This	 research	 follows	 the	 best	 practice	 set	 out	 by	 Dyreng	 et	 al	(2008),	calculating	ETR	over	a	ten	year	period.		Using	 the	 two	 measures	 allows	 for	 the	 comparison	 and	 greater	 understanding	 of	differences	between	them,	as	well	as	further	exploration	of	the	impact	of	one	on	the	other,	which	may	be	useful	to	future	researchers.	The	first	measure,	GAAP	ETR,	takes	the	Total	 Tax	 Expense	 (known	 as	GAAP	 tax	 expense)	 as	 disclosed	 in	 the	 company’s	annual	 report	 (US	 10K)	 and	 is	 therefore	 based	 on	 the	 firm’s	 financial	 accounting	earnings.	 It	 is	 composed	 of	 both	 the	 current	 year	 tax	 expense	 and	 any	 deferred	 or	accrued	 taxes	 that	 are	 determined	 according	 to	 GAAP	 but	 may	 be	 subject	 to	manipulation	(Hanlon	and	Heitzman	2010).		Deferred	taxes	are	those	that	arise	as	a	result	of	temporary	timing	differences.	It	is	a	technical	 accounting	 term	as	defined	 in	 International	Accounting	Standard	 (IAS)	12,	
Income	Taxes.	IAS	12	defines	a	deferred	tax	liability	as	being	the	amount	of	income	tax	payable	in	future	periods	in	respect	of	taxable	temporary	differences.	Deferred	tax	is	therefore	simply,	tax	that	is	payable	in	the	future.			If	a	company	 is	able	 to	define	tax	as	 ‘deferred	tax’	 the	current	year’s	 tax	charge	will	decrease	and	the	liability	to	pay	future	deferred	taxes	will	increase.	The	key	point	here	is	that	the	GAAP	ETR	measure	of	tax	will	include	all	these	movements	and	is,	therefore,	subject	to	change	based	not	simply	on	the	tax	charge	for	the	current	year	but	also	on	any	changes	to	deferred	taxes.	This	can	result	in	significant	year	on	year	variation	of	this	measure	of	ETR.	Understanding	the	details	of	a	company’s	activity	and	its	deferred	tax	will	assist	considerably	with	understanding	its	GAAP	ETR.		Cash	ETR	is	a	simpler	measure	calculated	using	the	annual	cash	paid	for	tax,	net	of	any	cash	tax	benefits.	US	companies	are	required	to	disclose	this	information	in	their	annual	report	(10K)	filing.	About	half	of	all	companies	disclose	this	as	a	note	at	the	bottom	of	
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their	Cashflow	Statement.	Others	include	within	their	tax	disclosures	and	some	within	a	Supplementary	Information	disclosure	note.			Another	key	difference	between	GAAP	and	Cash	ETRs	are	tax	credits	such	as	R&D	tax	credits.	These	are	used	to	reward	certain	company	behaviour,	such	as	investment	in	R&D	 by	 reducing	 taxes.	 These	will	 be	 included	 in	 the	 company’s	 tax	 calculation	 as	included	in	their	tax	return.	The	information	on	credits	claimed	is	included	within	the	company’s	tax	return	and	is	therefore	confidential.	These	will	not	affect	the	profit	as	determined	in	the	annual	report	and	will	therefore	not	affect	the	GAAP	measure	of	tax	but	will	reduce	the	amount	of	taxes	that	are	ultimately	paid	in	cash	and	will	therefore	reduce	the	Cash	ETR.		The	 model	 as	 specified	 shows	 that	 the	 GAAP	 ETR	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 company	characteristics,	 the	 profitability	 of	 the	 company	 and	 the	 cash	 /	 asset	 ratio.	 Certain	factors	related	to	the	company	determine	the	profits	that	it	generates,	which	in	turn	have	an	impact	on	the	cash	/asset	ratio	of	the	company.	These	factors	will	interact	to	determine	the	tax	payable	as	presented	in	the	annual	report	–	the	GAAP	ETR.	The	Cash	ETR	 is	 the	 ultimate	 measure	 of	 tax	 expense	 to	 the	 firm,	 determined	 by	 all	 of	 the	preceding	factors.		A	 long	 run	 (ten	 year)	measure	 of	 both	 ETRs	 (GAAP	 ETR	 and	 Cash	 ETR)	 is	 used	 to	capture	the	underlying	rate	rather	than	an	annual	ETR	that	would	be	subject	to	greater	fluctuation.	 Previous	 work	 has	 demonstrated	 the	 greater	 accuracy	 of	 a	 long	 run	measure	in	terms	of	the	actual	cost	to	the	company	(Dyreng,	Hanlon	and	Maydew	2008;	Harrington	and	Smith	2012)	Dyreng	et	al	(2008)	find	considerable	variation	between	firms	and	over	time.	They	also	find	that	single	year	ETRs	are	poor	predictors	of	their	long	run	measure	of	ETR,	reflecting	the	considerable	variation	that	can	occur	between	years.	Using	a	 ten	 year	ETR	 therefore	 increases	 the	 robustness	of	 the	 findings.	This	measure	of	long	run	cash	ETR	as	developed	by	Dyreng	et	al	has	been	accepted	in	the	accounting	literature	as	a	credible	method	for	identifying	tax	avoidance	(Ayers,	Jiang	and	 LaPlante	 2009;	 Blaylock,	 Shevlin	 and	 Wilson	 2012;	 Rego	 and	 Wilson	 2012;	Huseynov	and	Klamm	2012).	Harrington	and	Smith	(2012)	use	a	shorter	measure,	a	5	year	cash	ETR.	Rego	(2003)	employs	only	a	single	year	measure	of	ETR.		
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	Using	the	two	measures	of	ETR	within	the	recursive	structure	enables	conclusions	to	be	drawn	about	the	impact	of	the	company	characteristics	on	the	two	measures	and	the	extent	 to	which	 the	measures	differ,	 and	 their	 capacity	 to	 capture	 and	measure	 tax	avoidance.	Research	presented	in	the	previous	chapter	demonstrated	the	importance	many	 firms	 still	 place	 on	 the	 ETR.	 Other	 research	 also	 shows	 that	 tax	 directors	incentives	 are	 negatively	 associated	 with	 GAAP	 ETR	 but	 not	 with	 Cash	 ETR.	 This	suggests	that	the	aim	of	the	tax	department	relates	to	reducing	the	GAAP	ETR	rather	than	the	Cash	ETR	(Armstrong	et	al	2012;	Robinson	et	al	2010).		Some	researchers	have	attempted	to	develop	alternative	measures	of	tax	avoidance	due	to	perceived	problems	with	the	use	of	ETR	although	they	do	not	make	clear	the	nature	of	these	problems	(Frank,	Lynch	and	Rego	2009;	Wilson	2009;	Lanis	and	Richardson	2015).	ETR	is	a	complex	measure	and	requires	a	good	understanding	of	the	way	it	is	affected	 by	 different	 aspects	 of	 the	 company’s	 annual	 reporting.	 It	 is	 not	 a	 blunt	measure	that	can	indicate	directly	whether	a	firm	is	tax	avoiding.	Care	must	be	taken	when	 interpreting	 ETRs.	 Lanis	 and	Richardson	 (2015)	 consider	 ETR	 to	 be	 a	 ‘proxy’	measure	of	tax	avoidance	and	instead	use	a	measure	of	whether	a	company	has	been	in	dispute	with	the	tax	authorities	to	assess	tax	avoidance.	In	reality	this	is	a	far	less	direct	measure	 than	 ETR	 and	 provides	 weaker	 evidence	 of	 corporate	 behaviour	 or	 tax	planning.	There	may	be	a	range	of	reasons	why	a	company	has	been	in	dispute	with	the	Revenue	and	it	is	possible	that	companies	that	are	successful	at	avoiding	tax	may	be	excluded	 from	 this	measure.	 Only	 companies	 that	 have	 engaged	 in	 certain	 types	 of	questionable	tax	avoidance	will	be	included.		Brajcich	 et	 al	 (2016)	 use	 deferred	 foreign	 tax	 liabilities	 to	 measure	 tax	 avoidance.	Deferred	tax	arises	as	a	result	of	temporary	timing	differences	including	for	example,	those	 related	 to	 that	 depreciation	 is	 calculated	 for	 tax	 and	 financial	 accounting	 and	reporting	purposes.	Deferred	tax	is	not	in	itself	a	direct	measure	of	tax	avoidance.	As	Brajcich	et	al	(2016)	themselves	point	out,	if	an	MNE	decides	that	earnings	generated	overseas	are	permanently	reinvested	overseas	and	will	not	be	repatriated	in	the	future	to	the	US,	they	do	not	have	to	provide	for	the	deferred	taxes.	This	creates	a	significant	problem	of	undercounting	with	the	choice	of	foreign	deferred	tax	as	a	measure	of	tax	
	 184	
avoidance.	Companies	who	actively	manage	their	taxes	are	likely	to	declare	that	at	least	some	of	their	foreign	earnings	are	permanently	reinvested.	Deferred	tax	provisions	can	be	easily	manipulated	by	firms	choosing	to	determine	earnings	permanently	reinvested	or	by	choosing	to	reverse	an	earlier	decision.	Using	foreign	deferred	tax	liabilities	as	a	measure	of	tax	avoidance	is,	therefore,	likely	significantly	to	underestimate	the	amount	of	 tax	 avoided.	 In	 the	 sample	 used	 in	 this	 research	 75	 per	 cent	 of	 firms	 declared	permanently	reinvested	earnings	with	a	mean	value	of	$17,645	million.	This	issue	is	further	explored	in	the	case	studies	on	Goodyear	Tires	and	Ford	Motor	Company	(see	Chapter	6).		ETRs	are	complex,	reflecting	the	involved	nature	of	the	MNE’s	business	and	tax	position	and	making	them	a	difficult	DV	that	may	give	unexpected	results	at	times.	The	evidence	obtained	from	interviews	(Chapter	4)	indicates	that	MNEs	currently	aim	to	‘optimize’	their	level	of	tax	payments	rather	than	‘minimize’	them,	which	will	have	a	direct	impact	on	ETRs.	Using	a	ten-year	measure	of	ETR	will	smooth	some	of	the	variations	that	occur	naturally	as	a	company	goes	through	business	cycles	or	reflecting	the	impact	of	losses,	mergers	and	acquisitions	etc.	(Dyreng	et	al	2008).	When	the	numerator	is	the	GAAP	tax	charge	in	the	P&L	it	may	include	the	income	tax	for	that	year	but	as	discussed	above,	may	also	be	affected	by	other	charges	to	the	P&L	for	the	year,	for	example	the	creation	of	 or	 release	 of	 valuation	 allowances.	 Deferred	 tax	 assets	may	 be	 used	 to	 reduce	 a	company’s	tax	expense	in	a	future	period.	They	may	arise	from	net	loss	carryforwards	where	a	company	has	incurred	losses	in	one	period	that	may	be	used	and	set	off	against	profits	in	future	periods,	therefore	reducing	the	tax	payable	in	the	future.		When	a	company	records	a	deferred	tax	asset	it	must	be	convinced	that	they	will	be	able	to	use	them	to	reduce	future	liabilities.	Where	doubt	arises,	due	for	example	to	an	early	expiry	date	or	because	the	company	is	continuing	to	make	losses,	it	would	record	the	asset	in	the	balance	sheet	but	then	create	a	‘valuation	allowance’	which	is	used	to	reduce	the	overall	value	of	the	asset.	The	creation	of	a	valuation	allowance	will	impact	the	GAAP	tax	charge	for	the	year	and	therefore	the	GAAP	ETR.	No	cash	tax	is	paid	and	therefore	there	is	no	impact	on	the	Cash	ETR.	These	charges	are	potentially	large	and	do	not	indicate	tax	avoidance	but	could	affect	statistical	analysis	of	ETRs.			
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A	substantial	difference	could	arise	between	the	cash	and	GAAP	ETRs	even	over	the	long	run	period	examined	in	this	sample.	This	could	potentially	distort	the	findings	of	the	 economic	 model.	 As	 noted	 above	 the	 sample	 was	 examined	 for	 evidence	 of	companies	 that	 had	 booked	 or	 released	 significant	 valuation	 allowances	 during	 the	period	under	examination.	Two	companies,	Ford	and	Goodyear	Tires	were	removed	from	the	sample	when	they	were	found	to	have	substantial	differences	between	their	LR	Cash	ETR	and	LR	GAAP	ETRs.	These	companies	were	therefore	examined	separately	by	looking	in	depth	at	their	tax	affairs	as	case	studies	in	Chapter	6.	Other	companies	within	 the	 sample	 have	 created	 or	 released	 valuation	 allowances	 which	 will	 have	affected	their	ETR	but	without	such	significant	implications	for	their	ETRs.		
Table 7 Differences Between LR GAAP and LR Cash ETRs 
 LR GAAP ETR LR Cash ETR Difference 
Ford (337.91%) 49.89% 387.80% 
Goodyear Tires (11.89%) 69.18% 81.07 
Source:	Ford	and	Goodyear	Tires	Annual	Reports	2005-2014.		Detecting	these	two	companies	with	these	extreme	differences	does	not	undermine	the	use	of	ETR	as	a	measure	for	tax	avoidance	but	does	highlight	the	need	to	understand	the	measure	and	the	potential	for	its	distortion.	
5.5 Research Design A	sample	of	100	of	the	largest	US	companies	was	collated	taking	data	for	the	ten-year	period	2005	-	2014.	The	companies	were	selected	from	the	Fortune	500.	The	largest	US	companies	with	overseas	subsidiaries	were	selected.	Following	other	similar	research	(Taylor	 et	 al	 2015)	 companies	 in	 banking	 and	 the	 oil	 and	 gas	 sectors	 where	 tax,	disclosure	and	regulatory	arrangements	are	significantly	different,	were	excluded.			The	relatively	small	sample	allowed	for	in	depth	analysis,	providing	a	holistic	view	of	each	 company.	Data	was	 collected	manually	 from	 the	annual	reports	 for	each	of	 the	companies	 over	 a	 ten-year	 period.	 Information	 was	 read	 and	 analysed	 from	 the	Statement	of	Consolidated	Earnings,	Consolidated	Statement	of	Financial	Position,	the	management	discussion	and	the	disclosure	notes	to	 the	accounts.	One	company	was	
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subsequently	excluded	from	the	analysis	as	they	sold	substantially	all	of	their	overseas	holdings	 during	 the	 time	 period	 analysed.	 Two	 companies	were	 excluded	 from	 the	sample,	as	they	did	not	disclose	their	cash	taxes	paid,	despite	a	SEC	requirement	to	do	so.	Two	companies	merged	during	the	time	period	under	consideration	and	two	further	companies	 (Ford	and	Goodyear	Tires)	were	 removed	 from	 the	 sample,	 as	discussed	earlier,	as	an	initial	review	of	their	annual	reports	revealed	that	their	use	of	deferred	tax	 provisions	 significantly	 distorted	 their	 tax	 payments.	 These	 two	 companies	 are	investigated	 thoroughly	as	 case	 studies	 in	Chapter	6.	This	 leaves	a	 sample	of	94	US	MNEs	for	analysis	which	is	sufficient	for	statistical	testing.	Hair,	Black,	Babin,	Anderson	and	Tatham	(2010	p.174)	suggest	that	at	the	.01	level	this	sample	size,	combined	with	the	number	of	IVs	used	will	result	in	the	detection	of	relatively	small	R2	values.		The	sample	is	also	large	enough	to	generate	findings	that	are	generalizable	to	the	wider	population.	Hair	et	al	 (2010	p.175)	state	 that	 there	should	be	minimum	ratio	of	 five	observations	 for	each	 IV	 in	 the	 regression.	This	 sample	 comfortably	 sits	within	 that	ratio.	Although	the	sample	is	relatively	small	it	will	not	make	the	statistical	significance	tests	overly	sensitive	as	can	be	the	case	with	large	(1000+)	samples.		A	series	of	ordinary	least	squares	(OLS)	regressions	have	been	conducted	using	SPSS	and	 Eviews	 software	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 impact	 of	 factors	 on	 causality	 across	 the	model.			Regression	1	regresses	company	characteristics	on	profitability.	Regression	2	regresses	company	 characteristics	 on	 the	 cash	 /	 asset	 ratio	 and	 profitability.	 The	 impact	 of	company	characteristics,	profitability	and	cash	holdings	on	LR	GAAP	ETR	and	LR	Cash	ETR	are	then	calculated	in	Regressions	3	and	4.		The	next	section	discusses	the	use	of	ETR	in	quantitative	research	and	how	it	was	calculated	for	this	analysis.	
5.6 Descriptive Statistics This	section	sets	out	the	descriptive	statistics	for	the	sample.	Table	7	below	sets	out	the	differences	between	the	two	measures	of	ETR:	LR	GAAP	ETR	and	LR	Cash	ETR.			
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Table 8 Descriptive Statistics Comparing LR GAAP and LR Cash ETRs 
N=94 LR GAAP ETR LR CASH ETR 
Minimum (14.41%) 0.17% 
Maximum 63.95% 53.80% 
Mean 29.11% 25.72% 
Standard Deviation 10.86% 11.02% 	For	both	measures	of	the	ETR	the	federal	statutory	corporate	tax	rate	of	35	per	cent	falls	within	one	standard	deviation	of	the	mean.	Whilst	there	are	companies	at	the	lower	end	who	are	clearly	paying	a	distorted	rate	of	tax,	many	companies	are	paying	a	rate	that	is	relatively	close	to	the	nominal	rate.		
Figure 5 Continuum of LT Cash ETRs 
	Figure	5	shows	the	continuum	of	LR	ETRs	calculated.	Rather	than	clustering	around	the	statutory	rate	the	ETRs	create	a	smooth	curve.	The	company	highlighted	in	solid	black	is	the	pharmaceutical	company	Pfizer	which	is	the	company	that	has	paid	the	closest	to	the	 federal	 statutory	 rate	 over	 the	 ten	 year	 period.	 The	 chart	 demonstrates	 the	complexity	of	tax	planning.	The	case	studies	presented	in	Chapter	6	unravel	a	number	of	 these	positions.	The	dotted	 lines	 in	 the	chart	above	represent	 the	 four	case	study	
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companies	that	are	included	within	the	sample:	the	first	is	Google	(Alphabet),	followed	by	Amazon,	Nucor	and	Starbucks.		The	overall	mean	Cash	LR	ETR	of	the	sample	was	25.72	per	cent.	13.83	per	cent	of	this	sample	were	able	to	maintain	a	LR	Cash	ETR	of	less	than	20	per	cent	and	4.26	per	cent	were	able	to	maintain	a	rate	at	less	than	10	per	cent.	Overall	this	sample	of	companies	is	relatively	similar	to	the	large	(2,077	US	firms)	sample	used	by	Dyreng	et	al	(2008)	that	found	an	overall	mean	Cash	LR	ETR	of	around	29.6	per	cent.	 	Whilst	the	sample	mean	 reflects	 a	 more	 aggressive	 overall	 position,	 fewer	 companies	 were	 able	 to	maintain	extreme	positions	over	the	ten-year	period.	Dyreng	et	al	found	that	26.3%	of	the	firms	in	their	sample	were	able	to	maintain	a	LR	Cash	ETR	of	less	than	20%	and	that	9.2%	of	the	companies	in	the	sample	were	able	to	maintain	a	ten-year	rate	of	less	than	10%.	The	overall	ETRs	are	likely	to	reflect	a	combination	of	each	MNE’s	opportunity	and	motivation	to	avoid	taxes	as	discussed	in	Chapter	4.	Some	MNEs	may	be	working	to	minimize	 their	 taxes	but	others	may	be	more	aware	of	 factors	 such	as	 corporate	reputation	 that	 may	 lead	 them	 only	 to	 implement	 measures	 to	 reduce	 their	 tax	payments	to	a	certain	point.			The	differences	between	the	two	samples	may	reflect	the	different	time	periods	studied	(1995-2004	for	Dyreng;	2005-2014	here).	Dyreng’s	sample	was	taken	before	the	global	financial	 crash	 and	 any	 reduction	 in	 tax	 avoidance	 aggressiveness	 that	 may	 have	followed.	This	is	reflected	in	the	reduction	in	ETR	over	the	ten-year	period	studied	as	shown	in	Table	8.		
Table 9 GAAP and Cash ETR Ten Year Trends 
% 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
GAAP ETR 26.35 23.50 27.88 24.11 25.88 25.03 29.36 27.70 26.65 32.21 
Cash ETR  25.06 24.04 25.74 19.92 23.97 23.49 27.00 27.51 27.48 39.61 
Difference  1.29 -0.54 2.14 4.19 1.91 1.54 2.36 0.18 -0.82 -7.40 	The	ten	year	figures	in	Table	9	show	a	fairly	steady	downward	trend.	The	high	for	both	measures	was	in	2005	at	32.21	per	cent	for	GAAP	ETR	and	39.61	per	cent	for	Cash	ETR.	For	GAAP	ETR	the	lowest	year	was	2013	and	for	Cash	ETR	the	lowest	year	was	2011.	
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The	trend	since	the	lowest	point	for	both	measures	is	unclear.	Further	analysis	in	the	future	is	necessary	to	confirm	whether	there	is	now	an	upward	trend	as	projected	by	the	 interviewees	 in	 Chapter	 4	 who	 surmise	 that	 since	 the	 global	 financial	 crash	companies	have	pursued	tax	minimisation	 less	aggressively,	opting	 instead	for	a	 tax	optimisation	approach.		Descriptive	statistics	 for	 the	sample	are	presented	 in	Table	10.	The	names	and	brief	descriptive	 information	about	 the	companies	 included	 in	the	sample	are	 included	 in	Appendix	1.			Table	11	reports	the	correlations	between	explanatory	variables.	The	highest	level	of	correlation	is	r=-.566.	Hair	et	al	(2006)	suggest	that	this	should	be	considered	as	only	moderate	collinearity	(±0.25	and	±0.75).	The	higher	levels	of	correlation	are	between	the	different	measures	of	tax	haven	usage	–	Dot	tax	havens	and	the	Group	measures	and	the	internationality	index.		This	is	not	unexpected.			Variance	inflation	factor	(VIF)	values	have	been	calculated	for	each	of	the	IVs.	No	factor	is	greater	than	2.2,	which	is	well	below	the	level	of	10	cited	by	Hair	et	al	(2006).	Multi	collinearity	is	therefore	not	a	concern	for	this	model.		Inclusion	in	the	DJSI	2014	is	positively	correlated	at	the	1	per	cent	level	to	the	presence	of	a	female	CEO	and	the	percentage	of	women	on	the	board.	The	relationship	between	female	board	members	and	executives	and	companies	placing	a	greater	emphasis	on	corporate	social	responsibility	has	been	reported	in	the	literature	review.			Not	surprisingly	the	two	measures	of	LR	ETR	–	cash	and	GAAP	are	correlated	at	the	1	per	cent	level	demonstrating	the	systematic	relationship	between	these	two	measures	that	is	explored	in	the	following	regression	analysis.			
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Table 10 Descriptive Statistics 
Independent Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
LN 2014 Assets 8.72 13.39 10.63 0.91 
IP Assets/ Total 0.00 0.48 0.08 0.10 
% Women on Board 0.00% 37.50% 22.65% 7.97% 
Female CEO 0 1 0.074 0.2639 
Female CFO 0 1 0.16 0.3682 
Included in DJSI 0 1 0.351 0.4799 
Profitability -1,362.90 24,279.10 4,538.58 5,258.15 
Internationality index 0 0.9 0.4144 0.26945 
Dot Tax Havens 0 1 0.8404 0.36817 
Group 1 Tax Havens 0 1 0.8617 0.34706 
Group 2 tax Havens 0 1 0.6277 0.48602 
Group 3 Tax Havens 0 1 0.7021 0.45978 
2 or more yr loss 0 1 0.053 0.2256 
Cash / Asset ratio 0.00 0.24 0.07 0.04 		
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Table 11 Correlations 
N=94 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. LN 2014 Assets 1 
               
2. IP Assets/Total 
Assets  
.336*
* 
1 
              
3. % Women on 
Board 
0.194 0.009 1 
             
4. Female CEO 0.11 0.054 .230* 1 
            
5. Female CFO -0.027 -0.195 .204* -0.124 1 
           
6. Included in 
DJSI  
0.017 -0.102 .283** .301** 0.166 1 
          
7. Profitability 0.073 -0.039 0.133 0 0.118 0.098 1 
         
8. 
Internationality 
index 
0.085 0.082 0.042 0.052 -0.076 0.157 .237* 1 
        
9 Dot Tax 
Havens  
0.07 -0.005 0.072 0.013 0.031 0.199 -0.077 .445** 1 
       
10. Group 1 Tax 
Havens 
0.155 0.152 0.192 0.114 0.006 0.166 .254* .536** .330** 1 
      
11. Group 2 Tax 
Havens 
0.176 0.065 -0.032 0.135 0.095 .244* 0.112 .469** .566** .329** 1 
     
12. Group 3 Tax 
Havens 
.263* 0.035 -0.016 .299** -0.122 .285** -0.038 .455** .255* .235* .451** 1 
    
13. 2 or more 
year loss 
-0.087 -0.035 -0.118 -0.067 -0.103 0.124 -.392** -0.1 -0.026 -.317** -0.112 -0.139 1 
   
14. Cash / 
Assets ratio 
-0.148 -0.151 -0.168 -0.075 -0.04 0.052 .276** .325** 0.134 0.194 0.181 .231* -0.04 1 
  
15. 10yr GAAP 
ETR 
-.269** -0.194 .250* -0.075 0.146 0.075 -0.001 -.333** -0.133 -0.163 -.213* -.373** 0.001 -.257* 1 
 
16. 10yr cash 
ETR 
-.289** 0.063 .225* -0.063 0.062 -0.007 .266** -0.023 -.270** 0.029 -0.182 -0.158 -.297** -0.137 .433** 1 
**	Correlation	is	significant	at	the	0.01	level	(2	tailed)	*Correlation	is	significant	at	the	0.05	level	(2	tailed
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5.7 Overall Regression Results Table	 13,	 below	 presents	 the	 results	 from	 the	 four	 regressions	 that	 make	 up	 the	complete	 recursive	 model	 presented	 above	 in	 Figure	 4.	 The	 results	 confirm	 the	complexity	of	the	relationship	between	the	tax	charged	(LT	GAAP	ETR)	and	tax	paid	(LT	Cash	ETR)	by	a	company	with	the	company’s	characteristics	and	other	factors	related	to	tax	planning.	Whilst	the	regression	results	using	profitability	as	the	DV	are	presented	in	this	table	they	are	not	discussed	in	detail	in	this	section.	The	regression	is	a	step	towards	explaining	the	next	three	regressions.		The	R2,	the	coefficient	of	determination,	gives	the	overall	variance	that	is	explained	by	the	model.	It	measures	the	strength	of	the	relationship	between	the	set	of	IVs	and	the	DV.	 The	 R2	 dips	 between	 profitability	 and	 the	 cash	 ratio	 regressions	 indicating	 that	profitability	is	not	a	good	predictor	of	the	cash	/	asset	ratio.	The	R2	for	the	cash	/	asset	ratio	is	0.253	meaning	that	the	set	of	IVs	included	in	the	model	are	able	to	account	for	25	per	cent	of	the	total	variation	in	the	cash	/	asset	ratio.	As	expected,	as	the	model	builds	with	the	previous	DV	becoming	an	IV	the	overall	R2	increases.	The	R2	for	the	LR	GAAP	ETR	increases	to	0.355	or	35.5	per	cent	of	the	variation	and	to	.503	or	50	per	cent	for	the	LR	Cash	ETR.		The	 adjusted	 R2	 reduces	 the	 R2	 by	 considering	 the	 explanatory	 power	 from	 adding	additional	IVs	and	is	generally	considered	a	more	accurate	measure	of	goodness	of	fit	then	R2	(Hair	et	al	2006	p.215).	Like	the	R2,	the	adjusted	R2	increases	across	the	recursive	model	 from	 the	 cash	 /	 asset	 ratio	 to	 the	 two	ETR	measures.	 This	 indicates	 that	 the	addition	of	these	variables	into	the	set	of	IVs	is	adding	to	the	explanatory	power	of	the	model.		The	F	test	of	overall	significance	determines	whether	the	model	as	postulated	is	a	better	fit	 than	 an	 intercept	 only	 model.	 In	 this	 case	 the	 significance	 of	 F	 allows	 the	 null	hypothesis	to	be	rejected	and	the	conclusion	drawn	that	this	model	provides	a	better	fit	than	the	intercept	only	model.				
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5.7.1 Heteroskedasticity The	Breusch	Pagan	Godfrey	 tests	 for	heteroskedasticity	was	 conducted	using	Eviews	software	on	the	full	model.	The	results	shown	below	in	Table	12	show	that	there	is	an	overall	issue	of	heteroskedasticity	at	the	5	per	cent	level,	although	not	at	the	1	per	cent	level.	Examination	of	the	individual	variables	shows	that	Profitability	is	the	only	variable	that	demonstrates	significant	heteroskedasticity	at	0.0027.	The	negative	coefficient	of	-0.062120	 indicates	 that	 there	 is	 greater	 variability	 of	 ETR	 in	 firms	with	 very	 low	or	negative	levels	of	profitability.	This	is	likely	to	reflect	the	complexity	of	tax	payments	for	these	firms	and	in	particular	the	use	of	losses	brought	forward	to	reduce	tax	payments	as	discussed	above	in	section	5.3.7.		
Table 12 Breusch Pagan Godfrey Test for Heteroskedasticity  
F Statistic 2.009509 
 
Prob. F (15,78) 0.0248 
Obs*R-squared 26.20065 
  
Prob. Chi-Squared (15) 0.0360 
Scaled explained SS 19.56845 
 
Prob. Chi-Squared (15)  0.1891      
Variable Coefficient St. Error t-Statistic Prob 
Constant 0.014254 0.013031 1.093893 0.2774 
1. Natural Log of 2014 Assets -0.000839 0.001084 -0.773636 0.4415 
2. IP Assets /Total Assets 2014 0.012462 0.010126 1.230714 0.2221 
3. % Women on Board 2014 -0.000410 0.012752 -0.032179 0.9744 
4. Female CEO 0.005675 0.003653 1.553592 0.1243 
5. Female CFO 0.002530 0.002541 0.995354 0.3226 
6. Included in DJSI 2014 -0.000893 0.002074 -0.430583 0.6680 
7. Profitability -0.062120 0.020005 -3.105139 0.0027 
8. Degree of internationality index -0.003109 0.004673 -0.665385 0.5078 
9. Dot tax havens 0.000704 0.002894 0.243199 0.8085 
10. Group 1 Tax haven subsidiaries Y/N 0.001757 0.002419 0.726275 0.4698 
11. Group 2 Tax haven subsidiaries Y/N -0.002690 0.002650 -1.015029 0.3132 
12. Group 3 Tax haven subsidiaries Y/N 0.002584 0.002282 1.132249 0.2610 
13. 2 or more year loss 0.001932 0.004402 0.439046 0.6618 
14. Av Cash Av Assets 05-14 -0.001443 0.002981 -0.06279 0.9501 
15. LR GAAP ETR  0.017010 0.009978 1.704757 0.0922 	
5.7.2 Test for Normality The	Jarque	Bera	test	for	normality	was	conducted	using	SPSS	software.	The	results	are	given	below	in	Figure	6.	The	test	concludes	that	the	data	has	a	normal	distribution.	The	Jarque	 Bera	 test	 focuses	 on	 the	 tail	 of	 the	 distribution.	 The	 lack	 of	 serious	 outliers	
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demonstrates	ensures	that	the	tails	fit	the	test	for	normality.		It	should	be	noted	that	two	companies	that	could	potentially	have	been	significant	outliers,	Goodyear	Tires	and	the	Ford	Motor	company	were	removed	from	the	sample	prior	to	the	analysis	as	they	were	identified	as	companies	with	potentially	distorting	high	levels	of	deferred	tax	provision	movement.		
Figure 6 Jarque Bera Test for Normality  
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Table 13 Regression Results 
Dependent Variable Profitability Cash / Asset ratio LR GAAP ETR LR Cash ETR 
Constant 0.062 
(0.05) 
0.118** 
(0.054) 
0.685*** 
(0.128) 
0.556*** 
(0.134) 
1. Natural Log of 2014 Assets 0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.038*** 
(0.012) 
-0.04*** 
(0.011) 
2. IP Assets /Total Assets 2014 -0.036 
(0.054) 
-0.058 
(0.049) 
-0.086** 
(0.114) 
0.234** 
(0.103) 
3. % Women on Board 2014 0 
(0.001) 
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
4. Female CEO -0.019 
(0.02) 
-0.009 
(0.018) 
-0.056 
(0.042) 
-0.038 
(0.038) 
5. Female CFO 0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.006 
(0.03) 
-0.008 
(0.026) 
6. Included in DJSI 2014 0.014 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
0.021 
(0.024) 
0.006 
(0.022) 
7. Profitability - 0.221** 
(0.101) 
0.19 
(0.238) 
0.331 
(0.214) 
8. Degree of internationality 
index 
0.048** 
(0.023) 
0.037* 
(0.021) 
-0.103** 
(0.05) 
0.087* 
(0.046) 
9. Dot tax havens -0.033 
(0.02) 
0.014 
(0.018) 
0.045 
(0.042) 
-0.095** 
(0.038) 
10. Group 1 Tax haven 
subsidiaries Y/N 
0.01 
(0.018) 
0.013 
(0.016) 
0.008 
(0.037) 
-0.016 
(0.033) 
11. Group 2 Tax haven 
subsidiaries Y/N 
0.008 
(0.013) 
0.004 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.028) 
-0.002 
(0.025) 
12. Group 3 Tax haven 
subsidiaries Y/N 
-0.01 
(0.015) 
-0.014 
(0.013) 
 
-0.055* 
(0.031) 
0.017 
(0.028) 
13. 2 or more year loss -0.082*** 
(0.023) 
0.009 
(0.023) 
-0.023 
(0.052) 
-0.122** 
(0.047) 
14. Av Cash Av Assets 05-14   -0.603** 
(0.256) 
-0.294 
(0.238) 
15. LR GAAP ETR     0.345*** 
(0.101) 
     
R2 0.283 0.253 0.355 0.502 
Adjusted R2 0.176 0.132 0.241 0.407 
F  2.659 2.089 3.109 5.247 
Significance of F .005b 0.024 0.001 0.000 Standard	errors	are	presented	in	parentheses	*,	**	and	***	indicate	statistical	significance	at	the	10%,	5%	and	1%	level.		
5.8 Hypothesis Testing Results This	section	discusses	the	results	of	the	regression	and	interprets	the	specific	findings	in	relation	to	the	individual	hypotheses	that	were	posed	in	sections	5.2	and	5.3.		
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5.8.1 Size 
Hypothesis	1:	The	size	of	the	MNE	is	negatively	related	to	LR	ETR.	The	size	of	the	company	as	measured	by	the	natural	log	of	total	assets	is	significant	at	the	 1	 per	 cent	 level	 for	 dependent	 variables	 LR	 GAAP	 ETR	 and	 LR	 Cash	 ETR.	 The	coefficient	of	-0.38	for	LR	GAAP	ETR	and	-0.04	for	LR	Cash	ETR	are	similar,	suggesting	that	these	companies	would	pay	4	per	cent	less	tax	on	average.	This	is	clear	support	for	Hypothesis	1.		Size	 is	 not	 significantly	 related	 to	 either	 profitability	 or	 the	 cash	 /	 asset	 ratio.	 Prior	research	has	conjectured	that	larger	firms	have	the	finance	and	capability	to	invest	in	strategic	tax	planning.	All	of	the	firms	included	in	this	sample	are	large	and	should	have	the	funds	available	to	invest	in	tax	planning	if	they	are	motivated.	The	impact	of	size	on	GAAP	and	Cash	ETRs	is	clear	but	further	investigation	is	needed	to	understand	exactly	what	aspect	of	size	generates	the	motivation	or	opportunity	to	reduce	ETRs	in	this	way.		Table	 14	 gives	 further	 analysis	 of	 this	 issue,	 considering	 the	 impact	 of	 corporate	complexity.	 The	 table	 shows	 the	 top	 twenty	 firms	 by	 size	with	 their	 sector	 and	 the	number	of	subsidiaries.	The	mean	number	of	subsidiaries	in	the	sample	as	a	whole	is	594.	Eight	of	the	top	twenty	firms	have	fewer	than	the	mean	number	of	subsidiaries	and	twelve	have	more.	Size	does	not	seem	to	operate	directly	through	the	complexity	of	the	business,	or	the	number	of	subsidiaries	that	they	have.	Twelve	of	the	MNEs	in	the	top	twenty	 firms	have	more	than	50	per	cent	of	 their	subsidiaries	overseas	–	reflected	 in	their	‘internationality	index’.	However	two	of	these	firms	have	fewer	than	10	per	cent	of	their	subsidiaries	outside	the	US.		The	top	twenty	firms	by	size	are	dominated	by	the	tech	sector	and	by	pharmaceutical	firms.	 The	 top	 twenty	 also	 include	 Walmart	 (retail),	 GE	 (conglomerate)	 and	 P&G	(consumer	 staples).	 These	 firms	may	 have	more	 opportunity	 to	 shift	 profits	 via	 TP.	Further	research	is	needed	with	a	larger	sample	that	explores	the	relationship	between	industry	and	LR	Cash	and	LR	GAAP	ETRs.			
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Table 14 Companies Ranked by Size 
 Company  Industry sub group  Industry Natural 
Log 
2014 
Assets 
No 
subs 
Internationality 
Index  
(%) 
GE Industrial 
Conglomerates 
Industrials 13.11 2283 55 
AT&T Integrated 
Telecommunication 
Services 
Telecoms 12.91 773 8 
APPLE  Technology 
Hardware, Storage 
& Peripherals 
IT 12.58 145 33 
 
Verizon Integrated 
Telecommunication 
Services 
Telecoms 12.41 466 31 
Walmart  Hypermarkets & 
Super Centres 
Consumer staples 12.20 834 52 
Microsoft Systems Software IT 12.17 361 68 
Pfizer Pharmaceuticals Health Care 12.03 1390 78 
Comcast Cable and Satellite Consumer discretionary 12.02 1302 23 
Alphabet Inc Internet Software 
and Services 
IT 11.90 288 49 
Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceuticals Health Care 11.80 725 57 
P&G Household 
Products 
Consumer staples 11.75 676 67 
Duke Energy Electric Utilities Telecoms 11.70 523 22 
Cisco Systems Communications 
Equipment 
IT 11.64 622 72 
Oracle Systems Software IT 11.63 503 62 
IBM IT Consulting and 
Other Services 
IT 11.61 699 72 
 
HP Technology 
Hardware, Storage 
and  Peripherals 
IT 11.58 515 63 
Intel Corp Semiconductors IT 11.54 197 63 
Merck Pharmaceuticals Health Care 11.53 985 78 
Exelon Corp Electric Utilities Telecoms 11.47 984 2 		 	
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5.8.2 Intellectual Property 
Hypothesis	2:	The	level	of	IP	is	negatively	related	to	LR	ETR.	The	 coefficient	 for	 IP	 assets	 when	 regressed	 against	 LR	 GAAP	 as	 the	 DV,	 is	 -0.086,	significant	at	the	5	per	cent	level.	This	provides	support	for	Hypothesis	5,	indicating	that	companies	with	higher	levels	of	IP	face	a	GAAP	ETR	that	is	8.6	per	cent	lower	over	the	ten	year	period.			The	LR	Cash	ETR	the	coefficient	is	much	higher	at	0.234,	also	significant	at	the	5	per	cent	level	 but	 is	 positive.	 This	 does	 not	 provide	 support	 for	 Hypothesis	 5.	 As	 with	 the	internationality	 index	 discussed	 above,	 this	 is	 likely	 to	 relate	 to	 the	 cash	 taxes	 paid	overseas	that	are	not	set	off	against	current	GAAP	taxes	in	the	US.	Taxes	are	due	in	the	overseas	 subsidiaries	 and	 the	 US	 MNE	 pays	 these	 taxes	 but	 as	 the	 profits	 are	 not	returned	 to	 the	US	 there	 is	 no	 similar	 GAAP	 tax	 liability	 booked.	 Further	 case	 study	analysis	is	required	to	confirm	the	extent	of	these	differences	and	the	distorting	effects	that	these	are	likely	to	have	on	company	behaviour.	This	is	a	substantial	new	finding,	resulting	from	the	comparison	of	LR	GAAP	and	LR	Cash	ETRs.	The	level	of	IP	does	not	have	a	statistically	significant	impact	on	the	cash/asset	ratio.	
5.8.3 Role of Women on the Board 
Hypothesis	3a:	The	proportions	of	female	board	directors	are	positively	related	to	LR	ETR.		The	 regression	 results	show	support	 for	Hypothesis	3a.	Women	on	the	board	have	a	negative	impact,	significant	at	the	10	per	cent	level,	on	the	cash	holdings	of	a	company	(cash	/	asset	ratio).	This	is	consistent	with	cash	being	held	to	reduce	the	taxes	paid.	As	expected,	 the	percentage	of	women	on	the	board	has	a	positive	 impact	on	GAAP	ETR	(significant	at	the	5	per	cent	level),	indicating	that	if	there	are	more	women	on	the	board	the	 GAAP	 tax	 paid	 increases.	 Similarly	 the	 cash	 tax,	 cash	 ETR	 increases	 with	 the	percentage	of	women	on	the	board	although	this	is	only	significant	at	the	10	per	cent	level.			Whilst	the	magnitude	of	the	difference	is	not	large,	with	women	on	the	board	effecting	a	0.3	per	cent	change	to	LR	GAAP	ETR	and	an	even	smaller	0.2	per	cent	change	to	LR	Cash	ETR,	it	is	statistically	significant	demonstrating	support	for	Hypothesis	7a.	
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	In	this	sample	only	two	companies	have	no	women	on	the	board,	six	have	a	single	female	representative,	34	companies	have	two	female	board	members	and	32	have	three.	20	companies	 have	 four	 or	 more	 women	 on	 the	 board.	 In	 total	 women	 represent	approximately	one	quarter	of	all	board	members	(253	board	positions	out	of	a	total	of	1,118	in	the	sample.)	Supplementary	analysis	was	conducted	to	confirm	the	robustness	of	the	findings	and	to	consider	whether	there	is	a	critical	mass	that	is	important	to	the	operation	 of	 women	 on	 the	 board.	 	 The	 regressions	 were	 repeated	 replacing	 the	percentage	of	women	on	the	board	with	the	absolute	number	of	women.	 	In	this	case	there	was	no	significant	impact	on	the	cash	ratio	but	the	coefficients	using	LR	GAAP	ETR	was	0.032,	significant	at	1	per	cent	level.	Results	using	LR	Cash	ETR	gave	a	coefficient	of	0.026	significant	at	the	5	per	cent	level.		
Hypothesis	3b:	Having	women	in	key	executive	positions	(CEOs,	CFOs)	is	positively	related	
to	LR	ETR.	The	variables	measuring	whether	a	company	has	a	female	CEO	or	CFO	are	insignificant	across	all	of	the	regressions.	There	is	no	evidence	to	support	Hypothesis	7b.	The	sample,	however,	 includes	 only	 seven	 female	 CEOs16 	and	 18	 female	 CFOs	 which	 may	 have	affected	the	results.	Future	research	could	consider	the	role	of	female	executive	decision	makers	within	a	larger	sample	of	MNEs.	
5.8.4 CSR 
Hypothesis	4:	Concerns	for	CSR	are	positively	related	to	LR	ETR.	The	 regression	 results	 show	 that	 there	 is	 no	 statistically	 significant	 support	 for	Hypothesis	 4.	 Whilst	 the	 coefficients	 have	 the	 expected	 positive	 sign,	 they	 are	 not	statistically	 significant	 across	 the	 Cash	 /	Asset	 ratio	 and	 both	measures	of	 ETR.	 The	hypothesis	is	rejected.		
																																																								
16 Lynn Good at Duke Energy; Phebe Novakovic at General Dynamics; Virgina Rometty at IBM; Marillyn Hewson 
at IBM; Irene Rosenfeld at Mondelez; Indra Nooyi at Pepsi; Ursula Burns at Xerox. 
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5.8.5 Internationality Index 
Hypothesis	5:		The	degree	of	multinationality	is	negatively	related	to	LR	ETR.		The	results	for	internationality	are	striking.	The	coefficient	for	the	internationality	index	is	significant	across	all	four	regressions.	As	might	be	expected	it	has	a	positive	impact	on	profitability	and	the	propensity	to	hold	cash.	It	has	a	negative	impact	on	the	LR	GAAP	ETR,	with	a	coefficient	of	-0.103	indicating	that	the	most	international	companies	pay	a	10.3	per	cent	lower	tax	bill,	significant	at	the	5	per	cent	level.	This	provides	support	for	Hypothesis	5;	companies	that	are	more	international	are	thought	to	have	greater	scope	to	use	TP	to	shift	profits	and	reduce	group	tax	liabilities.	These	findings	confirm	earlier	work	by	Grubert	and	Mutti	(1991),	Rego	(2003),	Dyreng	and	Lindsey	(2009),	Mills	and	Newberry	(2004),	Taylor,	Richardson	and	Lanis	(2015).			The	coefficient	for	the	LR	Cash	ETR	is	however,	positive	and	significant	at	the	1	per	cent	level.	More	international	companies	are	paying	8.7	per	cent	more	cash	taxes.	This	finding	does	 not	 support	 Hypothesis	 5.	 This	 result	 is	 likely	 to	 reflect	 the	 fact	 that	 these	companies	do	still	have	to	pay	cash	taxes	in	the	overseas	jurisdictions	where	they	are	located.	MNEs	can	net	these	cash	taxes	paid	off	against	the	taxes	due	in	the	US	but	if	they	do	not	 repatriate	earnings	 to	 the	US	or	use	other	methods	 to	 reduce	 their	GAAP	 tax	payable	in	the	US	they	will	have	little	liability	to	offset	this	against.	It	is	likely	that	this	overpayment	of	cash	taxes	is	then	recorded	as	a	deferred	tax	asset	by	the	MNE	as	they	may	be	able	to	set	these	taxes	off	against	domestic	US	taxes	in	the	future.	The	differences	in	these	coefficient	signs	provides	significant	new	evidence	that	firms	are	able	to	reduce	their	GAAP	taxes	payable	whilst	earning	profits	overseas	on	which	tax	must	be	paid.	The	difference	 here	 between	 LR	 GAAP	 and	 Cash	 ETRs	 adds	 significantly	 to	 our	understanding	of	these	measures	and	of	corporate	behaviour.		These	results	are	reinforced	by	the	findings	discussed	in	section	5.8.2	on	IP.	
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5.8.6 Tax Havens 
Hypothesis	6:	The	establishment	of	at	least	one	tax	haven	subsidiary	is	negatively	related	
to	LR	ETR.	The	 model	 makes	 interesting,	 complex	 new	 findings	 in	 relation	 to	 tax	 havens.	 The	measure	of	dot	tax	havens	has	a	negative	coefficient	of	-0.095,	significant	at	the	5	per	cent	level	when	LR	Cash	ETR	is	the	DV.	This	provides	support	for	Hypothesis	6;	if	MNEs	have	a	presence	in	dot	tax	havens	their	LR	Cash	ETR	is	reduced	by	9.5	per	cent.	However,	analysis	 (not	 reported)	 that	 considered	 the	 total	 number	 of	 subsidiaries	 in	 dot	 tax	havens	 found	 no	 similar	 relationship.	 It	 appears	 that	 simply	 establishing	 a	 single	subsidiary	in	a	tax	haven	is	sufficient	to	gain	the	reduction	in	LR	Cash	ETR.	Firms	with	more	subsidiaries	in	dot	tax	havens	do	not	gain	further	advantage.	The	coefficient	for	Dot	Tax	Havens	when	LR	GAAP	ETR	is	the	DV	is	not	significant	but	it	is	interesting	as	the	sign	is	positive.	Firms	are	not	using	tax	havens	to	reduce	their	overall	GAAP	ETR;	the	GAAP	ETR	finding	does	not	provide	support	for	Hypothesis	6.		A	second	measure	of	tax	havens	using	an	IMF	definition	and	looking	at	the	three	groups	of	tax	havens	was	also	examined.	A	small	effect,	significant	at	the	10	per	cent	level	was	discerned	for	Group	3	Tax	Havens	with	GAAP	ETR	as	the	DV,	supporting	the	hypothesis.	No	effect	was	found	for	Groups	1	and	2.	Group	3	Tax	Havens	are	small	countries,	most	similar	 to	 the	 Dot	 Tax	 Havens	measure	 and	 therefore	 include	 only	 countries	where	investments	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 driven	 solely	 by	 tax	 haven	motivations.	Groups	 1	 and	2	include	larger	countries	where	market	access	may	also	be	a	factor,	making	isolating	the	tax	 haven	 effect	 more	 difficult.	 None	 of	 the	 tax	 haven	measures	 have	 a	 statistically	significant	impact	on	the	cash	/	asset	ratio.	Overall	the	findings	show	mixed	support	for	the	hypothesis,	demonstrating	the	complexity	of	the	use	of	tax	havens.		The	table	below	provides	the	number	of	subsidiaries	in	each	of	the	groups	of	tax	havens	studied.	There	is	huge	variation	in	the	number	of	subsidiaries	in	tax	havens.	This	is	likely	to	reflect	the	philosophy	behind	the	group	corporate	structure	as	well	as	the	company’s	tax	 avoidance	 position.	 Pfizer	 has	 the	most	 tax	 haven	 subsidiaries	with	 179.	 Only	 6	companies	have	no	tax	haven	presence	at	all.			
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Table 15 Tax Haven Subsidiaries  
Number of 
Dot Tax 
Haven 
Subsidiaries 
Number of 
Group 1 Tax 
Haven 
Subsidiaries 
Number of 
Group 2 Tax 
Haven 
Subsidiaries 
Number of 
Group 3 Tax 
Haven 
Subsidiaries 
TOTAL 
3M 7 20 1 6 27 
Abbott Laboratories 60 54 16 49 119 
AECOM 6 5 0 2 7 
Alcoa 2 3 0 0 3 
Alphabet Inc 3 11 3 0 14 
Altria 0 2 0 0 2 
Amazon 14 15 0 1 16 
American Airlines 2 0 0 2 2 
Amerisource Bergen 1 1 0 0 1 
Amgen 6 2 5 0 7 
APPLE 0 4 0 0 4 
Arrow Electronics 10 58 0 8 66 
AT&T 1 3 0 2 5 
Autonation 1 0 0 1 1 
Avnet Inc 6 45 1 4 50 
Best Buy 2 5 1 14 20 
Cardinal Healthcare 5 5 2 2 9 
Caterpillar 24 68 8 10 86 
Centurylink 1 7 0 2 9 
CHS Inc 7 9 1 3 13 
Cisco Systems 20 33 12 8 53 
Coca Cola 3 8 0 4 12 
Comcast 4 12 2 2 16 
Community Health 
Systems 
2 0 0 2 2 
Costco 1 0 1 0 1 
Cummins 1 7 0 5 12 
CVS Healthcare 0 0 0 0 0 
Danaher 11 73 2 1 76 
Deere & Co 5 8 0 0 8 
Delta Airlines 1 0 1 0 1 
Disney 5 11 1 1 13 
Dollar General 0 6 0 0 6 
Dow Chemicals 33 55 24 14 93 
Duke Energy 28 6 17 5 28 
DuPont 30 43 2 6 51 
Eli Lilly 10 25 3 7 35 
EMC 29 43 7 22 72 
Emerson Electric 20 54 8 13 75 
Exelon Corp 4 2 1 5 8 
Express Scripts 
Holding Company 
0 2 0 0 2 
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Fedex 9 10 1 2 13 
Fluor 15 1 6 14 21 
GE 29 52 9 6 67 
General Dynamics 2 20 2 0 22 
Gilead Science 2 5 1 1 7 
HCA Holdings 10 13 1 1 15 
Home Depot 0 1 0 0 1 
Honeywell 
International 
14 32 5 4 41 
HP 35 29 11 15 55 
IBM 16 16 7 8 31 
Icahn Enterprises 17 14 7 21 42 
Intel Corp 18 7 2 13 22 
International Paper  9 16 1 1 18 
Johnson & Johnson 6 48 0 0 48 
Johnson Controls 17 41 5 7 53 
Kimberly Clark 15 16 4 13 33 
Kohls 0 0 0 0 0 
Kroger 1 0 0 1 1 
Lockheed Martin 0 1 0 0 1 
Lowe Companies 0 0 0 0 0 
Macy 0 4 0 0 4 
Manpower 11 24 4 7 35 
McDonalds 7 23 1 0 24 
McKesson 16 9 12 0 21 
Merck 40 72 26 13 111 
Microsoft 15 27 2 2 31 
Mondelez 12 46 5 12 63 
Nike 12 15 12 2 29 
Northrop Grumman 1 1 0 1 2 
Nucor 0 0 0 0 0 
Oracle 15 26 6 9 41 
P&G 9 19 0 3 22 
Paccar 0 1 0 0 1 
Pepsi 82 62 23 36 121 
Pfizer 114 136 7 36 179 
Qualcomm 14 11 6 9 26 
Raytheon 5 1 2 3 6 
South West Airlines 1 0 1 0 1 
Staples 16 10 3 8 21 
Starbucks 3 12 0 4 16 
Sysco Corp 8 6 2 4 12 
Target 2 4 1 0 5 
Tech Data Corp 4 6 0 3 9 
Time Warner 0 5 0 0 5 
Tyson Foods 18 14 4 9 27 
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Union Pacific 0 0 0 0 0 
United Continental 
Holdings  
0 0 0 0 0 
United Technologies 34 60 1 7 68 
UPS 6 14 0 1 15 
Verizon 21 19 3 1 23 
Walgreen 18 25 3 5 33 
Walmart 48 46 1 35 82 
Whirlpool 22 35 3 3 41 
Xerox 25 22 11 8 41 
TOTAL 1,159 1,782 320 529 2,631 
Source:	OSIRIS	Database		
Figure 7 Frequency Distribution of Number of Tax Haven Subsidiaries	
		Figure	8	summarises	the	information	given	in	Table	14	above,	using	a	logarithmic	scale.	The	most	frequent	number	of	subsidiaries	falls	into	the	17-32	(18	companies)	category	followed	by	the	0-1	category	(where	6	companies	have	0	tax	haven	subsidiaries	and	9	have	1)	and	9-16	(15	companies).			The	correlation	matrix	(Table	10)	shows	that	the	relationships	between	the	Tax	Haven	variables	are	complex.	The	Dot	Tax	Haven	measure	is	positively	correlated	with	all	three	of	the	IMF	categories	(Groups	1,	2	and	3	Tax	Havens).	Dot	Tax	Havens	are	negatively	correlated	 with	 LR	 Cash	 ETR	 at	 the	 1	 per	 cent	 level	 (coefficient	 of	 -.270).	 The	 IMF	measures	do	not	correlate	with	the	LR	Cash	ETR	but	Groups	2	and	3	are	correlated	with	LR	GAAP	ETR	(Group	2	-.213	at	the	5	per	cent	level	and	Group	3	-.373	at	the	1	per	cent	
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level).	There	are	clearly	complex	interactions	occurring.	Further	understanding	of	the	differences	between	tax	havens	is	needed.	Rather	than	simply	using	size	as	a	refining	measure	as	with	Dot	Tax	Havens,	more	detail	on	the	infrastructure	that	is	available	in	these	locations	for	MNEs	and	what	the	specific	advantages	of	the	different	tax	havens	are	is	needed.	A	new	measure	of	tax	havens	that	considers	the	ease	of	use	for	MNEs,	the	facilities	available	and	the	cost	of	establishing	a	tax	haven	may	help	to	explain	some	of	the	complexity.	
5.8.7 Losses 
Hypothesis	7:	Registering	losses	for	two	or	more	years	is	negatively	associated	with	LR	ETR.	As	expected,	 the	variable	 capturing	whether	a	 company	had	 incurred	more	 than	 two	losses	over	the	last	ten	years	is	negatively	related	to	the	profitability	of	the	company,	significant	at	the	1	per	cent	level.	It	is	also	negatively	related	to	the	LR	Cash	ETR	at	the	5	per	cent	level.	This	provides	strong	support	for	Hypothesis	7	suggesting	that	MNEs	are	able	to	use	losses	to	reduce	the	taxes	paid.	It	seems	likely	that	some	of	the	losses	are	incurred	overseas	where	the	cash	payments	are	then	reduced.	No	effect	was	found	for	LR	GAAP	ETR.	This	is	a	new	finding	as	previous	studies	have	excluded	companies	with	losses	from	their	analysis.	Further	exploration	of	losses	and	how	they	contribute	to	tax	planning	is	required.	
5.8.8 Residuals Analysis The	 residuals	 from	 the	 three	 regressions	were	 correlated	with	 the	 results	presented	below	 in	 Table	 16.	 The	 low	 level	 of	 correlation	 between	 the	 three	 sets	 of	 residuals	confirms	 that	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 three	 regressions	 are	 unrelated,	 separate	factors.	There	are	no	unobserved	factors	simultaneously	impacting	on	the	three	DVs.			
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Table 16 Correlation of Residuals from the Three Regressions  
Cash Ratio DV LT GAAP ETR LT Cash ETR 
Cash Ratio DV 1 
  
LT GAAP ETR 0.001705 1 
 
LT Cash ETR 0.010593 0.13296 1 *No	correlations	are	significant	at	the	0.1,	0.005	or	0.01	level.	
5.9 Conclusion and Areas for Future Research This	research	has	presented	new	information,	contributing	to	our	understanding	of	the	key	company	characteristics	that	affect	a	MNE’s	motivation	and	ability	to	profit	shift	and	reduce	their	taxes	paid.			
Hypothesis Test results 
Hypothesis 1 The size of the MNE is negatively 
related to LR ETR. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 2 The level of IP is negatively related to 
LR ETR. 
LR GAAP ETR– Supported 
LR Cash ETR– Not supported 
Hypothesis 3a The proportions of female board 
directors are positively related to LR 
ETR. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 3b Having women in key executive 
positions (CEOs and CFOs) is positively 
related to LR ETR. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 4 Concerns for CSR are positively related 
to LR ETR 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 5 The degree of multinationality is 
negatively related to LR ETR. 
LR GAAP ETR – Supported 
LR Cash ETR – Not supported 
Hypothesis 6 The establishment of at least one tax 
haven subsidiary is negatively related 
to LR ETR. 
LR GAAP ETR  - Not supported 
LR Cash ETR – Supported 
Hypothesis 7 Registering losses for two or more 
years is negatively related to LR ETR. 
LR GAAP – Not supported 
LR Cash - Supported 	
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	This	study	demonstrates	the	importance	of	size	to	the	MNE	in	relation	to	its	tax	planning.	Size	was	consistent,	significantly	(at	the	1	per	cent	level)	related	to	both	measures	of	LR	ETR.	Extra	analysis	to	understand	what	aspect	of	size	enables	the	largest	MNEs	to	reduce	their	tax	burden	is	required.	Further	research	could	usefully	consider	what	properties	of	size	enables	these	companies	to	reduce	their	tax	burden	so	effectively,	particularly	since	 the	 analysis	 on	 group	 complexity	 is	 inconclusive.	 Complexity	 of	 corporate	structure	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 play	 a	 key	 role.	 Industry	 may	 be	 key	 with	 additional	research	presented	above	showing	that	the	top	twenty	firms	by	size	are	dominated	by	the	tech	sector	and	by	pharmaceutical	firms	which	may	have	more	opportunity	to	shift	profits	 via	 TP.	 Further	 research	 is	 needed	 with	 a	 larger	 sample	 that	 explores	 the	relationship	between	industry	and	LR	Cash	and	LR	GAAP	ETRs.			Internationality	(the	degree	of	multinationality)	plays	a	role	here	but	no	evidence	was	found	to	support	the	idea	that	the	more	complex	organisations,	that	is,	those	with	the	most	subsidiaries	are	better	at	reducing	their	tax	liability.	Tax	havens	play	a	key	role	in	reducing	tax	liabilities	with	MNEs	with	dot	tax	haven	presence	reducing	their	LR	Cash	ETR	by	9.5	per	cent.	Tax	havens	are	an	important	aspect	of	analysis	when	considering	tax	planning	as	the	use	of	tax	haven	subsidiaries	is	likely	to	be	more	directly	related	to	tax	 avoidance	 measures	 than	 other	 potential,	 more	 indirect	 mechanisms	 of	 profit	shifting.	 If	 a	 firm	 has	 a	 subsidiary	 in	 a	 dot	 tax	 haven	 it	 is	 almost	 certainly	 as	 a	consequence	of	 its	potential	 to	reduce	 its	 tax	 liability.	New	work	on	tax	havens	could	consider	the	different	aspects	of	infrastructure	and	services	available	in	different	places;	what	makes	firms	choose	one	dot	tax	haven	over	another.	A	new	measure	of	tax	havens	that	weights	the	ease	or	cost	of	use	in	comparison	to	the	potential	benefits	could	add	considerable	new	insight.		This	research	demonstrates	the	importance	of	IP	assets	as	a	mechanism	to	shift	profits,	affecting	both	LR	Cash	and	LR	GAAP	ETRs.	The	difference	here	between	the	negative	impact	 on	 LR	GAAP	 ETR	 and	 the	 positive	 impact	 on	 Cash	 ETR	 is	 an	 important	 new	finding.	 This	 repeats	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 internationality	 where	 more	international	 companies	 report	 lower	 LR	GAAP	 ETRs	 but	 higher	 LR	 Cash	 ETRs.	 The	different	impact	on	these	two	measures	is	an	important	new	finding	demonstrating	the	
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complexity	of	the	relationship	of	the	two	measures.	What	is	clear	is	that	MNEs	may	face	a	choice	between	measures	that	increase	the	volume	of	cash	tax	paid	overseas	and	the	GAAP	tax	charged	in	the	USA.	Further	exploration	of	the	manner	of	these	choices	and	the	way	in	which	MNE	evaluate	the	outcomes	would	add	to	understanding	of	this	key	issue.		The	 relationships	between	 the	different	measures	of	 the	ETR	 (LR	GAAP	ETR	and	LR	GAAP	ETR)	are	complicated	and	difficult	to	disentangle.	The	lack	of	cohesion	between	the	two	over	the	ten	year	period	may	indicate	the	presence	of	some	manipulation	but	there	are	 real	differences	 in	 the	way	 that	 the	 two	are	 calculated.	Further	 research	 is	needed	 to	 understand	 these	 differences	 and	 the	 way	 that	 they	 interact	 with	 the	characteristics	of	a	company.	As	stated	in	Section	5.4	the	use	of	reserves,	notably	the	use	of	 valuation	 allowances	 against	 deferred	 taxes	will	 have	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	differences	between	 the	ETRs.	The	 case	 studies	 that	 follow	 this	 chapter	on	Ford	and	Goodyear	 Tires	 explore	 this	 in	 more	 detail.	 Work	 that	 considers	 the	 differences	 in	deferred	tax	calculations	between	different	firms	in	a	statistical	manner	is	also	needed.		A	substantial	new	finding	from	this	research	is	the	role	that	women	play	on	the	board	of	these	companies	and	their	impact	on	the	LR	ETRs.	There	is	a	clear	relationship	between	the	percentage	of	women	on	the	board	and	the	Cash	Ratio	as	well	as	both	measures	of	LR	ETR.	The	proportion	of	women	on	the	board	clearly	operates	as	a	brake	on	corporate	tax	 avoidance.	 These	 findings	 confirm	 earlier	 research	 about	 the	 different	 profile	 of	women	on	the	board	(Eagly	and	Johnson	1990;	Hillman	et	al	2002;	Eagly	et	al	2003;),	their	approach	to	the	role	(Wang	and	Coffey	1992;	Williams	2003;	Adams	and	Ferreira	2009)	and	their	approach	to	risk	(Torgler	and	Valev	2010;	Francis	et	al	2014;	Barua	et	al	 2010	 and	 Huang	 and	 Kisgen	 2013).	 Women	may	 take	 a	 longer	 term	 view	 of	 the	company,	with	greater	 consideration	of	 the	 potential	 for	 tax	 avoidance	 to	 impact	 on	areas	such	as	corporate	reputation.	Women	may	therefore	place	even	more	emphasis	on	tax	optimisation	rather	than	tax	minimisation.	More	research	into	the	specific	manner	of	this	influence	is	needed	to	understand	how	women	are	able	to	influence	boards	in	this	way.		The	two	measures	of	ETR	used	here:	LR	GAAP	ETR	and	LR	Cash	ETR	appear	to	provide	useful	 information	about	 the	tax	avoiding	activities	of	 the	MNEs.	The	differences	that	
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emerge	between	 the	 two	measures,	particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 IP	and	 internationality		(the	degree	of	multinationality)	indicate	that	a	good	understanding	of	the	measures	and	how	they	are	compiled	is	essential	when	interpreting	results	involving	ETRs.	LR	Cash	ETR	 reflects	 the	 cash	 taxes	 incurred	 in	 overseas	 operations.	 This	 can	 then	 be	 offset	against	US	taxes	to	reduce	the	overall	cash	tax	liabilities.	If	there	are	insufficient	US	taxes	payable	due	to	tax	planning	or	poor	performance	these	taxes	cannot	be	offset	and	remain	and	irreducible	core.		The	next	chapter	consists	of	case	studies	of	six	companies	that	provide	a	detailed	picture	of	 the	tax	planning	strategies	of	 these	companies.	These	case	studies	supplement	the	findings	here	in	terms	of	the	complex	relationship	between	LR	Cash	and	LR	GAAP	ETRs.	They	 also	 demonstrate	 the	 substantial	 information	 that	 can	 be	 drawn	 from	 publicly	available	information	in	the	confidentially	sensitive	area	of	corporation	tax.	
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6 Case Studies This	 chapter	 includes	 six	 case	 studies	 of	 US	 MNEs:	 Amazon,	 Ford,	 Goodyear	 Tires,	Google,	Starbucks	and	Nucor.	The	case	studies	examine	their	tax	planning	strategies	in	detail	 to	 provide	 an	 overview	 of	 how	 companies	 are	 able	 to	 use	 the	 mechanisms	described	in	earlier	parts	of	this	thesis	and	how	the	characteristics	of	these	companies	influence	their	overall	tax	liabilities.	These	case	studies	are	designed	to	complement	and	enhance	the	research	presented	in	the	earlier	chapters	of	this	thesis.		These	case	studies	are	based	largely	on	an	analysis	of	the	content	of	company	annual	reports,	 	(content	analysis	methodology	Wright	2011).	These	provide	a	rich	source	of	information	 that	 is	 often	 neglected	 in	 IB	 research	 but	 are	 frequently	 used	 in	 the	accounting	 and	 international	 tax	 literature	 (Chen,	 Su	 and	 Wu	 2010,	 Bewley	 and	Schneider	 2013,	 Hageman	 and	 Bobek	 Schmitt	 2014).	 Quantitative	 research	 tends	 to	focus	on	the	comparison	of	large	scale	data	on	a	panel	or	longitudinal	basis.	Figures	may	be	extracted	from	the	annual	report	for	use	in	these	databases	but	there	is	little	research	that	uses	the	depth	of	information	that	is	provided.	Whilst	there	are	severe	limitations	to	 the	 disclosures	 made	 by	 companies	 in	 annual	 reports	 there	 is	 still	 scope	 for	researchers	to	utilise	this	public	information	to	a	far	greater	extent.			The	role	of	case	studies	and	the	purposes	and	the	conclusions	that	can	be	drawn	from	them	 have	 been	 explained	 in	 the	 Research	 Methodology	 section	 in	 Chapter	 3.	 This	chapter	presents	the	individual	case	studies	and	ends	with	a	concluding	section	detailing	the	findings	from	the	case	studies	and	implications	for	future	research.		 	
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6.1 Amazon Amazon.com	 is	 a	well	 known	US	company	 founded	 in	1994.	 	 It	 operates	13	websites	globally,	five	of	which	are	in	Europe.		It	was	listed	on	the	NASDAQ	in	1997.	It	initially	started	as	an	online	book	seller	but	has	diversified	and	is	now	the	world’s	largest	online	retailer	 selling	almost	anything,	 including	DVDs,	 clothes,	 electronics	and	groceries.	 It	also	 has	 an	 online	 ‘marketplace’	 where	 third	 parties	 can	 sell	 their	 products	 via	 the	amazon	 websites.	 It	 produces	 the	 Kindle,	 an	 electronic	 book	 reader	 and	 the	accompanying	e-books	as	well	as	online	music.		Amazon	 provides	marketing	 and	 online	 advertising	 services.	 	 Amazon	Web	 Services	provides	access	to	IT	infrastructure	for	a	range	of	different	types	of	business.			Amazon	has	pursued	sales	growth	and	a	strategy	of	market	domination	in	preference	to	short-term	 profit	maximisation	 (Rugman	 and	Collinson,	 2012).	 It	 has	 two	 regionally	segmented	divisions:	North	America	and	International.	Sales	have	grown	by	948%	in	the	ten	year	period	shown	below.	It	is	still	however	a	Home	Region	company	with	US	sales	dominating	 its	 income	 stream	 (Rugman	 and	Verbeke,	 2004).	 In	 2014	Amazon	 had	 a	global	revenue	of	$88,988	million	and	a	post	 tax	profit	of	$274million.	This	was	split	62%	($55,469)	North	America	and	38%	($33,519)	in	the	International	segment.			Amazon’s	key	FSAs	relate	to	its	size	and	logistics	expertise.	Amazon	has	strength	through	its	size	enabling	it	to	provide	goods	quickly	to	customers	all	over	the	world.	Amazon	has	also	gained	by	being	the	first	in	the	online	market	in	many	segments	enabling	it	to	attract	customers	and	build	its	dominant	logistics.	Amazon’s	brand	name	gives	it	another	clear	FSA,	helping	it	to	attract	customers	to	its	international	websites.		This	case	study	focuses	on	Amazon’s	UK	business	and	the	manner	in	which	it	attributes	revenues	 to	 the	UK	and	other	 countries,	 thereby	 selecting	 the	 jurisdiction	where	 tax	liability	is	generated.	Amazon	uses	two	key	methods	to	reduce	its	tax	payments	in	the	UK	that	are	explained	in	detail	below.	The	first	method	involves	reducing	the	amount	of	UK	sales	that	are	booked	by	the	UK	subsidiary	and	are	instead	charged	to	the	European	headquarters.	The	second	method	involved	TP	using	royalties	to	shift	profits	between	subsidiaries.	
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Table 17 Amazon Inc. Revenue and Net Sales Over Time 
US$ 
millions 
2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Total 
Revenue 
88,988 74,452 61,093 48,077 34,204 24,509 19,166 14,835 10,711 8,490 
YoY 
Sales 
Growth 
19.52
% 
21.86
% 
27.07
% 
40.56
% 
39.56
% 
27.88
% 
29.19
% 
38.50
% 
26.16
% 
22.67
% 
Profit 
/(loss) 
Before 
Tax 
(111) 506 544 934 1,497 1,161 901 660 377 428 
Provisio
n for 
income 
tax 
167 161 428 291 352 253 247 184 187 95 
Net 
income 
(241) 274 (39) 631 1,152 902 645 476 190 359 
Return 
on 
Sales* 
-0.12% 0.68% 0.89% 1.94% 4.38% 4.74% 4.70% 4.45% 3.52% 5.02% 
Source:	Amazon.	Annual	Reports		*Calculated	based	on	information	in	Annual	Reports		
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6.1.1 The Role of Amazon.co.uk Amazon.co.uk	Ltd	was	the	main	UK	subsidiary	of	online	retailer	Amazon.com	over	the	time	period	under	examination17.	The	UK	subsidiary	provides	services	to	other	group	companies,	 the	 largest	of	which	 is	 its	direct	parent	 company	Amazon	EU	Sarl	 that	 is	located	 in	 Luxembourg.	 Amazon.co.uk	 Ltd	 fulfilled	 orders	 that	 are	 placed	 online.	However,	the	UK	company	does	not	own	any	of	the	inventory	(or	bear	any	of	the	risk)	and	 consequently	 makes	 no	money	 from	 the	 sale	 of	 goods.	 Amazon.co.uk	 Ltd	 (now	Amazon	 UK	 Services	 Ltd)	 is	 a	 separate	 company	 and	 files	 accounts	 with	 the	 UK	Companies	House	 but	 is	merely	 a	 service	 company	 providing	 logistics	 and	 customer	support	 services	 as	well	 as	 some	 financial	 services	 to	 other	 group	 companies	 at	 the	instruction	 of	 Amazon	EU	 Sarl.	 It	 is	 paid	 by	Amazon	EU	 Sarl	 for	 these	 services.	 The	annual	report,	filed	at	the	UK	Companies	House	states	that:	‘The	principal	activity	of	the	
Company	 is	 the	 provision	 of	 fulfilment	 and	 corporate	 services	 to	 other	 Amazon	 group	
undertakings’	 (Amazon.co.uk	2014	p.5)	The	 report	 also	 indicates	 that	 the	KPI	 for	 the	company	is	the	control	of	administrative	expenses	(Amazon.co.uk	2014	p.5).		Amazon	EU	Sarl	does	not	have	a	Permanent	Establishment	(PE;	See	Glossary)	in	the	UK	and	so	is	not	liable	to	pay	UK	taxes.	The	only	tax	that	is	paid	in	the	UK	is	that	relating	to	Amazon.co.uk’s	income	from	providing	services	to	other	group	companies.	
																																																								
17 Amazon.co.uk changed its name on 3rd August 2015 to Amazon UK Services Ltd. 
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Table 18 Geographical Segment Sales 
$’000 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
North America 55,469 44,517 34,813 26,705 18,707 12,828 10,228 8,095 5,869 4,711 
International 33,519 29,935 26,280 21,372 15,497 11,681 8,938 6,740 4,842 3,779 
Total 88,988 74,452 61,093 48,077 34,204 24,509 19,166 14,835 10,711 8,490 
% International 
Sales 
37.66% 40.21% 43.02% 44.45% 45.31% 47.66% 46.63% 45.43% 45.20% 44.51% 
Source:	Amazon.com	Inc.	Annual	Reports	2005-2014.	
 
Table 19 Amazon.co.uk Sales and Net Income Over Time 
US$ ‘000 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Revenue 1,058,491 744,374 520,543 322,417 229,929 178,073 137,844 160,901 152,101 123,416 
Revenue Growth 42.20% 43.00% 61.45% 40.22% 29.12% 29.18% (14.33%) 5.79% 23.24% 13.60% 
PBT 53,606 28,307 17,649 4,800 (3,910) (5,375) (1,149) 637 2550 3828 
Tax (18,615) (6,883) (5,125) (2,918) (807) 2,026 (335) (2,262) (1,555) 473 
Net income 34,992 21,424 12,524 1,881 (4,717) (3,349) (1,483) (1,624) 995 4,301 
Return on sales 5.06% 3.80% 3.39% 1.49% -1.70% -3.02% -0.83% 0.40% 1.68% 3.10% 
Source:	Amazon.co.uk	Annual	Reports	2005-2014	Amounts	from	accounts	denoted	in	£GPB,	here	translated	to	$USD	using	year	end	exchange	rates.	
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	As	Amazon	reports	its	international	business	as	a	single	segment,	historically	very	little	information	 about	 its	 performance	 at	 a	 country	 or	 regional	 level	 has	 been	 available.	North	American	sales	dominate	total	revenue.	Until	2009	the	 international	segment’s	share	of	total	sales	was	growing	(highpoint	of	47.66%	in	2009)	but	from	this	point	the	North	American	sales	have	been	growing	faster	than	the	International	sales	such	that	by	2014	International	sales	accounted	for	only	37.66	per	cent.	Amazon	 is	 firmly	a	home	region	based	company	(Rugman	and	Verbeke,	2004).	International	sales	have,	however,	grown	quickly,	increasing	by	782	per	cent	over	the	ten	year	period.		
 It	would	appear	that	Amazon	should	have	been	providing	more	information	about	some	sales.	 IFRS	 8	 ‘Operating	 Segments’	 states	 that	 information	 should	 be	 provided	 about	countries	 that	 account	 for	 10	 per	 cent	 or	 more	 of	 a	 company’s	 sales.	 	 Accountants	PriceWaterhouseCoopers	(2008)	report	that:	
‘It	requires	an	entity	to	report	financial	and	descriptive	information	about	its	reportable	
segments.	 Reportable	 segments	 are	 operating	 segments	 or	 aggregations	 of	 operating	
segments	that	meet	specified	criteria:	[IFRS	8.13]	
its	reported	revenue,	from	both	external	customers	and	intersegment	sales	or	transfers,	is	
10	 per	 cent	 or	 more	 of	 the	 combined	 revenue,	 internal	 and	 external,	 of	 all	 operating	
segments;	or	
the	absolute	measure	of	its	reported	profit	or	loss	is	10	per	cent	or	more	of	the	greater,	in	
absolute	amount,	of	(i)	the	combined	reported	profit	of	all	operating	segments	that	did	not	
report	a	loss	and	(ii)	the	combined	reported	loss	of	all	operating	segments	that	reported	a	
loss;	or	
its	assets	are	10	per	cent	or	more	of	the	combined	assets	of	all	operating	segments.’	
 Prior	 to	 2012	 Amazon.com	 Inc	 did	 not	 disclose	 any	 information	 about	 any	markets	below	 the	 level	 of	 their	 ‘International’	 segment.	 From	 the	 information	 subsequently	released	it	would	appear	that	they	had	a	number	of	markets	(Japan,	Germany	and	the	UK)	that	were	contributing	more	than	10%	of	their	total	revenue	and	further	disclosures	should	have	been	made.	
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Table 20 Amazon Revenue by Country 2014-2012 
$’million 2014 2013 2012 
 Net sales % Total Net sales % Total Net sales % Total 
Germany 11,919 13.39 10,535 14.15 8,734 14.30 
Japan 7,912 8.89 7,639 10.26 7,800 12.76 
UK 8,341 9.37 7,291 11.93 6,478 10.06 
Source:	Amazon.com	Inc	Annual	Reports	2005-2014.		Information	disclosed	to	the	UK	House	of	Commons,	Public	Accounts	Committee	as	part	of	an	investigation	into	the	corporation	tax	paid	in	the	UK	by	certain	MNEs	shows	that	Germany,	Japan	and	the	UK	all	account	for	significant	parts	of	Amazon’s	business.		
Table 21 Amazon Revenue by Country 2012-2010 
$’million 2012 2011 2010 
 Net Sales % Total Net Sales % Total Net Sales % Total 
Germany 8,732 14.29 7,230 15.04 5,296 15.48 
Japan  7,800 12.77 6,576 13.68 5,025 14.69 
UK 6,478 10.6 5,348 11.12 3,929 11.49 
Source:	Public	Accounts	Committee	written	evidence	(2012);	Amazon.com	Inc.	Annual	Report	2012			Amazon’s	European	region	business	is	run	by	a	single	subsidiary,	Amazon	EU	Sarl.	This	operates	out	of	Luxembourg	across	27	EU	countries.	It	employs	500	people	and	made	revenue	of	Euros	9.1	billion	and	after	 tax	profit	of	Euros	20	million	(Public	Accounts	Committee	Verbal	Evidence	2012).	In	the	UK,	Amazon	has	more	than	15,000	employees	(plus	10,000	extra	seasonal	temporary	workers).	It	operates	8	fulfilment	centres	in	the	UK	 –	 large	warehouses	 from	where	 orders	 are	 completed	 and	 invoices	 printed	 and	dispatched	(Public	Accounts	Committee	Verbal	Evidence	2012).	Amazon’s	 third	party	market	place	seller	business	–	which	supports	sellers	on	amazon.co.uk.	is	also	owned	by	Amazon	Services	Europe	Sarl.	
 The	 following	 table	 gives	 information	 about	 sales	 made	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 the	 related	expenses.	These	sales	are	made	by	Amazon	EU	Sarl	rather	than	by	Amazon.co.uk	Ltd	and	reflect	all	the	sales	made	into	the	UK.	This	information	is	not	disclosed	by	the	company	and	 these	 figures	 were	 provided	 to	 the	 UK	 House	 of	 Commons	 Public	 Accounts	Committee	 investigation.	 	A	different	picture	of	 the	size	of	 the	UK	market	 to	Amazon	
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emerges	than	that	given	in	the	Amazon.co.uk	annual	reports.		Information	relating	to	the	UK	segment	has	subsequently	been	reported	in	the	Amazon.com	Inc	annual	reports		(See	Table	22)	but	was	not	available	before	the	Public	Accounts	Committee	investigation.		As	Amazon’s	European	sales	are	based	in	Luxembourg	it	must	pay	tax	there	on	all	its	European	sales.	It	also	applies	the	Luxembourg	VAT	rate	where	appropriate	to	its	sales.	The	VAT	rate	on	electronic	books	in	Luxembourg	is	only	3%	compared	with	20%	in	the	UK.	Amazon	 is	 therefore	able	 to	provide	e	–	books	to	UK	customers	at	a	significantly	lower	price	than	a	UK	retailer	(The	Guardian	21/10/2012).		The	table	below	shows	the	difference	in	revenue	and	profits	between	the	UK	segment	–	the	contribution	made	by	UK	consumers	to	the	Amazon	Inc.	finances	and	those	recorded	by	 the	 UK	 company	 Amazon.co.uk	 Ltd,	 for	 the	 year	 2011.	 Whilst	 the	 UK	 segment	generated	a	total	revenue	of	$1,872	million,	only	$134million	revenue	was	booked	in	the	UK	as	generated	by	Amazon.co.uk.	The	difference	between	these	two	amounts	would	have	been	booked	largely	in	Luxembourg	by	Amazon	EU	Sarl.	
Table 22 Amazon UK Segment Profit and Loss 2012 
‘$ million UK Segment Amazon.co.uk Ltd 
Amazon.co.uk 1,872 134 
LoveFilm and other 284 - 
TOTAL REVENUE 2,155 134 
Cost of Sales -1,730 - 
Expenses -268 -132 
Intercompany Charges 18  and 
net interest 
-97 - 
Other Expenses -12 - 
TOTAL COSTS 2,108 - 
Profits Before Tax 48 2 
Source:	Amazon	Written	Submission	to	Public	Accounts	Committee	2013.	Information	disclosed	in	£GBP	but	translated	into	$US	as	at	Dec	2011	exchange	rates.
																																																								
18 According to Amazon’s submission to Public Accounts Committee 2013, the intercompany charges are 
primarily payments made to Amazon Europe Holding Technologies S.C.S for the use of intellectual properties.  
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The	 scale	 of	 business	 reported	 by	 Amazon.co.uk	 was	 considerably	 smaller	 than	 the	overall	business	generated	in	the	UK.	In	2014	Amazon.co.uk	Ltd	made	a	profit	before	tax	of	$35million	on	a	 turnover	of	$1,058million.	 It	 then	booked	a	charge	 for	 the	year	of	$18million	for	UK	Tax.	
Amazon	is	able	to	record	in	the	UK,	only	a	small	amount	of	the	total	revenues	earned	in	the	UK	because	it	states	that	Amazon.co.uk	is	only	a	service	company,	offering	services	to	the	wider	Amazon	group.	The	wider	Amazon	group	companies	do	not	have	a	PE	in	the	UK	under	EU	rules.	The	EU	uses	the	OECD’s	rules	on	tax	that	state	that	companies	are	liable	to	pay	tax	in	a	country	where	they	have	a	PE.	OECD	rules	set	out	a	definition	of	a	physical	place,	however	in	reality	these	attempt	to	capture	where	economic	activity	is	undertaken.		The	OECD	Guidelines	(OECD	2010)	define	a	PE	in	a	country	as:	
‘a)	a	place	of	management;	
b)a	branch;	
c)an	office;	
d)	a	factory;	
e)	a	workshop,	and	
f)	a	mine,	an	oil	or	gas	well,	a	quarry	or	any	other	place	of	extraction	of	natural	resources.	
And	exclude:	
a)	 the	use	of	 facilities	 solely	 for	 the	purpose	of	 storage,	display	or	delivery	of	goods	or	
merchandise	belonging	to	an	enterprise;	
 Whilst	the	wider	Amazon	group	employs	a	large	number	of	people	in	the	UK	they	argue	that	their	‘fulfilment	centres’	fit	in	this	final	excluded	category	meaning	that	they	do	not	have	 a	 PE	 in	 the	 UK.	 Their	 UK	 operations	 simply	work	 on	 behalf	 of	 their	 European	company.		
6.1.2 Transfer Pricing and Amazon in Europe Amazon	 EU	 Sarl	 is	 Amazon’s	 principle	 operator	 of	 the	 retail	 and	 business	 services	offered	through	European	websites.	Amazon	EU	Sarl	(Luxembourg)	is	owned	by	Amazon	Europe	 Technologies	 Holding	 SCS	 (Technologies,	 Luxembourg)	 which	 is	 ultimately	owned	 by	 Amazon	 Inc.	 (the	 US).	 Technologies,	 Luxembourg	 owns	 the	 rights	 to	 the	intangible	assets	(IP)	that	has	been	developed	in	the	US	and	charges	its	subsidiaries	for	
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using	it	(Licence	Fee).		Amazon’s	European	business	and	in	particular	the	calculation	of	this	 royalty	 payment	 are	 the	 subject	 of	 a	 European	Commission	 inquiry	 to	 establish	whether	an	agreement	between	Amazon	and	the	Luxembourgish	tax	authorities	gives	Amazon	such	an	advantage	over	its	competitors	that	it	amounts	to	the	provision	of	State	Aid	 (European	 Commission	 2014).	 A	 preliminary	 report	 published	 in	 October	 2014	found	 that	 the	 tax	 ruling	was	 so	 favourable	 to	 Amazon	 that	 it	 constituted	 state	 aid	(European	Commission	2014).	
 A	letter	from	Amazon	to	the	Luxembourgish	tax	authorities	in	October	2003	(European	Commission	2014)	sets	out	a	specific	TP	arrangement	under	which	the	licence	fee	would	be	 calculated.	 The	 calculation	was	 approved	 by	 the	 tax	 authorities.	 The	 Licence	 Fee	would	be	calculated	each	year	as	a	percentage	of	all	revenue	(the	Royalty	Rate)	received	by	EU	Sarl	Luxembourg	in	connection	with	its	operation	of	the	European	web	sites.		Technologies	is	a	partnership	company	and	is	set	up	so	that	it	does	not	operate	a	PE	in	Luxembourg,	the	company	has	no	tangible	presence	in	Luxembourg,	that	is,	no	offices	or	employees.	In	this	way	it	does	not	have	to	pay	tax	in	Luxembourg.	The	partners	of	the	company	are	American	and	do	not	reside	in	Luxembourg,	their	income	should	therefore	be	taxed	in	their	home	countries.	However,	as	the	partners	are	American	they	are	not	obliged	to	pay	tax	on	their	income	until	it	is	repatriated	to	the	US.			Luxembourg	did	not	submit	any	TP	report	to	the	European	Commission	that	could	have	provided	 support	 for	 the	 TP	 arrangement	 in	 place.	 In	 its	 absence	 the	 European	Commission	 thinks	 likely	 that	 the	 Luxembourgish	 tax	 authorities	 did	 not	 properly	confirm	 Amazon’s	 TP	 arrangements.	 The	 ruling	 request	was	 assessed	within	 eleven	days,	so	in	reality	limited	analysis	could	have	taken	place.	The	TP	method	proposed	by	Amazon	and	accepted	by	the	Luxembourgish	authorities	in	the	contested	tax	ruling	does	not	seem	to	correspond	to	any	of	the	methods	in	the	OECD	Guidelines	(OECD	2010).	
 The	arrangement	determines	the	royalty	payment	(Licence	Fee)	owed	by	Amazon	EU	Sarl	(Luxembourg)	 to	Technologies	(Luxembourg)	 for	the	use	of	 intellectual	property	(IP)	rights.	The	OECD	Guidelines	(para	6.16)	states	that	:	‘a	royalty	would	ordinarily	be	a	
recurrent	payment	based	on	the	user’s	output,	sales,	or	in	some	rare	circumstances,	profits.’	
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 In	Amazon’s	case,	however,	the	royalty	is	calculated	as	a	residual	profit.	A	calculation	is	made	to	determine	the	profit	that	is	attributable	to	Amazon	EU	Sarl	through	its	operation	of	the	EU	websites.	The	remainder	of	the	profit	is	paid	as	the	Licence	Fee	to	Technologies.	This	royalty	is	clearly	a	‘residual’	but	according	to	Amazon	is	‘expressed’	as	a	percentage	of	revenues.	This	does	not	comply	with	the	OECD	Guidelines	that	state	that	the	residual	should	be	calculated	as	a	percentage	of	revenues.	Expressing	the	amount	as	a	percentage	of	 revenues	 is	 merely	 cosmetic,	 how	 the	 figure	 is	 presented	 rather	 than	 how	 it	 is	calculated.	Amazon	EU	Sarl	(Luxembourg)	receives	only	4	–	6%	of	operating	expenses	as	remuneration	for	its	work.		
 Luxembourg	says	that	the	payment	is	set	as	a	residual	as	Amazon	EU	Sarl	(Luxembourg)	performs	 less	 complex	 functions	 than	 Technologies	 (Luxembourg).	 The	 OECD	Guidelines	(art	3.18)	state	that:	
‘as	a	general	rule	the	tested	party	is	the	one	to	which	a	TP	method	can	be	applied	in	the	
most	reliable	manner	i.e.	it	will	most	often	be	the	one	that	has	the	less	complex	functional	
analysis’.	(OECD	2010)	
 However,	 it	 appears	 that	 the	 functions	 of	 Amazon	 EU	 Sarl	 are	 complex.	 It	 runs	 the	European	web	sites	and	serves	as	the	European	headquarters.	The	Commission	report	states	that	it: ‘seems	that	LuxOpCo	is	taking	strategic	business	and	commercial	decisions	
and	assuming	commercial	risk,	among	others,	inventory	risk	as	well	as	operational	risks	
related	to	the	operating	of	the	websites.’	(European	Commission	2014)	
 Technologies	(Luxembourg)	by	contrast,	appears	simply	to	sublicense	IP	that	was	not	developed	by	it.	The	Commission	(European	Commission	2014)	also	concludes	that	the	fact	 that	Technologies	 (Luxembourg)	does	not	pay	 tax	 in	Luxembourg	gives	 them	an	incentive	to	exaggerate	the	amount	of	royalty	when	applying	the	TP	arrangement.			Amazon	EU	Sarl’s	4	–	6%	of	operating	expenses	as	 revenue	calculation	appear	 to	be	based	on	 the	 transactional	net	margin	method	 (TNMM)	 (OECD	2010)	 In	order	 to	use	TNMM	an	 arm’s	 length	 remuneration	 is	 obtained	 by	 comparing	 net	 profit	 indicators	between	 independent	 companies	 to	 estimate	 the	 profits	 that	 one	 of	 each	 of	 the	
	 221	
associated	 companies	 could	 have	 earned	 had	 they	 dealt	 solely	 with	 independent	companies.	
 In	Amazon	EU	Sarl’s	case	a	net	profit	indicator	based	on	operating	costs	appears	to	have	been	 selected.	 There	 is	 no	 evidence,	 however,	 that	 this	 was	 calculated	 from	 any	comparability	analysis.	The	Commission	(European	Commission	2014)	points	out	that	as	 Amazon	 EU	 Sarl	 was	 performing	 complex	 functions	 this	 method	 appears	inappropriate	and	that	the	margin	used	seems	low.		
 In	addition	to	the	percentage	of	operating	expenses	used,	a	floor	(0.45%	of	European	turnover)	and	a	cap	(0.55%	of	European	turnover)	were	set.	These	essentially	override	the	 pricing	 method	 based	 on	 operating	 expenses.	 Amazon	 and	 the	 Luxembourgish	authorities	give	no	explanation	as	 to	why	such	a	 combination	of	methods	 is	used: ‘It	
appears	 that	 the	 floor	 and	 the	 cap	 are	 used	 to	 ensure	 a	 relatively	 predictable	 level	 of	
taxable	profit;	 they	do	not	seem	to	be	based	on	any	arm’s	 length	 reasoning’	 (European	
Commission	2014).	
6.1.3 Amazon: Conclusion Amazon’s	group	is	structured	in	a	way	that	reduces	the	tax	that	it	pays	in	both	the	UK	and	in	Luxembourg.	By	structuring	carefully	Amazon	has	been	able	to	avoid	having	a	PE	in	the	UK	despite	the	high	level	of	business	conducted	there.	The	calculation	of	a	UK	ETR	does	not	capture	this	 type	of	 tax	avoidance	as	 the	calculation	would	be	based	on	the	existing	business	conducted	in	the	UK,	without	including	any	evaluation	of	the	business	that	is	diverted	and	not	recorded	in	the	UK.	This	demonstrates	the	importance	of	the	level	 of	 analysis.	 	 Amazon’s	 structure	 and	 tax	 avoidance	 is	 complex	 and	 difficult	 to	capture	through	the	use	of	quantitative	data	justifying	the	use	of	case	study	methods	and	applying	specifically	the	OECD	concept	of	PE	and	the	tax	deal	offered	by	the	Luxembourg	government	to	analyse	in	detail	the	way	Amazon	structures	its	business	in	Europe.	This	case	study	provides	new	useful	insights	into	the	tax	affairs	of	this	important	company.			 	
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6.2 The Ford Motor Company  Ford	was	incorporated	in	1903,	and	began	by	selling	the	Model	A.	It	is	well	known	for	introducing	the	assembly	line	in	1913.	It	became	a	publicly	listed	company	in	1956	(Ford	2017).	 It	 is	 now	 ranked	 9th	 in	 the	 Fortune	 500	 (Fortune	 500).	 Whilst	 it	 incurred	significant	 losses	 in	 the	 2008	 financial	 crisis	 it	 was	 the	 only	 one	 of	 the	 large	 US	automobile	companies	that	did	not	receive	a	US	government	bail	out.	Ford	sells	Ford	and	Lincoln	branded	cars	and	vans	in	the	US	and	focuses	on	the	Ford	brand	outside	the	US.	These	brands	are	clear	FSAs	for	the	company.	
They	consider	their	main	global	competitors	to	include	Fiat	Chrysler	Automobiles	(Italy),	General	Motors	Company	(US),	Honda	Motor	Company	(Japan),	Hyundai-Kia	Automotive	Group	(South	Korea),	PSA	Peugeot	Citroen	(France),	Renault-Nissan	B.V.	(France/	Japan),	Suzuki	Motor	Corporation	(Japan),	Toyota	Motor	Corporation	(Japan),	and	Volkswagen	AG	Group	(Germany).	In	North	America,	Canada	and	Mexico	are	also	important	markets.	Britain	and	Germany	are	key	markets	in	Europe,	Brazil	and	Argentina	in	South	America	and	Australia,	Taiwan,	Thailand,	South	Africa	and	Japan	in	the	Asia	Pacific	region	(Ford	2014).	
As	well	as	the	manufacture	and	sale	of	cars	income	is	also	generated	through	leasing	and	financing	 (Ford	 2014).	 In	 2014	 approximately	 6	 per	 cent	 of	 revenue	was	 generated	through	financial	services	($8,295	from	their	financial	services	business	and	$135,782m	from	automotive	sales)	(Ford	2014).		This	case	study	explores	the	way	in	which	deferred	tax	assets	and	valuation	allowances	affect	 the	 company’s	 ETRs.	 It	 demonstrates	 the	 importance	 of	 understanding	 the	mechanisms	by	which	annual	tax	charges	are	calculated.	It	is	vital	that	researchers	using	information	 from	 annual	 reports	 understand	 the	 complex	 interactions	 between	different	line	items.	
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Table 23 Ford Revenue and Net Sales Over Time 
US$ millions 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Total Revenue 144,077 146,917 133,559 135,605 128,954 118,308 145,114 172,455 148,866 176,835 
YoY Revenue Growth (1.93%) 10.00% (1.51%) 5.16% 9.00% (18.47%) (15.85%) 15.85% (15.82%) 3.02% 
Profit Before Tax 1,234 14,371 7,720 8,681 7,149 3,026 (14,498) (3,746) (15,074) 1,054 
Income tax (Provision)/ benefit (4) (2,425) (2,056) 11,541 592 (69) (63) 1,294 2,655 855 
Net income 1,230 11,946 5,664 20,222 7,741 2,957 (14,561) (2,452) (12,419) 1,909 
Return on Sales* 0.86% 9.78% 5.78% 6.40% 5.54% 2.56% (9.99%) -2.17% -10.13% 0.60% 
Source:	Ford	Inc.	Annual	Reports,	2005-2014			*Calculated	based	on	information	in	Annual	Reports		
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Table 24 Ford Taxes Paid and ETRs 
$ million 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Tax Charge/ (Benefit) 4 2,425 2,056 (11,541) (592) 69 63 (1,294) (2,655) (855) 
Cash tax paid 365 394 400 268 73 (764) 685 (223) 423 382 
GAAP ETR (26.62%) (1.92%) 26.53% (130.24%) 8.28% (4.35%) (0.44%) 34.54% 17.61% (78.31%) 
Cash ETR 8.41% 5.6% 5.24% 3.02% 1.02% (29.4%) (4.76%) 5.95% (2.81%) 35.40% 
Source:	Ford	Inc.	Annual	Reports,	2005-2014			
 
Table 25 Ford Deferred Tax 
 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Total Gross DT Assets 22,187 21,734 22,722 22,285 23,370 27,087 28,966 23,612 28,682 23,087 
Less Valuation Allowance 1,604 1,633 1,923 1,545 15,664 17,451 17,268 8,560 7,180 248 
Net DT Assets 20,583 20,101 20,799 20,740 7,706 9,636 11,698 15,052 21,502 22,839 
Less Deferred Liabilities 7,129 7,384 6,084 6,311 6,838 8,571 10,625 14,586 19,296 22,233 
NET TOTAL DT 13,454 12,717 14,715 14,429 868 1,065 1,073 466 2,206 606 
Source:	Ford	Inc.	Annual	Reports,	2005-2014			
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6.2.1 Geographical Segment Reporting US	companies	are	required	to	provide	information	on	operating	segments	as	set	out	in	FASB	 131	 (FASB	 1997).	 Ford	 provides	 information	 on	 five	 geographical	 segments	(although	there	have	been	changes	in	the	segments	reported	over	the	ten	year	period).	It	currently	provides	 information	based	on	 five	geographic	segments:	North	America,	South	America,	Europe,	Middle	East	&	Africa,	and	Asia	Pacific	(Ford	2014	p	FS-64).			These	segments	record	revenues	on	a	‘where	sold’	basis	–	with	the	segment	recording	the	sale	when	it	is	made	to	the	ultimate	external	customer.	However,	they	report	that	due	 to	 the	 integrated	 structure	 of	 the	 business,	 geographic	 segments	 are	 allocated	 a	portion	of	costs	that	are	incurred	at	the	headquarters	level	or	where	relevant,	a	portion	of	costs	incurred	by	another	segment	(Ford	2014	p	FS-65).	 
6.2.2 Deferred Tax  Deferred	tax	(DT)	assets	and	liabilities	are	derived	from	temporary	differences	that	exist	between	 the	 financial	 statement	 carrying	 value	 of	 assets	 and	 liabilities	 and	 their	respective	 tax	 bases.	 They	 are	 recognized	 based	 on	 the	 future	 tax	 consequences	combined	with	operating	loss	and	tax	credit	carryforwards	on	a	taxing	jurisdiction	basis.	The	firm	must	assess	the	likelihood	that	they	will	have	sources	of	taxable	income	against	which	to	set	these	deferred	tax	assets.	The	US	GAAP	accounting	standards	require	firms	to	establish	a	‘valuation	allowance’	that	is	netted	off	against	the	asset,	in	effect	reducing	the	total	value	of	the	deferred	tax	asset,	if	they	think	that	they	have	a	less	than	50	per	cent	chance	of	realizing	the	assets.		In	 order	 for	 a	DT	 asset	 to	 have	 value	 the	 company	must	 consider	 that	 there	will	 be	sufficient	 income	 in	 the	 future	 for	 the	DT	 to	be	offset	 against.	As	Ford	states	 in	 their	Annual	Report	(2014):	
	‘Our	accounting	for	deferred	tax	consequences	represents	our	best	estimate	of	the	likely	
future	tax	consequences	of	events	that	have	been	recognized	on	our	financial	statements	
or	tax	returns	and	their	future	probability.	In	assessing	the	need	for	a	valuation	allowance,	
we	consider	both	positive	and	negative	evidence	related	to	the	likelihood	of	realization	of	
the	deferred	tax	assets.	If,	based	on	the	weight	of	available	evidence,	it	is	more	likely	than	
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not	that	the	deferred	tax	assets	will	not	be	realized,	we	record	a	valuation	allowance.’	(Ford	
2014	pFS-59) 	Ford	has	significant	DT	assets	and	liabilities.	These	are	likely	to	be	present	in	different	countries	so	may	not	be	able	to	be	netted	off	against	each	other.	Following	the	significant	losses	in	2008	($14,561million)	Ford	increased	its	valuation	allowance	against	the	DT	asset.	 It	 judged	 that	 there	was	 the	 possibility	 of	 insufficient	 future	 income	 to	 offset	against	 the	 whole	 DT	 asset.	 The	 valuation	 allowance	 therefore	 increased	 from	$8,560million	to	$17,268	million.			In	2011	Ford	disclosed	a	more	optimistic	outlook	on	its	earning	potential:	
‘At	the	end	of	2011,	our	US	operations	had	returned	to	a	position	of	cumulative	profits	for	
the	most	recent	three-year	period.	We	concluded	that	this	record	of	cumulative	profitability	
in	recent	years,	our	ten	consecutive	quarters	of	pre-tax	operating	profits,	our	successful	
completion	of	labor	negotiations	with	the	UAW,	and	our	business	plan	showing	continued	
profitability,	provide	assurance	that	our	 future	tax	benefits	more	 likely	 than	not	will	be	
realized.	Accordingly,	at	year-end	2011,	we	released	almost	all	of	our	valuation	allowance	
against	net	deferred	tax	assets	for	entities	in	the	United	States,	Canada,	and	Spain.’	(Ford	
2011,	pFS-77)		The	DT	valuation	allowance	therefore	fell	from	$15,664million	in	2010	to	$1,545million	in	2011.		This	had	the	effect	of	reducing	the	disclosed	ETR	by	172.3	per	cent	in	one	single	year,	turning	the	overall	disclosed	ETR	into	a	net	benefit	141	per	cent.			In	2013	Ford	restructured	their	European	business	and	made	tax	elections	to	include	the	operations	of	European	subsidiaries	in	their	US	tax	returns.	This	enabled	them	to	recognise	 the	DT	 assets	 relating	 to	 these	 subsidiaries	 as	 they	 could	 be	 viably	 set	 off	against	US	income.	This	resulted	in	an	increase	in	DT	assets	related	to	the	investments	in	European	affiliates	of	$1.5billion.	At	December	2014,	a	valuation	allowance	of	$1.6	billion	was	disclosed	primarily	for	DT	assets	related	to	Ford’s	South	America	operations.		
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6.2.3 Net Operating Loss Carryforwards and Tax Credits Net	 operating	 loss	 carryforwards	 refer	 to	 the	 ability	 to	 apply	 a	 year’s	 net	 operating	losses	 to	 future	 years’	 profits	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 tax	 liability.	 Including	 the	 previous	year’s	loss	on	the	balance	sheet	reduces	the	current	year’s	taxable	profit,	with	the	aim	of	providing	a	more	accurate	assessment	of	the	overall	position	of	the	company	over	time.	Firms	can	also	book	other	forms	of	tax	credits	to	the	balance	sheet,	relating	to	capital	losses.	Ford	books	‘credit	losses’	from	its	financing	business	by	calculating	an	average	expected	loss	using	a	‘collective	loss	to	receivables’	calculation	(Ford	2014	p.84).		Ford	 has	 a	 significant	 balance	 of	 Net	 Operating	 Loss	 Carryforwards	 -	 $7.2	 billion	 at	December	31,	2014,	resulting	in	a	DT	asset	of	$2.6	billion	(Ford,	2014	p.	FS-61).	There	is	no	expiration	date	for	$6	billion	of	these	losses.	The	remaining	losses	begin	to	expire	in	2015,	though	a	substantial	portion	expire	beyond	2017.	In	addition,	the	company	has	tax	credits	that	can	be	used	to	offset	future	tax	liabilities	of	$6.8billion	(Ford	2014	p.	FS-61).  
6.2.4 Permanently Reinvested Earnings Permanently	 Reinvested	 Earnings	 (PRE)	 are	 earnings	 generated	 outside	 the	 US	 and	which	the	company	states	are	‘permanently’	reinvested	outside	the	US,	that	is,	they	will	not	be	repatriated	and	therefore	are	not	subject	to	US	taxes.	Companies	are	required	to	state	the	level	of	PRE	that	they	hold	in	their	annual	report.	Auditors	are	required	to	verify	that	the	earnings	are	permanently	reinvested	but	there	is	no	specific	requirement	about	what	 constitutes	 permanent	 reinvestment.	 Accounting	 Principles	 Board	 (APB,	 the	forerunner	to	the	Financial	Accounting	Standards	Board)	issued	APB	23	(APB	1973)	in	1973	that	dictates	how	PRE	should	be	accounted	for.	APB	23	states	 that	 it	should	be	presumed	 that	 the	 undistributed	 earnings	 of	 a	 subsidiary	will	 be	 transferred	 to	 the	parent.	 This	would	mean	 accounting	 for	 tax	 due	 as	 a	 temporary	 difference.	 APB	 23	however,	also	crated	an	‘indefinite	reversal	criteria’	meaning	that	the	stated	presumption	can	 be	 ignored	 and	 no	 taxes	 need	 to	 be	 accrued	 if	 ‘sufficient	 evidence	 shows	 that	 the	
subsidiary	has	 invested	or	will	 invest	 the	undistributed	earnings	 indefinitely	of	 that	 the	
earnings	will	be	 remitted	 in	a	tax	 free	 liquidation’.	 	Accounting	Standards	Codification	(ASC)	740	–	30	(ASC	2009)	updates	the	position	and	says	that	a	company	with	plans	which	demonstrate	that	the	remittance	of	the	earnings	will	be	postponed	indefinitely	do	
	 228	
not	 need	 to	 recognise	 a	 DT	 liability.	 ASC	 740-30	 does	 not	 specify	 what	 evidence	 is	required.	 Audit	 firms	 have	 instead	 developed	 their	 own	 criteria	 to	 ‘sign	 off’	 client’s	assertion	that	its	undistributed	foreign	earnings	are	permanently	invested.		A	 firm	 choosing	 to	 classify	 earnings	 as	 permanently	 reinvested	 would	 have	 no	requirement	to	provide	for	potential	taxes	(DT)	on	the	amount	of	PRE.	In	future	years	the	 firm	could	reclassify	 the	earnings	and	provide	 for	DT.	This	simple	reclassification	could	have	a	significant	impact	on	the	amount	of	DT	charged	to	the	Income	Statement	as	the	GAAP	tax	charge	for	the	year.			Some	companies	calculate	and	disclose	the	amount	of	tax	that	would	be	payable	if	they	were	to	choose	to	repatriate.	Others	state	that	this	calculation	is	not	practicable.	Ford	states	the	amount	of	tax	that	would	be	payable	in	2014	would	have	been	$200million	if	they	had	repatriated	all	their	PRE	(Ford	2014	p.	FS-61).		The	American	Jobs	Creation	Act	(AJCA)	of	2004	reduced	the	amount	of	tax	payable	for	firms	repatriating	overseas	earnings	for	a	single	year	to	5.25	per	cent	(Clemmons	and	Kinney	2008;	Blouin	and	Krull,	2009).	Ford	took	advantage	of	this,	repatriating	earnings	that	 had	 previously	 been	 considered	 as	 PRE.	 The	 precise	 amount	 remitted	 is	 not	disclosed	but	PRE	fell	from	$860m	in	2004	to	$550m	in	2005.	They	disclose	a	tax	benefit	related	to	this	of	$250m.	The	reconciliation	between	the	statutory	rate	and	their	actual	rate	of	tax	paid	reveals	that	this	reduced	their	effective	tax	rate	by	33	per	cent.	If	the	AJCA	 is	 repeated	 in	 future	 years	 there	 will	 be	 large	 impacts	 on	 the	 GAAP	 ETR	 for	companies	taking	advantage	of	it.		
Table 26 Ford PRE $’million	 2014	 2013	 2012	 2011	 2010	 2009	 2008	 2007	 2006	 2005	
PRE	 4,300	 7,500	 6,600	 8,400	 812	 1,300	 1,200	 715m	 715	 550	
Source:	Ford	Annual	Reports	2005-2014.		The	increase	in	PRE	between	2010	and	2011	was	disclosed	as	being	due	to	a	change	in	accounting	policy	where	Ford	decided	that	an	additional	$6.3billion	of	overseas	earnings	
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would	not	be	repatriated.	They	therefore	increased	the	stated	PRE	from	$812million	to	$8.4billion.	As	a	consequence	this	reduced	their	DT	liabilities	by	$63million.		The	 amount	 of	 PRE	 increases	 from	 $550m	 in	 2005	 to	 $4300m	 in	 2014.	 There	 are	however	3	drops	in	the	amounts	recorded	between	2009	and	2010,	between	2011	and	2012	which	are	unexplained.	The	third	drop,	between	2013	and	2014,	of	$3billion	 is	sparsely	explained	in	the	accounts	as:	
‘…primarily	due	to	a	change	in	our	methodology	for	measuring	currency	gains	and	losses	
in	computing	the	earnings	of	our	European	operations	under	US	tax	law.’	(Ford	2014,	p.FS-61).			In	most	years	Ford	does	not	calculate	the	amount	of	tax	that	would	be	payable	if	these	earnings	were	repatriated,	simply	stating	that	they	have	already	paid	foreign	taxes	on	these	 earnings	 which	 would	 be	 credited	 against	 them	 if	 repatriated.	 In	 2014	 they	estimate	that	only	$200million	would	be	payable	if	the	$4.3billion	were	repatriated	–	a	rate	of	4.65	per	cent.	
6.2.5 Ford: Conclusion Ford	 has	 been	 operating	 in	 a	 difficult	 economic	 climate	 during	 the	 ten	 years	 under	consideration.	 In	 2006,	 2007	 and	 2008	 they	 made	 significant	 losses.	 These	 losses	affected	their	subsequent	tax	liabilities	both	directly	and	indirectly.	Losses	have	been	carried	 forward	 from	previous	years	and	offset	 again	 liabilities.	The	 losses	and	poor	performance	 also	 generated	 a	 less	 optimistic	 outlook	 for	 the	 future.	 This	 in	 turn	necessitated	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 valuation	 provision	 to	 reflect	 the	 reduced	 potential	 of	using	all	of	the	existing	DT	assets.			When	performance	improved	Ford	were	then	able	to	take	a	more	optimistic	view	of	the	valuation	of	these	DT	assets.		This	highlights	the	importance	of	the	long	term	view	taken	by	the	company	and	the	impact	that	this	valuation	of	DT	assets	can	have	on	their	tax	liabilities.			The	importance	of	decisions	about	the	future	made	by	the	company	is	also	demonstrated	in	the	PRE	fluctuations.		This	case	study	highlights	some	of	the	more	fluid	aspects	of	a	
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company’s	 tax	 position.	 Whilst	 no	 argument	 is	 made	 that	 these	 changes	 reflect	deliberate	tax	avoidance	on	the	part	of	Ford,	they	do	illustrate	some	of	the	mechanisms	available	to	management	to	affect	the	timing,	if	not	the	value	of	tax	liabilities.	
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6.3 The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company Goodyear	 is	 the	world’s	 largest	 tyre	 company	 currently	 ranked	 at	 147	 in	 the	 global	Fortune	500	list	of	companies	(Fortune	2016).	It	has	a	strong	brand	name	that	is	globally	recognized	 and	 invests	 in	 innovation	 to	 generate	 improvements	 in	 its	 products	 and	production	process	(The	Economist	2010).	It	has	operations	in	most	regions	of	the	world	with	the	business	operating	through	four	segments:	North	America,	Europe	Middle	East	and	Africa,	Latin	American	and	Asia	Pacific	(Goodyear	2014,	p.63).		The	company	generated	net	losses	over	the	period	2008	–	2010	at	least	in	part	driven	by	the	crisis	in	the	automobile	industry	following	the	financial	crash	of	2008.		Despite	these	losses	the	company	continued	to	pay	net	taxes	until	2014	when	it	recorded	a	net	benefit	of	$1,384million.	The	 company	 returned	 to	 profitability	 in	 2011,	 which	 also	 generated	 their	 highest	revenue	over	the	period.	Total	revenue	then	fell	from	2011	but	this	was	the	time	that	the	 US	 business	 became	 profitable.	 Return	 on	 sales	 across	 the	 business	 as	 a	 whole	reached	a	high	in	2013	of	4.39	per	cent	despite	of,	or	because	of	a	fall	in	revenue.	Return	on	sales	reached	a	high	in	2013	of	4.39	per	cent.			
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Table 27 Goodyear Revenue and Net Sales Over Time 
US$ millions 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Total revenue 18,138 18,540 20,922 22,767 18,332 16,301 19,488 19,644 18,751 18,098 
YoY revenue growth (%)* (2.17) (11.68) (7.80) 20.90 15.53 (16.35) (0.79) 4.76 3.61 (8.24) 
Profit before tax 687 813 440 618 8 (357) 186 464 (202) 452 
Income tax provision/ (benefit) (1,384) 138 203 201 172 7 209 255 60 233 
Net income 2,071 675 237 417 (164) (364) (23) 209 (262) 219 
Return on sales (%)* 3.79 4.39 2.10 2.71 0.04 (2.19) 0.95 2.36 (1.08) 2.5 
Source: Goodyear Tires Corporation Annual Reports 
*Calculated based on information in Goodyear Tires Annual Reports 
 
Table 28 Goodyear Taxes Paid and ETRs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:	Goodyear	Tires	Corporation	Annual	Reports	2005-2014.	*Calculated	based	on	information	in	Goodyear	Tires	Annual	Reports.	Figures	in	brackets	represent	net	benefits	to	the	firm.		 	
US$ millions 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Total 
GAAP Tax charge (1,384) 138 203 201 172 7 209 255 60 233 (356) 
Cash Tax Charge 127 186 204 212 167 97 278 274 310 239 2,094 
GAAP ETR* % (201.46) 16.97 46.16 32.52 2,150.00 (1.96) 112.37 54.96 (29.70) 51.55 (11.89) 
Cash ETR* % 18.49 22.88 46.36 34.30 2,087.50 (27.17) 149.46 59.05 (153.47) 52.88 69.18 
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Table 29 Goodyear US and Foreign Income and Taxes Paid 
$’million 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Total 
US Income 400 396 146 (111) (529) (631) (409) (342) (797) (324) (2,201) 
Foreign Income 287 417 294 729 537 274 595 806 595 776 5,310 
TOTAL INCOME 687 813 440 618 8 (357) 186 464 (202) 452 3,109 
Current US Tax (Federal and State) 1 (4) 3 3 (14) (11) (5) 2 (47) (28) (100) 
Current Foreign Tax  135 176 184 253 180 144 212 258 148 276 1,966 
TOTAL TAX 136 172 187 256 166 133 207 260 101 248 1,866 
Source:	Goodyear	Tires	Corporation	Annual	Reports	2005-2014.	
Table 30 Goodyear Deferred Tax Balance Sheet Position 
$’million 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
DT Asset 3,413 3,517 3,889 3,565 3,501 3,398 2,993 2,520 3,156 2,398 
Valuation Allowance (632) (2,968) (3,393) (3,132) (3,113) (3,056) (2,701) (2,231) (2,814) (2,052) 
DT Liabilities (618)  (481) (384) (350) (400) (368) (342) (331) (356) (397) 
Net DT 2,163   68 112 83 (12) (26) (50) (42) (14) (51) 
Source:	Goodyear	Tires	Corporation	Annual	Reports	2005-2014.			
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The	overall	LR	(ten	year)	GAAP	ETR	was	a	benefit	of	11.89	per	cent,	compared	with	the	long	 term	 cash	ETR	 of	 69.18	 per	 cent.	 The	 difference	 is	 due	 to	 the	 large	 tax	 benefit	($1,384million)	 recorded	 in	 2014.	 The	 movements	 in	 the	 valuation	 allowance	 (see	below)	transformed	the	GAAP	ETR	for	2014	to	a	net	credit	of	201.46	per	cent,	whilst	the	cash	ETR	remained	a	charge	of	18.49	per	cent.	Excluding	the	year	2014	the	GAAP	ETR	over	the	nine	year	period	was	61.02	per	cent	and	the	Cash	ETR	was	81.21	per	cent.	In	2006	the	release	of	an	uncertain	tax	position	reduced	their	tax	payable	by	$204	million	The	figures	above	show	that	the	US	business	as	a	single	segment	was	loss	making	from	2005	 until	 2011.	 Positive	 income	 was	 generated	 from	 businesses	 overseas	 creating	positive	income	in	all	years	except	2006	and	2009.		As	a	consequence	very	little	tax	was	paid	in	the	US.	Over	the	ten	year	period	the	overall	charge	was	a	net	credit	to	Goodyear	of	$100million.	Foreign	tax	liabilities	remained	on	the	profits	earned	overseas	and	over	the	ten	year	period	this	equaled	$1.9	billion.		These	overseas	taxes	paid	could	be	netted	off	against	any	positive	US	taxes	paid	if	the	funds	were	returned	to	the	US.	However,	as	no	net	US	taxes	were	paid	over	the	ten	year	period	Goodyear	had	no	tax	charge	to	net	these	taxes	off	against.	This	resulted	in	higher	tax	payments	overseas	and	little	tax	payment	in	the	US.	The	impact	of	this	is	highlighted	by	the	statement	made	by	Goodyear	that	they	had	little	to	gain	from	returning	overseas	earnings	under	the	 lower	tax	regime	 implemented	by	the	AJCA	2004	(Clemmons	and	Kinney	2008;	Blouin	and	Krull	2009).	No	funds	were	returned	by	Goodyear	under	the	AJCA	2004	(Goodyear,	2005).	
6.3.1 Deferred Tax  Net	operating	loss	carryforwards	are	recognized	as	assets	by	 firms	but	 if	 they	do	not	think	that	they	will	be	able	to	benefit	from	them	before	they	expire	they	must	reduce	their	 net	 value	 by	 raising	 a	 valuation	 allowance	 against	 them.	 For	 example,	 in	 2005	Goodyear	record	a	deferred	tax	asset	of	$299	million	for	net	operating	loss	and	tax	credit	carryforwards	related	to	certain	international	subsidiaries	and	$155	million	of	Federal	and	state	tax	assets	for	net	operating	loss	and	tax	credit	carryforwards.	Some	of	these	assets	would	start	to	expire	in	2006.	A	valuation	allowance	of	$247	million	was	therefore	recorded	against	the	international	assets	and	a	full	valuation	allowance	was	recorded	
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against	 the	US	deferred	 tax	assets.	These	provisions	are	needed	when	 the	use	of	 the	assets	is	uncertain	(Goodyear,	2005).		In	 2006	 favourable	 net	 tax	 adjustments	 totaling	 $163	million	were	 recorded.	 These	adjustments	largely	related	to	the	resolution	of	an	uncertain	tax	position	regarding	a	reorganization	of	certain	legal	entities	in	2001.	The	uncertainty	around	this	position	had	been	partially	offset	by	a	charge	of	$47	million	to	establish	a	foreign	valuation	allowance.	The	release	of	this	valuation	allowance	plus	the	favourable	adjustment	contributed	to	a	net	tax	benefit	being	recorded:	a	GAAP	ETR	of	29.70	per	cent.	The	fact	that	this	related	to	 a	 reorganization	 conducted	 in	 2001	 demonstrates	 the	 significant	 time	 lags	 that	emerge	in	tax	accounting.			Table	30,	above,	sets	out	the	DT	assets	and	liabilities	that	are	recorded	as	held	over	the	ten-year	period.	 	 SFAS	No.	109	 ‘Accounting	 for	 Income	Taxes’	 requires	 companies	 to	make	an	assessment	of	both	positive	and	negative	evidence	when	measuring	the	need	for	a	valuation	allowance.	The	annual	reports	reveal	that	the	losses	made	in	some	foreign	locations	as	well	as	in	the	US	represent	sufficient	negative	evidence	that	they	may	not	be	able	 to	 use	 the	 DT	 assets	 that	 they	 have	 accumulated.	 A	 full	 valuation	 allowance	 is	therefore	provided	in	these	locations.	SFAS	No.	109	suggests	that	operating	results	over	the	most	recent	three-year	period	is	key	evidence	and	should	be	given	greater	weight	than	 future	 expectations	 of	 profitability	 given	 the	 inherent	 uncertainty	 of	 future	earnings.		The	American	Taxpayer	Relief	Act	of	2012	as	signed	into	law	on	January	2,	2013	and	retroactively	adopts	certain	taxpayer	relief	provisions	that	could	not	be	reflected	in	the	2012	financial	statements	as	enactment	took	place	 in	2013.	The	timing	of	 this	would	clearly	affect	all	US	companies	entitled	to	claim	these	provisions.	The	act	reinstated	the	R&D	tax	credit	and	other	foreign	dividend	provisions	that	would	affect	the	calculation	of	deferred	taxes.	The	impact	on	Goodyear	Tires	was	limited	by	the	full	valuation	that	they	maintain	against	their	US	DT	assets	at	this	time.			
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In	2013	a	$33	million	benefit	was	recorded	due	to	the	company	from	a	special	enterprise	zone	tax	incentives	in	Poland	and	a	$13	million	benefit	related	to	changes	in	enacted	tax	laws	(Goodyear,	2014,	p.61).			Goodyear	maintained	a	full	valuation	allowance	against	their	US	DT	assets	until 2014 
when substantially	all	of	it	was	released.		The	release	of	this	valuation	allowance	resulted	in	a	$2,179	million	benefit	to	their	tax	expense	for	the	year	2014.	The	profit	booked	in	2014	 was	 the	 third	 successive	 year	 of	 profits.	 This,	 combined	 with	 the	 successful	agreement	 of	 labour	 negotiations	 and	 the	 full	 funding	 of	 pension	 funds	 as	well	 as	 a	forecast	of	profits	in	the	future	business	plan	created	the	expectation	that	a	significant	portion	of	the	US	deferred	tax	assets	will	be	able	to	be	realized. 	The	remaining	valuation	allowance	as	at	2014	related	to	certain	US	federal,	state	and	local	deferred	tax	assets	($14	million)	and	valuation	allowances	on	foreign	DT	assets	of	$618	million,	giving	a	total	valuation	allowance	of	$632	million.	At	the	same	time	charges	of	$131	million	were	made	to	record	DTs	on	certain	undistributed	earnings	of	certain	foreign	subsidiaries	although	more	detail	on	which	subsidiaries	these	are	or	what	this	directly	relates	to	has	not	been	(Goodyear	2014,	p.62)	disclosed.	Charges	of	$37	million	were	also	made	to	establish	valuation	allowances	against	the	deferred	tax	assets	of	the	Venezuelan	 and	 Brazilian	 subsidiaries.	 The	 annual	 report	 discloses	 that	 these	 were	necessitated	by	operating	losses	and	currency	devaluations	in	Venezuela.	A	charge	of	$9	million	established	a	valuation	allowance	on	the	net	deferred	tax	assets	of	a	Luxembourg	subsidiary,	and	a	charge	of	$11	million	was	made	due	to	a	change	of	law	in	Chile.		Goodyear	expects	an	increase	in	their	GAAP	ETR	as	a	result	of	recording	tax	expense	on	their	US	earnings	due	to	the	increased	earnings	in	the	US.	Goodyear	predicts,	however,	that	over	the	following	five	years,	they	will	utilize	tax	credits	and	tax	loss	carryforwards	in	their	tax	returns	that	will	result	in	their	paying	no	significant	federal	income	tax.	This	will	be	reflected	in	the	lack	of	cash	tax	payments	in	the	US	and	therefore	to	their	ETR.			As	at	the	end	of	2014,	Goodyear	had	$935	million	of	Federal	and	$107	million	of	state	tax	assets	for	net	operating	loss	and	tax	credit	carryforwards	(Goodyear,	2014	p.	61).	The	Federal	carryforwards	consist	of	$380	million	of	Federal	tax	assets	for	net	operating	
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losses	 that	 expire	 from	2029	 to	2034,	$499	million	of	 foreign	 tax	 credits	 that	 expire	between	2016	and	2024	and	$56	million	of	tax	assets	related	to	R&D	credits	that	expire	between	2027	and	2034.	A	valuation	allowance	of	$14	million	has	been	recorded	against	Federal	and	state	DT	assets	where	recovery	is	uncertain	(Goodyear,	2014	p.	62).			The	company	predicts	that	evidence	recorded	in	2015	may	be	sufficient	to	warrant	the	release	of	some	or	all,	of	certain	valuation	allowances	which	may	result	in	a	reduction	of	the	 foreign	 valuation	 allowance	 by	 up	 to	 $80	million.	 As	with	 the	 release	 of	 the	 US	valuation	allowance,	this	will	have	a	significant	beneficial	impact	on	GAAP	ETR.	
6.3.2 Goodyear Tires: Conclusion This	 case	 study	 demonstrates	 the	 impact	 on	 global	 taxes	 when	 the	 performance	 of	international	and	domestic	businesses	is	not	aligned.	Goodyear	Tires	have	paid	little	tax	in	the	US	and	as	a	result	have	been	unable	to	net	the	cash	taxes	paid	overseas	from	US	payments.	As	a	result	their	cash	tax	payments	are	higher	than	they	would	have	been	if	their	performance	had	been	more	evenly	balanced.		The	case	also	highlights	the	impact	that	the	creation	and	release	of	valuation	allowances	can	have	on	the	overall	DT	assets	and	charges.	The	release	of	valuation	allowances	is	based	on	the	company	adopting	a	more	optimistic	outlook	on	their	future	performance.	As	with	the	previous	case	study	on	the	Ford	Motor	Company,	the	outlook	of	the	MNE	has	a	direct	impact	on	the	overall	GAAP	tax	charge.		There	are	also	a	number	of	other	one	off	items	that	affect	the	overall	tax	liability	of	the	company.	Government	policy	reintroducing	tax	credits	has	a	significant	impact	on	the	overall	tax	liability	for	2013.	The	Polish	government’s	creation	of	a	special	enterprise	zone	with	tax	incentives	also	has	an	impact	on	the	tax	charge	for	2013.	The	size	of	these	credits	 is	 less	 important	 than	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 clearly	 illustrate	 the	 way	 that	government	incentives	can	impact	on	the	overall	tax	recorded	for	a	specific	year.	This	demonstrates	another	important	factor	driving	the	ETR.	Both	cash	and	GAAP	ETRs	can	be	affected	directly	by	government	policies.			 	
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6.4 Google This	case	study	uses	publicly	available	information	to	set	out	how	Google	Inc.	chooses	to	organize	its	affairs	for	tax	purposes.	It	describes	how	Google	uses	subsidiaries	in	Ireland	to	reduce	its	tax	payable	in	both	the	UK	and	the	US.		
 Google	Inc.	was	founded	in	the	USA	in	1998	and	it	listed	on	the	NASDAQ	stock	exchange	in	2004.	In	October	2015	a	new	parent	company,	the	public	holding	company	Alphabet	Inc.	was	established,	to	own	the	Google	group	companies.	Google’s	mission	statement	is	to	 ‘to	 organize	 the	 world's	 information	 and	 make	 it	 universally	 accessible	 and	 useful’	(Google	2012).	As	 such,	 it	 specializes	 in	 internet-related	 services	and	products.	Most	profits	are	generated	through	advertising	by	companies	placing	paid	for	adverts	within	the	Google	internet	search	engine.		Google	 has	 grown	 rapidly	 both	 through	 organic	 growth	 and	 a	 large	 number	 of	acquisitions.	 It	 owns	 YouTube	 and	 offers	 Gmail	 (email	 service)	 social	 networking	(Google+)	 and	 other	 products	 for	managing	 photos	 (Picassa),	 browsing	 the	 internet	(Google	Chrome),	cloud	based	GooglePlay,	mapping	service	Waze	and	instant	messaging.	It	has	also	led	the	development	of	the	Android	operating	system	for	mobile	phones.		
 Google	 has	 tried	 to	 maintain	 a	 flat	 corporate	 structure,	 despite	 its	 rapid	 growth,	believing	 that	 it	 encourages	 employees	 to	 work	 collaboratively	 and	 innovatively.	However,	it	now	operates	70	offices	in	more	than	40	countries	and	commentators	have	questioned	the	extent	to	which	it	has	been	able	to	maintain	this	corporate	culture	(The	Economist	2009).	The	company	says	that	it	is	transparent,	with	the	head	of	HR	revealing	in	detail	the	ways	in	which	employees	are	encouraged	to	work	openly	together	(Bock	2015).	As	this	case	study	demonstrates,	however,	it	is	less	transparent	in	its	financial	disclosures.		Google’s	original	FSA	was	a	logarithm	that	changed	the	way	that	search	engines	worked.	Its	 FSAs	 have	 now	 evolved.	 Its	 search	 engine	 is	 used	 to	 generate	 revenue	 through	advertising.	Its	size	and	international	reach	mean	that	its	brand	is	now	a	strong	asset	(FSA)	for	it.	Google	also	has	FSAs	relating	to	its	strong	ability	to	innovate	and	move	its	
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creativity	 into	 new	 areas	 of	 internet	 related	 services.	 It	 is	 also	 skilled	 at	 selecting,	acquiring,	and	then	managing	new	companies.	Its	success	can	be	seen	through	its	strong	year	on	year	sales	growth.	Google	is	a	profitable	company	with	a	strong	return	on	sales.	It	 is	 providing	 a	 good	 return	 for	 shareholders	 and	 has	 a	 strong	 return	 on	 capital	employed.	Its	revenues	placed	it	36th	on	the	Forbes	Global	500	list	in	2016.		Because	 of	 the	 broad	 nature	 of	 Google’s	 business	 they	 face	 a	 large	 number	 of	competitors.	In	their	annual	report	they	list	general	search	engines	such	as	Yahoo	and	Bing	 (Microsoft)	 as	 competitors	 as	 well	 as	 a	 large	 number	 of	 more	 specific	 sites:	Monster.com	(jobs)	WebMD	(health)	Amazon	and	Ebay	(retail).	As	most	of	their	revenue	comes	 from	 advertising	 their	 competitors	 also	 include	 those	 operating	 in	 more	traditional	forms	of	advertising	–	newspapers,	billboards,	magazines	etc.		
6.4.1 Regional Segment Information Google	products	and	services	are	provided	in	more	than	100	languages	(Google	2012).	Approximately	half	of	all	revenue	is	from	overseas	with	information	disclosed	for	the	US,	UK	and	Rest	of	the	World	(RoW).	The	UK	is	therefore	the	largest	market	outside	the	US,	 as	 figures	 are	 not	given	 for	 other	 individual	 countries.	The	UK	 share	 of	 revenue,	however,	 fell	 from	 a	 high	 of	 15.25	 per	 cent	 in	 2007	 to	 9.82	 per	 cent	 in	 2014.	 This	however,	reflects	the	faster	growth	in	the	RoW;	UK	revenue	has	continued	to	grow	(see	section	below).			
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Table 31 Google’s Revenue and Net Sales Over Time 
US$ millions 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Total Revenue 66,001 55,519 50,175 37,095 29,321 23,651 21,796 16,594 10,605 6,139 
YoY Revenue Growth % 18.88 10.65 32.37 29.28 23.97 8.51 31.35 56.47 72.76 92.48 
Profit Before Tax 17,259 15,899 14,469 12,326 10,796 8,381 5,854 5,674 4,011 2,142 
Provision for income tax 3,639 2,739 2,598 2,589 2,291 1,861 1,627 1,470 934 676 
Net income 13,620 13,160 10,788 9,737 8,505 6,520 4,227 4,203 3,077 1,465 
Return on Sales* % 20.64 23.70 21.50 25.69 29.01 27.57 19.39 25.33 29.02 23.87 
Source:	Google	Inc.	Annual	Reports	2005-2014	*Calculated	based	on	information	in	Annual	Reports		Return	on	sales	based	on	PBT		
Table 32 Google Inc. Segment Sales 
$’million 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
US sales 28,139 24,752 21,287 17,560 14,056 11,194 10,636 8,698 6,030 3,757 
UK sales 6,483 5,600 4,846 4,057 3,329 2,986 3,038 2,531 1,604 878 
RoW sales 31,379 25,167 19,906 16,288 11,936 9,471 8,122 5,565 2,971 1,504 
Total sales 66,001 55,519 46,039a 37,905 29,321 23,651 21,796 16,594 10,605 6,139 
Foreign % Total Sales* 57.37% 55.42% 53.76% 53.67% 52.06% 52.67% 51.20% 47.58% 43.14% 39.80% 
UK % Total Sales* 9.82% 10.09% 10.53% 10.70% 11.35% 12.63% 13.94% 15.25% 15.12% 14.30% 
Source:	Google	Inc	Annual	Reports	2005-2014	*	Calculated	based	on	information	in	Google	Inc.	Annual	Reports	a	Difference	between	total	sales	as	disclosed	by	segment	($46,039)	and	the	total	revenue	figure	($50,175)	given	above	in	Table	30	relates	to	the	acquisition	of	Motorola	Mobility	which	was	separately	disclosed	in	2012	($4,136).		
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6.4.2 Google Tax Payments After	listing	in	2004	Google	stated	in	its	annual	report	that	it	paid	tax	in	two	main	centres	–	the	US	and	Ireland.	Google	uses	its	Irish	subsidiaries	as	a	European	head	office	and	has	a	 similar	structure	using	Singapore	based	 subsidiaries	 in	Asia.	As	US	 tax	 is	not	 liable	when	 earnings	 are	 not	 remitted	 back	 to	 the	 US,	 the	 cash	 holdings	 that	 Google	 has	established	outside	the	US	are	exempt	from	US	tax.	The	proportion	of	revenue	coming	from	Google’s	international	segment	grew	steadily	from	34	per	cent	in	2004	to	57	per	cent	in	2014.	At	the	same	time	the	proportion	of	the	total	tax	bill	paid	overseas	increased	from	1.17	per	cent	in	2005	to	23.19	per	cent.	As	overseas	revenue	increased	and	the	proportion	of	tax	paid	overseas	(largely	in	Ireland)	increased,	the	ETR	fell.	Group	ETR	was	31.56	per	cent	in	2004	and	fell	from	that	point	to	its	lowest	rate	of	16.05	per	cent	in	2013.	ETR	was	19.3	per	cent	in	2014.	
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Table 33 Google Group Tax Payments 
$’million 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Total  
GAAP tax charge 3,331 2,282 2,598 2,589 2,291 1,861 1,626 1,470 934 676 20,247 
GAAP ETR (%) 19.30 16.05 20.15 21.00 21.22 22.20 27.79 25.91 23.28 31.58 20.91 
Cash tax charge 3,338 3,045 2,965 1,471 2,175 1,896 1,224 883 538 154 17,689 
Cash ETR (%) 19.34 19.15 20.49 11.93 20.15 22.62 20.91 15.56 13.41 7.19 18.27 
Foreign taxes as % total 23.19 28.19 12.47 11.04 7.32 6.95 4.77 3.13 2.76 1.17  
Unremitted earnings (PRE) 47,400 38,900 33,300 24,800 17,500 12,300 7,700 3,900 1,833 533  
Source:	Google	Inc.	Annual	Reports	2005-2014	
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The	amount	of	unremitted	earnings	(PRE)	 increased	from	$533.7million	 in	2005,	 the	year	after	Google	listed,	to	$47.4	billion	in	2014.	In	2005	and	2006	Google	calculated	that	they	would	have	had	to	pay	$208.9million	and	$715.2million	tax	respectively	if	they	had	chosen	to	repatriate	this	money.	They	calculated	that	39	per	cent	of	their	overseas	cash	holdings	 would	 have	 been	 payable	 as	 corporation	 tax	 on	 repatriation.	 From	 2007	onwards	 Google	 do	 not	 publish	 this	 expected	 tax	 liability,	 stating	 that	 it	 is	 ‘too	
complicated’	 to	 calculate	 (Google	 2007	 p.95).	 If	 they	 had	 paid	 35	 per	 cent	 tax	 on	repatriation	then,	by	2014	they	would	have	owed	the	US	government	$16.6billion	in	tax	if	they	had	chosen	to	repatriate	their	cash	holdings.		
6.4.3 Google’s Structure in Europe As	Google	sets	out	in	its	Annual	Report	(Google	2014)	–	Ireland	is	the	major	centre	where	it	pays	tax	outside	the	US.	Google	shifts	profits	from	all	of	its	European	subsidiaries	to	Ireland	(see	UK	example	below	for	explanation	of	how	Google	does	this).	Google	then	uses	a	complicated	structure	known	as	a	‘Double	Irish	Dutch	Sandwich’	(see	below)	to	reduce	 the	 tax	 it	 is	 liable	 to	 pay.	 Both	 Ireland	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 are	 low	 tax	jurisdictions	and	they	have	FDI-friendly	policies	and	highly	developed	legal	and	financial	consultancy	and	administrative	services	and	 infrastructures	to	support	MNEs’	special	purpose	entities	(SPEs)	(Altshuler	and	Grubert	2006;	Weyzig	and	Van	Dijk,	2009).	Other	large	US	companies,	such	as	Apple	also	use	this	structure	for	tax	purposes.	The	structure	works	 by	 shifting	 taxable	 profits	 from	 subsidiaries	 where	 profits	 are	 generated	 to	offshore	locations	by	using	royalty	payments	for	intellectual	property.	
	In	 2003,	 shortly	 before	 it	 listed,	 Google	 moved	 its	 IP	 (search	 and	 advertising	technologies)	 from	 the	 US	 to	 an	 Irish	 subsidiary:	 ‘Google	 Ireland	 Holdings’	 which	 is	incorporated	 in	 Ireland	 but	 is	 resident	 in	 Bermuda	 for	 tax	 purposes.	 At	 the	 time	 of	transfer,	Google	Inc.	would	have	been	liable	in	the	US	for	the	gains	arising	on	the	sale	of	the	IP	to	the	Irish	subsidiary.	As	Google	was	a	private	company	at	the	time,	however,	information	is	not	available	about	the	details	of	the	transfer	or	the	costs	involved.	The	value	would	certainly	have	increased	significantly	after	the	IPO.	
 ‘Google	 Ireland	Holdings’	 then	established	a	subsidiary:	 ‘Google	 Ireland	Limited,’	 and	licensed	 it	 to	 use	 Google’s	 technologies.	 Google	 Ireland	 Limited	 subsequently	 is	
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responsible	for	licensing	the	use	of	IP	to	all	Google’s	operating	subsidiaries	in	Europe,	the	Middle	East,	and	Africa	(EMEA).	Profits	are	therefore	generated	in	Google	Ireland	Limited	 from	 the	 payment	 of	 royalties,	 which	 are	 profit	 lowering	 expenses	 for	 the	overseas	subsidiaries	in	EMEA.	Ireland’s	current	rate	of	corporation	tax	is	12.5	per	cent	and	has	been	at	that	rate	since	Google	Ireland	Holdings	was	established;	significantly	lower	than	the	35	per	cent	statutory	rate	in	the	US.		Google	Ireland	Limited	therefore	has	to	pay	12.5	per	cent	on	its	profits.	Their	profits,	however,	are	reduced	by	the	large	royalty	payments	that	it	has	to	make	to	Google	Ireland	Holdings	 for	 the	 use	 of	 the	 IP.	 As	 Google	 Ireland	 Holdings,	 despite	 being	 an	 Irish	company,	 is	 resident	 in	 Bermuda,	 Google	 Ireland	 Limited	 should	 have	 to	 pay	 a	withholding	tax	on	remittances	 to	 it,	 as	 Ireland	charges	withholding	 taxes	on	royalty	payments	to	Bermuda.	So	instead	of	making	this	direct	payment,	which	would	be	subject	to	withholding	taxes,	the	royalty	payments	are	sent	via	the	Netherlands.		Google	Ireland	Limited	makes	the	payment	to	Google	BV	(a	shell	company	set	up	in	the	Netherlands).	 This	 payment	 is	 tax-free	 as	 there	 are	 no	 withholding	 taxes	 due	 on	payments	between	EU	subsidiaries.	Google	BV	then	pays	the	royalties	to	Google	Ireland	Holdings.	Under	Dutch	law,	Google	Ireland	Holdings	is	seen	as	an	Irish	company	despite	being	resident	in	Bermuda.	Therefore,	no	tax	is	payable	on	this	transfer.	Google	in	the	US	simply	has	to	‘check	the	box’	(see	Glossary)	for	Google	Ireland	Limited	and	Google	BV,	which	means	that	to	the	US	tax	authorities,	they	are	seen	not	as	companies	but	as	divisions	of	Google	Ireland	Holdings.	Therefore,	the	IP	transfers	are	intra-company	and	no	tax	liability	arises.			Google	Ireland	Limited	today	employs	about	2,000	employees	(Kleinbard	2011).	Google	has	confirmed	that	it	employs	no	staff	in	Bermuda	(PAC	2016).	It	is	the	subtle	differences	in	tax	treaties	and	regulations	that	make	these	tax	arrangements	possible.	For	the	US	tax	authorities,	 Google	 Ireland	 Limited	 and	 Google	 BV	 do	 not	 exist.	 For	 Ireland,	 Google	Ireland	Holdings	 is	a	Bermudan	company.	For	the	US	and	 in	the	Netherlands,	Google	Ireland	Holdings	is	seen	as	Irish	company.		
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Figure 8 Google’s Irish Corporate Structure 
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In	2013,	the	Irish	government	announced	that	companies	which	incorporate	in	Ireland	must	also	be	tax	resident	there.	This	took	place	from	January	2015,	for	new	companies,	and	will	take	effect	in	2020	for	companies	with	existing	operations	in	Ireland.	This	will	remove	Google’s	ability	to	avoid	tax	using	this	mechanism.	
6.4.4 Google Ireland The	 section	 focuses	 on	 Google’s	 Irish	 results	 and	 operations	 that	 are	 key	 to	 the	company’s	tax	structures	as	all	of	Google’s	EMEA	operations	are	funneled	into	Google	Ireland.	 Outside	 Google’s	 Irish	 structure	 there	 is	 limited	 information	 about	 the	company’s	Irish	subsidiaries	performance.	This	section	considers	the	information	that	is	disclosed	in	the	annual	reports	for	the	period	2005	–	2014.			In	2003	Google	Inc.	entered	into	a	cost	sharing	agreement	with	Google	Ireland	Holdings	which	gave	Google	 Ireland	Holdings	the	rights	 to	Google’s	 IP	 including	 its	search	and	advertising	technologies	for	use	in	EMEA.	As	discussed	above,	Google	shifts	profits	from	other	European	operations	into	Google	Ireland	Ltd	by	charging	them	a	significant	royalty	fee.	Therefore,	 the	revenue	for	Google	 Ireland	Ltd	must	 include	the	royalty	payments	made	to	it	by	overseas	operating	subsidiaries.	Cost	of	sales	must	include	the	payments	that	it	in	turn	makes	to	Google	Ireland	Holdings.	
 However,	limited	information	is	available	in	the	Google	Ireland	Ltd.	accounts.	Google’s	desire	to	be	transparent	does	not	extend	to	the	accounts	of	Google	Ireland	Ltd.	It	states	that	it	chooses	not	to	disclose	segmental	information	as	they	state	it	would	be:	‘seriously	
prejudicial	to	the	Company’	(Google	Ireland	Ltd.	2014	p.16)(in	accordance	with	SSAP	25).	They	also	choose	not	to	disclose	information	relating	to	related	party	transactions	(in	accordance	with	FRS8).		
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Table 34 Google Ireland Ltd Operating Results 
$’million 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Operating Revenue 22,719 23,447 20,482 16,118 13,500 11,335 9,379 7,775 4,403 1,961 
PBT 254 261 203 31 24 68 14 -14 23 10 
Tax 50 48 45 28 23 25 11 4 4 -1 
PAT 204 212 156 3 1 44 4 -18 19 11 
GAAP ETR (%) 19.69 18.39 22.17 90.32 95.83 36.76 78.57 (28.57) 17.39 (10.00) 
Employee number 2,577 2,288 2,071 1,916 1,513 1,387 1,316 1,167 675 257 
Source:	Google	Ireland	Ltd	Annual	Reports	2005-2014			
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	The	ETR	is	significantly	higher	than	the	Irish	12.5%	statutory	tax	rate.	This	is	largely	due	to	Google	charging	higher	depreciation	than	is	allowable	for	capital	allowances,	charging	expenses	 that	 are	 not	 deductible	 for	 tax	 purposes	 in	 Ireland	 and	 because	 of	 foreign	withholding	tax	charges.	 In	2010	and	2011	there	were	 large	write	downs	against	the	value	of	financial	assets	that	reduced	the	profits	as	per	the	profit	and	loss	account	but	were	not	deductible	for	tax	purposes.	The	limitations	of	the	disclosures	in	the	accounts	are	clear	as	it	is	not	possible	to	get	a	fuller	picture	of	the	tax	payments	made	in	Ireland.		In	2011	Google	Ireland	Holdings	acquired	Admeld	Inc.,	an:	‘ad	optimisation’	technology	company.	In	2012	the	rights	to	license	Admeld’s	IP	were	acquired	by	Google	Ireland	Ltd	from	Google	Ireland	Holdings	for	€161.3million.	This	is	a	good	example,	demonstrating	one	of	the	key	roles	of	Google	Ireland	Ltd	–	holding	IP	and	licensing	it	on	behalf	of	other	Google	companies.		
6.4.5 Google UK Ltd Google	in	the	UK	has	been	criticized	for	failing	to	pay	‘sufficient’	taxes	and	has	been	the	subject	of	inquiries	by	the	House	of	Commons	Public	Accounts	Select	Committee	in	2013	and	2016.	This	section	considers	the	role	of	Google	in	the	UK;	whether	and	how	taxes	paid	are	significantly	reduced	in	the	UK	as	a	consequence	of	the	structure	of	the	company	overall.		
 In	2014-15	Google	UK	Ltd	changed	its	reporting	year-end	from	31	December	to	30	June.	No	annual	report	was	therefore	produced	for	the	2014	but	instead	an	eighteen	month	period	ending	June	30	2015	was	produced.	For	the	sake	of	consistency	this	report	uses	the	 annual	 information	 produced	 for	 the	 year	 ending	 31	 December	 2013	 unless	otherwise	stated.		
 Google	UK	Ltd	provides	marketing	and	sales	services	to	Google	Ireland	Ltd.	and	provides	R&D	services	to	Google	Inc.	Google	UK	Ltd	does	not	earn	revenue	by	dealing	with	UK	customers;	all	deals	are	concluded	and	therefore	revenue	booked,	in	Ireland.	Google	UK	Ltd	 earns	 revenue	 only	 from	 Google	 Ireland	 Ltd	 for	 providing	 sales	 and	 marketing	
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service	(£542m	in	2013	and	£397m	in	2012)	and	from	Google	Inc.	for	providing	R&D	services	(£101m	2013	and	£109m	in	2012).		
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Table 35 Google UK Revenue 
$’million 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
UK segment reported by Google Inc. 6,483 5,600 4,846 4,057 3,329 2,986 3,038 2,531 1,694 878 
Google UK Ltd Revenue  1,004 1,294 802 634 371 266 278 208 120 49 
% UK sales reported by Google UK Ltd 17.93 19.96 16.55 15.65 11.15 8.92 9.15 8.23 7.47 5.59 
Source:	Google	Inc.	Annual	Reports	and	Google	UK	Ltd.	Annual	Reports.	Translated	from	£GBP	using	exchange	rate	at	period	end.			
Table 36 Google UK Ltd Operating Results 
$’million 18mths 
2015 
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Operating Revenue 1836 1294 802 634 371 266 278 208 120 49 
PBT 165 111 58 (33) (34) (17) (41) (5) (3) 5 
Tax (143) (34) (48) (5) (8) 3 (5) (2) 8 - 
PAT 22 76 9 (37) (42) (14) 36 (6) 5 5 
Employee numbers 2,329 1,835 1,613 1,304 930 848 772  539 284 156 
Source:	Google	UK	Ltd	Annual	Reports	Translated	from	£GBP	using	exchange	rate	at	period	end.		
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Table	35	shows	Google’s	revenue	in	the	UK	as	disclosed	in	Google	Inc.’s	annual	report	as	a	 segment	of	 the	 total	business	 compared	with	 the	 revenue	 recorded	 in	Google	UK’s	annual	report.	The	revenue	derived	from	the	UK	business	as	disclosed	as	a	segment	in	Google	 Inc.’s	 annual	 report	 reveals	 the	 true	 size	 of	 the	UK	market	 for	 Google	 as	 the	segment	 reporting	 includes	 sales	 to	 customers	 in	 the	 UK.	 Disclosure	 is	 limited	 to	turnover;	no	profit	 figures	are	disclosed.	The	actual	revenue	reported	 in	the	UK	(per	Google	UK	 Ltd’s	 annual	 reports	 filed	with	 the	UK	Companies	House)	 is	much	 lower:	17.93	per	cent	of	the	UK’s	revenues	are	recorded	in	the	UK	in	2014,	up	from	5.59	per	cent	in	2005.	Without	profit	figures	it	is	impossible	to	calculate	an	accurate	figure	for	the	tax	lost	to	the	UK	government.		
 This	section	now	goes	on	to	consider	how	Google	shifts	profits	 from	the	UK.	 In	2015	Google	UK	Ltd	employed	2,329	staff	of	which	1,075	worked	in	marketing,	799	in	R&D	and	 455	 in	 management	 and	 administration.	Whilst	 Google	 staff	 in	 the	 UK	 provide	services	to	clients	(training	and	education	in	how	to	use	their	products)	and	promotes	Google	products	Google	UK	Ltd	also	employs	a	significant	number	of	marketing	people	in	 the	UK,	 but	who	do	not	have	 the	 ability	 and	 responsibility	 to	 conclude	 a	 contract	(House	of	Commons,	Public	Accounts	Committee	2013).		
 Operating	revenue	and	employees	have	grown	steadily	across	the	period	shown	in	the	table	above.	Prior	to	2011	the	company	made	profit	in	only	one	year.	As	a	result	looking	at	 the	annual	ETR	does	not	add	to	our	understanding	of	 the	company’s	performance.	Over	the	period	shown	the	company	makes	a	loss	before	tax	as	a	whole	of	£136million	and	 pays	 tax	 of	 £150million.	 To	 pay	more	 tax	 than	 profits	 are	made	would	 seem	 to	indicate	the	Google	are	not	avoiding	tax	in	the	UK.	However,	as	Google	UK	Ltd	staff	are	deemed	only	to	be	providing	services	to	other	group	companies	they	are	not	engaging	in	sales	in	the	UK.	This	means	that	Google	does	not	operate	a	PE	(see	Glossary)	in	the	UK.	As	the	sales	to	customers	are	booked	in	Ireland	rather	than	the	UK	the	amount	of	revenue	recorded	in	Google	UK	Ltd’s	accounts	is	severely	reduced,	reflecting	only	intra	company	payments	for	services.	This	in	turn	reduces	the	amount	of	tax	paid	in	the	UK.		
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Whistleblowers	 told	 the	 UK	 Public	 Accounts	 Committee	 (House	 of	 Commons,	 Public	Accounts	Committee	2013)	that	in	practice	UK	staff	do	have	responsibility	for	generating	sales	in	the	UK	and	receive	sales	related	commission.	Google,	however,	argue	that	whilst	UK	 staff	may	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 negotiate	 a	 contract,	 the	 ultimate	 responsibility	 for	finalizing	any	contract	lies	with	Google	Ireland	Ltd	(House	of	Commons,	Public	Accounts	Committee	2013).	
 799	staff	in	the	UK	work	on	R&D	for	which	Google	UK	Ltd	is	paid	by	Google	Inc.	(Google	UK	Ltd	2015,	House	of	Commons,	Public	Accounts	Committee	2013).	This	work	largely	relates	to	work	on	the	Android	mobile	phone	operating	system.	Google	says	that	these	UK	staff	are	creating	economic	value	but	that	as	the	intellectual	property	is	owned	by	Google	 Inc.,	 outside	 the	 UK,	 they	 are	 not	 liable	 for	 UK	 corporation	 tax	 (House	 of	Commons,	Public	Accounts	Committee	2013).		
 The	 Public	 Accounts	 Select	 Committee	 report	 (House	 of	 Commons,	 Public	 Accounts	Committee	2013)	concluded	that	Google’s	company	structure	was	established	in	a	way	that	would	minimize	the	taxes	paid	in	the	UK,	‘rather	than	reflect[ing]	the	substance	of	
the	way	business	is	actually	conducted’.	The	report	also	found	that	Google	relied	on	the:	
‘deeply	unconvincing	argument	that	its	sales	to	UK	clients	take	place	in	Ireland,	despite	
clear	 evidence	 that	 the	 majority	 of	 sales	 activity	 takes	 place	 in	 the	 UK’.	 (House	 of	Commons,	Public	Accounts	Committee	2013)		After	criticism	in	the	UK	about	the	low	level	of	taxes	paid	Chairman	Eric	Schmidt	said,	
‘under	American	law	we	have	a	fiduciary	responsibility	to	our	shareholders	to	account	for	
things	properly,	so	if	we	were,	for	example,	to	just	arbitrarily	decide	to	pay	a	different	tax	
rate	than	we	were	required	to,	a	more	favourable	one	for	example	to	a	particular	country,	
how	would	we	account	for	that?’			In	 January	 2016	 Google	 settled	 ongoing	 tax	 audits	 with	 HMRC	 and	 agreed	 to	 pay	£130million	 (including	 £18million	 interest)	 as	 a	 total	 additional	 sum	 for	 liable	 for	previous	accounting	periods	to	make	up	for	underpayments	in	previous	years.	Rather	than	settle	the	matter	of	tax	avoidance	public	debate	increased	in	concern	that	HMRC	
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had	 not	 been	 tough	 enough	 in	 their	 negotiations	 with	 Google.	 The	 Public	 Accounts	Committee	 set	 out	 their	 concerns	 over	 how	 this	 £130million	 shortfall	 had	 been	calculated.	They	point	out	 that	HMRC	spent	6	years	 investigating	Google	but	 that	 the	details	 of	 how	 the	 settlement	 was	 calculated	 have	 not	 been	 published,	 removing	transparency.	HMRC	 confirmed	 that	 the	 issues	 considered	within	 the	 tax	 claim	were	related	to	TP	and	the:	‘fair	value	of	Google’s	activity	in	the	UK’. They	point	out	that:	
‘Google’s	 stated	 desire	 for	 greater	 tax	 simplicity	 and	 transparency	 is	 at	 odds	 with	 the	
complex	operational	structure	it	has	created	which	appears	to	be	directed	at	minimising	
its	 tax	 liabilities.	 Google	 admits	 that	 this	 structure	 will	 not	 change	 as	 a	 result	 of	 this	
settlement.’	(House	of	Commons,	Public	Accounts	Committee	2016	p.3)		The	House	of	Commons	Public	Accounts	Select	Committee	conclude	that: ‘Multinational	
firms	such	as	Google	have	made	a	choice	to	avoid	tax,	despite	any	claims	to	the	contrary’	
(House	of	Commons,	Public	Accounts	Committee	2016	p.6). French	and	Italian	tax	authorities	are	investigating	the	levels	of	tax	paid	by Google	in	their	respective	countries.	They	are	confident	 that	Google	will	owe	them	much	larger	amounts	 (French	 authorities	 expect	 £380million	 [Daily	 Mail	 2016],	 Italian	 expect	£150million	 (International	 Business	 Times	 2016)	 than	 they	 have	 made	 in	 the	 UK,	despite	the	UK	being	the	largest	market	for	Google	outside	the	US.		
6.4.6 Google: Conclusion As	a	company	delivering	digital	content	Google	has	a	considerable	degree	of	flexibility	to	choose	where	its	revenues	and	profits	are	recorded.	Google	has	chosen	to	shift	profits	from	the	whole	of	its	EMEA	region	to	Ireland	to	take	advantage	of	the	low	corporate	tax	rate	there	and	the	ability	to	shift	profits	offshore	to	Bermuda	where	no	tax	is	payable.	The	amount	of	tax	paid	in	the	UK	has,	as	a	consequence,	been	severely	eroded.	Google	has	not	been	judged	to	have	behaved	illegally	although	the	cases	against	Google	in	the	UK,	 Italy	 and	 France,	 amongst	 others	 demonstrate	 that	 tax	 authorities	 believe	 that	Google	has	underpaid.	Until	the	change	in	Irish	law	comes	into	force	in	2020	Google	will	be	able	to	continue	to	structure	its	tax	affairs	in	the	same	manner.	The	UK	does	not	seem	to	have	any	plans	to	force	them	to	recognize	the	sales	that	are	made	in	the	UK	in	the	accounts	of	Google	UK	Ltd.	
	 254	
 Changing	 the	 location	where	 taxes	are	booked	 reduces	 the	overall	 tax	 liability	of	 the	company	as	more	profits	are	booked	in	lower	tax	Ireland	and	Bermuda.	In	countries	such	as	the	UK	the	amount	of	tax	contributed	to	the	public	exchequer	is	reduced.	The	digital	nature	of	Google’s	business	enables	 it	to	appropriate	and	retain	a	greater	share	of	 its	profits.		 	
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6.5 Nucor This	section	provides	an	overview	of	the	steel	company	Nucor.	It	was	selected	as	a	case	study	 of	 a	 company	 that	 did	 not	 have	 any	 subsidiaries	 registered	 in	 tax	 havens	 and	where	 the	 Cash	 and	GAAP	ETRs	were	 both	 relatively	 close	 to	 each	 other	 and	 to	 the	statutory	rate	of	corporation	tax.	This	case	study	provides	a	contrast	to	the	other	case	studies	where	 taxes	 appear	 to	 be	manipulated	 and	where	 the	 tax	 planning	 strategy	appears	to	be	more	aggressive.	Clearly,	an	analysis	of	a	company’s	annual	report	cannot	comment	on	the	motivation	of	 the	company	for	undertaking	particular	actions	or	 for	implementing	 a	 particular	 structure.	 Further	qualitative	 research	 such	 as	 interviews	with	company	representatives	would	be	required	to	understand	the	motivations	behind	the	actions	of	the	company	as	reported	in	their	annual	reports.	The	case	study	highlights	what	appear	to	be	differences	between	the	strategy	adopted	by	this	company	and	those	adopting	more	aggressive	tax	planning	strategies.	
6.5.1 Company Background Nucor	was	placed	at	139	on	the	Fortune	500	in	2015.	It	is	a	manufacturer	of	steel	and	steel	 products,	 headquartered	 in	 Charlotte,	 North	 Carolina.	 According	 to	 its	 Annual	Report	(Nucor	2016)	it	is	the	most	diversified	steel	and	steel	products	company	in	North	America.	 	 Its	 financial	 performance	 has	 been	 hit	 by	 over	 capacity	 in	 the	 global	 steel	industry	and	by	 cheap	Chinese	 imports	 into	 the	US.	To	 combat	 this	 and	maintain	 its	competitiveness	Nucor	has	diversified,	improving	the	quality	of	goods	it	offers	as	well	as	expanding	its	downstream	businesses	such	as	fabricated	construction	products.		Originally	an	 industrial	 conglomerate	 (The	Nuclear	Corporation	of	America)	 the	 firm	began	to	focus	purely	on	steel	making	in	the	late	1960s	and	changed	its	name	to	Nucor	in	1971.	It	listed	on	the	NYSE	in	1972	and	entered	the	Fortune	500	in	1980.	Whilst	Nucor	is	 largely	 focused	 in	 the	 US	 it	 has	 significant	 operations	 in	 Canada,	 Colombia,	 Italy,	Mexico,	Switzerland,	United	Arab	Emirates	and	Trinidad	and	Tobago.		Nucor	employs	more	than	20,000	people	that	it	terms	‘team	mates’.	It	prides	itself	on	its	high	 levels	 of	 safety	 and	 being	 a	 ‘cultural	 and	 environmental’	 steward	 in	 the	communities	where	 its	plants	are	based	 (Nucor	2017).	Performance	pay	 at	 all	 levels	makes	up	a	larger	share	of	employee	reward	than	is	typical	in	the	sector	(Nucor	2017).		
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The	company	established	an	educational	fund	for	the	children	of	its	workers	in	1974	and	has	dispersed	more	than	$70million	in	scholarships	since	then.	All	children	of	current	‘team	mates’	 are	entitled	 to	 financial	 support	 for	education.	Nucor	 is	 also	 the	 largest	recycler	in	North	America	(Nucor	2014).		Nucor	 is	 structured	 into	 90	 operating	 units	 that	 are	 run	 independently	 although	according	 to	 their	 website	 they	 ‘compete	 collectively’.	 It	 operates	 wholly	 owned	subsidiaries	of	Harris	Steel,	The	David	J,	Joseph	Company	and	Skyline	Steel.	Nucor	also	claims	to	be	managed	in	a	streamlined	way	having	eliminated	layers	of	management	in	the	past	in	an	attempt	to	reduce	costs.			Nucor	operates	using	segments	for:	steel	mills,	steel	products	and	raw	materials.	It	does	not	disclose	information	about	international/	geographic	segments.	IFRS	8	‘Operating	Segments’	states	that	information	should	be	provided	about	countries	that	account	for	10	per	cent	or	more	of	a	company’s	sales.	It	is	therefore	possible	to	conclude	that	there	are	no	countries	outside	the	US	that	account	for	more	than	10	per	cent	of	the	company’s	turnover.		Turnover	fell	by	53	per	cent	in	2009	as	a	consequence	of	the	global	financial	crisis.	The	steel	 industry	 was	 hit	 particularly	 hard	 by	 the	 recession	 as	 production	 in	 other	industries	including	the	automotive	and	non-residential	construction	which	impacted	Nucor’s	business	(Nucor	2009).	By	2014	the	company’s	revenue	had	still	not	reached	its	previous	high	of	2008.	The	return	on	sales	shows	a	similar	fall.	It	reached	a	high	at	11.92	per	cent	in	2006	but	then	fell	to	a	loss	of	2.13	per	cent	in	2009.	By	2014	it	had	reached	only	3.87	per	cent.	Nucor	note	in	their	annual	report	the	impact	of	cheap	Chinese	steel	imports	on	their	profitability	(Nucor	2014).	
6.5.2 Subsidiaries Whilst	 Nucor	 is	 largely	 focused	 in	 the	 US	 it	 has	 significant	 operations	 in	 Canada,	Colombia,	 Italy,	Mexico,	Switzerland,	United	Arab	Emirates	and	Trinidad	and	Tobago.	Exhibit	21	of	their	10K	(Nucor	2014)	lists	a	total	of	24	subsidiaries.	Of	these	only	two	are	based	overseas:	Nu-Iron	Unlimited	in	Trinidad	and	Harris	Steel	ULC	based	in	Canada.		Operations	 in	 other	 countries	 are	 not	 disclosed	 as	 separate	 subsidiaries	 in	 the	 10K	
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disclosures.	It	would	appear	that	these	are	locations	where	commercial	operations	are	conducted	but	that	overseas	sales	are	limited.		Trinidad	is	not	included	within	the	list	of	tax	havens	included	in	the	statistical	analysis	in	Chapter	5.	It	is	clear	that	the	subsidiary	in	Trinidad	is	creating	economic	value.	The	plant	in	Trinidad	opened	in	2007	and	is	a	direct	reduced	iron	(DRI)	facility.	The	press	release	published	by	Nucor	(Nucor	2007)	at	the	time	the	plant	was	opened	stated	that	the	reason	for	the	selection	of	Trinidad	was	because	the	site:	 ‘benefits	from	a	low	cost	
supply	of	natural	gas	and	favorable	logistics	for	receipt	of	Brazilian	iron	ore	and	shipment	
of	DRI	to	the	US’	(Nucor	2007).	It	therefore	appears	the	choice	of	Trinidad	was	based	on	commercial	rather	than	tax	avoiding	reasons.		Out	of	the	total	24	subsidiaries	listed	20	are	registered	in	Delaware.	Delaware	has	no	state	taxes	for	firms	registered	there.	It	also	has	higher	levels	of	secrecy	than	some	other	US	states	for	example,	the	identity	of	the	owners	of	private	companies	do	not	need	to	be	filed.	The	Nucor	website	lists	the	locations	of	64	plants	in	the	US.	None	of	the	plants	are	based	in	Delaware.	It	would	therefore	seem	that	the	decision	to	register	subsidiaries	in	Delaware	may	be	based	on	the	tax	and	legal	position	in	Delaware	as	there	is	no	economic	activity	undertaken	there.	The	decision	may	be	a	historic	one,	however,	as	the	original	Nucor	corporation	was	registered	there	in	1958	(Nucor	2009).	Basing	the	subsidiaries	in	 Delaware	 means	 that	 the	 firm	 will	 pay	 less	 state	 tax	 within	 the	 US	 than	 if	 the	subsidiaries	were	 registered	 in	 other	 states.	 This	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 reflected	 in	 Nucor’s	material	tax	disclosures	which	simply	include	‘US	Taxes’	and	‘International	Taxes’	with	no	separate	disclosure	of	‘Federal’	and	‘State’	taxes	(See	Table	38	below).	
6.5.3 Taxes Paid The	reconciliation	between	the	statutory	rate	and	the	company’s	GAAP	ETR	is	given	in	the	notes	to	 the	annual	report	and	replicated	below	in	Table	38.	This	shows	that	 the	company	have	paid	an	average	of	1.53	per	cent	 in	state	 taxes	over	the	ten	years.	The	highest	rate	was	in	2009	when	it	paid	5.12	per	cent	in	state	tax.	No	explanation	is	given	in	the	accounts	for	the	higher	rate	of	tax	charge	in	this	year.		
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1.7	per	cent	of	the	total	difference	between	the	statutory	rate	and	the	GAAP	ETR	over	the	 ten	 years	 is	 accounted	 for	 by	 R&D	 tax	 credits	 and	 a	 deduction	 for	 domestic	manufacturing.	Only	0.5	per	cent	of	the	total	difference	is	generated	by	lower	foreign	tax	payments.	This	seems	to	indicate	that	a	large	part	of	the	differences	are	generated	by	legitimate	 government	 tax	 incentive	 schemes	 rather	 than	 through	 the	 diversion	 of	profits	to	low	tax	jurisdictions.		
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Table 37 Nucor Revenue and Net Sales Over Time 
$’million 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Total 
Total Revenue 21,105 19,052 19,429 20,024 15,845 11,190 23,663 16,593 14,751 12,700 174,352 
YoY Revenue growth %* 10.78 (1.94) (2.97) 26.37 41.6 (52.71) 42.61 12.49 16.15 11.63  
Profit before tax 1,205 791 853 1,252 267 (414) 2,790 2,253 2,692 2,016 13,705 
Provision for income tax 389 206 260 391 61 (176) 959 781 934 706 4,511 
Net income 816 585 593 861 206 (238) 1,831 1,472 1,758 1,310 9,194 
Return on sales (%)* 3.87 3.07 3.05 4.30 1.30 (2.13) 7.74 8.87 11.92 10.31 5.27 
Source:	Nucor	Annual	Reports	2005-2014.	*Calculated	from	information	in	Nucor	Annual	Reports		
Table 38 Nucor Corporation Provision for Tax (not including deferred tax) 
$’million 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Total 
US Tax 1,162 756 855 1,241 261 (353) 1,205 835 975 735 7,672 
Foreign Tax 43 35 (2) 10 6 (60) 48 27 0 0 107 
Total 1,205 791 853 1,251 267 (413) 1,253 862 975 735 7,779 
Source:	Nucor	Annual	Reports	2005-2014.		
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Table 39 Nucor PRE, GAAP and Cash ETRs  
 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Total  
GAAP tax charge ($m) 389 206 260 391 61 (176) 959 781 934 706 4,511 
GAAP ETR (%) 32.28 26.04 30.48 31.23 22.85 42.51 34.37 34.66 34.70 35.02 32.91 
Cash tax charge ($m) 398.7 64.8 313.5 322.4 (245) 213.2 952.7 875.6 971 806.7 4673.6 
Cash ETR (%) 33.09 8.19 36.75 25.75 (91.76) (51.5) 34.15 38.86 36.07 40.01 34.10 
Foreign taxes as % total 3.57 4.42 -0.23 0.80 2.25 14.53 3.83 3.13 0.00 0.00 1.38 
PRE($m) 194 222.4 176.5 168 141 100 139 0 0 0 - 
Source:	Nucor	Annual	Reports	2005-2014.			
Table 40 Nucor Reconciliation Between Statutory and Actual Tax Rates   
2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Average 
Statutory rate (%) 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
State income taxes 3.32 0.02 0.75 0.63 -1.72 5.12 2.1 1.76 1.76 1.57 1.53 
Federal research credit -0.27 -0.79 0 -0.28 -1.19 0.84 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.19 
Domestic manufacturing 
deduction 
-2.27 -1.74 -3.25 -2.21 0 -0.13 -1.99 -1.79 -1.03 -1.04 -1.54 
Equity in losses of foreign JV 0.85 1.36 1.43 0.64 3.09 -5.93 0 -0.07 0 0 0.14 
Foreign rate differential -0.93 -2.35 0.6 -0.92 -3.83 2.79 -0.88 -0.12 0 0 -0.56 
Non controlling interests -2.96 -4.32 -3.64 -2.32 -9.47 4.77 -3.54 -4.03 0 0 -2.55 
Out of period correction -1.1 -2.57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.37 
Other, net 0.64 1.38 -0.43 0.68 0.88 0.25 0.27 0.01 -0.92 -0.44 0.23 
GAAP ETR (%) 32.28 25.99 30.46 31.22 22.76 42.71 30.91 30.7 34.76 35.02 31.68 
Source:	Nucor	Annual	Reports	2005-2014.			
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6.5.4 GAAP Tax Charge and Cash Tax Payments Table	39	shows	the	tax	charge	in	Nucor’s	Profit	and	Loss	Account	for	the	ten	year	period.	The	firm	charged	an	average	GAAP	ETR	of	32.91	per	cent	for	the	ten	years.	The	highest	rate	was	42.51	per	cent	in	2009,	immediately	followed	by	the	lowest	charge	in	2010	of	22.85	per	cent.	The	higher	rate	in	2009	is	partly	account	for	by	the	higher	rate	of	state	tax	charged	for	 that	year	(discussed	above).	There	are	also	 larger	charges	than	usual	related	to	the	foreign	tax	differential	(2.79	per	cent)	and	a	charge	for	non	controlling	interests	in	investments	(4.77	per	cent).	No	explanation	is	given	for	these	charges.	They	have	also	received	a	large	tax	credit,	equal	to	a	reduction	of	almost	6	per	cent	(5.93	per	cent)	due	to	losses	made	in	a	foreign	JV.		The	reconciliations	provided	in	the	notes	to	the	annual	report	and	replicated	in	Table	40	show	the	reasons	for	the	differences	between	the	annual	charges	and	the	statutory	rate	of	 tax.	 The	 movements	 are	 relatively	 small	 and	 there	 are	 no	 big	 changes	 relate	 to	deferred	tax	provisions	as	with	Ford	and	Goodyear	Tires.			Nucor	have	accumulated	PRE	of	$194million	at	the	end	of	2014.	There	has	been	some	movement	 up	 and	 down	over	 the	 period	 that	 they	 have	 recorded	 these	 investments	which	 started	 only	 in	 2008.	 The	 amount	 recorded	 is	 significantly	 lower	 than	 other	companies	such	as	Ford	who	recorded	$4,300	and	Starbucks	who	recorded	$2,200m.		
6.5.5 Conclusions Nucor	have	 international	 subsidiaries	and	 significant	operations	overseas.	 It	 appears	however	that	the	bulk	of	their	sales	must	be	made	in	the	US	as	no	international	segment	reporting	is	included	in	their	annual	reports.	Their	corporation	tax	is	significantly	closer	to	the	statutory	rate	in	all	years	and	their	GAAP	and	cash	ETRs	are	similar	in	each	year	and	over	the	total	period.	This	combined	with	the	lack	of	tax	haven	subsidiaries	appears	to	 indicate	that	 the	company	has	adopted	a	non	aggressive	tax	avoidance	stance.	The	only	 indication	 of	 a	 tax	 avoidance	 strategy	 is	 the	 registration	 of	 US	 subsidiaries	 in	Delaware,	a	decision	that	appears	to	have	been	taken	as	early	as	1958.	This	case	study	shows	the	differences	between	MNEs.	Not	all	adopt	an	aggressive	tax	planning	position.		 	
	 262	
6.6 Starbucks Starbucks	 Corporation	 was	 founded	 in	 1971	 in	 Seattle.	 In	 1994	 with	 165	 stores	 it	completed	 its	 IPO,	 floating	on	the	NASDAQ.	 	Starbucks	 is	known	for	 its	huge	chain	of	coffee	shops	but	it	also	reaches	back	down	its	supply	chain	and	buys	green	coffee	beans	and	roasts	them.	As	per	its	Annual	Report	(Starbucks	2014)	Starbucks	states	that:	
‘We	purchase	and	roast	high-quality	coffees	that	we	sell,	along	with	handcrafted	coffee,	tea	
and	other	beverages	and	a	variety	of	fresh	food	items,	through	company-operated	stores.	
We	also	sell	a	variety	of	coffee	and	tea	products	and	license	our	trademarks	through	other	
channels	such	as	licensed	stores,	grocery	and	national	foodservice	accounts.	‘	(Starbucks	2014	p.2).	
	Starbucks	 has	 grown	 rapidly	 since	 it	 was	 founded	 and	 is	 now	 the	 second	 largest	restaurant	/	café	chain	in	the	world	(McDonalds	is	the	largest)	(Bergin	2012).	Over	the	ten	year	period	under	consideration,	Starbuck’s	global	revenue	has	grown	by	157	per	cent	 and	 net	 income	 has	 increased	 by	 more	 than	 320	 per	 cent.	 As	 markets	 reach	saturation	 and	 maturity,	 Starbucks	 becomes	 more	 profitable	 as	 its	 supply	 chain	 is	efficient	and	customer	base	well	 established	 (Starbucks	2014).	 Starbucks	 face	 strong	competition	 in	many	of	 their	markets	but	 they	 face	different	competitors	 in	different	local	markets.	In	the	UK	the	largest	coffee	shop	chain	is	Costa	(See	section	on	UK	below)	and	in	Canada	it	is	Second	Cup	with	360	cafés.	All	Second	Cup	cafes	are	franchises	which	makes	comparison	of	financial	performance	more	difficult.		Starbucks	 is	 an	 interesting	 case	 study	of	 a	profit	 shifting	 company.	 It	 is	 a	 traditional	‘bricks	and	mortar’	company	rather	than	the	digital	companies	that	tend	to	be	cited	as	tax	avoiders.	Starbucks’	clearest	FSA	however,	is	its	name	and	brand	which	gives	it	an	opportunity	to	profit	shift.	It	is	a	well-known	company	and	its	consistent	international	presence	gives	customers	a	clear	 idea	of	 the	coffee	and	service	that	 they	will	receive.	Starbucks	licensees	also	pay	for	the	Starbucks	‘system’	which	they	believe	gives	them	an	advantage	over	their	competitors.					
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Table 41 Starbucks Segment Income Split 
$’million Americas EMEA Asia Pac Other Total 
 2014 2013 2012 2014 2013 2012 2014 2013 2012 2014 2013 2012 2014 2013 2012 
Revenue 11,981 11,001 9,936 1,295 1,160 1,141 1,130 917 721 2,043 1,789 1,478 16,448 14,867 13,277 
Net Income 2,809 2,365 2,020 119 64 7 373 321 253 530 381 313 3,831 3,132 2,593 
Source:	Starbucks	Corporation	Annual	Report	2014		
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6.6.1 International Operations Starbucks	operates	across	three	international	regions:	Americas	(US,	Canada	and	Latin	America),	Europe,	Middle	East	and	Africa	(EMEA)	and	China	and	Asia	Pacific	(CAP).	It	remains	a	Home	Region	company,	however,	with	73	per	cent	of	sales	coming	from	the	American	 region.	 Starbucks	 operates	 stores	 themselves	 but	 also	 license	 to	 other	operators.	At	the	end	of	their	fiscal	year	2014	they	had	21,000	stores	globally.	Of	these	14,000	are	in	the	Americas,	2,100	are	in	EMEA	and	4,600	are	in	the	Asia	Pacific	Region	(Starbucks	2014).	No	figures	are	given	for	country	level	revenue	which	must	mean	that	there	is	no	country	outside	the	US	that	accounts	for	more	than	10%	of	sales.		Half	of	the	total	number	of	stores	are	licensed	and	half	are	company	operated.	Company	operated	stores	 accounted	 for	 79	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 total	 global	 revenue.	 With	 licensed	 stores	Starbucks	 receives	 a	 proportion	of	 the	 revenue	with	most	of	 the	 costs	 borne	 by	 the	licensee.	They	must	also	pay	for	Starbucks	royalties	and	buy	their	products	(coffee	beans	etc)	directly	from	Starbucks.	Licensees	are	used	only	when	Starbucks	feel	that	they	can	provide	access	to	good	retail	space	or	other	local	expertise.	Various	forms	of	licensing,	including	franchising	are	used.		In	company	operated	stores	75%	of	revenue	comes	from	beverages,	19%	from	sales	of	food,	 4%	 from	 the	 sale	 of	 packaged	 coffee	 and	 2%	 from	 the	 sale	 of	 coffee	 making	equipment	and	branded	merchandise.	Future	revenue	growth	is	expected	to	come	from	opening	new	stores	in	existing	and	new	markets	and	to	increase	sales	in	existing	stores	–	depending	on	the	maturity	of	the	market.			The	overall	headquarters	for	the	Starbucks	Corporation	are	based	in	Seattle.	Each	of	the	three	international	regions	have	their	own	headquarters.	The	33	countries	making	up	Europe,	Middle	East	and	Africa	region	were	based	in	Amsterdam	with	Starbucks	Coffee	EMEA	BV	as	the	holding	company	until	2014.	Separate	companies	based	in	the	market	countries	then	remitted	profits	(if	any)	back	to	the	Netherlands.	In	the	UK	the	business	was	run	by	the	Starbucks	Coffee	Company	(UK)	Ltd.	Of	 the	money	held	by	the	Dutch	company,	 approximately	 half	 remained	 there	 and	 half	 was	 remitted	 back	 to	 the	 US	where	 tax	 is	 paid.	 In	 the	 Netherlands	 tax	 is	 paid	 at	 an	 undisclosed	 rate	 after	 an	agreement	with	the	Dutch	tax	authorities.	A	global	coffee	bean	purchasing	business	is	
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operated	 from	 Lausanne,	 Switzerland.	 No	 accounts	 are	 available	 for	 this	 part	 of	 the	business	as	they	are	not	required	to	be	filed	in	the	Swiss	Canton	of	Vaud.	
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Table 42 Starbucks Inc. Revenue and Net Sales Over Time 
$’million 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Total 
Total Revenue 16,488 14,867 13,277 11,700 10,707 9,775 10,383 9,411 7,787 6,369 110,725 
YoY Revenue growth %* 10.63 11.98 13.47 9.27 9.54 (5.86) 10.32 20.86 22.26 42.91  
Profit before tax 3,160 (230) 2,059 1,811 1,437 560 456 1,056 906 796 12,012 
Provision for income tax 1,092 (239) 674 563 489 168 144 384 325 302 3,902 
Net income 2,068 9 1,385 1,248 948 392 312 673 581 494 8,109 
Return on sales %* 19.21 (1.55) 15.51 15.48 13.42 5.73 4.39 11.22 11.64 12.50  
Source:	Starbucks	Inc.	Annual	reports	2005-2014	*Calculated	from	information	in	Starbucks	Inc.	Annual	Reports		
Table 43 Starbucks UK Revenue and Net Sales Over Time 
$’million 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Total 
Total Revenue 637 623 644 620 618 605 582 511 447 381 567 
YoY Revenue growth %* 2.33 (3.38) 3.94 0.36 2.07 3.94 13.83 14.48 17.37 19.68  
Profit before tax 2 (32) (47) (51) (54) (81) (41) (2) (8) (13) (328) 
Income tax (Provision) / benefit  (19) 0 0 0 0 0.2 (32) (5) 17 3 (36) 
Net income (17) (32) (47) (51) (54) (81) (73) (7) 9 (10) (364) 
Return on sales %* (2.68) (5.12) (7.35) (8.26) (8.64) (13.42) (12.57) (1.51) 1.96 (2.63) (6.43) 
Source:	Starbucks	Coffee	Company	(UK)	Annual	reports	2005-2014	*	Calculated	from	information	in	Starbucks	Inc.	Annual	Reports	Converted	from	£GBP	using	2014	year	end	exchange	rates			
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6.6.2 Starbucks in the UK In	the	UK	(at	2012)	there	were	593	company	operated	stores	and	145	licensed	stores	(Starbucks	Coffee	Company	(UK)	Ltd	Annual	Report	2012).	Later	figures	are	unavailable.	Starbucks	has	been	strongly	criticised	in	the	UK	for	not	paying	adequate	taxes.	Like	other	tax	avoiders	it	has	argued	that	it	has	paid	all	the	tax	that	it	owes.	Starbucks,	with	Google	and	 Amazon	were	 called	 to	 give	 evidence	 in	 front	 of	 the	 House	 of	 Commons	 Public	Accounts	Committee	(House	of	Commons,	Public	Accounts	Committee	2012).		Starbucks	has	been	particularly	criticised	for	its	lack	of	transparency	that	creates	difficulties	for	tax	authorities	in	the	US,	UK	and	other	countries	(Kleinbard	2013).			In	2012	the	press	reported	that	Starbucks	had	recorded	losses	in	14	out	of	the	first	15	years	of	operations	in	the	UK	and	had	therefore	paid	very	little	tax.	(See	Table	43	above).	This	was	despite	holding	a	30	per	 cent	market	 share	and	reporting	 that	 the	U.K	was	performing	 well	 to	 shareholders	 (House	 of	 Commons,	 Public	 Accounts	 Committee	2012).	 Starbucks	was	 invited	 to	 give	 evidence	 before	 the	 House	 of	 Commons	 Public	Accounts	 Committee	 in	 November	 2012	 (House	 of	 Commons,	 Public	 Accounts	Committee	2012)	where	they	confirmed	that	they	had	made	losses	in	all	but	one	year	of	UK	 operations	 but	 that	 their	 optimism	 was	 based	 on	 their	 future	 forecasts	 for	 the	business.	Starbucks	argued	that	the	property	costs	in	the	UK	were	making	it	difficult	for	them	to	become	profitable.		In	2014	Starbucks	announced	that	they	were	moving	their	regional	headquarters	from	Amsterdam	to	the	UK.	Starbucks	explained	that	 this	move	was	because	the	UK	is	 the	largest	market	in	the	region.	The	UK	stand-alone	company	was	dissolved	and	replaced	with	a	new	company,	Starbucks	EMEA	Ltd.		One	other	reason	suggested	for	the	move	to	the	UK	is	the	recent	change	to	a	territorial	tax	system	–	where	companies	are	charged	tax	only	for	the	income	earned	within	the	UK.	They	are	not	charged	tax	on	income	earned	outside	the	UK.	This	means	that	no	taxes	are	charged	on	the	royalties	received	in	the	UK	from	the	rest	of	the	region.	This	makes	the	UK	a	more	efficient	location	for	tax	purposes	than	the	Netherlands.	This	illustrates	
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the	importance	of	tax	to	companies;	it	affects	where	they	locate	their	headquarters	as	well	as	how	they	structure	their	business	more	broadly.		The	change	in	corporate	structure	means	that	there	is	less	information	available	about	Starbucks	EMEA	and	UK	businesses.	The	UK	company	was	closed	and	replaced	with	the	EMEA	company.	The	only	accounts	 that	have	been	 filed	are	 for	 the	period	 from	 June	2014	to	September	2015.	No	comparative	figures	are	available.	The	company	chooses	not	to	produce	group	accounts	for	the	EMEA	region	as	these	companies	are	all	included	in	the	ultimate	group	accounts	for	Starbucks	Inc.	The	EMEA	accounts	are	prepared	under	FRS101	 Reduced	 Disclosure	 Framework	which	 are	 available	 to	 a	 company	 that	 will	ultimately	be	consolidated	into	a	set	of	group	accounts.			
Table 44 Starbucks EMEA Revenue Breakdown 
$’000 Period ended 27 Sept 2015 
Royalty income 182 
License fee income 5 
Other (1) 
Interest receivable and similar 27 
Dividend income from group undertakings 631 
Total turnover 843 
Source:	Starbucks	EMEA	Ltd	Accounts	2015		$14million	of	UK	corporation	tax	was	paid	on	the	income	before	tax	of		$682million.	This	gives	 a	 GAAP	ETR	of	 20.53	 per	 cent.	No	 information	 is	 published	 in	 relation	 to	 cash	payments	made	so	a	Cash	ETR	cannot	be	calculated.	
6.6.3 Supply Chain Starbucks	adds	value	by	breaking	down	its	supply	chain	to	buy	and	roast	coffee	beans.	These	operations	are	conducted	from	their	offices	in	Lausanne,	Switzerland.	Where	30	people	are	employed.		They	use	only	fair	trade	coffee	and	claim	to	use	the	best	quality	beans.	Controlling	their	own	supply	gives	them	a	secure,	good	quality	supply.	According	to	 their	 written	 evidence	 to	 the	 PAC	 75%	 of	 all	 coffee	 beans	 are	 traded	 through	Switzerland	 (Starbucks,	2012a).	 Starbucks	 accounts	 for	 less	 than	5%	of	world	 trade.	
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Starbucks	use	fixed	price	and	‘price	to	be	fixed19,	commitments	to	ensure	an	adequate	future	 supply.	 As	 at	 30	 September	 2012	 Starbucks	 had	 $557	 million	 of	 fixed	 price	contracts	and	an	estimated	$297million	‘price	to	be	fixed’	contracts.		Starbucks	 in	Switzerland	make	 a	 20%	mark	 up	 on	 sales	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 Starbucks	Group	 (House	 of	 Commons,	 Public	 Accounts	 Committee	 2012).	 Starbucks	 pay	 a	corporation	tax	rate	there	of	approximately	12%	(House	of	Commons,	Public	Accounts	Committee	2012).		Beans	are	roasted	in	Starbucks	owned	facilities	around	the	world.	In	Europe	there	is	a	roasting	facility	in	the	Netherlands.	260	people	are	employed	in	Starbucks	operations	in	the	 Netherlands.	 This	 number	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 diminished	 by	 the	 move	 of	headquarters	 to	 the	 UK	 (Starbucks	 2015).	 One	 source	 reported	 that	 only	 10	 extra	members	of	staff	are	likely	to	be	employed	in	the	UK	following	the	headquarters’	move	(Tax	Research	2014).			During	 the	year	ended	30	September	2012	Starbucks	operated	593	stores	 in	 the	UK	(down	14	over	the	year)	and	had	145	licensed	stores	(up	17	over	the	year)	in	the	UK.	The	UK	business	has	recorded	losses	for	all	but	one	year	of	trading	and	consequently	has	not	paid	corporation	tax	of	only	£8.6	million	relating	to	its	one	profitable	year	(2007).	
6.6.4 Profit Shifting Starbucks	 appears	 to	 have	 used	 three	 key	 mechanisms	 to	 shift	 profits	 between	jurisdictions:	 royalties	 and	 licence	 fees,	 TP	 manipulation	 on	 the	 price	 of	 coffee	 and	interest	paid	to	Starbucks	Inc.	on	intra	company	loans.	 	Until	2014	when	the	EMEA	headquarters	were	moved	to	the	UK,	royalties	were	paid	by	Starbucks	 UK	 to	 a	 Dutch	 subsidiary.	 In	 written	 evidence	 to	 the	 Public	 Accounts	Committee	 (Starbucks	 2012a)	 Starbucks	 reported	 that	 the	 operating	 companies	 in	EMEA	were	 paying	6	 per	 cent	 royalty	 payments	 to	 the	Dutch	headquarters.	 This	 fee	
																																																								
19 ‘ ‘Price to be Fixed’ contracts are purchase commitments whereby the quality, quantity, delivery period, and 
other negotiated terms are agreed upon but the date, and therefore the price…has not yet been established.’  
Starbucks Annual Report 2012 P. 6 
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entitled	the	operating	companies	to	use	the	Starbucks	brand	and	trademarks	as	well	as:	
‘use	of	the	proprietary	business	model’	and	‘store	design	concepts’.		Starbucks	argued	that	6	 per	 cent	 was	 a	 ‘standard	 business	 practice’	 (House	 of	 Commons,	 Public	 Accounts	Committee	2012b)	and	a	 justifiable	TP	under	 the	ALS.	A	 later	agreement	with	HMRC	reduced	the	allowable	percentage	to	4.7	per	cent	(Hodge	2016	p.	81).	McDonalds	and	Burger	King	charge	4%	to	their	subsidiaries,	KFC	do	not	charge	subsidiaries	a	royalty	fee.	
	A	Starbucks	subsidiary	in	Switzerland	(Starbucks	Coffee	Trading	Sarl)	buys	coffee	beans	for	 the	global	company.	This	business	was	revealed	to	employ	only	30	people	and	to	charge	a	mark	up	of	20	per	cent	on	the	coffee	sold	on	to	Starbucks	operating	companies	including	the	UK	company	(House	of	Commons,	Public	Accounts	Committee	2012).	It	is	impossible	to	calculate	whether	this	 is	an	ALS	TP	although	many	commentators	have	argued	that	it	is	an	excessively	high	charge,	aimed	at	transferring	profits	to	the	low	tax,	low	transparency	jurisdiction	of	Switzerland.		The	 third	mechanism	which	appears	 to	be	used	 for	profit	 shifting	 is	 the	use	of	 intra	company	loans.	Starbucks	Coffee	Company	UK	Ltd	is	funded	by	debt,	provided	by	the	Group,	 on	which	 it	 then	 pays	 interest.	The	 rate	 charged	 by	 Starbucks	 Corporation	 is	Libor	plus	4.9%.	Starbucks	Corporation	bonds	carried	a	coupon	of	Libor	plus	1.3%	in	October	2012	so	they	are	charging	the	UK	company	significantly	more	than	their	own	borrowing	costs	(Bergin	2012).		It	is	clear	that	the	use	of	these	three	mechanisms	drove	down	Starbucks	profits	in	the	UK	 company	 and	 shifted	 them	 to	overseas,	 low	 tax	 subsidiaries.	 The	 following	 table	compares	the	financial	performance	of	Starbucks	with	its	competitor	company	Costa.	
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Table 45 Comparison Between Starbucks UK and Costa 
£’000 Starbucks (UK) 2012 Costa (UK) 2012 
Turnover 413,393 458,596 
Cost of Sales (342,810) (131,121) 
Gross Profit 70,583 327,475 
Admin Expenses  (98,200) (261,920) 
Exceptional items (1,831) (3,614) 
Net Interest Income / Payable (955) 683 
Profit / Loss on Ordinary Activities (30404) 49,468 
Tax - (15,077) 
Source:	Starbucks	Coffee	Company	UK	Ltd	Annual	Report	2012;	Costa	Ltd	Annual	Report	2012.		The	 table	 above	 provides	 a	 comparison	 of	 Costa	 and	 Starbucks	 (UK)	 Profit	 and	 Loss	Accounts	for	the	year	2012.	Whilst	Costa’s	turnover	is	11%	higher	than	Starbucks,	its	Gross	Profit	 is	363	per	 cent	higher.	This	difference	 relates	 largely	 to	 the	£26	million	Royalties	and	License	Fee	paid	to	Starbucks	Corporation	by	Starbucks	Coffee	Company	UK	Ltd.	Starbucks	have	historically	paid	6	per	cent	of	turnover	to	Starbucks	Corporation	for	intellectual	property.		Following	the	bad	publicity,	particularly	around	the	Public	Accounts	Committee	enquiry	Starbucks	 offered	 to	 pay	 an	 extra	 £20million	 in	 corporation	 tax	 over	 the	 next	 two	financial	years.	Margaret	Hodge	reveals	(Hodge	2016)	that	rather	than	approach	HMRC	to	discuss	their	tax	affairs	the	Starbucks	UK	managing	director	spoke	directly	to	her	to	offer	to	make	this	payment.	Hodge	argues	that	this	offer	demonstrates	the	problems	with	the	corporation	tax	system	when	MNEs	choose	to	make	tax	payments	rather	than	paying	the	 tax	 assessed	 by	 the	 tax	 authorities.	 The	 decision	 to	 make	 this	 payment	 was	considered	to	reveal	bad	judgement	by	a	number	of	the	tax	executives	interviewed	for	the	research	in	Chapter	4.		
Table 46 Starbucks PRE 
$’million 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
PRE 2,200 1,900 1,500 987 646 520 409 284 179 86 
Source:	Starbucks	Inc.	Annual	Reports	2005-2014.		
	 272	
The	 steady	 increase	 in	 PRE	 demonstrates	 the	 success	 that	 Starbucks	 have	 had	 in	generating	profits	outside	the	US	and	then	maintaining	these	earnings	outside	the	US.	Starbucks	have	not	provided	for	the	tax	that	would	be	payable	if	these	were	returned	to	the	US	as	 they	state	 that	 they	are	planning	to	maintain	these	 funds	outside	the	US	 in	order	to	avoid	the	tax	that	would	be	payable	on	repatriation.	
6.6.5 Starbucks: Conclusions Examining	the	case	of	Starbucks	provides	clear	insight	into	the	way	that	this	company,	operating	 in	 a	 very	 traditional	 ‘bricks	 and	mortar’	manner,	 is	 able	 to	 reduce	 its	 tax	liabilities.	 It	 demonstrates	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Starbucks	 are	 able	 to	 reduce	 their	 UK	profitability	 by	 using	 three	 different	mechanisms.	 The	 change	 to	 the	 UK	 tax	 system,	moving	 to	 a	 territorial	 system	 from	 a	 worldwide	 system,	 when	 combined	 with	 the	impact	of	public	criticism,	appears	to	have	stimulated	Starbucks	to	move	their	regional	headquarters	 from	 the	 Netherlands	 to	 the	 UK	 This	 demonstrates	 the	 importance	 of	public	policy.	Government	changes	can	stimulate	significant	changes	 in	MNE	policies.	This	move	also	demonstrates	the	impact	that	tax	can	have	on	the	activities	of	MNEs.		 	
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6.7 Case Studies: Conclusions and Areas for Further Research These	six	case	studies	provide	new	in-depth	insights	into	the	tax	planning	affairs	of	the	selected	MNEs.	In	depth	case	studies,	based	on	published	data	can	provide	significant	and	new	insights	into	the	behaviour	of	MNE	which	can	be	useful	especially	when	access	to	companies	is	limited.	This	is	particularly	important	with	issues	of	tax,	because	of	the	fundamental	 underlying	 issues	 of	 confidentiality.	 The	 insight	 generated	 here	demonstrates	the	importance	of	this	type	of	research	for	the	IB	community	where	too	often	 research	 is	 based	 on	 quantitative	 analysis	 (complex	 regressions)	 to	 generate	findings.	The	qualitative	research	using	in-depth	case	studies	and	the	content	analysis	methodology	based	on	detailed	 scrutiny	of	 financial	data	and	disclosure	notes	of	 the	firm’s	and	the	subsidiary’s	annual	reports	as	well	as	other	publicly	available	documents	shed	new	light,	enhancing	our	understanding	of	the	phenomena.			The	Amazon	case	is	used	to	explore	the	way	in	which	digital	companies	can	approach	tax	planning.	By	ensuring	that	they	do	not	have	a	PE	in	the	UK	they	are	able	to	reduce	the	 income	 recorded	 as	 UK	 revenues.	 Complex	 structures	 instead	 divert	 income	 to	subsidiaries	located	in	low	tax	countries	ensuring	that	their	tax	liability	is	minimised.	The	 study	 of	 Google	 explores	 these	 complex	 structures	 in	 more	 detail.	 Google,	 like	Amazon	minimises	the	income	that	is	booked	to	the	UK	subsidiary,	making	the	case	that	revenues	are	only	generated	out	of	Google	Ireland	Limited.	These	two	cases	rely	on	the	digital	nature	of	their	businesses,	where	the	point	of	sale	is	obscured.	This	is	clearly	an	issue	of	growing	concern	to	governments	to	appropriate	a	share	of	earnings	generated	within	their	jurisdictions.				The	 case	 of	 Starbucks	 provides	 a	 contrast,	 focusing	 on	 a	 company	 that	 delivers	 to	customers	at	the	point	of	sale.	There	can	be	no	obfuscation	of	where	the	sale	is	made.	Yet,	Starbucks	have	managed	to	reduce	their	profitability	in	the	UK	by	shifting	profits	to	other	group	subsidiaries	through	the	use	of	intra	company	debt,	royalty	charges	and	TP.	MNEs	can	choose	to	adopt	mechanisms	such	as	these	to	reduce	their	tax	bill.	The	case	study	approach	demonstrates	 the	 importance	of	 these	mechanisms	 to	 the	 companies	under	 scrutiny	 but	 cannot	 add	 to	 knowledge	 about	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 these	 are	
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adopted.	Research	that	could	evaluate	the	importance	of	these	mechanisms	to	a	range	of	MNEs	would	make	an	important	contribution	but	given	the	current	disclosure	rules	it	is	not	clear	how	this	could	be	undertaken.			The	cases	of	Goodyear	Tires	and	Ford	Motor	Company	have	a	different	emphasis.	These	companies	 have	 not	 been	 accused	 of	 tax	 avoiding	 but	 the	 case	 studies	 are	 used	 to	highlight	 the	 complexity	of	 tax	accounting	and	 reporting.	 It	 is	 essential	 that	 research	looking	 at	 corporate	 tax	 affairs	 is	 based	 on	 a	 sound	understanding	 of	 the	ways	 that	corporate	 accounting	 distorts	 the	 behaviour	 of	 MNEs	 and	 the	 presentation	 of	 their	results.		Nucor	 was	 selected	 to	 provide	 a	 contrast	 to	 the	 other	 five	 case	 studies.	 Nucor	was	selected	as	their	tax	payments	appeared	straightforward	and	they	do	not	have	any	tax	haven	subsidiaries.	This	appears	to	be	a	relatively	rare	phenomenon	where	large	MNEs	are	 concerned	 (only	5	of	 those	 in	 the	 sample	 studied	 in	Chapter	5	had	no	 tax	haven	subsidiary).	 This	 underlines	 the	 choices	 that	MNEs	make	 in	 this	 area,	 the	 grey	 area	where	tax	executives,	CEOs	and	board	members	appear	to	drive	attitudes	and	therefore	decisions.	 Thoroughly	 understanding	 the	 behaviour	 of	 MNEs	 must	 involve	understanding	the	stance	that	they	take	in	relation	to	corporation	tax.	Not	all	companies	make	 the	 same	 decisions	 as	 demonstrated	 through	 the	 diversity	 of	 approaches	presented	in	these	six	case	studies.			Each	 of	 these	 case	 studies	 provides	 new	 insights	 into	 the	 workings	 of	 the	 different	companies	and	the	strategies	adopted	to	ensure	that	they	take	an	‘efficient’	approach	to	their	tax	planning.	Together	they	provide	a	significant	contribution	to	the	understanding	of	the	heterogeneity	of	approaches	adopted	by	MNE	to	tax	planning.		The	case	studies	as	a	whole	demonstrate	strong	evidence	to	support	P1,	that	MNEs	have	the	 ability	 to	 adopt	 strategies	 that	 intentionally	 enable	 them	 to	 avoid	 taxes.	 The	differences	between	the	approaches	adopted	by	the	companies	demonstrate	the	range	of	 options	 available	 to	 them.	Whilst	 the	MNEs	 included	 here	 clearly	 adopt	 different	approaches	it	is	difficult	to	conclude	strongly	about	how	much	is	driven	by	motivation	and	how	much	by	opportunity.	The	contrast	between	company	Nucor	and	Starbucks	in	
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particular	may	indicate	some	difference	in	motivation.	Starbucks	as	a	traditional	‘bricks	and	mortar’	 company	does	not	have	 some	of	 the	opportunities	available	 to	 the	more	digital	companies	in	terms	of	mechanisms	to	avoid	tax.	It	is	still,	however,	able	to	find	mechanisms	to	reduce	its	tax	payable	in	the	UK.	(P2).	Without	information	directly	from	the	company	about	the	motivation	for	their	tax	planning	strategies	it	is	not	possible	to	conclude	on	the	different	motivations	from	these	case	studies.			Whilst	the	case	studies	were	not	designed	to	test	the	effectiveness	of	the	ETR	measure	it	is	used	within	them	to	measure	trends	and	gives	useful	insight	into	the	behaviour	of	these	companies.		In	depth	case	studies	allow	for	the	exploration	of	an	issue	and	the	generation	of	theory.	The	 heterogeneity	 of	 approaches	 presented	 in	 these	 case	 studies	 underlines	 the	importance	of	this	form	of	data	gathering.	Further	research	is	needed	to	generate	a	body	of	evidence	that	can	be	used	to	generate	new	IB	theory	that	encompasses	the	role	that	tax	plays	in	stimulating	behaviour	and	the	adoption	of	strategies	by	MNEs.		Whilst	each	of	these	case	studies	independently	offers	insight	into	the	behaviour	of	the	focal	companies	they	are	an	important	part	of	the	contribution	of	this	thesis	as	a	whole.			The	 following	 Chapter	 draws	 the	 findings	 from	 this	 chapter,	 the	 theoretical	 and	empirical	literature	reviews,	the	interviews	reported	in	Chapter	4	and	the	quantitative	analysis	 together	 to	 conclude	on	what	 drives	 the	 heterogeneity	of	 approaches	 to	 tax	adopted	by	different	MNEs.			 	
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7 Discussions, conclusions and limitations The	overall	question	posed	by	this	 thesis	 is:	 ‘What	drives	 the	tax	avoidance	strategies	
adopted	by	US	MNEs?’	The	research	presented	aims	to	generate	an	understanding	of	the	heterogeneity	of	approaches	to	corporate	tax	planning	adopted	by	these	firms.	In	order	to	 do	 this	 a	 holistic	 and	 systematic	 approach	 is	 adopted	 with	 the	 motivation	 of	companies	examined	using	qualitative	and	quantitative	methodologies.	Understanding	what	is	happening	inside	the	‘black	box’	of	the	company	is	key.		The	findings	are	complex	and	nuanced.	MNEs	clearly	adopt	strategies	to	optimise	their	corporation	tax	expense.	This	is	a	new	finding	made	by	this	study:	firms	optimise	rather	than	minimise	their	ETRs.	This	can	make	measuring	tax	avoidance	and	evaluating	the	scale	of	the	problem	difficult.	It	is	clear	from	the	interviews,	regression	analysis	and	case	studies	 that	MNEs,	or	 those	working	within	them,	make	choices	about	how	much	tax	should	be	paid	and	where	they	should	pay	it.		This	chapter	considers	the	conclusions	that	can	be	drawn	from	the	research	carried	out	as	a	whole.	 It	briefly	discusses	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	 conclusions	add	to	 the	extant	literature	and	the	new	contributions	made	by	this	thesis.	The	chapter	starts	by	revisiting	the	 existing	 gaps	 in	 the	 literature	 and	 describes	 how	 the	 research	 programme	 was	designed	to	address	the	deficiencies	in	the	existing	knowledge.	The	chapter	then	goes	on	to	discuss	the	key	findings	of	the	research	as	a	body	of	work	and	how	it	has	addressed	the	key	questions	that	it	posed	at	the	outset.		The	next	section	outlines	potential	 implications	 for	policy	makers	and	managers.	The	final	sections	outline	the	latent	limitations	of	this	study	and	areas	where	further	work	could	make	useful	contributions.	
7.1 Contribution to the Literature The	 literature	 reviews	presented	 in	Chapter	2	provide	a	 comprehensive	overview	of	what	 is	 known	 about	 the	 tax	 planning	 affairs	 of	 MNEs	 from	 both	 a	 theoretical	 and	empirical	perspective.		
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This	thesis	argues	that	the	early	IB	theorists	intuited	the	importance	of	tax	as	a	driver	for	corporate	behaviour.	Subsequent	theoretical	advancements	however,	neglected	tax,	resulting	 in	 a	 theoretical	 gap	 in	 the	 understanding	 of	 how	 corporation	 tax	 drives	behaviour.	The	literature	review	argues	that	early	IB	theory	had	an	explicit	focus	on	tax	and	the	opportunities	that	it	confers	on	the	MNE.	Early	work	on	internalization	theory	concluded	that	the	financial	advantages	of	MNEs	over	domestic	companies	were	central	to	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 MNE	 (Hymer	 1976;	 Lessard	 1979;	 Rugman	 1980).	 As	internalization	theory	evolved	the	focus	of	discussion	changed,	with	more	recent	work	placing	 a	 greater	 emphasis	 on	 the	 creation	 and	 transfer	 of	 knowledge	 as	 the	 key	advantage	of	the	MNE.			The	modern	view	placed	less	emphasis	on	the	role	of	internal	financial	transfers	within	the	MNE.	Over	time	the	financial	advantages	derived	from	being	a	MNE	became	seen	as	less	central	to	the	overall	theory	of	the	MNE	than	knowledge	transfers.	TP	are	therefore	modelled	simply	as	a	tax	avoidance	mechanism,	rather	than	being	considered	as	one	of	the	key	advantages	for	the	very	existence	of	the	MNE.			This	study	makes	a	new	key	theoretical	contribution	by	extending	knowledge	about	the	motivations	and	abilities	of	MNE	to	plan	their	tax	affairs	efficiently.	The	Motivation	and	Opportunity	Matrix	presented	in	Chapter	4	(p.	160)	begins	to	address	the	limitations	in	the	existing	theory	by	directly	considering	the	MNE’s	motivation	and	opportunities	to	avoid	tax.	Understanding	the	interplay	between	these	two	factors	will	help	explicate	and	predict	the	tax	planning	strategy	adopted	by	the	MNE.		The	focus	of	IB	theory	needs	to	be	expanded	in	order	to	incorporate	an	understanding	of	the	way	in	which	tax	influences	MNEs’	motivations,	activity	and	strategic	planning.	The	 demonstration	 of	 the	 original	 importance	 attached	 to	 tax	within	 internalization	theory	 and	 its	 subsequent	 neglect	 is	 one	 of	 the	 key	 theoretical	 contributions	 of	 this	thesis.	Findings	from	the	interview	research	also	suggest	the	importance	of	aspects,	such	as	 the	relevant	experience	of	 individuals’	 involved	 in	tax	planning	and	the	company’s	overall	attitude	to	risk	that	 the	development	of	 theory	must	 take	 into	account.	These	new	findings	generate	an	important	extension	to	internalization	theory.		
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The	 empirical	 literature	 review	demonstrates	 that	whilst	 there	 is	 a	 growing	 body	 of	research	looking	at	the	issue	of	taxation,	tax	planning	and	avoidance,	very	little	of	this	is	conducted	within	 the	 field	 of	 IB.	 This	 is	 confirmed	 by	 the	 focussed	 literature	 review	presented	in	Chapter	2.	The	findings	support	the	argument	that	the	topics	of	tax	and	tax	planning	have	been	neglected	by	IB	scholars.	The	empirical	research	presented	comes	from	the	fields	of	IB,	law,	accountancy	and	finance.	The	piecemeal	approach	to	research	has	 resulted	 in	 disjointed	 findings	 that	 do	 not	 present	 a	 coherent	 picture	 of	 the	 tax	planning	affairs	and	approaches	of	the	MNE.	Growing	public	policy	interest	in	the	topic	of	tax	avoidance	appears	to	be	driving	a	resurgence	of	interest	in	this	area.	IB	has	an	important	role	to	play	in	generating	an	understanding	of	how	MNEs	behave	and	what	factors	drive	their	decision	making.			The	lack	of	clear	data	that	is	available	for	empirical	research	is	one	of	the	factors	that	has	created	the	situation	where	different	researchers	have	adopted	different	techniques	to	investigate	tax	planning	and	avoidance.	One	stream	of	research	attempts	to	evaluate	the	extent	of	tax	avoidance	at	the	macro	level	(Zucman	2014,	2015)	and	demonstrates	that	MNEs	have	considerable	ability	to	profit	shift	(Grubert	and	Mutti	1991;	Hines	and	Rice	1994;	Huizinga	and	Laeven	2008),	that	this	ability	is	increasing	(Altshuler,	Grubert	and	Newlon	2000;	Klassen	and	LaPlante	2012;	Zucman	2014)	and	that	MNE	are	becoming	more	sensitive	to	tax	rates	(Altshuler,	Grubert	and	Newlon	2000).			The	 second	 stream	 of	 research	 looks	 at	 specific	 aspects	 of,	 or	 mechanisms	 for,	 tax	avoidance	and	attempts	to	find	evidence	of	their	use	and	gauge	the	size	of	their	impact	on	 government	 revenue	 and	 corporate	 strategy	 (including	 Grubert	 and	 Mutti	 2000,	Grubert	 2003b,	 Huizinga	 and	 Laeven	 2008,	 Clausing	 2009,	 Barrios,	 et	 al	 2012,	 and	Dyreng	et	al	2015).	These	approaches	do	not	provide	a	coherent	view	of	the	MNE	as	an	entity.	They	cannot	explain	what	drives	the	MNE	to	adopt	the	tax	avoidance	strategies	that	it	does	or	the	relative	importance	of	different	mechanisms	to	different	firms.	This	significant	gap	 in	the	 literature	therefore	drove	the	development	and	adoption	of	 the	research	methodology	used	in	this	thesis.	
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7.2 Research Methodology This	thesis	has	taken	a	novel	and	systematic	approach	to	empirical	research,	particularly	for	 a	 thesis	 within	 the	 school	 of	 IB.	 Mixed	 methods	 have	 been	 used	 to	 generate	 a	comprehensive	 understanding	 of	 a	 complex	 issue.	 Examining	 the	 area	 from	 three	separate	directions,	namely,	 interviews	with	company	tax	executives	and	tax	experts,	quantitative	 analysis	 (statistical	 regressions)	 and	 case	 studies	using	 content	 analysis	methodology,	 allows	 information	 gathered	 from	 each	 to	 reinforce	 the	 others	 and	enhances	the	overall	understanding	of	this	multifaceted	area.		The	data	analysis	presented	in	Chapter	5	uses	a	relatively	small	data	set.	This	enables	deeper	 investigation	 into	 the	 behaviour	 of	 specific	 MNEs.	 The	 manageable	 sample	enables	the	analysis	of	companies	at	the	individual	level	to	complement	the	regression	analysis.	The	use	of	outlier	analysis	and	the	case	studies	presented	in	Chapter	6	facilitate	the	thorough	analysis	of	individual	companies	within	the	sample	and	this	contributes	to	the	holistic	view	of	the	MNE	that	previous	studies	have	lacked.			The	 interviews	presented	 in	Chapter	4	also	 contribute	 to	 this	holistic	understanding.	Qualitative	research	can	make	a	vital	contribution	towards	opening	the	‘black	box’	of	the	tax	planning	of	the	MNE,	towards	going	‘Inside	the	Multinationals’	(Rugman	1981).		This	is	particularly	important	in	a	subject	like	corporation	tax	where	issues	of	confidentiality	and	transparency	generate	difficulties	and	deficiencies	in	more	traditional	forms	of	data	analysis.	Doz	(2011)	argues	that:	
‘only	 rich,	 thick	descriptions	 can	provide	 the	basis	 for	 the	use	and	possible	 synthesis	 of	
multiple	theories	into	new	conceptual	development’	(Doz	2011).	Only	 qualitative	 research	 can	 provide	 the	 depth	 needed	 to	 create	 these	 ‘thick	descriptions’.	 The	 series	 of	 interviews	 reported	 in	 Chapter	 4	 make	 a	 significant	contribution	 towards	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 requisite	 description.	 It	 is	 imperative	 to	understand	 the	 decision-making	 processes	 within	 the	 firm,	 and	 to	 understand	 the	concerns	and	motivations	of	those	who	are	making	key	decisions	(Rugman	and	Verbeke,	2008).	 	 As	 a	 consequence	 Chapter	 4	 provides	 an	 important	 new	 data	 source.	 This	research	 is	 unique,	 not	 just	within	 the	 field	 of	 IB	 but	 across	 the	 different	 disciplines	where	tax	is	considered	important.		
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7.3 Key Research Findings The	mixed	methods	approach	provides	a	range	of	findings	that	triangulate	to	present	a	complex	picture	of	the	tax	affairs	of	MNEs.	The	findings	are	nuanced	and	complex.	The	quantitative	 analysis	 reported	 in	 Chapter	 5	 provides	 significant	 new	 findings.	 By	considering	the	characteristics	of	companies	and	their	ETRs	the	research	contributes	to	the	 overall	 research	 question	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 heterogeneity	 in	 the	 tax	 planning	approaches	of	the	MNE.		Direct	 evidence	 for	 tax	 avoidance	 itself,	 however	 is	 not	 straightforward.	 For	 both	measures	of	ETR	the	mean	rate	for	the	firms	within	the	sample	studied	in	Chapter	5	is	within	one	standard	deviation	of	the	statutory	rate.	Whilst	there	are	many	companies	that	have	 low	ETRs	over	the	ten	year	period	studied	there	are	many	where	ETRs	are	closer	to	the	statutory	rate.	Figure	5	(page	187)	shows	that	in	reality	the	different	ETRs	form	a	relatively	smooth	continuum.	Overall	the	Cash	LR	ETR	of	the	sample	was	25.72	per	cent.	13.83	per	cent	of	the	firms	studied	maintained	a	LR	Cash	ETR	of	less	than	20	per	cent	and	4.26	per	cent	maintained	a	rate	of	less	than	10	per	cent.	There	is	clearly	huge	 variation	 in	 the	 ETR’s	 of	 these	 companies	 and	 this	 thesis	 argues	 that	 this	 is	 a	consequence	of	the	decisions	made	within	these	firms.	MNEs	appear	to	‘optimise’	rather	than	 ‘minimise’	corporation	tax.	The	 interviewees	(Chapter	4)	explained	how	the	top	management	of	 the	company	and	their	approach	to	risk	 influence	the	aggressiveness	with	which	tax	avoidance	is	pursued.			Far-sighted	 management	 of	 MNEs	 must	 consider	 the	 long-term	 prospects	 for	 the	company.	 The	 potential	 risks	 of	 tax	 avoidance	 in	 terms	 of	 harm	 to	 the	 company’s	reputation	must	be	weighed	against	the	shorter-term	advantages	of	the	lower	tax	bill.	The	 interviewees	 (Chapter	 4)	 argue	 that	 as	 public	 interest	 has	 grown	 in	 this	phenomenon,	 following	 the	global	 financial	 crisis	of	2008,	MNEs	are	 taking	a	 longer-term	 approach,	 more	 conscious	 than	 previously	 of	 the	 potential	 damage	 to	 their	corporate	reputation.	This	is	reflected	in	the	figures	in	Table	8	(page	188)	that	shows	the	 ten	year	 trends	 in	both	GAAP	 and	Cash	ETRs.	There	appears	 to	be	 a	 fairly	 stead	downward	 trend	 over	 the	 ten	 year	 period	 studied,	 which	 is	 consistent	 with	 firms	adopting	a	more	conservative	approach	to	tax	avoidance.		
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ETR	itself	is	a	complex	measure	and	the	research	presented	in	Chapter	5,	particularly	the	 outlier	 analysis	 (see	 case	 studies	 on	 Goodyear	 Tires	 and	 Ford	 in	 Chapter	 6)	demonstrates	the	importance	of	understanding	the	details	of	the	measure	used.			The	 differences	 between	 the	 two	measures	 used	 here,	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 the	findings	on	 IP	and	 the	 Internationality	 Index	demonstrate	 the	 complexity	of	 the	ETR	measures.	The	discussion	in	Chapter	4	on	KPIs	where	interviewees	reveal	the	continuing	importance	of	the	ETR	to	MNEs	is	a	key	finding	with	practical	implications	for	empirical	research.	Whilst	there	is	some	lack	of	agreement	over	the	current	extent	of	use	of	ETR	as	a	specific	 target	or	KPI,	 it	remains	clear	 that	 the	ETR	is	an	 important	measure	 for	MNEs.	If	MNEs	themselves	monitor	and	concentrate	on	these	measures	they	remain	a	valid	 focus	 for	 academic	 research.	 The	 motivation	 for	 some	 researchers	 (Lanis	 and	Richardson	2015	and	Brajcich	et	al	2016)	to	move	away	from	ETR	as	the	DV	in	statistical	research	may	be	due	to	its	complex	nature.	It	remains	the	most	direct	measure	of	tax	charges	payments	despite	its	complexity.	Its	complexity	may	be	due	in	part	to	the	finding	that	firms	engineer	an	optimal	rather	than	a	minimal	rate.			Using	a	long	run	measure	of	both	cash	and	GAAP	ETR	generates	important	findings.	The	understanding	 of	 the	 differences	 between	 these	 two	 measures	 engendered	 has	important	 implications	 for	 future	 empirical	 research.	 The	 case	 studies	 on	 Goodyear	Tires	 and	 Ford	 Motor	 Company	 in	 Chapter	 6	 also	 add	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 this	measure	with	the	focus	on	the	implications	of	shifts	in	deferred	tax	assets	and	valuation	allowances.		It	 is	clear	 that	 this	 indicates	 that	ETR	a	useful	measure	of	a	company’s	propensity	 to	avoid	tax.	ETR	is	a	complex	measure,	or	set	of	measures.	Researchers	must	understand	the	measure	that	they	employ	and	its	interaction	with	IVs.	The	importance	placed	on	this	measure	by	MNEs	themselves	emphasizes	its	importance	and	the	need	for	researchers	to	embrace	 its	complexity	rather	than	rejecting	 it	 in	 favour	of	other	 less	direct	proxy	measures.			The	findings	reveal	the	importance	of	size	of	the	MNE	on	its	ETRs.	Previous	findings	have	been	mixed	with	some	finding	that	larger	firms	are	associated	with	more	tax	avoidance	
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(Benvignati	 1985;	 Zimmerman	 1983,	 Rego	 2003,	 Lanis	 and	 Richardson	 2015)	 and	others	finding	a	negative	impact	(Porcano	1986)	or	no	association	(Shevlin	and	Porter	1992,	Gupta	and	Newberry	1997).	This	earlier	work	relied	on	single	year	measures	of	ETR	and	did	not	consider	both	Cash	and	GAAP	ETRs.	Whilst	this	research	demonstrates	the	clear	importance	of	size	on	ETRs	it	does	not	explain	what	aspect	of	size	confers	this	advantage.	 Investigation	 in	 Table	 13	 (page	 197)	 shows	 that	 the	 largest	 firms	 are	dominated	by	those	in	the	tech	sector	and	pharmaceuticals.	It	may	be	that	greater	scope	for	 TP	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 reported	 advantage	 of	 size.	 Further	work	with	 a	 larger	sample	size	is	required	to	continue	the	exploration	of	the	impact	of	industry	and	size	on	GAAP	and	Cash	ETRs.		The	differences	between	the	signs	for	LR	GAAP	and	Cash	ETRs	for	the	internationality	index	 and	 IP	 findings	 demonstrate	 the	 complexity	 of	 these	 measures.	 If	 MNEs	 pay	foreign	 taxes	 (cash)	 but	 do	 not	 repatriate	 sufficient	 profits	 to	 the	US	 they	may	 have	insufficient	US	tax	liability	with	which	to	offset	the	foreign	cash	payments	made.	This	finding	 adds	 significantly	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 IP	 and	internationality	to	the	MNE	in	relation	to	tax	planning	but	also	reinforces	the	need	for	care	when	interpreting	ETRs.			The	model	makes	significant	new	findings	in	relation	to	tax	havens.	If	MNEs	have	at	least	one	tax	haven	subsidiary	their	LR	Cash	ETR	is	reduced	by	9.5	per	cent.	The	measures	involved	 in	work	 on	 tax	 havens	 are	 complex	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 agreement	 between	scholars	about	what	constitutes	a	tax	haven.	The	measure	of	‘dot	tax	havens’	used	relies	on	the	small	size	of	the	country	and	the	consequent	lack	of	market	there.	Future	work	should	examine	which	specific	aspects	of	these	dot	tax	havens	and	the	services	available	are	attractive	 to	MNEs	to	generate	a	more	 complete	understanding	of	 the	 role	of	 tax	havens.	This	in	turn	may	generate	a	new,	more	precise	definition	of	tax	havens	for	use	in	future	analysis.		The	role	of	women	on	the	board	and	their	impact	on	ETRs	is	a	clear	and	important	new	finding.	This	adds	new	evidence	to	the	emerging	field	of	research	that	considers	the	role	of	gender	 in	corporate	management	and	strategy.	The	 findings	here	demonstrate	the	important	role	that	is	played	by	the	board	in	setting	the	tax	planning	tone	within	the	
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company	 and	 that,	 in	 turn,	 drives	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	 approaches	 adopted.	 This	reinforces	the	findings	from	the	interviews	that	suggest	the	importance	of	the	tone	from	the	 top	 of	 the	 company	 as	 well	 as	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 board	 itself.	 The	 findings	demonstrate	 clearly	 the	 different	 attitude	 taken	 by	 female	 board	 members	 and	 the	influence	that	they	have	across	the	different	measures	of	tax	avoidance	included	within	the	data	analysis.	It	appears	likely	that	women	take	a	different	stance	on	the	long-term	view	of	the	company	and	place	greater	emphasis	on	the	potential	for	tax	avoidance	to	damage	the	company’s	reputation.	Women	may	therefore	place	greater	emphasis	on	tax	optimisation	 rather	 than	 tax	minimisation.	 This	 is	 consistent	with	 previous	 research	which	 finds	 that	women	 adopt	 a	 different	 approach	 to	 their	 role	 as	 board	members	(Wang	 and	 Coffey	 1992;	 Williams	 2003;	 Adams	 and	 Ferreira	 2009)	 as	 well	 as	 to	evaluating	risk	(Barua	et	al	2010;	Torgler	and	Valev	2010;	Francis	et	al	2014;	Huang	and	Kisgen	2013).		That	women	on	the	board	are	able	to	influence	tax	strategy	in	this	way	is	a	significant	new	finding.	As	more	women	find	places	on	the	boards	of	MNEs	their	influence	is	likely	to	grow.	This	highlights	the	importance	of	understanding	the	MNE	as	a	dynamic	rather	than	a	static	organisation	and	the	importance	for	IB	scholars	to	ensure	that	both	theory	and	empirical	research	keep	pace	with	change.			It	is	clear	that	MNEs	have	scope	to	plan	their	tax	affairs.	How	they	choose	to	do	this	will	vary	between	companies	depending	on	the	motivation	of	the	company	to	avoid	tax	and	the	opportunities	available	to	it.	The	Motivation	and	Opportunity	Matrix	presented	in	Chapter	4	(page	160)	explores	the	factors	that	influence	the	decision	made	by	MNEs	and	why	some	avoid	tax	more	aggressively	than	others.	The	opportunities	available	may	be	influenced	 by	 the	 potential	 to	 profit	 shift	 via	 TP	 or	 other	 mechanisms.	 The	 MNE’s	motivation,	or	the	extent	to	which	they	choose	to	avoid	tax	appears	to	reflect	the	long-term	 assessment	 of	 its	 implications	 for	 the	 future	 of	 the	 company.	 Companies	 with	greater	concern	for	the	potential	impact	of	tax	avoidance	on	its	reputation	will	choose	to	optimise	rather	than	minimise	tax.	This	highlights	the	ability	of	MNEs	to	choose	their	tax	strategy	and	to	determine	the	aggressiveness	with	which	they	pursue	tax	avoidance.	
	 284	
7.4 Implications for Managers and Policy Makers Whilst	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 research	 is	 not	 on	 tax	 policy	 per	 se,	 there	 are	 some	 clear	implications	 for	 those	 developing	 policy	 and	 for	 tax	 managers.	 All	 three	 pieces	 of	empirical	research	demonstrate	the	 flexibility	 that	MNEs	currently	experience	within	the	 international	 tax	 regime	 given	 that	 the	 differentials	 in	 tax	 rates	 across	 countries	provide	MNEs	with	vast	opportunities	for	arbitrage.	MNEs	demonstrate	behaviours	that	enable	 them	 to	 plan	 their	 tax	 liabilities.	 The	 background	 and	 experiences	 of	 those	involved	in	setting	and	managing	tax	policy	within	the	MNE	will	have	an	impact	on	its	overall	strategy.	The	characteristics	of	the	firm	will	denote	the	areas	where	it	has	greater	scope	for	tax	planning.	The	overall	aggressiveness	of	behaviour	that	emerges	will	be	a	consequence	of	these	two	factors	and	it	is	clear	that	many	MNEs	choose	to	optimise	their	ETRs	rather	than	minimise.		There	are	clear	implications	for	managers	of	MNEs	–	both	at	the	headquarters	and	at	the	subsidiary	 level.	Management	 needs	 to	 be	 clear	 that	when	 they	 are	 setting	 their	 tax	planning	 strategy	 they	 are	 making	 a	 choice	 with	 implications	 not	 only	 for	 the	corporation	tax	paid	but	also	potentially,	risks	to	the	business	including	those	of	public	perception	 and	 potential	 damage	 to	 their	 corporate	 reputation.	 Executives	 should	actively	manage	their	tax	planning	strategy	in	the	light	of	these	potential	trade	offs.		Policy	is	also	needed	to	address	these	areas.	Tax	executives	argue	that	they	respond	to	the	 legal	 framework	 and	 may	 feel	 pressure	 from	 within	 the	 corporation	 or	 from	shareholders	 to	 reduce	 their	 tax	 liability	 if	 they	 are	 out	 of	 line	with	 their	peers.	 Tax	planning	and	payments	need	to	become	less	of	a	choice	and	more	of	an	obligation	for	MNEs.			This	 research	 demonstrates	 that	MNEs	 do	 not	 adopt	 a	 homogenous	 approach	 to	 tax	planning	and	government	policies	need	to	respond	to	these	differences.	MNEs	operate	across	borders	and	the	case	studies	presented	in	Chapter	6	demonstrate	the	extent	of	the	 impact	 of	 tax	 planning	 on	 their	 corporate	 structures	 and	 behaviour.	 Without	 a	similar	transnational	perspective	governments	will	be	at	a	disadvantage	compared	to	the	MNE,	focusing	on	a	smaller	jurisdiction	than	the	MNE.	As	the	length	of	value	chains	increases,	all	MNEs,	not	simply	those	involved	in	digital	base	industries,	will	be	able	to	
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exploit	 the	 possibilities	 that	 this	 increasing	 role	 of	 digital	 technology	 offers.	Governments	need	to	consider	how	they	can	gain	this	international	perspective.	
7.5 Limitations of this Research This	thesis	takes	a	novel	approach,	adopting	three	distinct	methodologies	(interviews	with	 tax	 executives;	 statistical	 regressions	 and	 company	 case	 studies)	 to	 construct	 a	systematic	and	comprehensive	picture	of	the	heterogeneity	of	approaches	adopted	by	US	MNEs	to	tax	planning.	Each	of	the	methodologies	have	inherent	limitations,	but	by	adopting	this	multi	facetted	approach	the	interplay	between	the	approaches	generates	complementary	 findings	 that	work	 together	 to	 give	 a	 complete	 picture	 of	 a	 complex	phenomenon.	Work	in	this	area	is	inherently	difficult	due	to	the	confidential	nature	of	tax	 planning.	 Rather	 than	 concerns	 for	 confidentiality	 emerging	 simply	 due	 to	 the	competitive	 nature	 of	 business,	 there	 are	 genuine	 concerns	 about	 the	 legality	 or	legitimacy	of	the	strategies	of	MNEs.	Tax	executives	do	not	want	to	draw	attention	to	their	MNEs	or	the	mechanisms	used	within	their	corporate	tax	planning	strategy.		The	 research	based	on	 interviews	with	 tax	executives	 is	based	on	a	 small	sample,	 as	access	issues	driven	by	confidentiality	concerns,	limited	participation.	Care	was	taken	however,	to	ensure	that	there	was	no	bias	in	the	sample	and	that	those	interviewed	had	a	 senior	 enough	 role	 within	 the	 organisation	 to	 be	 able	 to	 contribute	 fully	 to	 the	interview	process.	The	 findings	 from	 the	 interviews	complemented	 those	 from	other	empirical	studies.	There	were	no	clear	disagreements	between	the	interviewees,	indeed	the	level	of	repetition	between	the	interviewees	seemed	to	suggest	that	saturation	had	been	achieved	(Suddaby	2006).	A	larger	sample	size	could	have	enabled	stratification	and	examination	of	any	emerging	differences	between	those	working	within	MNEs	and	those	advising	them.		A	 small	dataset	was	developed	 for	 the	 regression	analysis	presented	 in	Chapter	5	 in	order	to	enable	the	research	to	drill	down	and	present	a	holistic	view	of	the	companies.		A	larger	sample	would	have	enabled	greater	focus	on	any	industrial	differences	and	may	have	enabled	greater	analysis	of	the	differences	between	companies.		Data	was	collected	for	 these	 companies	 over	 a	 ten-year	 time	 horizon	 and	 this	 incorporated	 the	 global	financial	crisis	of	2008.	Examination	of	a	longer	time	period	would	have	given	a	greater	
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understanding	of	the	changes	emerging	over	time	that	were	discussed	in	the	interviews.	Interviewees	 discussed	 the	 changes	 in	 attitude	 that	 had	 emerged	 since	 the	 global	financial	crash	of	2008	but	the	relatively	short	time	horizon	of	ten	years	did	not	enable	any	analysis	 to	be	undertaken	of	 the	 impact	of	 the	 financial	 crash	and	whether	MNE	behaviour	or	outcomes	changed	as	a	consequence	of	the	crash.		The	research	focuses	on	US	MNEs,	their	home	country	tax	regime	and	UK	operations.	The	 data	 analysis	 considers	 their	 group	 operations	 whilst	 the	 interviews	 largely	consider	their	UK	operations.	The	case	studies	offer	the	ability	to	combine	the	two	levels	of	analysis	(the	parent	firm	and	foreign	subsidiaries)	where	relevant.	The	research	was	structured	 in	this	way	to	produce	a	multi-level	analysis,	however,	synergies	between	interviewees	and	data	analysis	at	the	same	level	may	have	been	reduced.	Interviewing	tax	executives	 in	 the	US	headquarters	could	have	supplemented	the	existing	 findings	although	gaining	access	would	have	been	problematic.		As	 the	 focus	 is,	 like	much	 extant	 research,	 on	 US	MNEs,	 the	 generalizability	may	 be	limited.	 US	 firms	 are	 dominant	 in	 the	 global	 market,	 however,	 they	 face	 specific	challenges	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 home	 tax	 regime	 that	 may	 mean	 they	 respond	 to	international	possibilities	in	a	different	way	to	companies	with	other	home	countries.	The	focus	on	their	UK	and	multinational	operations	creates	an	international	perspective.	The	main	 findings	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	 approaches	 undertaken	 by	 US	MNEs	are	likely	to	hold	for	a	wider	sample	of	countries.		The	 case	 studies	 represent	 an	 underused	 form	 of	 IB	 research.	 Supplementing	 the	document	analysis	presented	here	with	interviews	and	data	from	inside	the	company	would	have	enabled	a	more	holistic	view	of	 the	company	to	be	presented.	 Interviews	would	 also	 have	 assisted	 in	 generating	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 interplay	 between	motivation	and	opportunity.	The	case	studies	analyse	what	can	be	gleaned	from	public	information	about	the	position	adopted	by	the	MNEs	but	cannot	conclude	on	what	drove	the	adoption	of	that	position.		
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7.6 Areas for Future Research A	number	of	areas	for	future	research	have	been	identified	throughout	this	thesis.		This	section	brings	these	areas	together	to	present	the	key	areas	where	additional	research	could	usefully	generate	new	insight	to	supplement	the	findings	of	this	thesis.		Tax	 has	 been	 a	 neglected	 topic	 within	 the	 field	 of	 IB.	 The	 findings	 from	 the	 three	empirical	studies	have	demonstrated	the	importance	of	this	subject	and	underline	the	need	for	IB	researchers	to	address	the	shortcomings	from	within	the	IB	field.	IB	theory	and	research	needs	to	account	for	the	implications	of	corporate	taxation	for	company	strategy.		Given	 the	 important	 findings	made	 in	relation	 to	 the	use	of	Tax	Havens	 in	Chapter	5	further	research	could	usefully	focus	on	the	features	of	tax	havens	and	what	makes	them	attractive	 relative	 to	 each	 other.	 This	 would	 enable	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 more	 precise	definition	of	 ‘dot	 tax	havens’,	moving	away	 from	a	 reliance	 simply	on	 the	 size	of	 the	country.	 Further	 analysis	 is	 also	 required	 to	 further	 explore	 the	 role	 of	MNE	 size	 in	determining	ETR.	Analysis	should	focus	on	what	aspects	of	size	or	industry	contribute	to	this	finding.	This	work	could	consider	the	complexity	of	group	structures	as	well	as	the	functions	of	different	subsidiaries.		Data	analysis	could	usefully	focus	on	the	use	of	NOLs	and	deferred	taxes	and	how	these	have	been	used	by	MNEs	over	time.	This	is	a	highly	technical	area	and	has	been	neglected	by	 previous	 research	 with	 loss	 making	 firms	 often	 simply	 excluded	 from	 analysis	(Azemar	2003;	Markle	and	Shackelford	2009;	Dharmapala	and	Riedel	2008).		The	 innovative	use	of	 case	studies	 in	Chapter	6	demonstrates	 the	useful	 information	contained	 in	 annual	 reports	 that	 are	 too	 often	 neglected	 as	 a	 source	 by	 academic	researchers.	 	 In	 depth	 case	 studies	 based	 on	 annual	 reports	 can	 provide	 important	insight	when	access	to	companies	is	limited.	These	allow	for	the	in	depth	exploration	of	issues	 as	 well	 as	 the	 generation	 of	 theory.	 More	 qualitative	 research	 is	 needed	 to	continue	to	pursue	the	area	of	what	drives	the	variation	in	tax	avoidance.	Work	could	usefully	 investigate	 the	 processes	within	 the	 firm:	who	 sets	 tax	 policy	 and	 how	 it	 is	implemented.	New	qualitative	research	is	needed	as	the	basis	for	the	generation	of	new	
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theory	addressing	tax.	The	importance	of	tax	as	an	issue	for	those	operating	within	the	MNE	must	be	reflected	in	the	research	of	those	studying	the	MNE.	
7.7 Final Conclusions The	multi-disciplinary	 approach	 to	methodology	 adopted	 in	 this	 research	 enables	 a	comprehensive	analysis	to	be	made	of	a	topic	that	has	long	been	neglected	within	the	IB	field.	The	research	demonstrates	that	this	is	an	important	area	for	IB	researchers,	with	the	potential	to	generate	an	enhanced	understanding	of	the	MNE	more	broadly.	Using	both	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 methods	 of	 inquiry	 enabled	 the	 research	 to	 make	significant	contributions	both	to	empirical	understanding	but	also	to	existing	theory.			The	nature	of	this	research	is	timely	given	the	new	focus	on	corporation	tax	payments	by	policy	makers	and	the	general	public.	The	findings	demonstrate	the	importance	to	MNEs	of	optimising	their	corporation	tax	payments	rather	than	simply	minimising	them.	This	emphasises	the	role	played	by	individuals	within	MNEs,	here	demonstrated	by	the	finding	that	more	female	board	members	tend	to	lead	to	an	increase	in	corporate	ETRs,	suggesting	that	they	are	less	aggressive	in	tax	planning.				 	
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9 Appendices 
9.1 Appendix 1 Consent Form 
	Henley	Business	School	The	University	of	Reading		Consent	form	Corporate	Taxation	of	US	Multinational	Enterprises	in	the	UK	Contact:	Maggie	Cooper	m.cooper@pgr.reading.ac.uk	07722965159	 	I	confirm	that	I	have	had	the	purposes	of	this	research	project	and	of	this	interview	explained	to	me.	I	understand	what	will	be	required	of	me.			I	understand	that	the	answers	that	I	give	will	not	be	attributed	to	me	or	to	the	company	that	I	represent.	I	understand	that	my	participation	in	this	project	is	entirely	voluntary	and	that	I	may	withdraw	at	any	time.		I	have	received	a	copy	of	this	consent	form.		Signature	__________________________________				Date	_________________	 	 		
	 310	
9.2 Appendix 2 Interview Question Schedule 
General	 More	specific		 Looking	for	Does	background	influence	their	view	of	tax	avoidance?	 Could	you	tell	me	a	little	about	your	background	/	experience?	How	long	have	you	worked	here?	Have	you	worked	in	practice?	
Years	in	role	Practice	or	industry	background	(years	in	either	/	both).	What	 kind	 of	 priority	 is	 tax	 avoidance	given?	Is	this	dictated	from	Group	level	or	set	within	the	subsidiary?				
How	many	FTE	are	employed	within	the	UK	tax	department?	How	does	this	compare	to	the	tax	department	at	the	Group	level?	When	company	 strategy	 is	 being	 established	how	does	 tax	 feed	 in?	 Is	strategy	set	and	then	tax	strategy	follows	or	is	it	more	integrated?	How	and	where	are	transfer	prices	set	within	the	company	–	what	is	the	process	used?	How	regularly	are	they	reviewed?	Are	intra	company	transfers	a	significant	part	of	the	P&L?		Which	areas	are	most	significant	within	the	company?	–	Royalties,	debt,	management	fees,	intermediate	goods.	What	KPIs	are	the	tax	department	measured	on?	Do	they	employ	external	tax	advisers?	
FTE	(approx.)	in	tax	department	Tax	director	position	–	operating	board?	Specifics	 on	 TP	 process	 –	 negotiated	 or	dictated.	Research	will	have	shown	which	areas	are	likely	 to	be	 important	 for	each	company	but	 asking	 about	 this	 area	 will	 add	 to	understanding.	Detail	of	KPIs	
Do	they	genuinely	think	there	is	/	isn’t	a	significant	 problem	 in	 terms	 tax	avoidance	in	the	UK?		
What	do	you	think	about	the	current	Government’s	tax	policy?	Do	you	think	that	changes	are	need	in	government	policy	to	reduce	tax	avoidance?	 	How	 useful	 do	 you	 think	 the	 Government’s	 /House	 of	 Commons	enquiries	into	and	pronouncements	about	tax	avoidance	are?	
Government	policy	will	/	will	not	have	an	impact	 on	 their	 ability	 to	 avoid	 tax	 in	future	There	 is	 /	 is	 not	 a	 problem	 for	 public	policy	makers	in	terms	of	tax	avoidance	
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Have	reductions	in	the	UK	tax	rate	influenced	any	decisions	within	the	group	about	where	 to	do	business	/	expand	etc?	 Is	 the	UK	now	more	attractive	to	companies?	Is	 their	 company	 actively	 avoiding	 tax?	How	 much	 pressure	 is	 on	 them	 as	 tax	director	to	reduce	ETR?		Does	 tax	 avoidance	 influence	 company	behaviour?	
How	does	tax	planning	fit	in	with	the	company’s	strategic	planning?	Are	the	same	people	involved?	Which	comes	first	time	wise?	How	 aggressive	 would	 you	 say	 your	 company	 is	 in	 relation	 to	 tax	planning?	To	what	extent	does	efficient	tax	planning	contribute	to	the	profitability	of	the	group?	To	what	extent	do	you	think	it	is	essential	for	companies	to	plan	tax	in	a	manner	that	matches	the	tax	strategies	of	their	competitors?	Do	you	keep	the	location	of	your	HQ	under	review	and	what	factors	are	considered?	Do	you	use	tax	rates	as	a	factor	when	deciding	where	to	base	European	operations?	
Compare	with	competitors		Location	HQ	decision	made	 by	Group	 or	Subsidiary	
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9.3 Appendix 3 Summary Descriptions of US MNEs Included in the Quantitative Analysis (Information,	including	the	Business	Description	taken	from	OneSource	global	database	by	Dun	&	Bradstreet.)	
Company 
Name 
Incorpo
ration 
Date 
ISIC Rev 4 
Description 
Business Description Sales 
US$ (mil) 
2014 
Assets 
US$ 
(mil) 
2014 
3M 1902 Manufacture 
of medical and 
dental 
instruments 
and supplies 
3M Company is a technology company. It operates through five segments: 1. Industrial 
segment serves a range of markets, such as automotive original equipment manufacturer 
and automotive aftermarket, electronics, appliance, paper and printing, packaging, food 
and beverage, and construction. 
2. Safety and Graphics segment serves a range of markets for the safety, security and 
productivity of people, facilities and systems.  
3. Health Care segment serves markets that include medical clinics and hospitals, 
pharmaceuticals, health information systems, and food manufacturing and testing.  
4. Electronics and Energy segment serves customers in electronics and energy markets, 
including solutions for the performance of electronic devices; electrical products, 
including infrastructure protection, and power generation and distribution.  
5. Consumer segment serves markets that include consumer retail, office business to 
business, home improvement, drug and pharmacy retail, and other markets. 
31,821 31,209 
Abbott 
Laboratories 
1900 Manufacture 
of 
pharmaceutica
ls, medicinal 
chemical and 
botanical 
products. 
Abbott Laboratories is engaged in the discovery, development, manufacture and sale of a 
range of healthcare products. The Company operates through four segments: Established 
Pharmaceutical Products, Diagnostic Products, Nutritional Products and Vascular 
Products. Its Established Pharmaceutical Products include a range of branded generic 
pharmaceuticals manufactured around the world and marketed and sold outside the 
United States. Its Diagnostic Products include a range of diagnostic systems and tests. Its 
Nutritional Products include a range of paediatric and adult nutritional products. Its 
Company's Vascular Products include a range of coronary, endovascular, vessel closure 
and structural heart devices for the treatment of vascular disease. The Company, through 
St. Jude Medical, Inc., also offers products, such as rhythm management products, 
electrophysiology products, heart failure related products, vascular products, structural 
heart products and neuromodulation products. 
20,247 41,207 
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Company 
Name 
Incorpo
ration 
Date 
ISIC Rev 4 
Description 
Business Description Sales 
US$ (mil) 
2014 
Assets 
US$ 
(mil) 
2014 
AECOM 1980 Architectural 
and 
engineering 
activities and 
related 
technical 
consultancy 
AECOM is engaged in designing, building, financing and operating infrastructure assets 
for governments, businesses and organizations. The Company's segments include design 
and consulting services (DCS), construction services (CS) and management services (MS). 
Its DCS segment is engaged in planning, consulting, architectural and engineering design 
services to commercial and government clients in major end markets, such as 
transportation, facilities, environmental, energy, water and government. Its CS segment 
is engaged in construction services, including building construction and energy, 
infrastructure and industrial construction, primarily in the Americas. Its MS segment is 
engaged in programming and facilitating management and maintenance, training, 
logistics, consulting, technical assistance, and systems integration and information 
technology services, primarily for agencies of the United States government and other 
national governments. 
8,357 6,123 
Alcoa 1903 Manufacture 
of basic 
precious and 
non ferrous 
metals 
Alcoa Corporation, formerly Alcoa Upstream Corporation, is engaged in the production of 
bauxite, alumina and aluminium of various cast and rolled products. The Company is 
engaged in the production and management of aluminium and alumina combined 
through its participation in various aspects of the industry, such as technology, mining, 
refining, smelting, and recycling. The Company's segments include Bauxite, Alumina, 
Aluminium, Cast Products, Energy and Rolled Products. The Company's Bauxite segment 
represents its global portfolio of bauxite mining assets. The Company's Alumina segment 
represents its refining system across the world, and processes bauxite into alumina and 
sells it directly to internal and external smelter customers across the world. The 
Company's Aluminium segment represents its smelter system across the world. Its 
Energy segment represents its portfolio of energy assets, with power production capacity 
of approximately 1,685 megawatts. 
23,906 37,363 
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Company 
Name 
Incorpo
ration 
Date 
ISIC Rev 4 
Description 
Business Description Sales 
US$ (mil) 
2014 
Assets 
US$ 
(mil) 
2014 
Alphabet 2015 Computer 
consultancy 
and computer 
facilities 
management 
activities 
Alphabet Inc. is a holding company. The Company's businesses include Google Inc. 
(Google) and its Internet products, such as Access, Calico, CapitalG, GV, Nest, Verily, 
Waymo and X. The Company's segments include Google and Other Bets. The Google 
segment includes its Internet products, such as Search, Ads, Commerce, Maps, YouTube, 
Google Cloud, Android, Chrome and Google Play, as well as its hardware initiatives. The 
Google segment is engaged in advertising, sales of digital content, applications and cloud 
offerings, and sales of hardware products. The Other Bets segment is engaged in the 
sales of Internet and television services through Google Fiber, sales of Nest products and 
services, and licensing and research and development (R&D) services through Verily. It 
offers Google Assistant, which allows users to type or talk with Google; Google Maps, 
which helps users navigate to a store, and Google Photos, which helps users store and 
organize all of their photos. 
66,001 129,187 
Altria 1919 Manufacture 
of tobacco 
products 
Altria Group, Inc. is a holding company. The Company's segments include smokeable 
products, smokeless products and wine. The Company's subsidiaries include Philip Morris 
USA Inc. (PM USA), which is engaged in the manufacture and sale of cigarettes in the 
United States; John Middleton Co. (Middleton), which is engaged in the manufacture and 
sale of machine-made cigars and pipe tobacco, and UST LLC (UST), which, through its 
subsidiaries, including U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Company LLC (USSTC) and Ste. Michelle 
Wine Estates Ltd. (Ste. Michelle), is engaged in the manufacture and sale of smokeless 
tobacco products and wine. Its other operating companies include Nu Mark LLC (Nu 
Mark), a subsidiary that is engaged in the manufacture and sale of tobacco products, and 
Philip Morris Capital Corporation (PMCC), a subsidiary that maintains a portfolio of 
finance assets. Other subsidiaries include Altria Group Distribution Company and Altria 
Client Services LLC. 
24,522 34,475 
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Company 
Name 
Incorpo
ration 
Date 
ISIC Rev 4 
Description 
Business Description Sales 
US$ (mil) 
2014 
Assets 
US$ 
(mil) 
2014 
Amazon 1994 Retail sale via 
mail order 
houses or via 
internet 
Amazon.com, Inc. offers a range of products and services through its Websites. The 
Company operates through three segments: North America, International and Amazon 
Web Services (AWS). The North America segment consists of retail sales of consumer 
products (including from sellers) and subscriptions through North America-focused 
Websites, such as www.amazon.com, www.amazon.ca and www.amazon.com.mx. The 
International segment primarily consists of retail sales of consumer products (including 
from sellers) and subscriptions through internationally-focused Websites, such as 
www.amazon.com.au, www.amazon.nl, www.amazon.es and www.amazon.co.uk. The 
AWS segment consists of sales of compute, storage, database, and other service offerings 
for start-ups, enterprises, government agencies and academic institutions. The 
Company's products include merchandise and content that it purchases for resale from 
vendors and those offered by third-party sellers. It manufactures and sells electronic 
devices. 
88,988 54,505 
American 
Airlines 
Group 
1982 Passenger air 
transport 
American Airlines Group Inc. is a holding company. The Company's primary business 
activity is the operation of a network air carrier, providing scheduled air transportation 
for passengers and cargo. The Company operates through American segment, which 
provides air transportation for passengers and cargo. The Company's cargo division 
provides a range of freight and mail services with facilities and interline connections 
available across the globe. Together with its regional airline subsidiaries and third-party 
regional carriers operating as American Eagle, its airline operated an average of nearly 
6,700 flights per day to nearly 350 destinations in more than 50 countries, principally 
from its hubs in Charlotte, Chicago, Dallas/Fort Worth, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, 
Philadelphia, Phoenix and Washington, District of Columbia, as of December 31, 2016. In 
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2016, approximately 199 million passengers boarded 
its mainline and regional flights. 
42,650 43,225 
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Company 
Name 
Incorpo
ration 
Date 
ISIC Rev 4 
Description 
Business Description Sales 
US$ (mil) 
2014 
Assets 
US$ 
(mil) 
2014 
Amerisource 
Bergen 
2001 Wholesale of 
other 
household 
goods 
AmerisourceBergen Corporation is a pharmaceutical sourcing and distribution services 
company. The Company's segments include Pharmaceutical Distribution and Other. The 
Company provides services to healthcare providers, and pharmaceutical and biotech 
manufacturers. As of June 30, 2016, the Pharmaceutical Distribution segment consists of 
two operating segments, including the operations of AmerisourceBergen Drug 
Corporation (ABDC) and AmerisourceBergen Specialty Group (ABSG), which distributes 
specialty drugs to their customers. Servicing healthcare providers in the pharmaceutical 
supply channel, the Pharmaceutical Distribution segment's operations provide drug 
distribution and related services. The Other segment consists of the operations of various 
segments, including the AmerisourceBergen Consulting Services (ABCS), the World 
Courier Group, Inc. and the MWI Veterinary Supply, Inc. ABSG operates distribution 
facilities that focus primarily on complex disease treatment regimens. 
119,569 21,532 
Amgen Inc. 1980 Manufacture 
of 
pharmaceutica
ls, medicinal 
chemicals and 
botanical 
products 
Amgen Inc. is a biotechnology company. The Company discovers, develops, manufactures 
and delivers various human therapeutics. It operates in human therapeutics segment. Its 
marketed products portfolio includes Neulasta (pegfilgrastim); erythropoiesis-stimulating 
agents (ESAs), such as Aranesp (darbepoetin alfa) and EPOGEN (epoetin alfa); 
Sensipar/Mimpara (cinacalcet); XGEVA (denosumab); Prolia (denosumab); NEUPOGEN 
(filgrastim), and other marketed products, such as KYPROLIS (carfilzomib), Vectibix 
(panitumumab), Nplate (romiplostim), Repatha (evolocumab), BLINCYTO 
(blinatumomab), IMLYGIC (talimogene laherparepvec) and Corlanor (ivabradine). It 
focuses on human therapeutics for the treatment of serious illness in the areas of 
oncology/haematology, cardiovascular disease and neuroscience. Its product candidates 
in Phase III include Erenumab for episodic migraine, Aranesp for myelodysplastic 
syndromes, BLINCYTO for acute lymphoblastic leukaemia and IMLYGIC for metastatic 
melanoma. 
20,063 69,009 
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Company 
Name 
Incorpo
ration 
Date 
ISIC Rev 4 
Description 
Business Description Sales 
US$ (mil) 
2014 
Assets 
US$ 
(mil) 
2014 
Apple Inc. 1977 Manufacture 
of 
communicatio
n equipment 
Apple Inc. designs, manufactures and markets mobile communication and media devices, 
personal computers and portable digital music players. The Company sells a range of 
related software, services, accessories, networking solutions, and third-party digital 
content and applications. The Company's segments include the Americas, Europe, 
Greater China, Japan and Rest of Asia Pacific. The Americas segment includes both North 
and South America. The Europe segment includes European countries, India, the Middle 
East and Africa. The Greater China segment includes China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The 
Rest of Asia Pacific segment includes Australia and the Asian countries not included in the 
Company's other operating segments. Its products and services include iPhone, iPad, 
Mac, iPod, Apple Watch, Apple TV, a portfolio of consumer and professional software 
applications, iPhone OS, OS X and watchOS operating systems, iCloud, Apple Pay and a 
range of accessory, service and support offerings. 
182,795 231,839 
Arrow 
Electronics, 
Inc. 
1935 Wholesale of 
electronic and 
telecommunic
ations 
equipment 
and parts 
Arrow Electronics, Inc. is a provider of products, services and solutions to industrial and 
commercial users of electronic components and enterprise computing solutions. The 
Company has a portfolio of product offerings available from various electronic 
components and enterprise computing solutions suppliers. The Company's segments 
include the global components business; the global enterprise computing solutions (ECS) 
business, and corporate business segment. It distributes electronic components to 
original equipment manufacturers and contract manufacturers through its global 
components business segment. Through global ECS business segment, it provides 
enterprise computing solutions to value-added resellers. The Global components 
segment markets and distributes electronic components and provides a range of value-
added capabilities. Global ECS' portfolio of computing solutions includes datacentre, 
cloud, security, and analytics solutions. 
22,769 12,435 
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AT&T 1983 Wired 
telecommunic
ations activity 
AT&T Inc. is a holding company. The Company is a provider of communications and 
digital entertainment services in the United States and the world. The Company operates 
through four segments: Business Solutions, Entertainment Group, Consumer Mobility 
and International. The Company offers its services and products to consumers in the 
United States, Mexico and Latin America and to businesses and other providers of 
telecommunications services worldwide. It also owns and operates three regional TV 
sports networks, and retains non-controlling interests in another regional sports network 
and a network dedicated to game-related programming, as well as Internet interactive 
game playing. Its services and products include wireless communications, 
data/broadband and Internet services, digital video services, local and long-distance 
telephone services, telecommunications equipment, managed networking, and 
wholesale services. Its subsidiaries include AT&T Mobility and SKY Brasil Servicos Ltda 
128,752 296,834 
Autonation, 
Inc. 
1980 Sale of motor 
vehicles 
AutoNation, Inc. (AutoNation) is an automotive retailer in the United States. The 
Company offers a range of automotive products and services, including new vehicles, 
used vehicles, parts and service, which includes automotive repair and maintenance 
services, as well as wholesale parts and collision businesses, and automotive finance and 
insurance products, including vehicle service and other protection products, as well as 
the arranging of financing for vehicle purchases through third-party finance sources. It 
operates through three segments: Domestic, Import and Premium Luxury. Its Domestic 
segment consists of retail automotive franchises that sell new vehicles manufactured by 
General Motors, Ford and FCA US. The Import segment consists of retail automotive 
franchises that sell new vehicles manufactured primarily by Toyota, Honda and Nissan. 
The Premium Luxury segment consists of retail automotive franchises that sell new 
vehicles manufactured by Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Audi and Lexus. 
19,109 8,400 
Avnet, Inc. 1955 Wholesale of 
electronic and 
telecommunic
ations 
Avnet, Inc. is a distributor of electronic components, enterprise computer, networking 
and storage products and software, and embedded subsystems. The Company operates 
through Electronics Marketing (EM) segment. The EM segment markets and sells 
semiconductors; interconnect, passive and electromechanical devices, and embedded 
products to a customer base serving various end markets. The Company creates a link in 
27,500 11,251 
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equipment 
and parts 
the technology supply chain that connects electronic component and computer product 
manufacturers and software developers with a customer base of original equipment 
manufacturers, electronic manufacturing services providers, original design 
manufacturers, systems integrators, independent software vendors and value-added 
resellers. The Company distributes electronic components, computer products and 
software, as received from its suppliers or through a customized solution, and offers 
assembly and other services. 
Bestbuy Co., 
Inc 
1966 Retail sale of 
household 
electrical 
appliances, 
furniture, 
lighting 
equipment 
and other 
household 
articles in 
specialized 
stores 
Best Buy Co., Inc. is a provider of technology products, services and solutions. The 
Company offers products and services to the customers visiting its stores, engaging with 
Geek Squad agents, or using its Websites or mobile applications. It has operations in the 
United States, Canada and Mexico. The Company operates through two segments: 
Domestic and International. The Domestic segment consists of the operations in all 
states, districts and territories of the United States, under various brand names, including 
Best Buy, bestbuy.com, Best Buy Mobile, Best Buy Direct, Best Buy Express, Geek Squad, 
Magnolia Home Theatre, and Pacific Kitchen and Home. The International segment 
consists of all operations in Canada and Mexico under the brand names, Best Buy, 
bestbuy.com.ca, bestbuy.com.mx, Best Buy Express, Best Buy Mobile and Geek Squad. As 
of December 31, 2016, the Company operated 1,200 large-format and 400 small-format 
stores throughout its Domestic and International segments. 
40,611 15,245 
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Cardinal 
Health, Inc 
2016 Wholesale of 
other 
household 
goods 
Cardinal Health, Inc. is a healthcare services and products company. The Company 
operates through two segments: Pharmaceutical and Medical. The Pharmaceutical 
segment distributes branded and generic pharmaceutical, specialty pharmaceutical, 
over-the-counter healthcare and consumer products. This segment also operates nuclear 
pharmacies and cyclotron facilities; provides pharmacy management services to 
hospitals, as well as medication therapy management and patient outcomes services to 
hospitals, other healthcare providers and payers, and provides services to healthcare 
companies. The Medical segment distributes a range of medical, surgical and laboratory 
products, and provides services to hospitals, ambulatory surgery centres, clinical 
laboratories and other healthcare providers. This segment also manufactures, sources 
and develops its own Cardinal Health brand medical and surgical products. It provides 
post-acute care management and transition services, and software to hospitals. 
91,084 26,033 
Caterpillar 
Inc. 
1925 Manufacture 
of machinery 
for mining, 
quarrying and 
construction 
Caterpillar Inc. is a manufacturer of construction and mining equipment, diesel and 
natural gas engines, industrial gas turbines and diesel-electric locomotives. The Company 
operates through segments, including Construction Industries, which is engaged in 
supporting customers using machinery in infrastructure, forestry and building 
construction; Resource Industries, which is engaged in supporting customers using 
machinery in mining, quarry, waste and material handling applications; Energy & 
Transportation, which supports customers in oil and gas, power generation, marine, rail 
and industrial applications, including Cat machines; Financial Products segment, which 
provides financing and related services, and All Other operating segments, which 
includes activities, such as product management and development, and manufacturing of 
filters and fluids, undercarriage, tires and rims, ground engaging tools, fluid transfer 
products, and sealing and connecting components for Cat products. 
55,184 84,681 
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Centurylink, 
Inc. 
1968 Wired 
telecommunic
ations 
activities 
CenturyLink, Inc. is an integrated communications company. The Company is engaged in 
providing an array of communications services to its residential and business customers. 
Its segments include business, which provides strategic, legacy and data integration 
products and services to small, medium and enterprise business, wholesale and 
governmental customers, including other communication providers, and consumer, 
which provides strategic and legacy products and services to residential customers. Its 
communications services include local and long-distance voice, broadband, Multi-
Protocol Label Switching (MPLS), private line (including special access), Ethernet, 
colocation, hosting (including cloud hosting and managed hosting), data integration, 
video, network, public access, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), information 
technology and other ancillary services. As of December 31, 2016, it served 
approximately 5.9 million broadband subscribers and 325,000 Prism TV subscribers. 
18,031 49,103 
CHS, Inc. 1930 Wholesale of 
agricultural 
raw materials 
and animals 
CHS Inc. is an integrated agricultural company, providing grain, foods and energy 
resources to businesses and consumers on a global basis. The Company's segments 
include Energy, Ag, Nitrogen Production, Foods, and Corporate and Other. The Energy 
segment derives its revenues through refining, wholesaling and retailing of petroleum 
products. The Company's Ag segment includes its grain marketing, country operations, 
crop nutrients, processing and food ingredients, and renewable fuels businesses. The 
Nitrogen production segment consists equity method investment in CF Industries 
Nitrogen, LLC. The Food segment consists its equity method investment in Ventura 
Foods, LLC. The corporate and other segment includes wheat milling operations, as well 
as business solutions operations consisting of commodities hedging, insurance and 
financial services related to crop production. Its businesses primarily include financing, 
insurance, hedging and other service activities related to crop production. 
42,664 15,296 
Cisco 
Systems, Inc. 
1984 Manufacture 
of computers 
and peripheral 
equipment 
Cisco Systems, Inc. designs and sells a range of products, provides services and delivers 
integrated solutions to develop and connect networks around the world. The Company 
operates through three geographic segments: Americas; Europe, the Middle East and 
Africa, and Asia Pacific, Japan and China. The Company groups its products and 
technologies into various categories, such as Switching; Next-Generation Network 
47,142 105,070 
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Routing; Collaboration; Data Centre; Wireless; Service Provider Video; Security, and 
Other Products. In addition to its product offerings, the Company provides a range of 
service offerings, including technical support services and advanced services. The 
Company delivers its technology and services to its customers as solutions for their 
priorities, including cloud, video, mobility, security, collaboration and analytics. The 
Company serves customers, including businesses of all sizes, public institutions, 
governments and service providers. 
The Coca 
Cola 
Company 
1886 Manufacture 
of other food 
products 
The Coca-Cola Company is a beverage company. The Company owns or licenses and 
markets non-alcoholic beverage brands, primarily sparkling beverages and a range of still 
beverages, such as waters, flavoured waters and enhanced waters, juices and juice 
drinks, ready-to-drink teas and coffees, sports drinks, dairy and energy drinks. The 
Company's segments include Europe, Middle East and Africa; Latin America; North 
America; Asia Pacific; Bottling Investments, and Corporate. The Company owns and 
markets a range of non-alcoholic sparkling beverage brands, including Coca-Cola, Diet 
Coke, Fanta and Sprite. The Company owns or licenses and markets over 500 non-
alcoholic beverage brands. The Company markets, manufactures and sells beverage 
concentrates, which are referred to as beverage bases, and syrups, including fountain 
syrups, and finished sparkling and still beverages. 
45,998 92,023 
Comcast 
Corporation 
1963 Television 
programming 
and 
broadcasting 
activities 
Comcast Corporation is a media and technology company. The Company has two primary 
businesses: Comcast Cable and NBCUniversal. Its Comcast Cable business operates in the 
Cable Communications segment. Its NBCUniversal business operates in four business 
segments: Cable Networks, Broadcast Television, Filmed Entertainment and Theme 
Parks. Its Cable Communications segment consists of the operations of Comcast Cable, 
which provides video, high-speed Internet and voice services to residential customers 
under the XFINITY brand. Its Cable Networks segment consists of a portfolio of national 
cable networks. Its Broadcast Television segment operates the NBC and Telemundo 
broadcast networks. Its Filmed Entertainment segment primarily produces, acquires, 
markets and distributes filmed entertainment across the world, and it also develops, 
68,775 159,186 
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produces and licenses live stage plays. Its Theme Parks segment consists primarily of its 
Universal theme parks in Orlando, Florida and Hollywood, California. 
Community 
Health 
Systems, Inc. 
1985 Hospital 
activities 
Community Health Systems, Inc. is an operator of general acute care hospitals and 
outpatient facilities in communities across the country. The Company operates through 
hospital operations segment, which includes its general acute care hospitals and related 
healthcare entities that provide inpatient and outpatient healthcare services. The 
Company provides healthcare services through the hospitals that it owns and operates 
and affiliated businesses in non-urban and selected urban markets throughout the 
United States. The services provided through its hospitals and affiliated businesses 
include general acute care, emergency room, general and specialty surgery, critical care, 
internal medicine, obstetrics, diagnostic, psychiatric and rehabilitation services. The 
Company also provides additional outpatient services at urgent care centres, 
occupational medicine clinics, imaging centres, cancer centres, ambulatory surgery 
centres, and home health and hospice agencies. 
18,639 27,421 
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Costco 
Wholesale 
Corporation 
1983 Other retail 
sale in non 
specialized 
stores 
Costco Wholesale Corporation is engaged in the operation of membership warehouses in 
the United States and Puerto Rico, Canada, the United Kingdom, Mexico, Japan, 
Australia, Spain, and through its subsidiaries in Taiwan and Korea. As of August 28, 2016, 
the Company operated 715 warehouses across the world. The Company's average 
warehouse space is approximately 144,000 square feet. The Company's warehouses on 
average operate on a seven-day, 70-hour week. The Company offers merchandise in 
various categories, which include foods (including dry foods, packaged foods and 
groceries); sundries (including snack foods, candy, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, 
and cleaning supplies); hardlines (including appliances, electronics, health and beauty 
aids, hardware, and garden and patio); fresh foods (including meat, produce, deli and 
bakery); softlines (including apparel and small appliances), and other (including gas 
stations and pharmacy). 
112,640 33,024 
Cummins, 
Inc. 
1919 Manufacture 
of engines and 
turbines 
except 
aircraft, 
vehicle and 
cycle engines.  
Cummins Inc. designs, manufactures, distributes and services diesel and natural gas 
engines and engine-related component products. The Company's segments include 
Engine, Distribution, Components and Power Systems. The Engine segment manufactures 
and markets a range of diesel and natural gas powered engines under the Cummins 
brand name, as well as certain customer brand names, for the heavy and medium-duty 
truck, bus, recreational vehicle, light-duty automotive and agricultural markets. The 
Distribution segment consists of the product lines, which service and/or distribute a 
range of products and services, including parts, engines, power generation and service. 
The Components segment supplies products, including aftertreatment systems, 
turbochargers, filtration products and fuel systems for commercial diesel applications. 
The Power Systems segment consists of businesses, including Power generation, 
Industrial and Generator technologies. 
19,221 15,764 
CVS Health 
Corporation 
1963 Retail sale of 
pharmaceutica
l and medical 
goods, 
cosmetic and 
CVS Health Corporation, together with its subsidiaries, is an integrated pharmacy 
healthcare company. The Company provides pharmacy care for the senior community 
through Omnicare, Inc. and Omnicare's long-term care operations, which include 
distribution of pharmaceuticals, related pharmacy consulting and other ancillary services 
to chronic care facilities and other care settings. It operates through three segments: 
126,761 74,187 
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toilet articles  
in specialized 
stores 
Pharmacy Services, Retail/LTC and Corporate. The Pharmacy Services Segment provides a 
range of pharmacy benefit management (PBM) solutions to its clients. As of December 
31, 2016, the Retail/LTC Segment included 9,709 retail locations (of which 7,980 were its 
stores that operated a pharmacy and 1,674 were its pharmacies located within Target 
Corporation stores), its online retail pharmacy Websites, CVS.com, Navarro.com and 
Onofre.com.br, 38 onsite pharmacy stores, its long-term care pharmacy operations and 
its retail healthcare clinics. 
Danaher 
Corporation 
1980 Manufacture 
of medical and 
dental 
instruments 
and supplies 
Danaher Corporation designs, manufactures and markets professional, medical, 
industrial and commercial products and services. The Company operates through four 
segments: Life Sciences, which offers a range of research tools that scientists use to study 
the basic building blocks of life, including genes, proteins, metabolites and cells, in order 
to understand the causes of disease, identify new therapies and test new drugs and 
vaccines; Diagnostics; which offers analytical instruments, reagents, consumables, 
software and services; Dental, which provides products that are used to diagnose, treat 
and prevent disease and ailments of the teeth, gums and supporting bone, and 
Environmental & Applied Solutions, which consists of various lines of business, including 
water quality and product identification. As of December 31, 2016, Danaher's research 
and development, manufacturing, sales, distribution, service and administrative facilities 
were located in over 60 countries. 
19,914 36,992 
Deere and 
Company 
1837 Manufacture 
of agricultural 
and forestry 
machinery 
Deere & Company is engaged in equipment operations. The Company is engaged in 
providing financial services. The Company operates through three business segments: 
agriculture and turf, construction and forestry, and financial services. The agriculture and 
turf segment manufactures and distributes a line of agriculture and turf equipment and 
related service parts. The construction and forestry segment provides a line of 
construction equipment, and forestry machines and attachments available in the world. 
The construction and forestry segment is also engaged in providing fleet management 
telematics solutions. The financial services segment primarily finances sales and leases by 
the Company dealers of new and used agriculture and turf equipment and construction 
and forestry equipment. The financial services segment also provides wholesale financing 
36,067 61,336 
	 326	
Company 
Name 
Incorpo
ration 
Date 
ISIC Rev 4 
Description 
Business Description Sales 
US$ (mil) 
2014 
Assets 
US$ 
(mil) 
2014 
to dealers of the foregoing equipment, finances retail revolving charge accounts and 
offers extended equipment warranties. 
Delta Air 
Lines, Inc. 
1929 Passenger air 
transport 
Delta Air Lines, Inc. provides scheduled air transportation for passengers and cargo 
throughout the United States and across the world. The Company's segments include 
Airline and Refinery. The Company's route network is centred around a system of hub, 
international gateway and airports that the Company operates in Amsterdam, Atlanta, 
Boston, Detroit, London-Heathrow, Los Angeles, Minneapolis-St. Paul, New York-
LaGuardia, New York- John F Kennedy International Airport, Paris-Charles de Gaulle, Salt 
Lake City, Seattle and Tokyo-Narita. Each of these operations includes flights that gather 
and distribute traffic from markets in the geographic region surrounding the hub or 
gateway to domestic and international cities and to other hubs or gateways. The 
Company's route network includes its international joint ventures, its alliances with other 
foreign airlines, its membership in SkyTeam and agreements with multiple domestic 
regional carriers that operate as Delta Connection 
40,362 54,005 
The Walt 
Disney 
Company 
1925 Television 
programming 
and 
broadcasting 
activities 
The Walt Disney Company is an entertainment company. The Company operates in four 
business segments: Media Networks, Parks and Resorts, Studio Entertainment, and 
Consumer Products & Interactive Media. The media networks segment includes cable 
and broadcast television networks, television production and distribution operations, 
domestic television stations, and radio networks and stations. Under the Parks and 
Resorts segment, the Company's Walt Disney Imagineering unit designs and develops 
new theme park concepts and attractions, as well as resort properties. The studio 
entertainment segment produces and acquires live-action and animated motion pictures, 
direct-to-video content, musical recordings and live stage plays. It also develops and 
publishes games, primarily for mobile platforms, books, magazines and comic books. The 
48,813 84,141 
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Company distributes merchandise directly through retail, online and wholesale 
businesses. Its cable networks consist of ESPN, the Disney Channels and Freeform. 
Dollar 
General 
Corporation 
1955 Other retail 
sale in non 
specialized 
stores 
Dollar General Corporation is a discount retailer. The Company offers a selection of 
merchandise, including consumables, seasonal, home products and apparel. The 
Company's consumables category includes paper and cleaning products (such as paper 
towels, bath tissue, and other home cleaning supplies); packaged food (such as cereals, 
spices, sugar and flour); perishables (such as milk, beer and wine); snacks (such as candy, 
cookies, and carbonated beverages); health and beauty (such as over-the-counter 
medicines and personal care products); pet (pet supplies and pet food), and tobacco 
products. Its seasonal products include decorations, toys, batteries, stationery, prepaid 
phones and accessories, and home office supplies. Its home products include cookware, 
craft supplies and kitchen, and bed and bath soft goods. Its apparel products include 
casual everyday apparel for infants, toddlers, girls, boys, women and men, as well as 
socks, underwear, disposable diapers, shoes and accessories 
17,504 11,209 
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The Dow 
Chemical 
Company  
1897 Manufacture 
of plastics and 
synthetic 
rubber in 
primary forms 
The Dow Chemical Company manufactures and supplies products used primarily as raw 
materials in the manufacture of customer products and services. The Company's 
segments include Agricultural Sciences, which is engaged in providing crop protection 
and seed/plant biotechnology products and technologies, urban pest management 
solutions and healthy oils; Consumer Solutions, which consists of Consumer Care, Dow 
Automotive Systems, Dow Electronic Materials and Consumer Solutions-Silicones 
businesses; Infrastructure Solutions, which consists of Dow Building & Construction, Dow 
Coating Materials, Energy & Water Solutions, Performance Monomers and Infrastructure 
Solutions-Silicones businesses; Performance Materials & Chemicals, which consists of 
Chlor-Alkali and Vinyl, Industrial Solutions and Polyurethanes businesses, and 
Performance Plastics, which consists of Dow Elastomers, Dow Electrical and 
Telecommunications, Dow Packaging and Specialty Plastics, Energy and Hydrocarbons 
businesses. 
58,167 68,687 
Duke Energy 
Corporation 
1904 Electric power 
generation, 
transmission 
and 
distribution 
Duke Energy Corporation is an energy company. The Company operates through three 
segments: Electric Utilities and Infrastructure; Gas Utilities and Infrastructure, and 
Commercial Renewables. The Company operates in the United States through its direct 
and indirect subsidiaries. The Electric Utilities and Infrastructure segment provides retail 
electric service through the generation, transmission, distribution and sale of electricity 
to approximately 7.5 million customers within the Southeast and Midwest regions of the 
United States. The operations include electricity sold wholesale to municipalities, electric 
cooperative utilities and other load-serving entities. The Gas Utilities and Infrastructure 
segment serves residential, commercial, industrial and power generation natural gas 
customers. The Commercial Renewables primarily acquires, builds, develops and 
operates wind and solar renewable generation throughout the continental United States. 
23,925 120,557 
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E.I. DuPont 
De Nemours 
and 
Company 
1802 Manufacture 
of pesticides 
and other 
agrochemical 
products 
E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company is a science and technology-based company. It 
operates through six segments: Agriculture, Electronics & Communications, Industrial 
Biosciences, Nutrition & Health, Performance Materials and Protection Solutions. Its 
Agriculture segment includes products, such as corn hybrids and soybean varieties, 
herbicides, fungicides and insecticides. Its E&C segment includes products, such as 
printing and packaging materials, photopolymers and electronic materials. Its Industrial 
Biosciences segment includes products, such as enzymes, bio-based materials and 
process technologies. Its Nutrition & Health segment includes products, such as 
probiotics, cultures, emulsifiers, natural sweeteners and soy-based food ingredients. Its 
Performance Materials segment includes products, such as engineering polymers, 
packaging and industrial polymers, films and elastomers. Its Protection Solutions 
segment includes products, such as nonwovens, aramids and solid surfaces. 
34,906 50,490 
Eli Lilly and 
Company  
1876 Manufacture 
of 
pharmaceutica
ls , medicinal 
chemical and 
botanic 
products 
Eli Lilly and Company is engaged in drug manufacturing business. The Company 
discovers, develops, manufactures and markets products in two segments: human 
pharmaceutical products and animal health products. The Company's human 
pharmaceutical business segment sells medicines, which are discovered or developed by 
its scientists. Its animal health business segment operates through the Company's Elanco 
division, which develops, manufactures and markets products for both food animals and 
companion animals. The Company's human pharmaceutical products include 
endocrinology products, neuroscience products, oncology products, immunology 
products and cardiovascular products. The Company's animal health products segment 
includes products for food animals and products for companion animals. As of December 
31, 2016, the Company manufactured and distributed its products through facilities in 
the United States, Puerto Rico and 14 other countries. 
19,616 36,308 
EMC / Dell 
Technologie
s Inc 
2013 Research and 
experimental 
development 
on natural 
Dell Technologies Inc., formerly Denali Holding Inc., is a provider of information 
technology solutions. The Company operates through two segments: Client Solutions and 
Enterprise Solutions Group (ESG). The Client Solutions segment includes sales to 
commercial and consumer customers of desktops, thin client products and notebooks, as 
well as services and third-party software and peripherals closely tied to the sale of Client 
24,440 45,585 
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sciences and  
engineering 
Solutions hardware. Its offerings include hardware, such as desktop personal computers, 
notebooks and tablets, and peripherals, such as monitors, printers and projectors, as well 
as third-party software and peripherals. The ESG segment includes servers, networking 
and storage, as well as services and third-party software and peripherals that are closely 
tied to the sale of ESG hardware. It designs, develops, manufactures, markets, sells and 
supports a range of products and services. 
Emerson 
Electric Co 
1890 Manufacture 
of measuring, 
testing, 
navigating and 
control 
equipment 
Emerson Electric Co. is a diversified global manufacturing company, which provides 
solutions to customers by bringing technology and engineering together in the industrial, 
commercial and consumer markets around the world. The Company operates through 
four segments based on the nature of the products and services rendered: Process 
Management, Industrial Automation, Climate Technologies and Commercial & 
Residential Solutions. The Company's principal production operations are electronics 
assembly, metal stamping, forming, casting, machining, welding, plating, heat treating, 
painting and assembly. In addition, the Company uses specialized production operations, 
including automatic and semiautomatic testing, automated material handling and 
storage, ferrous and nonferrous machining, and special furnaces for heat treating and 
foundry applications. The Company provides measurement, control and diagnostic 
technologies for automated industrial processes. 
24,537 24,177 
Exelon 
Corporation 
1999 Electric power 
generation, 
transmission 
and 
distribution 
Exelon Corporation is a utility services holding company. The Company, through its 
subsidiary, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Generation), is engaged in the energy 
generation business. The Company, through its subsidiaries, Commonwealth Edison 
Company (ComEd), PECO Energy Company (PECO), Baltimore Gas and Electric Company 
(BGE), Pepco Holdings LLC (PHI), Potomac Electric Power Company (Pepco), Delmarva 
Power & Light Company (DPL) and Atlantic City Electric Company (ACE), is engaged in the 
energy delivery businesses. It operates through 12 segments: Generation's six segments: 
Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, New England, New York, ERCOT and Other Power Regions; 
ComEd; PECO; BGE, and PHI's three utility segments: Pepco, DPL and ACE. Generation's 
integrated business consists of the generation, physical delivery and marketing of power 
27,429 86,416 
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across geographical regions through its customer-facing business, Constellation, which 
sells electricity and natural gas to both wholesale and retail customers. 
Express 
Scripts 
Holding 
Company 
2011 Retail sale of 
pharmaceutica
l and medical 
goods, 
cosmetic and 
toilet articles 
Express Scripts Holding Company is a pharmacy benefit management (PBM) company. 
The Company is engaged in providing healthcare management and administration 
services to its clients, including managed care organizations, health insurers, third-party 
administrators, employers, union-sponsored benefit plans, workers' compensation plans 
and government health programs. The Company operates through two segments: PBM 
and Other Business Operations. The PBM segment includes its integrated PBM 
operations and specialty pharmacy operations. Its Other Business Operations segment 
includes its subsidiary, United BioSource Corporation (UBC), and its specialty distribution 
operations. Its integrated PBM services include clinical solutions, Express Scripts 
SafeGuardRx, specialized pharmacy care, home delivery pharmacy services, specialty 
pharmacy services, retail network pharmacy administration, benefit design consultation, 
drug utilization review and drug formulary management. 
100,887 53,748 
Fedex 
Corporation 
1971 Courier 
activities 
FedEx Corporation provides a portfolio of transportation, e-commerce and business 
services through companies competing collectively, operating independently and 
managed collaboratively, under the FedEx brand. The Company's segments include FedEx 
Express, TNT Express, FedEx Ground, FedEx Freight and FedEx Services. The FedEx 
Express segment offers a range of the United States domestic and international shipping 
services for delivery of packages and freight. TNT Express segment collects, transports 
and delivers documents, parcels and freight on a day-definite or time-definite basis. The 
FedEx Ground segment provides business and residential money-back guaranteed 
ground package delivery services. The FedEx Freight segment offers less-than-truckload 
freight services. The FedEx Services segment provides its other companies with sales, 
45,576 36,531 
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marketing, information technology, communications, customer service and other back-
office support. 
Fluor 
Corporation 
1912 Architectural 
and 
engineering 
activities and 
related 
technical 
consultancy 
Fluor Corporation is a holding company. The Company operates its business in four 
segments: Energy, Chemicals & Mining; Industrial, Infrastructure & Power; Government, 
and Maintenance, Modification & Asset Integrity. The Company, through its subsidiaries, 
offers professional services providing engineering, procurement, construction, 
fabrication and modularization, commissioning and maintenance, as well as project 
management services on a global basis. The Company is an integrated solutions provider 
for various industries, including oil and gas, chemicals and petrochemicals, mining and 
metals, transportation, power, life sciences and advanced manufacturing. It is also a 
service provider to the United States federal Government and governments abroad. It 
offers services in various categories, including engineering and design, procurement, 
construction, fabrication, maintenance, modification and asset integrity and project 
management 
21,532 8,194 
General 
Electric 
Company 
1892 Manufacture 
of air and 
spacecraft and 
related 
machinery 
General Electric Company is a global digital industrial company. The Company's products 
and services range from aircraft engines, power generation, and oil and gas production 
equipment to medical imaging, financing and industrial products. Its segments include 
Power, which includes products and services related to energy production and water 
reuse; Renewable Energy, which offers renewable power sources; Oil & Gas, including 
liquefied natural gas and pipelines; Aviation, which includes commercial and military 
aircraft engines, and integrated digital components, among others; Healthcare, which 
provides healthcare technologies in medical imaging, digital solutions, patient monitoring 
and diagnostics, and drug discovery, among others; Transportation, which is a supplier to 
the railroad, mining, marine, stationary power and drilling industries; Energy Connections 
146,045 654,954 
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& Lighting, which includes Energy Connections and Lighting businesses, and Capital, 
which is a financial services division. 
General 
Dynamics 
Corporation 
1952 Manufacture 
of air and 
spacecraft and 
related 
machinery 
General Dynamics Corporation is a global aerospace and defence company. The Company 
offers a portfolio of products and services in business aviation; combat vehicles, weapons 
systems and munitions; information technology services and C4ISR (command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) solutions, 
and shipbuilding and ship repair. It operates through four business groups: Aerospace, 
Combat Systems, Information Systems and Technology, and Marine Systems. Its 
Aerospace group offers aircraft design; cockpit and cabin systems, and product service 
and support. Its Combat Systems group offers combat vehicles, weapons systems and 
munitions. The Information Systems and Technology group provides technologies, 
products and services in support of various programs. The Marine Systems group is a 
designer and builder of nuclear-powered submarines, surface combatants and auxiliary 
and combat-logistics ships. 
30,852 35,337 
Gilead 
Sciences Inc. 
1987 Manufacture 
of 
pharmaceutica
ls, medicinal 
chemicals and 
botanical 
products 
Gilead Sciences, Inc. is a research-based biopharmaceutical company that discovers, 
develops and commercializes medicines in areas of unmet medical need. The Company's 
portfolio of products and pipeline of investigational drugs includes treatments for Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS), liver 
diseases, cancer, inflammatory and respiratory diseases and cardiovascular conditions. 
Its products for HIV/AIDS patients include Descovy, Odefsey, Genvoya, Stribild, 
Complera/Eviplera, Truvada, Emtriva, Tybost and Vitekta. Its products for patients with 
liver diseases include Vemlidy, Epclusa, Harvoni, Sovaldi, Viread and Hepsera. It offers 
Zydelig to patients with haematology/oncology diseases. Its products for patients with 
various cardiovascular diseases include Letairis, Ranexa and Lexiscan. Its products for 
various inflammation/respiratory diseases include Cayston and Tamiflu. It had operations 
in more than 30 countries, as of December 31, 2016 
24,890 34,664 
HCA 
Holdings, 
Inc. 
1990 Hospital 
activities 
HCA Healthcare, Inc., formerly HCA Holdings, Inc., is a holding company. The Company, 
through its subsidiaries, owns and operates hospitals and related healthcare entities. As 
of December 31, 2016, the Company operated in two geographically organized groups, 
36,918 30,980 
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including the National and American Groups. As of December 31, 2016, the National 
Group included 84 hospitals, which were located in Alaska, California, Florida, southern 
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, northern Kentucky, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Carolina, 
Utah and Virginia. As of December 31, 2016, the American Group included 80 hospitals, 
which were located in Colorado, northern Georgia, Kansas, southern Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Texas. As of December 31, 2016, the 
Company operated six hospitals in England. The Company owns, manages or operates 
hospitals, freestanding surgery centres and freestanding emergency care facilities, walk-
in clinics, diagnostic and imaging centres, among others 
The Home 
Depot Inc. 
1978 Retail sale of 
hardware, 
paints and 
glass in 
specialized 
stores 
The Home Depot, Inc. is a home improvement retailer. The Company sells an assortment 
of building materials, home improvement products, and lawn and garden products, and 
provides various services. The Home Depot stores serves three primary customer groups: 
do-it-yourself (DIY) customers, do-it-for-me (DIFM) customers and professional 
customers. Its DIY customers are home owners purchasing products and completing their 
own projects and installations. The Company assists these customers with specific 
product and installation questions both in its stores and through online resources and 
other media designed to provide product and project knowledge. Its DIFM customers are 
home owners purchasing materials themselves and hiring third parties to complete the 
project or installation. Professional Customers are primarily professional 
renovators/remodellers, general contractors, repairmen, installers, small business 
owners and tradesmen 
78,812 39,946 
Honeywell 
International 
Inc. 
1920 Manufacturers 
of air and 
spacecraft and 
related 
machinery 
Honeywell International Inc. is a technology and manufacturing company. The Company 
operates through four segments: Aerospace, Home and Building Technologies, 
Performance Materials and Technologies, and Safety and Productivity Solutions. The 
Company's Aerospace segment supplies products, software and services for aircraft and 
vehicles that it sells to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and other customers. 
The Home and Building Technologies segment provides products, software, solutions and 
technologies that help owners of homes stay connected and in control of their comfort, 
security and energy use. The Performance Materials and Technologies segment is 
40,306 45,451 
	 335	
Company 
Name 
Incorpo
ration 
Date 
ISIC Rev 4 
Description 
Business Description Sales 
US$ (mil) 
2014 
Assets 
US$ 
(mil) 
2014 
engaged in developing and manufacturing materials, process technologies and 
automation solutions. The Safety and Productivity Solutions segment is engaged in 
providing products, software and connected solutions to customers that manage 
productivity, workplace safety and asset performance. 
HP Inc 1939 Manufacture 
of computers 
and peripheral 
equipment 
HP Inc. is a provider of products, technologies, software, solutions and services to 
individual consumers, small- and medium-sized businesses, and enterprises, including 
customers in the government, health and education sectors. The company provides 
personal computing and other access devices, imaging and printing products, and related 
technologies, solutions and services. Its segments include Personal Systems, Printing and 
Corporate Investments. The Personal Systems segment provides commercial personal 
computers (PCs), Consumer PCs, workstations, thin clients, commercial tablets and 
mobility devices, retail point-of-sale systems, displays and other accessories, software, 
support and services for the commercial and consumer markets. The Printing segment 
provides consumer and commercial printer hardware, supplies, media, solutions and 
services, as well as scanning devices. The Corporate Investments segment includes the 
operations of HP Labs and certain business incubation projects. 
111,454 103,206 
International 
Business 
Machines 
Corporation 
1910 Computer 
programming, 
consultancy 
and related 
activities 
International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) is a technology company. The 
Company operates through five segments: Cognitive Solutions, Global Business Services 
(GBS), Technology Services & Cloud Platforms, Systems and Global Financing. The 
Cognitive Solutions segment delivers a spectrum of capabilities, from descriptive, 
predictive and prescriptive analytics to cognitive systems. Cognitive Solutions includes 
Watson, a cognitive computing platform that has the ability to interact in natural 
language, process big data, and learn from interactions with people and computers. The 
GBS segment provides clients with consulting, application management services and 
global process services. The Technology Services & Cloud Platforms segment provides 
information technology infrastructure services. The Systems segment provides clients 
92,793 117,271 
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with infrastructure technologies. The Global Financing segment includes client financing, 
commercial financing, and remanufacturing and remarketing 
Icahn 
Enterprises 
L.P. 
1987 Other financial 
service 
activities, 
except 
insurance and 
pension 
funding 
Icahn Enterprises L.P. is a holding company. The Company's segments include 
Automotive, Energy, Metals, Railcar, Gaming, Food Packaging, Mining, Real Estate and 
Home Fashion. The Company's Investment segment includes various private investment 
funds. The Company operates its Automotive segment through its ownership in Federal-
Mogul Holdings Corporation and IEH Auto Parts Holding LLC. The Company operates 
Energy segment through its controlling interest in CVR Energy, Inc. It operates its Metals 
segment through its subsidiary, PSC Metals, Inc. The Company operates its Railcar 
segment through its ownership interests in American Railcar Industries, Inc. Its Food 
Packaging segment consists of ownership in Viskase Companies, Inc. The Company's Real 
Estate operations consist of rental real estate, property development and associated 
resorts. It also owns a limited partner interest in Icahn Enterprises Holdings L.P. 
18,758 35,790 
Intel 
Corporation 
1968 Manufacture 
of electronic 
components  
and boards 
Intel Corporation is engaged in designing and manufacturing products and technologies, 
such as the cloud. The Company's segments are Client Computing Group (CCG), Data 
Centre Group, Internet of Things Group, Non-Volatile Memory Solutions Group, Intel 
Security Group, Programmable Solutions Group, All Other and New Technology Group. It 
delivers computer, networking and communications platforms to a set of customers, 
including original equipment manufacturers, original design manufacturers, cloud and 
communications service providers, as well as industrial, communications and automotive 
equipment manufacturers. It offers platforms to integrate various components and 
technologies, including a microprocessor and chipset, a stand-alone System-on-Chip, or a 
multichip package. The CCG operating segment includes platforms that integrates in 
55,870 91,900 
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notebook, two in one systems, desktop computers for consumers and businesses, 
tablets, and phones. 
International 
Paper 
Company 
1898 Manufacture 
of pulp, paper 
and 
paperboard  
International Paper Company is a paper and packaging company with primary markets 
and manufacturing operations in North America, Europe, Latin America, Russia, Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East. The Company's segments include Industrial Packaging, Global 
Cellulose Fibres, Printing Papers and Consumer Packaging. The Company is a 
manufacturer of containerboard in the United States. Its products include linerboard, 
medium, whitetop, recycled linerboard, recycled medium and saturating kraft. The 
Company's cellulose fibres product portfolio includes fluff, market and specialty pulps. 
The Company is a producer of printing and writing papers. The products in Printing 
Papers segment include uncoated papers. The Company is a producer of solid bleached 
sulfate board. As of December 31, 2016, the Company operated 29 pulp, paper and 
packaging mills, 170 converting and packaging plants, 16 recycling plants and three bag 
facilities in the United States 
23,617 28,684 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
1886 Manufacture 
of other 
articles of 
paper and 
paperboard 
Johnson & Johnson is a holding company, which is engaged in the research and 
development, manufacture and sale of a range of products in the healthcare field. It 
operates through three segments: Consumer, Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices. Its 
primary focus is products related to human health and well-being. The Consumer 
segment includes a range of products used in the baby care, oral care, skincare, over-the-
counter pharmaceutical, women's health and wound care markets. The Pharmaceutical 
segment is focused on five therapeutic areas, including immunology, infectious diseases, 
neuroscience, oncology, and cardiovascular and metabolic diseases. The Medical Devices 
segment includes a range of products used in the orthopaedic, surgery, cardiovascular, 
diabetes care and vision care fields. Its research facilities are located in the United States, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Singapore, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
74,331 130,358 
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Johnson 
Controls, 
Inc. 
1885 Manufacturer 
of furniture 
Johnson Controls, Inc. is a global diversified technology and industrial company. It 
undertakes designing, manufacturing, distribution and sales of building efficiency, 
automotive experience and power solutions products. It offers heating, ventilating and 
air conditioning systems; building management systems; controls; security and 
mechanical equipment; door systems; floor consoles and instrument panels and lead-
acid automotive batteries. The company also offers industrial refrigeration products and 
residential air conditioning and heating systems. Johnson Controls offers its products and 
services to customers in North America, South America, South Africa, Europe, Middle 
East and Asia-Pacific. The company is headquartered in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the US. 
The company reported revenues of (US Dollars) US$37,179 million for the fiscal year 
ended September 2015 (FY2015), a decrease of 4.1% over FY2014. In FY2015, the 
company’s operating margin was 5.8%, compared to an operating margin of 4.9% in 
FY2014. In FY2015, the company recorded a net margin of 4.2%, compared to a net 
margin of 3.1% in FY2014.The company reported revenues of US$8,929.0 million for the 
first quarter ended December 2015, an increase of 2.1% over the previous quarter. 
42,828 32,804 
Kimberly-
Clark 
Corporation 
1872 Manufacture 
of pulp, paper 
and 
paperboard 
Kimberly-Clark Corporation is engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of a range of 
products made from natural or synthetic fibres. The Company's segments include 
Personal Care, Consumer Tissue, K-C Professional and Corporate & Other. The Company's 
Personal Care segment offers various solutions and products, such as disposable diapers, 
training and youth pants, swim pants, baby wipes, feminine and incontinence care 
products, and other related products. The Company's Consumer Tissue segment offers 
products, such as facial and bathroom tissue, paper towels, napkins and related 
products. The Company's K-C Professional segment offers solutions and supporting 
products, such as wipers, tissue, towels, apparel, soaps and sanitizers. The Company's 
business outside North America includes Developing and Emerging Markets and 
Developed Markets. It sells its products to supermarkets, mass merchandisers, 
drugstores, warehouse clubs and other retail outlets. 
19,724 15,526 
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Kohl’s 
Corporation 
1962 Other retail 
sale in non 
specialized 
stores 
Kohl's Corporation is an operator of department stores. The Company operates 
approximately 1,154 Kohl's department stores, a website, approximately 12 FILA outlets, 
and approximately three Off-Aisle clearance centres. The Company's stores and Website 
sell moderately-priced private label and national brand apparel, footwear, accessories, 
beauty and home products. The Company's website includes merchandise that is 
available in its stores, as well as merchandise that is available only online. The Company's 
merchandise mix includes both national brands and private brands that are available only 
at Kohl's. The Company's private brands include Apt. 9, Croft & Barrow, Jumping Beans, 
SO and Sonoma Goods for Life. The Company's exclusive brands include Food Network, 
Jennifer Lopez, Marc Anthony, Rock & Republic and Simply Vera Vera Wang. 
19,031 14,333 
The Kroger 
Co 
1883 Retail sale in 
non 
specialized 
stores with 
food, 
beverage or 
tobacco 
predominating 
The Kroger Co. (Kroger) manufactures and processes food for sale in its supermarkets. 
The Company operates supermarkets, multi-department stores, jewellery stores and 
convenience stores throughout the United States. As of January 28, 2017, it had operated 
approximately 4,000 owned or leased supermarkets, convenience stores, fine jewellery 
stores, distribution warehouses and food production plants through divisions, 
subsidiaries or affiliates. These facilities are located throughout the United States. As of 
January 28, 2017, Kroger operated, either directly or through its subsidiaries, 2,796 
supermarkets under a range of local banner names, of which 2,255 had pharmacies and 
1,445 had fuel centres. As of January 28, 2017, the Company offered ClickList and Harris 
Teeter ExpressLane, personalized, order online, pick up at the store services at 637 of its 
supermarkets. P$$T, Check This Out and Heritage Farm are the three brands. Its other 
brands include Simple Truth and Simple Truth Organic. 
98,375 30,497 
Lockheed 
Martin 
Corporation 
1995 Manufacture 
of air and 
spacecraft 
related 
machinery 
Lockheed Martin Corporation is a security and aerospace company. The Company 
operates through four segments. Aeronautics segment is engaged in the research, 
design, development, manufacture, integration, sustainment, support and upgrade of 
military aircraft, including combat and air mobility aircraft, unmanned air vehicles and 
related technologies. Missiles and Fire Control segment provides air and missile defence 
systems; fire control systems; manned and unmanned ground vehicles, and energy 
management solutions. Rotary and Mission Systems segment provides design, 
45,600 37,046 
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manufacture, service and support for a range of military and civil helicopters; mission 
systems and sensors for rotary and fixed-wing aircraft; simulation and training services, 
and unmanned systems and technologies, among others. Space Systems segment is 
engaged in the research and development, design, engineering and production of 
satellites, strategic and defensive missile systems and space transportation systems. 
Lowe’s 
Companies, 
Inc. 
1946 Retail sale of 
hardware, 
paints and 
glass in 
specialized 
stores 
 
Lowe's Companies, Inc. is a home improvement retailer. The Company operates 
approximately 1,860 home improvement and hardware stores, representing 
approximately 200 million square feet of retail selling space. The Company operates 
approximately 1,800 stores located across over 50 states in the United States, including 
approximately 80 Orchard Supply Hardware stores in California and Oregon, as well as 
approximately 40 stores in Canada and over 10 stores in Mexico. The Company operates 
through the home improvement retail operations segment. The Company offers a range 
of products for maintenance, repair, remodelling and decorating. The Company offers 
home improvement products in categories, including Lumber and Building Materials; 
Tools and Hardware; Appliances; Fashion Fixtures; Rough Plumbing and Electrical; Lawn 
and Garden; Seasonal Living; Paint; Flooring; Millwork; Kitchens; Outdoor Power 
Equipment, and Home Fashions. 
53,417 31,721 
Macy’s, Inc. 1830 Other retail 
sale in non 
specialized 
stores 
Macy's, Inc. is an omni channel retail company operating stores, Websites and mobile 
applications under various brands, such as Macy's, Bloomingdale's and Bluemercury. The 
Company sells a range of merchandise, including apparel and accessories (men's, 
women's and children's), cosmetics, home furnishings and other consumer goods. Its 
subsidiaries provide various support functions to its retail operations. Its bank subsidiary, 
FDS Bank, provides credit processing, certain collections, customer service and credit 
marketing services in respect of all credit card accounts that are owned either by 
Department Stores National Bank, which is a subsidiary of Citibank N.A., or FDS Bank. The 
private label brands offered by the Company include Alfani, American Rag, Aqua, Bar III, 
Belgique, Charter Club, Club Room, Epic Threads, first impressions, Giani Bernini, Greg 
27,931 21,330 
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Norman for Tasso Elba, Holiday Lane, Home Design, Hotel Collection, John Ashford, Karen 
Scott, Thalia Sodi and lune+aster 
Manpowergr
oup Inc. 
1948 Temporary 
employment 
agency 
activities 
ManpowerGroup Inc. is a provider of workforce solutions and services. The Company's 
segments include Americas, Southern Europe, Northern Europe, Asia Pacific Middle East, 
Right Management and Corporate. The Company's Americas segment includes 
operations in the United States and Other Americas. Its Southern Europe segment 
includes operations in France, Italy and Other Southern Europe. Its Northern Europe 
segment includes operations in the United Kingdom, the Nordics, Germany and the 
Netherlands. The Company's operations provide a range of workforce solutions and 
services offered through Manpower, Experis and ManpowerGroup Solutions, including 
permanent, temporary and contract recruitment, assessment and selection, training and 
outsourcing. The Company's Right Management segment provides talent and career 
management workforce solutions. The Company provides services under its Experis 
brand, particularly in the areas of information technology, engineering and finance. 
20,763 7,181 
McDonald’s 
Corporation 
1940 Restaurants 
and mobile 
food activities 
McDonald's Corporation operates and franchises McDonald's restaurants. The 
Company's restaurants serve a locally relevant menu of food and drinks sold at various 
price points in over 100 countries. The Company's segments include US, International 
Lead Markets, High Growth Markets, and Foundational Markets and Corporate. The U.S. 
segment focuses on offering a platform for authentic ingredients that allows customers 
to customize their sandwiches. Its High Growth Markets segment includes its operations 
in markets, such as China, Italy, Korea, Poland, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands and related markets. The International Lead markets segment includes the 
Company's operations in various markets, such as Australia, Canada, France, Germany, 
the United Kingdom and related markets. The Foundational markets and Corporate 
27,441 34,227 
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segment is engaged in operating restaurants and increasing convenience to customers, 
including through drive-thru and delivery 
McKesson 
Corporation 
1833 Wholesale of 
other 
household 
goods 
McKesson Corporation is engaged in delivering pharmaceuticals, medical supplies and 
healthcare information technology. The Company operates through two segments: 
McKesson Distribution Solutions and Technology Solutions. The McKesson Distribution 
Solutions segment distributes drugs and equipment, and health and beauty care 
products across North America and internationally. The Distribution Solutions segment 
provides pharmaceutical solutions for biotech and pharmaceutical manufacturers, and 
practice management, technology, clinical support and business solutions to oncology 
and other specialty practices operating in the community setting. The Technology 
Solutions segment delivers clinical, patient care, financial, supply chain and strategic 
management software solutions, as well as connectivity, outsourcing and other services. 
Its McKesson Health Solutions portfolio includes ClarityQx, which is a payment 
technology 
137,392 53,870 
Merck and 
Company , 
Incorporate
d 
1928 Manufacture 
of 
pharmaceutica
ls, medicinal 
chemicals and 
botanicals 
Merck and Co., Inc. is a global healthcare company. The Company offers health solutions 
through its prescription medicines, vaccines, biologic therapies and animal health 
products. It operates through four segments: Pharmaceutical, Animal Health, Healthcare 
Services and Alliances. The Company's Pharmaceutical segment includes human health 
pharmaceutical and vaccine products marketed either directly by the Company or 
through joint ventures. Human health pharmaceutical products consist of therapeutic 
and preventive agents, generally sold by prescription, for the treatment of human 
disorders. The Company sells its human health pharmaceutical products primarily to drug 
wholesalers and retailers, hospitals, government agencies and managed healthcare 
providers, such as health maintenance organizations, pharmacy benefit managers and 
other institutions. Vaccine products consist of preventive paediatric, adolescent and 
adult vaccines, primarily administered at physician offices. 
42,237 98,167 
Microsoft 
Corporation 
1975 Software 
publishing 
Microsoft Corporation is a technology company. The Company develops, licenses, and 
supports a range of software products, services and devices. The Company's segments 
include Productivity and Business Processes, Intelligent Cloud and More Personal 
86,833 174,472 
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Computing. The Company's products include operating systems; cross-device 
productivity applications; server applications; business solution applications; desktop and 
server management tools; software development tools; video games, and training and 
certification of computer system integrators and developers. It also designs, 
manufactures, and sells devices, including personal computers, tablets, gaming and 
entertainment consoles, phones, other intelligent devices, and related accessories, that 
integrate with its cloud-based offerings. It offers an array of services, including cloud-
based solutions that provide customers with software, services, platforms, and content, 
and it provides solution support and consulting services. 
Mondelez 
International
, Inc. 
2000 Manufacture 
of dairy 
products 
Mondelez International, Inc. is a snack company. The Company manufactures and 
markets snack food and beverage products for consumers. It operates through four 
segments: Latin America, Asia, Middle East, and Africa, Europe and North America. As of 
December 31, 2016, its brands spanned five product categories: Biscuits (including 
cookies, crackers and salted snacks); Chocolate; Gum and candy; Beverages (including 
coffee and powdered beverages), and Cheese and grocery. Its portfolio includes various 
snack brands, including Nabisco, Oreo, LU and belVita biscuits; Cadbury, Milka, Cadbury 
Dairy Milk and Toblerone chocolate; Trident gum; Halls candy, and Tang powdered 
beverages. The Company sells its products to supermarket chains, wholesalers, 
supercentres, club stores, mass merchandisers, distributors, convenience stores, gasoline 
stations, drug stores, value stores and retail food outlets. As of December 31, 2016, it 
sold its products to consumers in approximately 165 countries. 
34,244 66,771 
Nike, Inc. 1964 Manufacture 
of footwear 
Nike, Inc. is engaged in the design, development, marketing and selling of athletic 
footwear, apparel, equipment, accessories and services. The Company's operating 
segments include North America, Western Europe, Central & Eastern Europe, Greater 
China, Japan and Emerging Markets. Its portfolio brands include the NIKE Brand, Jordan 
Brand, Hurley and Converse. As of May 31, 2016, the Company focused its NIKE brand 
product offerings in nine categories: Running, NIKE Basketball, the Jordan Brand, Football 
(Soccer), Men's Training, Women's Training, Action Sports, Sportswear (its sports-
inspired lifestyle products) and Golf. Men's Training includes its baseball and American 
27,779 21,597 
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football product offerings. It also markets products designed for kids, as well as for other 
athletic and recreational uses, such as cricket, lacrosse, tennis, volleyball, wrestling, 
walking and outdoor activities. The Company sells a range of performance equipment 
and accessories under the NIKE Brand name 
Northrop 
Grumman 
Corporation 
1939 Manufacture 
of measuring, 
testing, 
navigating and 
control 
equipment 
Northrop Grumman Corporation is a global security company. The Company provides 
products, systems and solutions in autonomous systems; cyber; command, control, 
communications and computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; strike, 
and logistics and modernization. The Company's segments include Aerospace Systems, 
Mission Systems and Technology Services. The Company's Aerospace Systems segment is 
engaged in the design, development, integration and production of manned aircraft, 
autonomous systems, spacecraft, high-energy laser systems, microelectronics and other 
systems/subsystems. The Mission Systems segment offers mission solutions and 
multifunction systems for Department of Defence, intelligence community, international, 
federal civil and commercial customers. The Technology Services segment provides 
logistics solutions supporting the full life cycle of platforms and systems for global 
defence and federal-civil customers. 
23,979 26,572 
Nucor 
Corporation 
1940 Manufacture 
of basic iron 
and steel 
Nucor Corporation (Nucor) manufactures steel and steel products. The Company 
produces direct reduced iron (DRI) for use in its steel mills. It operates in three segments: 
steel mills, steel products and raw materials. The steel mills segment produces and 
distributes sheet steel (hot-rolled, cold-rolled and galvanized), plate steel, structural steel 
(wide-flange beams, beam blanks, H-piling and sheet piling) and bar steel (blooms, 
billets, concrete reinforcing bar, merchant bar, wire rod and special bar quality). The 
steel products segment produces steel joists and joist girders, steel deck, fabricated 
concrete reinforcing steel and cold finished steel. The raw materials produces DRI; 
brokers ferrous and nonferrous metals, pig iron, hot briquetted iron (HBI) and DRI; 
supplies ferro-alloys, and processes ferrous and nonferrous scrap metal. It also processes 
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ferrous and nonferrous metals and brokers ferrous and nonferrous metals, pig iron, HBI, 
and DRI. 
Oracle 
Corporation 
1977 Software 
publishing 
Oracle Corporation (Oracle) provides products and services that address all aspects of 
corporate information technology (IT) environments, including application, platform and 
infrastructure. The Company's businesses include cloud and on-premise software, 
hardware and services. Its cloud and on-premise software business consists of three 
segments, including cloud software and on-premise software, which includes Software as 
a Service and Platform as a Service offerings, cloud infrastructure as a service and 
software license updates and product support. Its hardware business consists of two 
segments, including hardware products and hardware support. The Company's services 
business includes the remainder of the Company's segments. Its services business 
includes activities, such as consulting services, enhanced support services and education 
services, among others. 
38,275 110,903 
The Proctor 
& Gamble 
Company  
1837 Manufacture 
of soap and 
detergents, 
cleaning and 
polishing 
preparations, 
perfumes and 
toilet 
preparations.   
The Procter & Gamble Company is focused on providing branded consumer packaged 
goods to the consumers across the world. The Company operates through five segments: 
Beauty; Grooming; Health Care; Fabric & Home Care, and Baby, Feminine & Family Care. 
The Company sells its products in approximately 180 countries and territories primarily 
through mass merchandisers, grocery stores, membership club stores, drug stores, 
department stores, distributors, baby stores, specialty beauty stores, e-commerce, high-
frequency stores and pharmacies. The Company owns and operates approximately 20 
manufacturing sites located in over 20 states in the United States. In addition, it owns 
and operates over 100 manufacturing sites in approximately 40 countries. It offers 
products under the brands, such as Olay, Old Spice, Safeguard, Head & Shoulders, 
80,510 129,495 
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Pantene, Rejoice, Mach3, Prestobarba, Venus, Cascade, Dawn, Febreze, Mr. Clean, 
Bounty and Charmin. 
Paccar, Inc. 1905 Manufacture 
of motor 
vehicles 
Paccar Inc is a technology company. The Company's segments include Truck, Parts and 
Financial Services. The Truck segment includes the design, manufacture and distribution 
of light-, medium- and heavy-duty commercial trucks. The Company's trucks are 
marketed under the Kenworth, Peterbilt and DAF nameplates. It also manufactures 
engines, primarily for use in the Company's trucks, at its facilities in Columbus, 
Mississippi; Eindhoven, the Netherlands, and Ponta Grossa, Brazil. The Parts segment 
includes the distribution of aftermarket parts for trucks and related commercial vehicles. 
The Financial Services segment includes finance and leasing products and services 
provided to customers and dealers. Its Other business includes the manufacturing and 
marketing of industrial winches. The Company operates in Australia and Brazil and sells 
trucks and parts to customers in Asia, Africa, Middle East and South America. 
18,997 20,619 
Pepsico, Inc. 1919 Manufacture 
of other food 
products 
PepsiCo, Inc. is a global food and beverage company. The Company's portfolio of brands 
includes Frito-Lay, Gatorade, Pepsi-Cola, Quaker and Tropicana. The Company operates 
through six segments: Frito-Lay North America (FLNA), Quaker Foods North America 
(QFNA), North America Beverages (NAB), Latin America, Europe Sub-Saharan Africa 
(ESSA), and Asia, Middle East and North Africa (AMENA). The FLNA segment includes its 
branded food and snack businesses in the United States and Canada. The QFNA segment 
includes its cereal, rice, pasta and other branded food businesses in the United States 
and Canada. The NAB segment includes its beverage businesses in the United States and 
Canada. The Latin America segment includes its beverage, food and snack businesses in 
Latin America. The ESSA segment includes its beverage, food and snack businesses in 
66,683 70,509 
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Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. The AMENA segment includes its beverage, food and 
snack businesses in Asia, Middle East and North Africa. 
Pfizer Inc. 1942 Manufacture 
of 
pharmaceutica
ls, medicinal 
chemicals and 
botanical 
products 
Pfizer Inc. is a research-based global biopharmaceutical company. The Company is 
engaged in the discovery, development and manufacture of healthcare products. Its 
global portfolio includes medicines and vaccines, as well as consumer healthcare 
products. The Company manages its commercial operations through two business 
segments: Pfizer Innovative Health (IH) and Pfizer Essential Health (EH). IH focuses on 
developing and commercializing medicines and vaccines, as well as products for 
consumer healthcare. IH therapeutic areas include internal medicine, vaccines, oncology, 
inflammation and immunology, rare diseases and consumer healthcare. EH includes 
legacy brands, branded generics, generic sterile injectable products, biosimilars and 
infusion systems. EH also includes an R&D organization, as well as its contract 
manufacturing business. Its brands include Prevnar 13, Xeljanz, Eliquis, Lipitor, Celebrex, 
Pristiq and Viagra. 
49,605 167,566 
Qualcomm 
Incorporate
d 
1985 Manufacture 
of electronic 
equipment 
and boards 
Qualcomm Incorporated is engaged in the development and commercialization of a 
digital communication technology called code division multiple access (CDMA). The 
Company is engaged in the development and commercialization of the orthogonal 
frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) family of technologies, including long-term 
evolution (LTE), which is an Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM)-based 
standard that uses OFDMA and single-carrier Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA), 
for cellular wireless communication applications. The Company's segments include QCT 
(Qualcomm CDMA Technologies), QTL (Qualcomm Technology Licensing) and QSI 
(Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives). The Company also develops and commercializes a range 
of other technologies used in handsets and tablets that contribute to end user demand. 
The Company's products principally consist of integrated circuits and system software 
used in mobile devices and in wireless networks. 
26,487 48,574 
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Raytheon 
Company 
1922 Manufacture 
of measuring, 
testing, 
navigating and 
control 
equipment 
Raytheon Company is a technology company, which specializes in defence and other 
government markets. The Company develops integrated products, services and solutions 
in various markets, including sensing; effects; command, control, communications, 
computers, cyber and intelligence; mission support, and cyber security. The Company 
operates through five segments: Integrated Defence Systems; Intelligence, Information 
and Services; Missile Systems; Space and Airborne Systems, and Forcepoint. The IDS 
segment develops and produces sensors and mission systems. The IIS segment provides a 
range of technical and professional services to intelligence, defence, federal and 
commercial customers. The MS segment is a developer, integrator and producer of 
missile and combat systems. The SAS segment is engaged in the design, development 
and manufacture of integrated sensor and communication systems for missions. The 
Force point segment develops cyber security products. 
22,826 27,716 
Southwest 
Airlines Co. 
1971 Passenger air 
transport 
Southwest Airlines Co. operates Southwest Airlines, a passenger airline that provides 
scheduled air transportation in the United States and near-international markets. The 
Company provides point-to-point service. The Company offers ancillary service offerings, 
such as Southwest's EarlyBird Check-In and transportation of pets and unaccompanied 
minors, in accordance with Southwest's respective policies. Southwest's Rapid Rewards 
frequent flyer program enables program members to earn points for every dollar spent 
on Southwest fares. Its Internet Website, Southwest.com, is an avenue for Southwest 
customers to purchase and manage travel online. As of December 31, 2016, Southwest 
operated a total of 723 Boeing 737 aircraft and served 101 destinations in 40 states, the 
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and eight near-international 
countries: Mexico, Jamaica, The Bahamas, Aruba, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Belize, 
and Cuba. 
18,605 19,723 
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Staples, Inc. 1985 Retail sale of 
books 
newspapers 
and stationery 
in specialized 
stores 
Staples, Inc. is a provider of products and services that serve the needs of business 
customers and consumers. The Company offers a range of print and marketing and 
technology services. The Company's segments include North American Delivery, North 
American Retail and Other. The North American Delivery segment consists of the United 
States and Canadian businesses, including Staples Business Advantage, staples.com, 
staples.ca, and quill.com, that sell and deliver products and services primarily to 
businesses. The North American Retail segment includes its retail stores in the United 
States and Canada. As of January 28, 2017, its North American Retail segment consisted 
of 1,255 stores in the United States and 304 stores in Canada. The Company has other 
businesses in Australia, South America and Asia. Staples Australia serves primarily 
contract and government customers in Australia and New Zealand. The Company also 
has operations in China, Argentina, Taiwan and Brazil. 
23,114 10,308 
Starbucks 
Corporation 
1985 Restaurants 
and mobile 
food service 
activities 
Starbucks Corporation is a roaster, marketer and retailer of coffee. As of October 2, 2016, 
the Company operated in 75 countries. The Company operates through four segments: 
Americas, which is inclusive of the United States, Canada, and Latin America; China/Asia 
Pacific (CAP); Europe, Middle East, and Africa, and Channel Development. The Company's 
Americas, CAP, and EMEA segments include both company-operated and licensed stores. 
Its Channel Development segment includes roasted whole bean and ground coffees, Tazo 
teas, Starbucks- and Tazo-branded single-serve products, a range of ready-to-drink 
beverages, such as Frappuccino, Starbucks Doubleshot and Starbucks Refreshers 
beverages and other branded products sold across the world through channels, such as 
grocery stores, warehouse clubs, specialty retailers, convenience stores and the United 
States foodservice accounts. 
16,448 10,753 
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Sysco 
Corporation 
1970 Wholesale of 
food, 
beverages and 
tobacco 
Sysco Corporation is a distributor of food and related products primarily to the 
foodservice or food-away-from-home industry. The Company's segments include 
Broadline, SYGMA and Other. The Broadline segment includes its Broadline operations 
located in the Bahamas, Canada, Costa Rica, Ireland, Mexico and the United States. 
Broadline operating companies distribute a full line of food products and a range of non-
food products to both traditional and chain restaurant customers, hospitals, schools, 
hotels, industrial caterers and other venues where foodservice products are served. 
SYGMA operating companies distribute a full line of food products and a range of non-
food products to certain chain restaurant customer locations. The Other segment 
includes the Company's specialty produce; custom-cut meat operations; lodging industry 
segments; a company that distributes specialty imported products; a company that 
distributes to international customers, and Sysco Ventures platform. 
46,517 17,989 
Target  
Stores, Inc. 
1962 Retail sale in 
non 
specialized 
stores with 
food, 
beverages or 
tobacco 
predominating 
Target Stores, Inc. is a supermarket/grocery store, primarily engaged in the retail sale of 
all sorts of canned foods and dry goods, such as tea, coffee, spices, sugar, and flour; fresh 
fruits and vegetables; and fresh and prepared meats, fish, and poultry. 
71,279 41,172 
Tech Data 
Corporation 
1974 Wholesale of 
computers, 
computer 
peripheral 
equipment 
and software 
Tech Data Corporation is a wholesale distributor of technology products. The Company 
serves as a link in the technology supply chain by bringing products from the technology 
vendors to market, as well as providing its customers with logistics capabilities and 
services. It operates through the segment of distributing technology products, logistics 
management and other value-added services. It operates in two geographic segments: 
the Americas and Europe. It provides resellers training and technical support suite of 
electronic commerce tools customized shipping documents product configuration or 
integration services and access to financing programs. Its customers include value-added 
resellers, direct marketers, retailers and corporate resellers who support the diverse 
26,822 6,137 
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technology needs of end users. It sells its products to customers in approximately 100 
countries throughout North America, South America, Europe, the Middle East and Africa. 
Time 
Warner Inc. 
2001 Television 
programming 
and 
broadcasting 
activities 
Time Warner Inc. is a media and entertainment company. The Company operates 
through three segments: Turner, which consists of cable networks and digital media 
properties; Home Box Office, which consists of premium pay television and over the top 
services and premium pay, basic tier television and services internationally, and Warner 
Bros., which consists of television, feature film, home video, and videogame production 
and distribution. It also holds interests in companies that operate broadcast networks. 
The Company holds interest in Central European Media Enterprises Ltd. , which is a 
broadcasting company that operates television networks in Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia and The CW broadcast network, 
which includes a lineup of advertising-supported original programming, such as The 100, 
Arrow, Crazy Ex-Girlfriend, DC's Legends of Tomorrow, The Flash, Frequency, iZombie, 
Jane the Virgin and No Tomorrow. 
27,359 63,146 
Tyson Foods, 
Inc. 
1935 Processing and 
preserving of 
meats 
Tyson Foods, Inc. is a food company, which is engaged in offering chicken, beef and pork, 
as well as prepared foods. The Company offers food products under Tyson, Jimmy Dean, 
Hillshire Farm, Sara Lee, Ball Park, Wright, Aidells and State Fair brands. The Company 
operates through four segments: Chicken, Beef, Pork and Prepared Foods. It operates a 
vertically integrated chicken production process, which consists of breeding stock, 
contract growers, feed production, processing, further-processing, marketing and 
transportation of chicken and related allied products, including animal and pet food 
ingredients. Through its subsidiary, Cobb-Vantress, Inc., the Company is engaged in 
supplying poultry breeding stock across the world. It produces a range of fresh, frozen 
and refrigerated food products. Its products are marketed and sold by its sales staff to 
37,580 23,956 
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grocery retailers, grocery wholesalers, meat distributors, warehouse club stores and 
military commissaries, among others. 
Union Pacific 
Corporation 
1969 Passenger rail 
transport, 
interurban 
Union Pacific Corporation is a railroad operating company in the United States. The 
Company operates through its principal operating company, Union Pacific Railroad 
Company. Its business mix includes Agricultural Products, Automotive, Chemicals, Coal, 
Industrial Products and Intermodal. Its freight traffic consists of bulk, manifest, and 
premium business. Bulk traffic primarily consists of coal, grain, soda ash, ethanol, rock 
and crude oil shipped in unit trains-trains transporting a single commodity from one 
origin to one destination. Manifest traffic includes individual carload or less than train-
load business involving commodities, such as lumber, paper, food and chemicals. The 
transportation of finished vehicles, auto parts, intermodal containers and truck trailers 
are included as part of its premium business. As of December 31, 2016, its network 
included 32,070 route miles, linking Pacific Coast and Gulf Coast ports with the Midwest 
and Eastern United States gateways. 
23,988 52,372 
United 
Continental 
Holdings, 
Inc. 
1968 Passenger air 
transport 
United Continental Holdings, Inc. is a holding company and its principal subsidiary is 
United Air Lines, Inc. The Company transports people and cargo through its mainline 
operations. It has global air rights in North America, Asia-Pacific, Europe, Middle East, 
Africa and Latin America. The Company, through United and its regional carriers, 
operates flights from its hubs at Newark Liberty International Airport, Chicago O'Hare 
International Airport, Denver International Airport, George Bush Intercontinental Airport, 
Los Angeles International Airport, A.B. Won Pat International Airport, San Francisco 
International Airport and Washington Dulles International Airport. It has contractual 
relationships with regional carriers to provide regional jet and turboprop service branded 
38,901 36,595 
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as United Express. These regional operations are an extension of the Company's mainline 
network. 
United 
Technologie
s 
Corporation 
1934 Manufacture 
of air 
spacecraft and 
related 
machinery 
United Technologies Corporation is engaged in providing high technology products and 
services to the building systems and aerospace industries around the world. The 
Company operates through four segments: Otis; UTC Climate, Controls & Security; Pratt 
& Whitney, and UTC Aerospace Systems. Otis operates as an elevator and escalator 
manufacturing, installation and service company. UTC Climate, Controls & Security 
segment is engaged in providing heating, ventilating, air conditioning and refrigeration 
solutions. The Pratt & Whitney segment supplies aircraft engines for the commercial, 
military, business jet and general aviation markets. Pratt & Whitney segment provides 
fleet management services and aftermarket maintenance, repair and overhaul services. 
The UTC Aerospace Systems segment provides aerospace products and aftermarket 
service solutions for aircraft manufacturers, airlines, regional, business and general 
aviation markets, military, space and undersea operations. 
65,100 91,206 
United 
Parcel 
Service, Inc. 
1907 Courier 
activities 
United Parcel Service, Inc. is a package delivery company. The Company is a provider of 
global supply chain management solutions. The Company operates through three 
segments: US Domestic Package operations, International Package operations, and 
Supply Chain and Freight operations. As of December 31, 2016, the Company delivered 
packages in over 220 countries and territories. The Company offers a spectrum of the 
United States domestic guaranteed ground and air package transportation services. The 
International Package segment includes the small package operations in Europe, Asia-
Pacific, Canada and Latin America, the Indian sub-continent, the Middle East and Africa. 
The Supply Chain & Freight segment includes its forwarding and logistics services, 
truckload freight brokerage, UPS Freight and its financial offerings through UPS Capital. 
58,232 35,440 
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The Company serves the global market for logistics services, which include 
transportation, distribution, contract logistics and ground freight. 
Verizon 
Communicat
ions Inc. 
1983 Wired 
telecommunic
ations 
activities 
Verizon Communications Inc. is a holding company. The Company, through its 
subsidiaries, provides communications, information and entertainment products and 
services to consumers, businesses and governmental agencies. Its segments include 
Wireless and Wireline. The Wireless segment offers communications products and 
services, including wireless voice and data services and equipment sales, to consumer, 
business and government customers across the United States. The Wireline segment 
offers voice, data and video communications products and services, such as broadband 
video and data, corporate networking solutions, data centre and cloud services, security 
and managed network services, and local and long distance voice services. The Company 
provides these products and services to consumers in the United States, as well as to 
carriers, businesses and government customers both in the United States and around the 
world. 
127,079 232,616 
Walgreens 
Boots 
Alliance 
1901 Retail sale of 
pharmaceutica
l and medical 
goods,  
cosmetic  and 
toilet goods in 
specialized 
stores 
Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. is a holding company. The Company is a pharmacy-led 
health and wellbeing company. The Company operates through three segments: Retail 
Pharmacy USA, Retail Pharmacy International and Pharmaceutical Wholesale. The Retail 
Pharmacy USA segment consists of the Walgreen Co. business, which includes the 
operation of retail drugstores, care clinics and providing specialty pharmacy services. The 
Retail Pharmacy International segment consists primarily of the Alliance Boots pharmacy-
led health and beauty stores, optical practices and related contract manufacturing 
operations. The Pharmaceutical Wholesale segment consists of the Alliance Boots 
pharmaceutical wholesaling and distribution businesses. The Company's portfolio of 
retail and business brands includes Walgreens, Duane Reade, Boots and Alliance 
76,392 37,250 
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Healthcare, as well as global health and beauty product brands, including No7, Botanics, 
Liz Earle and Soap & Glory 
Wal-mart 
Stores, Inc. 
1945 Other retail 
sale in non 
specialized 
stores 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. is engaged in the operation of retail, wholesale and other units in 
various formats around the world. The Company operates through three segments: 
Walmart US, Walmart International and Sam's Club. The Walmart US segment includes 
its mass merchant concept in the United States operating under the Walmart or Wal-
Mart brands, as well as digital retail. The Walmart International segment consists of the 
Company's operations outside of the United States, including various retail Websites. The 
Walmart International segment includes various formats divided into three categories: 
retail, wholesale and other. These categories consist of various formats, including 
supercentres, supermarkets, and warehouse clubs, such as Sam's Clubs, cash and carry, 
home improvement, specialty electronics, apparel stores, drug stores and convenience 
stores, as well as digital retail. The Sam's Club segment includes the warehouse 
membership clubs in the United States, and samsclub.com 
476,294 203,490 
Whirlpool 
Corporation 
1898 Manufacture 
of domestic 
appliances 
Whirlpool Corporation is a manufacturer and marketer of home appliances. The 
Company's segments include North America; Europe, Middle East and Africa; Latin 
America, and Asia. In North America, the Company markets and distributes home 
appliances and small domestic appliances under a range of brand names. In EMEA, it 
markets and distributes its home appliances primarily under the Whirlpool, Bauknecht, 
Ignis, Maytag, Laden, Indesit and Privileg brand names, and domestic appliances under 
the KitchenAid, Hotpoint and Hotpoint-Ariston brand names. In Latin America, it markets 
and distributes its home appliances and small domestic appliances primarily under the 
Consul, Brastemp, Whirlpool and KitchenAid brand names. The Company markets and 
distributes its products in Asia primarily under the Whirlpool, Maytag, KitchenAid, 
19,872 20,002 
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Amana, Bauknecht, Jenn-Air, Diqua and Royalstar brand names. It manufactures and 
markets a line of home appliances and related products. 
Xerox 
Corporation 
1906 Manufacture 
of optical 
instruments 
and 
photographic 
equipment 
Xerox Corporation is engaged in imaging, business process, analytics, automation and 
user-centric insights. The Company's segments include Services, Document Technology 
and Other. The Company's Services segment includes service offerings, such as BPO and 
Document Outsourcing. It provides business services in markets across various industries 
and to government agencies. The Company's Document Technology segment includes 
the sale of products and supplies, as well as the associated technical service and 
financing of those products. The product groups offered under this segment are entry, 
mid-range and high-end products. Other segment includes paper sales in its developing 
market countries, wide-format systems, licensing revenue, global imaging systems 
network integration solutions and non-allocated corporate items, including other 
expenses and net. Its DO offers services, such as managed print services include 
workflow automation and centralized print services. 
19,540 27,658 
		
	 357	
	
9.4 Appendix 4 Summary Table of Empirical Research 
 
Reference Research Design / Sample Measures Key Variables Key Findings / Results 
Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) 
US sample: Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 
500, S&P MidCaps, and S&P SmallCap 
firms collected by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center for the 
period 1996–2003. Sample 1,939 firms; 
86,714 directorships 
DV: gender 
IVs: attendance behaviour, committee 
assignment, CEO turnover, equity based 
compensation for CEO, stock 
performance 
Women have better attendance records than 
men and more likely to join monitoring 
committees. Diverse boards more likely to hold 
CEOs accountable for poor stock price and CEO 
turnover more sensitive to stock return 
performance in firms.  
Altshuler and 
Grubert (2002) 
Impact of taxes on repatriation on MNE 
behaviour. 1996 tax returns. Largest 
6000 CFCs in terms of assets. Country 
statutory tax rates and withholding 
taxes on dividends. Calculate country 
average ETR to construct the CFC’s 
repatriation taxes. 
DV: financial assets held by CFC (various 
asset items / total CFC assets). IVs: 
repatriation taxes (statutory and actuals); 
total foreign taxes paid to foreign net 
income; country ETR, age of CFC. 
Controls: GDP, GDP per capita. 
When retained lightly taxed earnings are 
‘trapped’ because of the repatriation tax, they 
are trapped in all foreign subsidiaries as a 
group. CFCs that face high repatriation taxes 
make greater investments in related affiliates, 
send a greater share of dividends to other 
foreign affiliates, and pay off more local debt. 
Altshuler and 
Newlon (1993) 
1986 tax returns for US MNEs and their 
foreign subsidiaries to consider 
structure and coordination of the 
repatriation of foreign income and how 
affected by tax liabilities.  
DV: dividend remittances to parent 
IVs: tax cost of dividends, CFC after tax 
income, other CFC characteristics, parent 
characteristics 
MNEs can use foreign credits and deferral to 
reduce US tax liability. CFCs with parents in net 
credit position pay out more dividends as these 
will not incur tax. 
Azemar (2010) Regresses US capital invested abroad on 
foreign average corporate tax rates. 
Uses 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000 
US Treasury CFC files compiled by the 
IRS. Includes the 7,500 largest foreign 
corporations controlled by US MNE with 
total assets in excess of 500 million 
USD.  
The average tax rate for each country is 
calculated controlling for the impact of 
other determinants of US activity abroad 
- host country GDP, GDP per capita, and 
trade openness, real exchange rate, 
physical infrastructure, and a Law and 
Order index. 
Investment is strongly influenced by average 
tax rates, particularly for low-tax rates. Firms 
report higher profit, higher Subpart F income, 
and are less likely to repatriate dividends when 
in low-tax jurisdictions. Low degrees of law 
enforcement are also associated with higher 
income shifting. 
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Reference Research Design / Sample Measures Key Variables Key Findings / Results 
Barrios, 
Huizinga, 
Laeven and 
Nicodeme 
(2012) 
 
Large international firm level data set 
incorporating a range of European 
countries and companies. Consider the 
interaction between home and host 
country corporate and withholding tax 
systems on the location decision of 
MNEs. Sample analysed over multi 
country framework. 
DV: location. IV: tax (corporate statutory 
rate) Controls: for market size (GDP as a 
ratio of the GDPs of all potential host 
countries); contiguity (common border); 
difference in labour costs (log of ratio of 
labour costs in home and host country), 
economic freedom, EU membership. 
Even with deferral parent country taxes exert 
an effect on MNEs. Location decisions for 
highly profitable subsidiaries are less 
responsive to tax inducements than for less 
profitable subsidiaries. Location decisions of 
foreign subsidiaries with low fixed assets are 
more sensitive to parent and host country 
taxes. 
Barua, 
Davidson, 
Rama and 
Thiruvadi 2010 
Sample of 1559 firms in 2005. 
Hypothesise that women are more 
cautious and therefore have lower 
abnormal accruals. Firms (non financial) 
for which data available in Compustat. 
 
DV: total accruals 
IV: size, (log assets), ratio book to market 
equity, revenue growth, changes in 
receivables, PPE, ROA, book value debt, 
big 4 auditor (dummy) female CFO 
(dummy) 
Companies with female CFOs have lower 
performance-matched absolute discretionary 
accruals and lower absolute accrual estimation 
errors, after controlling for other factors that 
prior research has shown to be associated with 
accruals.  
Boise and 
Koenig (2002) 
Practitioner focused article providing 
overview of the US tax system with 
particular focus on inversions. 
  
Barrios, 
Huizinga, 
Laeven and 
Nicodeme 
(2012) 
Examine effects of host and parent 
country taxes on location decision. How 
parent company taxation interacts with 
host country. Consider structure of 
European companies using data from 
Amadeus. 909 subsidiaries. 
DV: location. IV: host and home country 
taxes. Controls: GDP, distance, difference 
in labour costs, economic freedom, EU 
membership. 
Double taxation by the parent company is 
important in shaping the structure of the MNE. 
Estimate that home and host country taxation 
is of equal importance. Location decisions of 
highly profitable subsidiaries are less elastic. 
Bartelsman 
and Beetsma 
(2003) 
Isolate the income shifting effects from 
tax rates on real activity by controlling 
for the effects of taxes and unobserved 
productivity. Regress the ratio of total 
value added to wage payments on tax 
rate differences.  
OECD data on labor compensation and 
value-added for 16 countries and 15 
sectors for 1979–1997. PWC data on tax 
rates. Control variables: long-term 
interest rate and the price deflator for 
investment. 
Income shifting responds to differences in 
corporate tax rates. Revenue from a unilateral 
increase in the tax rate is lost because of a 
decline in reported income. Can increase 
revenue through tighter control of TP but 
enforcement of TP rules by high tax countries 
may cause shifts real activity to lower tax 
countries. 
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Bear, Rahman 
and Post 2010 
Explores relationship between CSR, 
women on the board and corporate 
reputation. 689 companies take from 
Fortune 2009 World’s Most Admired 
Companies. KLD index to measure CSR. 
Diversity and CEO duality from 
Mergent. COMPUSTAT 
DV: reputation 
Mediator: CSR rating 
IVs: diversity of directors, number of 
women on board 
Controls: CEO duality, firm performance 
(change in stock price) ROA,  
Number of women on the board had a positive 
association with the strength ratings for CSR.  
Benvignati 
(1987 60 (3) ) 
Uses confidential data from US Federal 
Trade Commission to test of MNEs 
report higher rates of profits on 
domestic profits than non MNEs. 
 
DV: domestic profits 
IVs: multinationality, industry level 
multinationality, industry concentration 
industry export share, R&D intensity, 
industry advertising intensity, industry 
asset ratio, industry minimum efficient 
scale, industry growth, market share.  
MNEs do have profits advantages when 
domestic activity aligned with international. 
Brajcich, 
Friesner and 
McPherson 
(2013) 
Consider potential gains from tax from 
establishment of foreign subsidiary. Use 
a gravity model to consider the impact 
of tax distance (and others) on impact 
of establishing CFC. Use US tax return 
data from 2004, 2006 and 2008. Plus 
other government (BLS) data. 
DV: measure of resource shifting 
potential; real value of assets of US CFC 
IV: economic activity and flow, 
geographic distance, tax related distance, 
firm related distance, business climate 
related distance, time related distance. 
Tax rates do influence where MNCs shift 
income, but to a limited extent and only after 
foreign operations are established. Tax rates 
are an incentive but only when zero, when 
CFCs are established with larger asset base. 
Buckley and 
Pearce (1979) 
Sourcing policy of MNEs and how 
decision made about which production 
facilities serve which markets. Tests 
whether R&D intensive firms have 
greater incentive to internalize. 172 
largest MNEs in 1972 (questionnaire). 
DVs: multinationality of production; 
multinationality of sales; export 
behaviour; two sourcing ratios. 
IVs: size, country, industry, research 
intensity. 
MNEs run international networks linking 
production to market. The larger the firm the 
more likely it is to service foreign markets by 
production there. Considerable variation exists 
in sourcing policy but national characteristics 
are stronger explanatory variables than 
industry. 
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Buettner and 
Ruf (2007) 
Sample of German MNEs over the 
period 1996-2003. Panel data 
examining impact of tax on location 
decision of German MNEs. Based on FDI 
data from German Bundesbank. 
DV: ETR; statutory tax rate; effective 
marginal rate. 
Control: market size (log GDP); labour 
costs (log hourly labour wage published 
by US Bureau of labor statistics). 
MNEs are affected more by host country 
statutory rates than average ETRs. Find impact 
of tax incentives, market size, and labour cost 
have more significant impact on cross-border 
location decisions than marginal effective tax.  
Buettner and 
Wamser (2007) 
Choice of intra-company loans and 
profit shifting. Uses micro level data 
from Deutsche Bundesbank. Examines 
80 countries over a 9 year period. 
DV: loans received by a foreign affiliate 
from other foreign affiliates, scaled by 
total capital 
IV: tax rate differences, statutory tax rate 
of affiliate receiving loans 
Controls: borrowing costs 
Significant impact of tax-rate differences within 
MNE group on the use of intracompany loans 
as evidence of profit shifting. Implied tax 
revenue effects are small; costs of adjusting the 
capital structure for profit-shifting purposes are 
large. 
Buettner and 
Wamser (2013) 
Role of internal debt as a vehicle for 
shifting profits to low tax countries. 
German MNE in 100 different countries 
(1996-2005). Deutsche Bundesbank 
data. 
DV: internal loans as proportion total 
capital 
IV: host country tax rate, time, 
alternative tax rates, loss carry forwards, 
sales (size), ratio fixed to total assets 
(tangibility). 
Control: factors related to costs of 
borrowing. 
Internal debt is used more by MNE with 
affiliates in low tax countries. Increases with 
the spread between the host country tax rate 
and the lowest tax rate among all affiliates. 
Magnitude is small. Anti tax avoidance 
provisions may curb profit shifting through the 
use of internal debt. 
Chan and Chow 
(1997) 
Study of 81 tax audits in China 
undertaken in 1992-93 on TP. 
Analysed characteristics and results of 
tax audits. Six cases then selected for 
examination to confirm and reinforce 
the findings of the overall analysis. 
 TP tax audits in China are confined mainly to 
smaller, lower-tech companies and transfer of 
tangible goods. Persistent losses, low profits 
and lack of local partners in JV management 
trigger tax audits. Tax differentials not the most 
important inducement to TP manipulations. 
Clausing (2003) Monthly data on US international trade 
prices over 1997, 1998, and 1999 to 
investigate the impact of tax on 
intrafirm trade prices. 425,000 
observations of monthly prices. 33% of 
these observations are for exports. 38% 
DV: prices of products – intrafirm and 
non intrafirm 
IVs: ETR and statutory tax rates 
Control: exchange rates, industry, 
whether price originally in $. 
Substantial evidence of tax-motivated TP in US 
intrafirm trade prices. Strong and statistically 
significant relationship between countries’ tax 
rates and the prices of intrafirm transactions. 
As country tax rates are lower US intrafirm 
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observations are intrafirm trade. 54 
countries. 
export prices are lower, and US intrafirm 
import prices are higher. 
Clausing (2009) US MNE 1982-2004. Financial effect of 
taxes - income shifting in terms of US 
affiliate profit rates and host country 
tax rates. Real effect -. regresses 
employment on the tax rate 
differences. 
DV: profit rate (Gross income / sales).  
IV: ETR difference (ETR US – ETR foreign 
hosts). 
DV: employment rate.  
IV: ETR difference.  
Controls: market size (GDP), wealth (GDP 
per capita), distance from US. 
1% fall in host country tax rate associated with 
a 0.5% increase in profits booked by affiliates in 
that country. Tax factors led to the relocation 
of real economic activity that in effect shifted 
approx. $80 billion of US profits to low tax 
countries. 
Clemmons and 
Kinney (2008) 
Consider the AJCA and which firms 
were induced to repatriate funds. Use 
data from Compustat – 364 repatriating 
firms. 
DV: repatriation 
IVs: size, foreign ROA, foreign tax rate, 
tax difference, CAPEX/ Total assets, 
Growth, R&D / Total assets.  
Substantial funds were repatriated but were 
not used to fund significant changes in debt 
levels, R&D spend, capital expenditures, or 
acquisitions. Stock purchases did increase in 
the year of repatriation.  
Davis, 
Guenther, Krull 
and Williams 
(2016) 
Whether CSR and tax payments are 
seen as complements or substitutes.. 
Construct CSR index from MSCI annual 
dataset on environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) ratings. 
DV: 5 yr cash ETR, lobbying spend 
(dummy) 
IVs: CSR 
Control: size, leverage, intangible assets, 
pretax profitability, foreign income, 
admin expenses, R&D, Loss carry 
forwards, PPE. 
CSR index is negatively related to ETR. Also CSR 
positively related to tax lobbying. Conclude 
socially responsible firms do not necessarily 
regard paying taxes as complementary to CSR. 
De Mooij and 
Ederveen 
(2006) 
Based on met analysis to understand 
variation in elasticity FDI to corporate 
tax rates. Transform findings from each 
study into tax rate elasticities – how FDI 
changes in response to tax rate change. 
DV: FDI (range of measures). IV: Tax rate 
(range of measures). Control for study 
characteristics – type of capital data 
used; type of tax data used; whether 
home country adopts credit or 
exemption system; distance; time. 
Heterogeneity of approaches in research 
means can’t make single estimate. Median 
value of elasticities of 2.9. Type of capital data 
used is important – amount of capital invested 
is more responsive to taxes than the location 
itself. 
Desai and 
Dharmapala 
(2006) 
Analyse link between tax avoidance and 
management incentives. Theoretical 
model of the impact of incentives on 
DV: book - tax gap less accruals 
IV: incentives, index of corporate 
governance quality, ratio of value of 
Incentive compensation appears to dive tax 
avoidance. Particularly true for firms with weak 
governance arrangements.  
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choices. Use data from Compustat and 
Execucomp. 1993-2001. 
stock options / total compensation top 5 
executives 
Controls -size (logs of assets, sales, 
market value) 
Desai, Foley 
and Hines 
(2006) 
Consider the types of firms that use tax 
havens and the purposes that they are 
used for. Sample of US MNE between 
1982 and 1999 using BEA survey data. 
DVs: haven dummy, share of affiliates in 
havens, share affiliate sales in havens, 
share haven affiliates in Big 7 havens, 
share affiliate sales in Big 7 havens, ratio 
foreign taxes to sales, affiliate sales 
growth in non tax havens, affiliate net 
PPE growth in non tax havens.  
IVs: log of non haven sales, log of parent 
sales, av non haven tax rate, ind. Av non 
tax haven tax rate, ind share of sales to 
related parties abroad, parent ind R&D 
ratio, own affiliate in haven, parent owns 
affiliates only in dot tax havens, country 
tax rate, leverage, leverage interacted 
with country tax rate, begin of period 
sales in havens, beg period net PPE in 
havens, GDP growth rate. 
Larger, more international, more R&D intensive 
firms and those with more intra company 
transactions are more likely to have tax haven 
companies. Find that use of large tax haven 
countries are to reallocate taxable income. 
Smaller tax havens are used more to defer 
repatriation 
Desai and 
Hines (2002) 
Case study on Stanley Works 
expatriation decision. Statistical analysis 
of factors that contribute expatriation: 
analyse the correlation of measurable 
firm attributes with decision to invert. 
Small sample of inverting firms so 
combine with information on a sample 
of firms that do not invert, and analyse 
inversion decision as a logit model. Data 
from 10-Ks of inverting firms with and 
Compustat for other firms. Examine 
Consider price and volume history of 
Stanley stock trades, along with the 
movements of the S&P 500 index from 
surrounding the announcement.  
DV: expatriation 
IVs: Log total assets, foreign asset share, 
leverage, av foreign tax rate, interaction 
of leverage and foreign tax rate. 
Price changes in market mean participants 
expect inversion to be accompanied by a 
reduction in tax liabilities. Inverting firms tend 
to be large, have sizable foreign assets, 
extensive debt, and face low foreign tax rates 
meaning that can gain from inversion. Share 
prices rise by an average of 1.7% in response to 
expatriation announcements. 10% higher 
leverage ratios are associated with 0.7% 
greater market reactions to expatriations, 
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stock price reactions to inversion 
announcements. 
reflecting the benefit of avoiding the US rules 
concerning interest expense allocation. 
Devereux and 
Griffith (1998) 
Panel of US MNE – how tax affects 
location decision for subsidiaries in 
France, Germany and UK. (1632 US 
MNEs 1980-1994). Models location 
decision vs export or not serve market. 
DV: location decision (where subs are). 
IVs: Effective average tax rates and 
marginal rates; Profitability.  
Controls: segment data (sales, profits, 
assets) and export data. Industry level 
data on labour costs, demand, 
production, trade flows used to measure 
agglomeration. 
Av ETR plays a role in choice between locations 
but not in choice of whether to locate in 
Europe or alternative. Agglomeration effects 
also important. 
Devereux and 
Griffith (2003) 
Develops theory and new measure of 
average ETR to consider the choices 
made by MNE in particular location. 
Estimates EATR for series of countries 
1979 – 1999. 
Forward looking average ETR measured 
using weighted average of an effective 
marginal tax rate and an adjusted 
statutory tax rate with weights 
dependent on profitability. 
Concludes that more profitable investments 
are more responsive than less profitable 
investments. 
Dharmapala, 
Foley and 
Forbes (2010) 
Uses BEA survey data from 1996 and 
2005 supplemented with data from 
Compustat and Execucomp. 
DV: earnings repatriated scaled by 
assets; 
IVs: high costs of repatriation (dummy), 
tax haven company (dummy), leverage, 
Tobin’s q, cash / assets, profitability. 
AJCA did not increase domestic investment, 
employment or R&D. $1 increase in 
repatriations was associated with a $0.92 
increase in shareholder payouts. 
Dharmapala 
and Riedel 
(2013) 
Uses exogenous earnings shocks at the 
parent firm level and investigates how 
these impact on profit shifting – how 
shocks move across the low tax and 
high tax MNE subs. 
Large panel of European multinational 
affiliates over the period 1995–2005. 
18,000 observations on 4,000 firms.  
DV: log of PBT. 
IV: construct and use measure of profit 
that would have expected before profit 
shifting. 
Control: for variations in country 
characteristics. 
Parents’ positive earnings shocks are 
associated with a significantly positive increase 
in pre tax profits at low tax affiliates, relative to 
the effect on the pre tax profits of high tax 
affiliates. 2% of parents additional earnings are 
shifted to low tax subsidiaries due to the 
strategic use of debt across affiliates.  
Dischinger and 
Riedel (2011) 
Use panel data from AMADEUS on 
European MNEs and control for 
heterogeneity between affiliates. Focus 
DV: intangible assets The lower a subsidiary's corporate tax rate 
relative to other affiliates of the group the 
higher is its level of intangible asset 
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on industrial EU parent and 
subsidiaries-25 1995–2005.  
At least 3 subsidiaries to ensure 
sufficient size so that can observe 
strategic allocation intangibles. Exclude 
MNE with losses. 
IVs: statutory tax rates (home and host), 
unweighted average corporate tax rate 
relative to other subsidiaries 
Control: GDP per capita, population, R&D 
expenditures as % GDP, corruption index, 
unemployment rate 
investment. Effect is statistically and 
economically significant, even after controlling 
for size etc. Mean value of intangible assets for 
both parent and subsidiaries is increasing over 
time. 
Dyreng, Hanlon 
and Maydew 
(2008) 
2,077 firms (1995–2004). Only those 
with profits. Extent to which some firms 
are able to avoid taxes over periods as 
long as 10 years, and how predictive 
one-year tax rates are for long-run tax 
avoidance 
Develop and describe new measure of LT 
(10yr) corporate tax avoidance (Cash 
ETR). 
Find considerable cross-sectional variation in 
tax avoidance. Annual cash ETR are not good 
predictors of LT cash ETR. Low annual cash ETR 
are more persistent than are high annual cash 
ETR. Firms successful at keeping their cash ETR 
low over long periods are well spread across 
industries but with some clustering. 
Dyreng and 
Lindsey (2009) 
Use of tax havens and other locations 
on tax rates of US MNE. Use financial 
accounting data to examine average 
worldwide, federal and foreign tax rates 
on worldwide, foreign and federal pre 
tax income. Large sample US MNE incl 
those with and without tax haven subs. 
DV: Tax rate measures 
IVS: tax haven use and other locations 
Control for tax loss carryforwards, firm 
size, long term debt, advertising expense 
and R&D expense. Tax haven average 
rates over time. 
Tax haven defined as in 3 /4 source lists. 
On average firms with at least operations in at 
least one tax haven country have world wide 
tax burden on world wide income that is 1.5% 
lower than firms without. US firms with tax 
haven subs may pay a higher domestic tax rate 
as pay less in overseas foreign countries. 
Dyreng et al 
(2015) 
Look at global equity chains MNE to see 
how tax and other characteristics affect 
decisions about where to base holding 
companies. 916 US MNE and their 
subsidiaries. 
DV: whether foreign subs has foreign 
holding company. IV: withholding tax 
rate on dividends from foreign country to 
US; whether there is a bilateral tax treaty 
with US; statutory tax rate in host 
country of subs; corruption in host (data 
from Transparency International; 
investment risk in host (Political Risk 
Services data). 
Find US MNE HQ distribute finance to overseas 
subs via holding companies based in low tax 
countries. Foreign holding companies are 
disproportionately found in low tax countries 
with lower corruption and investment risk. Tax 
and non tax factors are important in locating 
holding companies. 
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Eagly, 
Johannesen-
Schmidt and   
and van Engen 
(2003) 
Meta analysis of 45 psychological 
studies. 
 Female leadership styles varied significantly 
from those of men, in particular, women 
exhibited more ‘transformational’ leadership 
then men.  
Eden and 
Kudrle (2005) 
Discussion of the OECD’s Harmful Tax 
Competition initiative. 
  
Eden, Valdez 
and Li (2005). 
Event study methodology using the 
stock market prices of American 
Depository Receipts of all Japanese 
MNEs with US subsidiaries over the 
1990s to assess the impact of the US TP 
penalty on the stock market valuation 
of Japanese MNEs with US subsidiaries 
in the 1990s. 
 Find that the penalty caused a drop in their 
cumulative market value of $56.1 billion, 
representing 12.6% of their 1997 market value 
Egger, Eggert, 
Keuschnigg and 
Winner (2010), 
How financial decisions affected by tax. 
Considers debt to asset ratio for 
domestic and foreign owned plants and 
the extent to which difference is 
systematically related to corporate 
taxation. Data from 32,000 European 
MNE. 
DV: debt ratio 
IV: statutory tax rate, loss carryforwards 
to correct statutory rate.  
Controls: Foreign MNE ownership, firm 
age, plants per region and industry, 
employees, regional worker 
compensation, cost intermediate goods, 
total assets. 
Find that foreign-owned firms have higher debt 
ratio than domestically owned counterparts in 
the host country. Difference increases with the 
host country’s statutory corporate tax rate.  
 
Foley, Hartzell, 
Titman and 
Twite 2007 
Consider whether the tax costs of 
repatriation lead firms to hold cash. 
Sample from Compustat 1982-2004 
DV: cash /assets ratio 
IV: book value / equity, R&D spend / total 
assets, SD of operating income, log 
assets, dividend payout (dummy), capex / 
total assets, market leverage. 
Firms with higher costs of repatriation hold 
more cash. Higher foreign cash holdings are not 
completely offset by lower domestic cash 
holdings. Technology intensive firms more 
sensitive. 
Francis, Hasan, 
Park and Wu 
2014 
Focus on firms with male to female CFO 
change. 
TA- tax sheltering, UTB discretionary 
book-tax differences. 
Female CFOs associated with lower levels tax 
aggressiveness. 
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Compare pre / post male – female CFO 
transition. 
Fuest, Spengel, 
Finke, 
Heckemeyer 
and Nusser 
(2013) 
Background paper that discusses profit 
shifting and potential policy options. 
  
Gordon and 
Lee (2001) 
Time series data; US corporate income 
tax returns (1954-1995) and balance 
sheet data on all corporations, to 
estimate the effects of changes in 
corporate tax rates on the debt policies 
of firms of different sizes.. 
DV: debt ratio (total, LT and ST debt) 
IVs: statutory and ETR 
Controls: real assets per return, net 
assets, land/assets, cash/assets, accounts 
receivable / assets, intangible assets / 
assets. 
Taxes have had a strong and statistically 
significant effect on debt levels. If the 
corporate tax rate is cut by 10%, holding 
personal tax rates fixed, this will reduce the 
fraction of assets financed with debt by around 
3.5%. 
Graham, 
Hanlon and 
Shevlin (2011) 
Analyze survey responses from nearly 
600 tax executives about corporate 
decisions on real investment location 
and profit repatriation.  
DVs: Deferral GAAP expense, deferral 
cash expense. 
IVs: public sector, assets, foreign source 
earnings, foreign asset %, GAAP ETR, 
R&D spend. 
Avoiding financial accounting income tax 
expense (GAAP) is as important as avoiding 
cash income taxes when MNEs decide on 
location and repatriation. 
Gravelle (2009) Article reporting on use of tax havens 
and their definition. Estimates amount 
of tax revenue lost to US government 
from use of havens. 
Literature review summarising previously 
published research and concluding on 
potential policy options. 
Corporate profit shifting may cost the US 
government up to $60 billion in revenue and 
remedies are likely to involve tax law changes.  
Grubert (1998) Analyses the way that firms divide 
foreign affiliate operating income 
among royalties, dividends, interest, 
and retained earnings. Uses tax return 
data for US MNE and CFCs. 
 
DVs: R&D, advertising, tax price on 
dividends, witholding tax on royalties, 
withholding tax on interest, statutory tax 
rate 
IVs: earnings and profits, royalties and 
interest, dividends to US, all dividends, 
royalties, interest, retained earnings. 
Taxes have large effect on the composition of 
payments; interest, royalties and dividends are 
a significant deterrent to the respective 
payments. Royalties and interest payments are 
highly substitutable. Dividend taxes are not 
significant in increasing retained earnings, so 
companies find other means to repatriate 
earnings. 
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Grubert 
(2003a) 
How tax planning and use of IP and 
debt affect ETR. To which subsidiary 
profits should be allocated when made 
across countries.  
Calculates overall ETR on US 
manufacturing abroad and decomposes. 
Then uses data from company reports to 
Treasury to calculate ETR at subsidiary 
level to see which pay above / below 
average in different locations. 
Taxation of royalties, use of tax havens, and 
allocation of interest expenses impact ETR. 
Host countries favour mobile investment and 
those offering employment to locals. Exporters 
are treated favourably but importers are 
penalized. Subsidiaries of R&D intensive 
companies pay higher ETR  - host country 
governments extract rents. 
Grubert 
(2003b) 
Investigates links between intangible 
income, income shifting, intra company 
transactions and location choice. 
DV: ratio of CFC pre tax earnings / CFC 
sales 
IVs: CFC age, Parent R&D/sales, parent 
advertising / sales, parent domestic 
profit / sales, local statutory tax rate, log 
of parent sales, CFC assets / sales, GDP 
per capita, CFC debt / asset ratio. 
Half of profit shifting comes from R&D based 
intangible assets. R&D intensive subsidiaries 
have more intra company transactions so 
greater opportunity re TP. Subsidiaries in very 
high / low tax jurisdiction have stronger 
motivation to profit shift. Difference in profits 
between high and low tax subs are accounted 
for by IP and debt.  
Grubert and 
Mutti (1991) 
1982 data on a cross section of 33 
countries. Manufacturing companies. 
Considers relationship between profit 
margins and tax rates. Consider host 
country tax rates and tariffs on stock of 
real capital 
After tax profit as % net sales, after tax 
RoR on equity. Uses both statutory tax 
and average ETR as DV.  
Second part of research uses net plant 
and equipment to measure capital 
investment. 
Taxes contribute significantly to the 
distribution of MNE real capital locations. 
There is a disproportionate shifting of income 
into very low tax countries. 
Grubert and 
Mutti (2000) 
Data from tax returns from 1992 of 
more than 500 US manufacturing MNEs 
to identify the role of host country tax 
rates in determining the amount of 
capital invested in 60 potential 
locations. Carries out a cross-sectional 
analysis of the relationship between 
real capital stock and local tax rates. 
Includes only CFCs with positive 
income. 
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Grubert and 
Mutti (2007) 
Uses US Treasury tax return data from 
US CFCs. Compares earnings from 
royalties etc in 1996 and 2002 after 
introduction of check the box. Also uses 
BEA data on affiliate operations and 
royalty payments. 
Some regression analysis but largely 
discussion of trends in data on royalties, 
CFC income and IP. 
Hybrid firms have enabled greater migration of 
IP assets out of the US. Firms have incentive to 
leave returns to R&D abroad. Parent R&D was a 
more important determinant of royalty 
payments to US parents than affiliate earnings 
and profits in 1996, but played a larger role in 
earnings and profits than royalties by 2002. 
Gupta and 
Newberry 
(1997) 
Micro level longitudinal data 
considering impact of 1986 Tax Reform 
Act. 
DV: ETR 
IVs: capital structure (gearing), asset mix, 
industry, performance (ROA) 
Control: profitability 
ETRs are not related to firm size. ETR is 
associated with capital structure, asset mix,  
and performance.  
Hanlon and 
Heitzman 
(2010) 
Literature review covering: (1) Financial 
accounting for income tax expense, (2) 
corporate tax avoidance, (3) corporate 
decision-making (4) taxes and asset 
pricing.  
  
Harrington and 
Smith (2012) 
Use accounting and stock market data 
from Compustat and US corporate bond 
yields from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis FRED database. Excludes utility 
firms from sample. Period 1994 to 
2008. 
DV: Leverage -defined as total long-term 
debt divided by total assets (use book 
and market measures) 
IV: LR Cash ETR to measure tax 
avoidance. 
Controls: profit, firm size, market-to-
book assets ratio, asset tangibility, 
industry median leverage, and expected 
inflation  
Regression results indicate that general tax 
avoidance has a positive influence on leverage. 
Firms that focus on general tax avoidance use 
relatively more debt in their capital structures.  
Hillman et al 
2002 
Fortune 100 companies. Tracked 
sample of 100 male, 100 female, and 
100 African American directors from 
1993 to 1997. Education – doctoral 
degrees. 
 
 Most racial minority and female directors come 
from non business backgrounds. More hold 
doctorates than the white males (56.25% 
African American women; 52.81% white 
women; 19.19% white men) 
	 369	
Reference Research Design / Sample Measures Key Variables Key Findings / Results 
Hines and Rice 
1994 
Considers ability of MNEs to shift real 
activity and profits between tax 
jurisdictions. Identify 41 countries as tax 
havens, the split between ‘dot’ havens 
and larger. 
 
DV – pre tax non financial income. 
IV – tax rate 
Control for capital and labour inputs. 
Control for productivity (log GDP per 
capita) 
Tax haven subsidiaries account for more than 
20% of US FDI and a third of profits. Revenue 
maximizing tax rate for tax haven is 5-8%.  Find 
tax rate has significant negative impact on 
income. 1 % higher tax rate results in 3% lower 
reported profits. 
Hoi et al 2013 Accounting data from Compustat. CSR 
data from KLD database. Exclude 
utilities and finance companies. 2003-
2009. Coverage 2620 companies. 
DVs: Discretionary book – tax 
differences, permanent book tax 
differences. 1 yr cash ETR. Tax sheltering 
dummy 
IVs: negative social rating (KLD database), 
Controls: ROA, gearing, R&D spend, size, 
industry 
Firms with excessive irresponsible CSR activities 
have a higher likelihood of engaging in tax-
sheltering activities and greater 
discretionary/permanent book-tax differences  
Huang and 
Kisgen 2013 
Look at financial decisions made by 
male and female executives in field of 
corporate finance. Data from 
ExecuComp database supplemented 
with hand picked data from annual 
reports. Large firms 1993-2005, gives 
12,348 firm years. 
Compare activity before and after 
transitions from a male to a female 
executive (after been in power 3 years) 
with a control sample of male-to-male 
transition firms.  
Find male executives undertake more 
acquisitions and issue debt more often than 
women. Acquisitions made by women post 2% 
greater returns. Women are more likely to 
exercise stock options early. Conclude women 
less ‘over confident’ than men.  
Huizinga and 
Laeven (2008) 
Firm-level information on the parent 
companies and subsidiaries of European 
multinationals (Amadeus) and 
information about the international tax 
system, to test the model. 
DV – log of earnings before interest and 
tax, log of earnings before tax but after 
interest. 
IVs – capital (measured by log of assets, 
employment (log of labour 
compensation, log of number of 
employees), financial leverage 
(debt/total assets) 
Reported pre tax profits in Europe reflect the 
tax rates: a semi-elasticity of reported profits 
with respect to the top statutory tax rate of 
1.3, while shifting costs are estimated to be 
0.6% of the tax base. European nations appear 
to gain revenue from profit shifting by MNEs, at 
the expense of Germany. 
Huizinga, 
Laeven and 
Data from Amadeus on European 
multinationals and their subsidiaries, 
combined with newly collected data on 
DV: leverage 
IV: effective marginal tax rate, tax 
incentive to shift debt 
Level of debt in a country depends on weighted 
average of national tax rates and differences 
between national and foreign tax rates. Foreign 
	 370	
Reference Research Design / Sample Measures Key Variables Key Findings / Results 
Nicodeme 
(2008) 
the international tax treatment of 
dividend and interest streams. 10 years 
1994-2003. 
Controls: tangibility, log of sales, 
profitability, creditor rights, political risk, 
inflation, growth opportunities. 
subsidiary’s capital structure reflects local 
corporate tax rates as well as tax rate 
differences with the parent and other foreign 
subsidiaries. 
Huesynov and 
Klamm 2012 
Sample of firms that use auditor- 
provided tax services.  Uses S&P 500 
firms (between 25 and 425 per year). 
Compustat for financial data and 3 
(from 7) measures of CSR performance 
from the KLD database.  
DV: GAAP and Cash ETRs (3yr averages),  
IVs: (1) corporate governance; (2) 
community; and (3) diversity. Tax fees 
paid to auditors scaled by PBT 
 
Interaction of community concerns with tax 
management fees positively affects both GAAP 
and Cash ETR. Interaction of corporate 
governance strengths and diversity concerns 
with tax management fees negatively affects 
Cash ETR.  Those that pay higher tax 
consultancy fees have lower ETR.  
Klassen and 
LaPlante (2012) 
Compare two time periods: 2005-2009 
and 1998-2002. Construct proxy to 
measure profit shifting over multi 
period time frame. Use accounting 
data. Sample US firms 1998-2009 with 5 
years data and positive income. Sample 
of 380 companies with low average tax 
rates. 
DV: average foreign tax rate, variable 
whether foreign rate higher than US rate, 
unexpected foreign income (after 
allowing for incentives to shift) 
Regress total foreign profits on average 
profitability with residual capturing 
unexpected foreign income. If 
unexpected income correlated with tax 
incentives assume profit shifting. 
Controls:  industry, year, regulatory cost. 
Sample companies shifted an extra $10bn 
income out of the US between 2005-2009 
compared to 1998-2002. 
Analyses with single year measures are not 
effective 
Konrad, 
Kramer and 
Erkut 2008).   
Qualitative: Interviews with 50 board 
directors, 12 CEOs and 7 company 
secretaries. 
 A single woman on a board of directors may 
have little influence but more (3) will have 
more impact as critical mass is achieved.  
Kopits 1972 Concerned with explaining the 
behaviour of dividend remittance. 
Builds theoretical model. Uses US 
Treasury Dept statistics from 1969 re US 
MNE and CFCs. Includes manufacturing 
CFCs in developed countries. 
DV: dividend remittances 
IVs: earnings after foreign income tax, 
difference in foreign tax between 
retained and distributed income, foreign 
corporate tax rate, price of output, 
quantity of output, depreciation rate of 
The higher the net earnings of CFCs or lower 
the growth of their desired capital stock, the 
larger is their dividend payout to the parent 
company. Remittance of earnings is sensitive to 
variations in United States and foreign direct 
tax rates. 
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fixed assets, domestic corporate tax rate, 
foreign withholding tax on dividends. 
Kopits (1976) Background paper on the influence of 
tax on the decisions of the MNE. 
Theoretical development of model. 
  
Lall (1979) Considers the issues for governments 
and in particular developing 
governments in tracking the behaviour 
of MNEs in relation to TP. Concludes 
that inter country cooperation is 
essential. 
  
Lanis and 
Richardson 
(2011) 
Studies board composition – insider and 
outsider directors.  Small sample 32 
companies  (16 non aggressive 
companies and 16 aggressive 
companies). 5 year time period. 
DV: tax avoidance (dummy: firms 
involved in tax cases)  
IV:  outside board members; ‘grey’ 
directors who have some non board 
affiliation with the company. 
Control: size, financial health, age, CEO 
tenure. 
Increasing the number of independent 
directors on the board increases the 
effectiveness of its scrutiny of top 
management. Direct relationship between a 
larger proportion of independent (outside) 
board members and a reduction of tax 
avoidance. 
 
Lanis and 
Richardson 
(2015) 
Whether CSR performance is related to 
corporation tax avoidance. Matched 
sample US companies 217 tax 
avoidance years and 217 non tax 
avoidance firm years. 2003-09. 
DV: tax avoidance (dummy: firms 
involved in tax cases) 
IVs:  7 categories from KLD database 
Controls: board independence, 
management stock ownership, age, CEO 
tenure, CEO duality, use of Big 4 auditor. 
Statistically significant negative relationship 
between CSR performance and tax avoidance.  
CSR categories community relations and 
diversity are the most important elements of 
CSR performance in relation to reducing tax 
avoidance.  
Louie and 
Rousslang 2008 
How host country tax treaty with US 
and governance affect the required rate 
of return on FDI. Use data from US tax 
returns for 1992, 1994 and 1996.  
DV: after tax rate of return from foreign 
subsidiary 
IVs: required rate of return, host country 
GDP, host country GDP growth, GDP 
growth variance, host country statutory 
Investment in countries with poor governance 
and instability require higher rates of return. 
No evidence that a bilateral income tax treaty 
with the United States reduces the required 
rates of return to US FDI.  
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tax rate, quality of governance, whether 
has a tax treaty with US. 
Markle and 
Shackelford 
2009 
Financial statement data to estimate 
ETRs for 10,642 corporations from 85 
countries from 1988 to 2007. 
DV: ETR 
IVS: Country, foreign subs (dummy), 
industry, size (assets, revenue, equity) 
MNEs and domestic companies face similar 
ETRs. ETRs declined by 20% over the period. 
German, Japanese, Australian and Canadian 
decreases were large. American, British, and 
French declines were more modest. 
Muller and 
Kolk 2015 
Investigates relationship between CSR 
and tax avoidance, particularly whether 
international firms pay higher taxes 
than local firms in India. Sample of 82 
firms. Automotive; IT and finance; 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Used 
consultancy to gather firm level data. 
Foreign ownership from Dun and 
Bradstreet. 
DV: GAAP ETR.  
IVS: foreign ownership, CSR (inclusion in 
Dow Jones Sustainability Index). 
MNEs pay considerably higher ETR than local 
firms and MNEs that are known for ‘CSR’ pay 
more than those that don’t have the same 
reputation. 
Mutti and 
Grubert (2009) 
Considers how MNEs reach cost sharing 
agreements with tax haven subsidiaries 
and how facilitated by check the box 
regulations. Focuses on aggregate level 
data (IRS and BEA) from 1996 and 2002. 
DVs: CFC profits/sales, royalties / sales, 
cost share/ sales.  
IVs: age of firm, parent, R&D / sales, 
advertising / sales, affiliate assets / sales, 
tax havens, manufacturing. 
Find large migration of IP assets out of the US 
facilitated by hybrid entities. R&D activity has 
not been shifted. Firms more likely to pay 
royalties when they can shield from US 
taxation. Payments for royalties etc. have 
increased over time. 
Overesch and 
Schreiber 
(2009) 
Whether R&D intensive MNE have 
more opportunities to profit shift. Firm-
level data on German outbound FDI 
(1996 – 2005). Data includes 
subsidiaries in 36 countries. 
DVs: current assets of which claims on 
affiliated enterprises, total debt / capital 
ratio, internal debt / capital ratio, fixed 
assets. 
IVs: loss carryforwards (dummy), sales, 
tangibility (fixed / total assets), GDP, GDP 
per capita, lending rate.  
Tax response of intragroup transactions 
depends on the R&D intensity of MNEs. Impact 
of taxes on investments decreases with 
increasing R&D intensity. Local tax rate 
becomes less important for investment 
decisions of R&D intensive MNE. 
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Nguyen (2013) Uses finance capital structure theories 
in combination with internalization. 
Original primary dataset collected by a 
survey of 101 foreign subsidiaries of 
British MNEs in six emerging economies 
in the ASEAN region.  
Reports results from survey on funding 
sources – internal and external, using 
countries across ASEAN. 
Support for pecking order theory. Subsidiaries 
rely on internal funds from within the MNE 
with less external debts raised in the host 
countries. Foreign subsidiaries have capital 
structure influenced by the home country and 
the parent firm’s financing sources. These 
subsidiaries have used the financial resources 
to develop business networks with local SMEs 
which contribute to economic development of 
the host countries.  
Nguyen and 
Rugman (2015) 
Original primary dataset collected by a 
survey of 101 foreign subsidiaries of 
British MNEs in six emerging economies 
in the ASEAN region 
DVs: subsidiary financial performance, 
subsidiary non financial performance 
IVs: subsidiary internal equity financing, 
subsidiary level financial decision making 
Controls: host country institutions, 
subsidiary characteristics, parent firm 
characteristics, industrial sectors. 
Find that internal equity financing is an FSA and 
improves subsidiary performance. More than 
90% of financing sources in the British 
subsidiaries come from internal funding. 
Subsidiary-level financial management 
decision-making has a statistically significant 
positive impact on subsidiary performance.  
Pak (2007) Constructs a ‘price filter matrix’, using 
information on US trade to identify 
transactions with excessively high or 
low prices. The construction of the 
matrix means that it will always show 
that there is some mispricing as by 
definition there are always goods at the 
higher and lower extremes of pricing. 
The price filter assumes that goods 
traded at significantly above or below the 
average for their category are evidence 
of transfer pricing manipulation. 
He concludes that imports into the US were 
underpriced by 12.1% and that US exports 
were overpriced by 5.5%. 
Porcano (1986) 1300 companies taken from Value Line 
Database II. 
ETR – calculate for different groups of 
companies 
Finds that corporate taxation is regressive 
rather than proportional as designed to be. 
Post, Rahman 
and Robow 
2011 
Considers relationship between board 
composition and environmental CSR 
(ECSR). 78 Fortune 1000 companies – 
mix electronics and chemical industry. 
DV: Environmental CSR (2 proxy 
measures)  
IVs: directors age, gender, education.  
 
Higher proportion of outside directors results 
in more emphasis on ECSR. More than 3 female 
directors is associated with stronger KLD scores 
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but not the measure from company 
disclosures. 
Rugman (1985) Theoretical paper applying 
internalization theory to the Canadian 
petroleum industry and criticizes a 
paper on TP. 
  
Shackelford et 
al (2011) 
Theoretical paper presenting a formal 
model of the idea that some investment 
decisions may be more attractive 
because they provide managers with 
discretion over the timing of taxable 
income and/or book income 
  
Shevlin and 
Porter (1992) 
Considers impact of 1986 Tax Reform 
Act up to 1989. Use Compustat data 
plus other. 
Consider ETRs by groups of companies – 
large and small and pre and post 1986 
changes. 
Find that tax base was broadened and ETRs 
increased post 1986. 
Singh et al 
(2008) 
Considers ‘human capital’ of new board 
appointees in UK FTSE 100 companies. 
Uses Hillman (2000) taxonomy to classify 
experience:  Insiders, Business Experts, 
Business Support Specialists and 
Community Influentials. 
Newly appointed women more likely than men 
to have an MBA. Male appointees more likely 
to have CEO / COO experience. Women more 
likely to have smaller company board 
experience. 
Torgler and 
Valev 2010 
Consider whether attitudes to 
corruption and tax evasion differ 
systematically between men and 
women. 
Eight western European countries from 
World Values Survey and European 
Values Survey. 1981-1999. 
Women have significantly greater aversion to 
corruption  - holds across time and countries.  
Vaitsos (1974) Examines contracts between wholly 
owned foreign subsidiaries and 
unaffiliated licensors and those 
between foreign subsidiaries and 
parents to look at TP. Includes 5 Andean 
countries. Finds evidence of TP 
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particularly in pharmaceutical sector in 
Colombia. 
Wang and 
Coffey (1992) 
78 Fortune 500 firms from 1984.  
 
DV: charitable contributions, (% of pretax 
earnings given to charities).  
IVs: ratio of insiders/outsiders, insider 
ownership, concentration ratio, and the 
proportion of women and minority 
directors 
Ratio of insiders to outsiders, the proportion of 
women and minority directors are positively 
related to corporate giving.  
Williams (2003) Continuous Fortune 500 firms 1991-94 
(sample 185 firms). 
DV: firm charitable giving (5 measures) 
IV: percentage of women on board 
Control: ROE, reputation (dummy) 
Higher proportion of women on the board 
results in more philanthropy – charitable giving 
and community service and the arts. 
Zimmerman 
(1985) 
Examines association between firm size 
and ETR.  Uses firm level data from 
Compustat from 1946-1981. 
Time series analysis The fifty largest US listed firms, have higher 
worldwide ETR than other firms due to the 
political cost of size. Time series analysis shows 
‘large’ MNEs have higher ETRs in 20/35 years.  
Zucman (2014) Uses national balance sheet data to 
estimate amount held in tax havens. 
Overall more financial securities are 
recorded as liabilities than assets. 
Estimates overall tax loss to 
governments. Computes ETR at US 
national level.  
BOP statistics to show where income is 
held (not generated). 
BEA data – estimate taxes paid by US 
firms on the profits recorded in tax 
havens. 
US national ETR – divides all corporate 
taxes paid by US firms by US profits. 
From 1998 – 2013 US ETR fell from 30% to 20% 
- 2/3 this change can be attributed to tax 
avoidance. 
Concludes that 2008-2013 the amount of 
money in tax havens increased by 25%. Hidden 
wealth accounts for $7.6trillion. 
Source:	author’s	compiling	
